Poetic language may be able to evoke them, and that's about the best you're gonna get. — Janus

Philosophy has always grappled with the 'meaning of Being', explicitly or otherwise.

Let physics do physics. Let phenomenology do phenomenology. Lets not conflate them. — Apustimelogist

You're not thinking philosophically, but like an engineer.

I will be offline for a while. Thanks for the feedback.

Philosophy has always grappled with the 'meaning of Being', explicitly or otherwise. — Wayfarer

I'd say it's more the case that it has grappled with the meaninglessness of being. Only certain philosophers have bothered to try to deal with, as Aristotle says "being as being". Heidegger comes to mind, but he anthropomorphizes being as "Dasein". I don't deny it's one way of looking at it, and perhaps not without some interest, but there is no one "correct" way to think about being. There are only ways that make sense in various contexts, and ways that make no sense at all.

You're not thinking philosophically, but like an engineer. — Wayfarer

And in saying that you're pontificating like a fool.

Philosophy has always grappled with the 'meaning of Being', explicitly or otherwise.
— Wayfarer

I'd say it's more the case that it has grappled with the meaninglessness of being

You're not thinking philosophically, but like an engineer.
— Wayfarer

And in saying that you're pontificating like a fool. — Janus

:lol: :up:

The ‘subject’ at issue is not you viewed objectively; it is the subject or observer for whom anything can appear as ‘a world’ at all. — Wayfarer

Of course the subject is me! It's a different perspective - but a different perspective of the same me. It's like working in building: you know the building from the perspective of an occupant - where the toilets are, the carpet colors, knowledge of other occupants, etc. Someone who never worked in this building will not have this insider perspective, but you would be able to understand his perspective - one based on external appearances. These 2 perspectives have no ontological significance - what's different is the background knowledge and context.

By re-describing the ‘I’ entirely from the third-person standpoint, you’ve already shifted back into the objective stance and thereby bracketed out the very role of subjectivity that is in question.

Acknowledging my subjectivity does not undercut my beliefs about things that exist. If one believes X exists, then one believes this to be objective fact. Pointing to the phenomenology doesn't undercut anyone's beliefs about what exists. It only raises the possibility of having false beliefs about reality, and possibility alone is of no epistemic value - beyond the modal truth.

I have the capacity to consider myself from a 3rd person perspective, but that's all it is: a perspective. It's an exercise in considering the world at large, and my place in it. It has no ontological significance - except to the degree that having this cognitive capacity needs to be accounted for ontologically.

In terms of my building analogy, I'm the sole occupant of me. I have internal knowledge of me that is unavailable to anyone else. But I can still consider myself from an outsider's perspective. It doesn't imply an ontological distinction, just a difference of background knowledge and context.

Nearly everyone on earth does this implicitly!
— Relativist

Right! Which is why it's so hard to argue against. — Wayfarer

What I'm looking for is your own epistemic justification to believe what you do. You previously shared the common view - it was a belief you held. Somehow, your old beliefs were supplanted. You make much of the phenomenology; if that were the sole basis, it would be irrational - it would be dropping a belief because it's possibly false. So there must be more than that. This is what I'm asking you to explain.

it's not a 'problem to be solved'. It's not that 'nobody can describe pain satisfactorily'. It's being pointed to as an 'explanatory gap' - 'look, no matter how sophisticated your scientific model, it doesn't capture or convey the felt experience of pain, or anything other felt experience.' So there's a fundamental dimension of existence that is left out of objective accounts. — Wayfarer

I think you mean that third-person descriptions cannot convey knowledge of pain. This is Mary's room. Knowledge of pain and other qualia is a knowledge of experience. Nevertheless, it IS an explanatory gap that a complete ontology should account for. You talk around the issue in vague terms, by (I think) implying there's something primary about first-person-ness. Does that really tell us anything about ontology? It's not an explanation, it's a vague claim that you purport to be central. Obviously, 1st person experience is central to a first-person perspective. It's also the epistemic foundation for understanding the world. But it seems an unjustified leap to suggest it is an ontological foundation - as you seem to be doing.

But...there's no reason to think this is the case- there's no evidence of it, and it's not entailed by accepted theory.
But there’s no reason to assume that it isn’t the case either. It’s a possibility, so having an understanding of what we don’t know helps us to not make assumptions, or broad brush conclusions about the world and existence. — Punshhh

You're right. My issue is how one uses possibilities in further reasoning. Conpiracy theories begin with a possibility. It's possible some vaccine increases the liklihood of autism. It would be irrational to reject vaccines solely on the basis of this possibility. It would be rational to examine data to look for correlations.

My issue is how one uses possibilities in further reasoning.

What I’m getting at here is that by examining feasible possibilities, one can see the orthodox explanations in a different light. This helps to develop a broader context and develop ways of thinking outside of the orthodox paradigm. Add into the mix the extent of what we don’t know, then one can in a sense break free of the orthodox. This is how mysticism makes use of philosophy.

An example, when contemplating being I sometimes imagine all beings are one being, manifest as many separate beings extended through time and space. So in a sense, all beings have a part of themselves which is that one being simultaneously, while living as many separate beings. This can become an axiom in a sense from which implications can be drawn about how this might offer a different view about what beings are and how they interact in the world. If I watch a murmeration of birds. Here in the U.K. you can watch vast flocks of starlings flying in formation. Displaying complex patterns which have through evolution developed the ability to confuse peregrine falcons. The flock is acting as one being in that moment. Are these birds watching each other to know how to fly in formation? Are they using some kind of telepathy? Are they literally being one being? Well in my example, they are one being, they are not watching each other, or using telepathy, but that part of themselves which is that one being. And through doing it in this way, they become extra responsive and gain an edge on the peregrine.

I think this is a serious oversimplification. Aristotle does not abandon Forms; his hylomorphism is still a form–based ontology—the difference is that Forms are no longer conceived as existing in a separate, self-subsisting realm, but as ontologically prior principles instantiated in matter. Matter, for Aristotle, has no actuality or determinate identity on its own; it exists only as pure potentiality until it receives form. — Wayfarer

Yes, Realism vs Idealism is a dualistic simplification of a multi-faceted complex concept that contains various aspects of both outlooks : what I facetiously call Redealism : the top-down view of a material world populated with imperfect people who create little perfect worlds in their own minds.

Whether that duality is an "over-simplification" depends on personal preference : perfect models vs messy actuality. Deep thinkers have been arguing over absolute truth (philosophy) vs practical usefulness (science) for at least 2500 years.

In the context of this thread, my preference is to over-simplify the philosophical battleground between Plato and Aristotle as a focus on either Transcendence or Immanence. And then, to put each notion into its proper context --- whatever that may be. Both views may be ultimately proven valid or invalid depending on its application : universal or local.

Therefore, my wishy-washy BothAnd*1 position varies, depending on the context of the moment. In this thread, I stand mutably in the moot mushy moderate middle-ground of maybe; where I get shot-at from both sides, by those standing on the firm ground of certainty. :smile:



*1. The BothAnd Philosophy :
Philosophy is the study of ideas & beliefs. Not which are right or wrong – that is the province of Religion and Politics – but which are closer to relevant wisdom. That unreachable goal can only be approximated by Reason & Consensus, which is the method of applied Science and Philosophical dialog. In addition to ivory tower theories, practical Philosophy attempts to observe the behavior of wild ideas in their natural habitat.
   The BothAnd philosophy is primarily Metaphysical, in that it is concerned with Ontology, Epistemology, & Cosmology. Those categories include abstract & general concepts, such as : G*D, existence, causation, Logic, Mathematics, & Forms. Unlike pragmatic scientific "facts" about the physical world, idealistic Metaphysics is a battle-ground of opinions & emotions.
   The BothAnd principle is one of Balance, Symmetry and Proportion. It eschews the absolutist positions of Idealism vs Realism, in favor of the relative compromises of Pragmatism. It espouses the Practical Wisdom of the Greek philosophers, instead of the "Perfect" divine revelations of the Hebrew Priests. The BA principle of practical wisdom requires “skin in the game”* to provide real-world feedback, which counter-balances the extremes of Idealism & Realism. That feedback establishes limits to freedom and boundaries to risk-taking. BA is a principle of Character & Virtue, viewed as Phronesis** or Pragmatism, instead of Piety or Perfectionism.
   The BA philosophy is intended to be based on empirical evidence where possible, but to incorporate reasonable speculation were necessary. As my personal philosophy, the basic principle is fleshed-out in the worldview of Enformationism, which transcends the Real world only insofar as  to establish the universal Ground of Being, and the active principle in Evolution.


* ref : Skin In The Game, by Nassim Nicholas Taleb;  researcher in philosophical, mathematical, and (mostly) practical problems with probability.
** Phronesis : an Ancient Greek word for a type of wisdom or intelligence. It is more specifically a type of wisdom relevant to practical action, implying both good judgement and excellence of character and habits, or practical virtue.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

This is Mary's room. Knowledge of pain and other qualia is a knowledge of experience. Nevertheless, it IS an explanatory gap that a complete ontology should account for. You talk around the issue in vague terms, by (I think) implying there's something primary about first-person-ness. Does that really tell us anything about ontology? It's not an explanation, it's a vague claim that you purport to be central. — Relativist

THe fact that you can't see something which I and many others believe to be obvious, and instead describe it as 'vague', is only an indication of your inability to see the issue. I'm done trying to explain it to you.

Obviously, 1st person experience is central to a first-person perspective. It's also the epistemic foundation for understanding the world. But it seems an unjustified leap to suggest it is an ontological foundation - as you [@Wayfarer] seem to be doing. — Relativist

:100:

I surmise that you have no rational justification for your claims, and you have rationalized your position by blaming me for failing to grasp what you're saying. This is because even if there's something I'm not understanding, you could respond to this:

What I'm looking for is your own epistemic justification to believe what you do. You previously shared the common view - it was a belief you held. Somehow, your old beliefs were supplanted. You make much of the phenomenology; if that were the sole basis, it would be irrational - it would be dropping a belief because it's possibly false. So there must be more than that. This is what I'm asking you to explain. — Relativist

I surmise that you have no rational justification for your claims, and you have rationalized your position by blaming me for failing to grasp what you're saying. — Relativist

This seems to me to aptly describe @Wayfarer's m.o. (and that of some other TPF members of the woo-of-the-gaps gang).

What I'm looking for is your own epistemic justification to believe what you do. You previously shared the common view - it was a belief you held — Relativist

I've laid it out in the OP, The MInd Created World. It makes a rational case for a scientifically-informed cognitive idealism. We had a long discussion in that thread. We'll always be at odds. Simple as that.

I think they get carried away, following a path of philosophical analysis based on a hypothetical possibility, without ever considering whether or not it leads to a justifiable belief. Metaphysics is not exempt from epistemology. If justifiable belief is not their objective, they should say so.

The core problem is this: physicalism treats “the physical” as the fundamental ontological primitive, yet physics itself does not—and cannot—define what 'the physical' ultimately is. The content of physics is a sequence of evolving mathematical formalisms, not an account of what being physical means in itself. (The fact that you say that the definition entailed by physics is not relevant to your claims only serves to underline, not defuse, this point.)

So when you insist that everything is “physical,” you are making a metaphysical assertion, not a scientific one—while simultaneously denying the legitimacy of metaphysics. That is the equivocation.

My point is precisely that you cannot justify treating “the physical” as the basic category of being when you cannot even say what it is, except by contrast with “the mental.” That inability is not a flaw in my argument—it is the unresolved foundation of your position.

The position I defend is that the mathematical models used to analyse the physical domain are themselves intellectual structures, consisting of meanings, identities, and necessities that can only be grasped by rational understanding. No equation, proof, or law functions as physics in virtue of its physical inscription, but only in virtue of its intelligible content. Physics is grounded in such irreducible acts of understanding.

More fundamentally still, cognition—even in non-human animals—is not built up from meaningless physical atoms, but is organized through meaningful gestalts: structured wholes that are apprehended within a lived context of significance. Charles Pinter's 'Mind and the Cosmic Order' shows that this can be said even of insects. Meaning is therefore not something added to or emerging from a self-contained physical process; it is the form in which all cognition exists.

If that is so, then neither rationality nor meaning can coherently be treated as derivative products of a domain that is itself defined only in abstraction from them.

That is the basic argument presented in the Mind Created World, which I don't believe you have countered.

If you have anything other than ad homs, sarcasm and emojis, this would be a good time to provide it.

I can see perfectly clearly the background to this interminable debate - the aftermath of Cartesian dualism, the division of the universe into mental stuff and material stuff, the incoherence of the idea of mental stuff, the subsequent attempt to define everything in terms of matter and energy.

physicalism treats “the physical” as the fundamental ontological primitive — Wayfarer

I don't see any examples on this thread of anyone using physicalism as an ontological category. Your stipulation (as usual) is a red herring, Wayf. Speaking for myself, I know of no other standard as reliable as "the physical" either for truth-makers of non-formal truth-claims or for constraints on non-formal speculations. Btw, my "fundamental ontological primitive" – necessarily presupposed by every discursive practice (i.e. embodied cognition) – is anti-supernatural / non-spiritual / not-transcendent (i.e. the natural (e.g. vacuum fluctuations)).

Physics is grounded in such irreducible acts of understanding.

Nonsense. "Physics is grounded" in useful correlations with natural regularities or processes. For example, Newton didn't even know what gravity was and only that a mathematical constant happened to work in his model of celestial mechanics. The following are some of the fundamentals of modern physics which even physicists do not (yet?) understand: quantum gravity, the nature of space time mass energy, matter-antimatter asymmetry, the beginning and end of cosmogenesis, etc.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_physics

So when you insist that everything is “physical,” you are making a metaphysical assertion, not a scientific one ...

Well, since no one has made such a "metaphysical assertion", Wayf, your statement is, at best, just another non sequitur.

More fundamentally still, cognition...

More nonsense. Demonstrate how "cognition" is "more fundamental" than whatever is (i.e. nature) that embodies "acts of understanding". A 'Machine in the Ghost'? (pace Bishop Berkeley)

I don't see any examples on this thread of anyone using physicalism as an ontological category. — 180 Proof

Relativist has made this claim repeatedly in numerous discussions over the past year. We've extensively discussed D M Armstrong's 'Materialist Theory of Mind', as recently as a few pages back. Armstrong's is the textbook example of physicalism as an ontology.

Physics is grounded in such irreducible acts of understanding ~ Wayfarer


Nonsense. "Physics is grounded" in useful correlations with natural regularities or processes. — 180 Proof

They are correlations between observations and mathematical calculations. Which, incidentally, have yielded insights into physical principles far beyond the scope of un-aided observation, purely on the basis of Wigner's 'unreasonable efficacy of mathematics in the natural sciences.' Dirac's prediction of anti-matter is a boilerplate example. Such calculations are purely intellectual in nature, then correlated against observations, so far as they can be (and as you note with many gaps.)

So when you insist that everything is “physical,” you are making a metaphysical assertion, not a scientific one ...

Well, since no one has made such a "metaphysical assertion", Wayf, your statement is, at best, just another non sequitur. — 180 Proof

Your 'fundamental ontological primitive', defined in negative terms, is of course a metaphysical assertion.

You constantly use the description 'non sequiter' to describe things you can't understand or don't agree with. Nothing I've said here or elsewhere in this thread is a non sequiter.

I had read that Op, and the longer article you linked to. I had it in mind thoughout my comments in this thread.

You article simply laid out a point of view. However, there was no argument showing why you would believe this, vs a more standard ontology.

Examples:

- Mind foundational to the nature of existence
You could have justifiably said that mind provides the foundation for an understanding of existence, but as written, it was an unsupported ontological claim.

To think about the existence of a particular thing in polar terms — that it either exists or does not exist — is a simplistic view of what existence entails. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it."
These are unsupported assertions about the nature of existence. You accept that the universe existed billions of years ago, despite it not having actually been perceived (so...does inferred count?). Is it false to assert that unicorns do not exist?

You discuss the role of our human perspective in developing our understanding of reality, but you fail to consider the fact that we nevertheless make some true statements about reality from this perspective. As you note (and I agree) perspective is essential to understanding. But having a perspective doesn't entail falsehood. If you accept science, then you have to accept that our human perspectives managed to discern some truths about reality - truths expressed in our terms- but nonetheless true. (I discussed the role of perspective in the post that led to your dropping out. Considering the importance you place on perspective, it's something you need to be able to address).

The core problem is this: physicalism treats “the physical” as the fundamental ontological primitive, yet physics itself does not—and cannot—define what 'the physical' ultimately is. — Wayfarer

The core problem in our discussion, in this thread, is your false dichotomy: physicalism or your view. In case you haven't noticed, I have not been discussing or defending physicalism here. I've been pointing to general problems that I see with your claims. My criticisms are not contingent upon physicalism being true. On the other hand, your only justification seems to be that physicalism is false, therefore your view must be true.

You accept that the universe existed billions of years ago, despite it not having actually been perceived (so...does inferred count?) — Relativist

I note this objection at the outset. 'Science has shown that h. sapiens only evolved in the last hundred thousand years or so, and we know Planet Earth is billions of years older than that! So how can you say that the mind ‘‘creates the world”’? I also say that 'there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis. Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object.'

Do you see the point?

These are unsupported assertions about the nature of existence. — Relativist

It is supported by the above. The argument is that 'existence' is a compound or complex idea, not a binary 'yes/no': it's not always the case that things either exist or don't exist, there are kinds and degrees of existence. The key point is that our grasp of the existence of objects, even supposedly those that are real independently of the mind, is contingent upon our cognitive abilities. Physicalism declares that some ostensibly 'mind-independent' object or state-of-affairs is real irrespective of the presence of absence of any mind - that is what is being disputed (on generally Kantian grounds).

On the other hand, your only justification seems to be that physicalism is false, therefore your view must be true. — Relativist

Physicalism is highly influential in modern culture. Much of modern English-speaking philosophy is based on a presumptive physicalism, and it's important to understand how this came about. So the argument I'm putting is not peculiar to me but to many other critics of physicalism.

having a perspective doesn't entail falsehood. If you accept science, then you have to accept that our human perspectives managed to discern some truths about reality - truths expressed in our terms- but nonetheless true. (I discussed the role of perspective in the post that led to your dropping out. Considering the importance you place on perspective, it's something you need to be able to address). — Relativist

I don't say that having a perspective entails falsehood. Nor do I dispute scientific facts.'I am not disputing the scientific account, but attempting to reveal an underlying assumption that gives rise to a distorted view of what this means. What I’m calling attention to is the tendency to take for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. But nor am I advocating relativism or subjectivism - that only what is 'true for you' is real. Only that the subjective pole or aspect of reality is negated or denied by physicalism, which accords primacy to the objective domain, neglecting the foundational role of the mind in its disclosure.

Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis. — Wayfarer

This is an unjustified statement: you have provided no basis to claim reality has a mental aspect. I infer from other statements that you really mean "our mental image of reality has an inextricably mental aspect" - but this makes it trivial: a mental image is inextricably mental.

This part is fine:

Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object.' — Wayfarer

But it doesn't imply that we don't have true beliefs about the world. (Where true=corresponds to objective reality). Nor does it imply that the gestalts we identify as objects aren't a valid paradigm for developing truths about the world.

These are unsupported assertions about the nature of existence.
— Relativist

It is supported by the above. The argument is that 'existence' is a compound or complex idea, not a binary 'yes/no': it's not always the case that things either exist or don't exist, there are kinds and degrees of existence. — Wayfarer

No! It isn't support at all, because your observations only apply to our mental image of reality.

The key point is that our grasp of the existence of objects, even supposedly those that are real independently of the mind, is contingent upon our cognitive abilities. — Wayfarer

Which is reasonable, but it doesn't imply our undetstandings are false.

Physicalism declares that some ostensibly 'mind-independent' object or state-of-affairs is real irrespective of the presence of absence of any mind - that is what is being disputed (on generally Kantian grounds).

That's not physicalism! It's the common view of reality (shared by physicalists) - likely grounded in our innate view of the world. I expect you believed it too, before you entertained idealism.

It's not even clear that you deny it now- you equivocate by writing AS IF the actual world is dependent on mind - speaking about reality, then saying you don't really mean it.

On the other hand, your only justification seems to be that physicalism is false, therefore your view must be true.
— Relativist

Physicalism is highly influential in modern culture. Much of modern English-speaking philosophy is based on a presumptive physicalism, and it's important to understand how this came about. — Wayfarer

Irrelevant. Not(physicalism) does not justify your ontological claims.

I don't say that having a perspective entails falsehood. Nor do I dispute scientific facts.'I am not disputing the scientific account, but attempting to reveal an underlying assumption that gives rise to a distorted view of what this means. — Wayfarer

Distorted? That's an unjustified leap from simply noting the basis for our perspective. Distortion does imply falsehood- something non-veridical about our understanding. Either a scientific fact is true, or it not. It is a fact that the universe is billions of years old. This is not a distortion, even though this fact is phrased and understood in human terms.

This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. — Wayfarer

Strictly speaking, the "phenomenal world" is what we directly perceive. Both scientists and metaphysicians make efforts to understand aspects of reality at a deeper level. Scientists clearly have had a lot of success- they've provided a set of objective facts about the world. Of course it's in human terms, but still true. To be clear, I'm not defending scientific realism. Even an instrumentalist acknowledges that the equations reflect something about reality.

Only that the subjective pole or aspect of reality is negated or denied by physicalism, which accords primacy to the objective domain, neglecting the foundational role of the mind in its disclosure. — Wayfarer

I can't imagine why you would think physicalists necessarily have to deny the subjectivity associated with being human. But it's irrelevant, because you still have provided no justification for the ontological claims I highlighted:
-that mind is foundational to existence;
- that the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it.

This is an unjustified statement: you have provided no basis to claim reality has a mental aspect. — Relativist

But you do understand when you say this, you are assuming that the world is mind-independent - that reality is outside of us, and our mental picture is inside our minds. This, to you, is so obvious that it can't be questioned - but it is what I am calling into question.

The view I’m defending is closer to a cognitivist idealism than to any denial of science or of an external world. The claim is not that reality is “mental stuff,” but that what we know as a world — objecthood, existence, lawfulness, measurability — is intelligible only through the constructive activity of brain/mind. The mind is not a mirror of nature, as if there were mind here and world there as two independently existing domains. Mind and world are co-arising, not separable in that way. Because, how would you know what the world is, without mind?

So when you say I lack justification for speaking of a “mental aspect” of reality, that objection already presupposes the very mirror-of-nature model that is under dispute. It also implicitly assumes a standpoint outside cognition itself — as if one could survey both “mind” and “world” from some position beyond one’s actual living cognition of either.

Demonstrate how "cognition" is "more fundamental" than whatever is (i.e. nature) that embodies "acts of understanding".

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1027879

Again: Demonstrate how "cognition" is "more fundamental" than whatever is (i.e. nature) that embodies "acts of understanding". A 'Machine in the Ghost'? (pace Bishop Berkeley) — 180 Proof

That's confused. What I'm saying is that cognition is a constructive and active process. The mind is not a blank mirror which simply reflects or receives what is already there. It is continually interpreting and synthesising whatever it perceives into its internal world-model. That is enactivism and embodied cognition. So I'm saying, that process of cognition and assimilation is what is truly fundamental - not the ostensible primitives of physics. I'm arguing that the world that we perceive as separate and apart from ourselves is in that sense a mental construct (Vorstellung in Schopenhauer.) And that 'objectivism' forgets this, and imagines that it sees the world as it would be with no observer in it. That is the argument in a nutshell.

I can't imagine why you would think physicalists necessarily have to deny the subjectivity associated with being human. But it's irrelevant, because you still have provided no justification for the ontological claims I highlighted:
-that mind is foundational to existence;
- that the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it.

(I’m not speaking for Wayfarer, rather saying it how I see it.)
It’s not a claim about existence, it’s a claim about our world, the world we find ourselves in. The point being that our mind as an intrinsic aspect of our being interacts with the natural external realm (neumenon), such that what we experience is commensurate with the character of our being. Or in other words, the world meets us in a form appropriate to our nature of being. In the case of a plant, or tree, the neumenon will be meet it with an entirely different experience appropriate to its being. Something which it would be impossible for us to understand without being a tree ourselves.

As for the unperceived object refer to Kant, or quantum physics. It’s just a soup of interacting infinitesimally small particles passing energies around. It is only experienced as an object when experienced by a being on our scale (approx’ 6 feet tall as opposed to infinitesimally small), with our inherent sensory apparatus (I include the body as a whole in these apparatus)*

* I am working with the idea that all beings, are one being manifest as many beings in incarnation. So looking at the whole universe, it is as a whole, one being meeting one neumenon. But experienced by the beings as a vast extended universe of separate particles and beings.