What I mean is, why is the form it's in not the form that it can most easily process and act upon? — Patterner

As the brain receives a sensory signal, it is just a signal, presumably without any qualitative content. The brain has to do the work so that the signal can be interpreted by (the conscious subset of) itself as qualitative.

The key insight is that the sensory manifold we experience is not accidental or epiphenomenal. It is a highly efficient way of organizing information that would otherwise overwhelm the nervous system.

If the private-symbol model requires “lockstep drifting qualia” just to keep meaning afloat, then abandon the model. Meaning doesn’t live there anyway. — Banno

Wait what? Drifting qualia is your idea, not mine. I'm pointing out how implausible it would be for memories and qualia to drift in lockstep without our notice.

On the presumption that there is such a thing as "the correct subjective smell", which is the very point at issue. — Banno

You identify the smell as just another version of the chemical. This seems to imply that there is a correct subjective smell, which is absurd.

But people do experience colours. The problem is that some folk want now to talk about ineffable private experiences of colour, instead of yellow. — Banno

IYou specifically said "...an illusion of language and introspection" and "What is spoken of as "the sensation of red" is not a thing at all, so much as the illusion of a thing.". But fine, let's not talk of illusion.

It is an objective fact that we see colors. It is a subjective experience in that we cannot quantify the experience, or transfer the knowledge of it to someone else. We can't tell a blind person what sight it, much less color. We can't tell someone with complete color blindness what color is. We can't tell someone with deuteranopia or protanopia what red or green are, even though they see other colors just fine. Color is not objective.

Which is why we say we cannot know that what you experience as red is the same as what I experience as red. We both experience whatever it is we each experience consistently, so we agree on what things are red. (For the most part, anyway.) But we have no way of objectively demonstrating that we experience it the same way. I would bet we do, but we'll never know.

Drifting qualia is your idea, not mine. I — hypericin

Yep. Well, Wittgenstein's. I'm just parroting him.

Your qual change over time but you do not notice, yet the language game continues unchanged. Therefore the qual are irrelevant to the language game.

You identify the smell as just another version of the chemical. — hypericin

No, I suggested that the smell might be another description of the chemical. Not unlike the way you suggest the smell is a different symbol for the chemical.

It is a subjective experience in that we cannot quantify the experience, or transfer the knowledge of it to someone else. — Patterner

But we have colour tables that allow us to do just that at the paint shop.

we cannot know that what you experience as red is the same as what I experience as red — Patterner

...and this makes no difference. The qual - the private experiences - do not have a place at the paint shop.

Your qual change over time but you do not notice, yet the language game continues unchanged. Therefore the qual are irrelevant to the language game. — Banno

The quale can change, but memories must as well. This does not imply that qualia are irrelevant. What is required is the qualia are stable with respect to memories of them.

It is true that given a radically different cognitive architecture that does not make use of qualia, they would be irrelevant. But the fact is, we do make use of them. Given our cognitive makeup, without stable qualia (at minimum, stable relative to memory), we could never coordinate our experiences. It is on you to describe how we can agree that the aroma of coffee is in the air without them.

Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you. — Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations, Anscombe translation p. 207

It's translated in exactly the same way in the G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schultep edition. p218, §214

But the fact is, we do make use of them. — hypericin

Where do we make use of qualia - outside of philosophy fora?

Your argument seems to be: Our "cognitive makeup" is coherent; the only way it could be coherent is if there are qualia; therefore there are qualia. A transcendental argument, with all the problems thereof. The core complaint is that it is on obvious that the only way to make sense here is by using qualia.

Again, it is not at all apparent how qualia keep the game stable. As Wittgenstein showed, even if the qualia change, the game can still be played.

Where do we make use of qualia - outside of philosophy fora? — Banno

For instance, I make use of qualia when I identify the smell of coffee. If I didn't recognize that particular subjective olfactory experience as coffee, I couldn't make the identification. That there is coffee in the air is revealed to me by the quale of coffee aroma.

I believe most humans, including neuroscientists, agree with me here. Does your brain somehow work otherwise?

For instance, I make use of qualia when I identify the smell of coffee. If I didn't recognize that particular subjective olfactory experience as coffee, I couldn't make the identification. That there is coffee in the air is revealed to me by the quale of coffee aroma. — hypericin

So you "have" a qual, and you run down a table of qualia and match it to the qual you previously identified as "coffee".

I just smell coffee.

Suppose that your qual for coffee changes over time, and your table of qualia also changes to match. You still run down the table to identify the qual, yet it is a completely different qual.

What role did your qual play here?


But further, a qual is supposedly a here, now sensation. However the existence of the table implies the qual for coffee stays the same over time, that the qual you have now is the same as the one you had previously. Qualia are supposed to explain how we recognize things, but the recognition depends on stability, which qualia, as momentary sensations, cannot guarantee.

So you have a qual, and you run down a table of qualia and match it to the qual you previously identified as "coffee". — Banno

Perhaps this suffices to describe what my brain does. I'm not generally aware, unless I'm struggling to identify an odor.

I just smell coffee. — Banno

That is a statement of what you do. It explains nothing.

Suppose that your qual for coffee changes over time, and your table of qualia also changes to match. You still run down the table to identify the smell, but it is a completely different smell.

What role did your qual play here? — Banno

The qualia I experience still matches my "table", even in the implausible scenario both are drifting.

Qualia are supposed to explain how we recognize things, but the recognition depends on stability, which qualia, as momentary sensations, cannot guarantee. — Banno

While qualia themselves are momentary, the cognitive machinery which produces them must be stable enough to allow for recognition through time.


Again, please explain how you identify the aroma of coffee without qualia.

Perhaps this suffices to describe what my brain does. I'm not generally aware, unless I'm struggling to identify an odor. — hypericin

it is unlikely that there is a table of any sort in your brain. More likely that there are neural paths that activate when there is coffee in the air.

The qualia I experience still matches my "table", even in the implausible scenario both are drifting. — hypericin

Yep. But the qual plays no role. You want an explanation that goes odour→qual→table →coffee when one that goes odour→coffee will suffice.

Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a “beetle”. No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But what if these people’s word “beetle” had a use nonetheless? If so, it would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the box might even be empty. a No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. — §293

While qualia themselves are momentary, the cognitive machinery which produces them must be stable enough to allow for recognition through time. — hypericin

Yep. Same for smell, which unlike a qual has temporal continuity. That is, your qualia become smells in order to be of any use.

it is unlikely that there is a table of any sort in your brain. More likely that there are neural paths that activate when there is coffee in the air. — Banno

Certainly. "Table look up" is at best a logical description of the operation, but not faithful to the actual mechanics.

Yep. But the qual plays no role. You want an explanation that goes odour→qual→table →coffee when one that goes odour→coffee will suffice. — Banno

"Odor" is supposed to be the molecules here? Sorry, but the gap is far too great. How do you get from odor to coffee?

Yep. Same for smell, which unlike a qual has temporal continuity. That is, your qualia become smells in order to be of any use. — Banno

What is a smell if not a quale?

Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a “beetle”. No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But what if these people’s word “beetle” had a use nonetheless? If so, it would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the box might even be empty. a No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. — §293

I still don't know how the"game" functions without the "beetle". Specifically, how you are able to accurately utter "l smell coffee" without the involvement of qualia.

Sorry, but the gap is far too great. — hypericin

What gap? It's the smell of coffee.

If you want phenomenology, there is no gap between my smelling that and my smelling coffee. That's the point. What there might be is a gap between my smelling coffee and my choosing the word "coffee" for what I smell.

What is a smell if not a quale? — hypericin

...and that's the very question I asked, way, way back. If qual are just smells and colours, why bother? Why not just talk about smells and colours?

I see you added a bit.

I still don't know how the"game" functions without the "beetle" — hypericin

The Beetle Game
Materials / Setup:
Each player has a small sealed box (their “beetle box”).
Inside the box is an object known only to that player. It could be anything: a pebble, a coin, a crumpled note — the point is that no one else can see it.
There is a shared score sheet or public ledger.

Rules:
Naming:
Each player must choose a word for their private object. Let’s use “beetle.”
Whenever a player’s beetle is referenced publicly, they use the word “beetle,” but no one can look inside the box.
Public Tasks:
Players take turns making statements about their beetle: “My beetle is shiny,” “My beetle is round,” “I will pass my beetle to the next player.”
Others respond according to the rules of the game, not by inspecting the box, but based on the pattern of use of the word “beetle” in prior turns.

Scoring / Action:
If a player uses the word “beetle” consistently with prior uses (for example, always passing it when they say “pass my beetle”), they earn points.



The content of the actual object is irrelevant; the game rewards coordination in public usage, not private inspection.

The game works without anyone knowing or needing to know what a beetle actually is; all that matters is that the word is used consistently in public practices.The “private beetle” may exist or not, it may change from day to day, but the language-game continues unaffected.

Specifically, how you are able to accurately utter "l smell coffee" without the involvement of qualia. — hypericin

By uttering it when there is a smell of coffee.

we cannot know that what you experience as red is the same as what I experience as red
— Patterner
...and this makes no difference. The qual - the private experiences - do not have a place at the paint shop. — Banno

It makes no difference in the paint shop. If that is your only concern, then you're good.

So where do you think it makes a difference?

I want to understand consciousness. Science has allowed us to come to know our reality to a degree that allows us to measure both the fantastically huge and fantastically small to degrees that are as fantastic, to understand the things and forces at work father away than we can comprehend outside of mathematics, and create wonders. We can communicate all of this information to others in various ways, giving them the ability to measure, understand, and creater the same things. And all this knowledge grows every day.

And yet, keeping with the paint store for an example, we have no idea how we experience redness. We know about photons of certain wavelengths, the retina, cones, optic nerve, neurons in the brain, and more other things than I can guess. But we have no idea why all of that physical activity is accompanied by our experience of redness. No idea how to even beginning looking for the answer.

We can give someone who can see all colors but red all the information that can ever be given, and they will not know what red looks like. No description or data will help.

To me, consciousness is the most fascination topic of all, and qualia is a big part of it.

And yet, keeping with the paint store for an example, we have no idea how we experience redness. We know about photons of certain wavelengths, the retina, cones, optic nerve, neurons in the brain, and more other things than I can guess. But we have no idea why all of that physical activity is accompanied by our experience of redness. No idea how to even beginning looking for the answer. — Patterner

Sure, all that. But how do qualia help here? I think that they are a red herring...

And I think I've made a good fist of showing that they are not well understood.

What I mean is, why is the form it's in not the form that it can most easily process and act upon?
— Patterner

As the brain receives a sensory signal, it is just a signal, presumably without any qualitative content. The brain has to do the work so that the signal can be interpreted by (the conscious subset of) itself as qualitative.

The key insight is that the sensory manifold we experience is not accidental or epiphenomenal. It is a highly efficient way of organizing information that would otherwise overwhelm the nervous system. — hypericin

I guess I'm wondering about the timeline. Were the brain's ability to do the work so that the conscious subset could interpret the signals and the conscious subset always both present? Or came into being at the same time?

If not, which came first? If the ability to do the work came first, then why was it doing that? If the conscious subset came first, then what did it do before there was an interpretable signal for it?

Sure, all that. But how do qualia help here? I think that they are a red herring...

And I think I've made a good fist of showing that they are not well understood. — Banno

I think if someone was going to strip away your qualia, you would object. Probably strenuously. You are going to the paint store for some specific color, or deliberating once you get there. I'm sure there's a color that is best, on the whole, for vision. Is every wall, ceiling, and floor in your home is that color? Sunsets and the Grand Canyon serve absolutely no purpose for humans. still, people go crazy for them.

Qualia are absolutely not well understood. I do not think trying to understand them is a red herring. But, to each their own. if the fact that you and I can look at objects of various colors and agree on which is red, which is blue, and which is green is all that is important to you, that's perfectly fine.

I think if someone was going to strip away your qualia... — Patterner

Oddly irrelevant.

It remains for advocates of qualia to explain what qualia add to the conversation that is not already found in our talk of sensations, colours, odours and sounds.

If you want phenomenology, there is no gap between my smelling that and my smelling coffee. That's the point. What there might be is a gap between my smelling coffee and my choosing the word "coffee" for what I smell. — Banno

This is demonstrably untrue. It doesn't allow for the common case where you smell something but cannot recall what it is. Despite not recalling, there is still something it is like to smell it. For this to be possible, there must be a difference between smelling something and identifying it, even if the identification is not always conscious.

...and that's the very question I asked, way, way back. If qual are just smells and colours, why bother? Why not just talk about smells and colours? — Banno

So are qualia redundant? Incoherent? Or non-existent? Which is it, you have claimed each of these at various times.

Qualia is a generic term for the individual, subjective experience of smells and colors, and anything else we experience. Invented, I suppose, because "experiences" and "sensations" are already too overloaded. Whereas, "smells" and "colors" can equally refer to the properties engendering these experiences.

no one can look inside the box. — Banno

This does not respect the structure of qualia. The owner of the box may look inside, but no one else. Moreover, the box is not disconnected from the world. There is perhaps a global beetle, and everyone's personal beetle is, though a network of cameras, an image which is a perspective on that global beetle.

This is demonstrably untrue. It doesn't allow for the common case where you smell something but cannot recall what it is. — hypericin

Look again, with care. That is precisely what it does allow for - the smell is recognised, but the matching word is not:

there is no gap between my smelling that and my smelling coffee. That's the point. What there might be is a gap between my smelling coffee and my choosing the word "coffee" for what I smell. — Banno

So are qualia redundant? Incoherent? Or non-existent? Which is it, you have claimed each of these at various times. — hypericin

All three, depending on which account of qualia is under consideration.

Qualia is a generic term for the individual, subjective experience of smells and colors, and anything else we experience. — hypericin

Then is it anything other than what is commonly called a "sensation"? If not, let us use that term rather than invent a new one. It will suffice.

This does not respect the structure of qualia. The owner of the box may look inside, but no one else. — hypericin

It is clear in the text that the owner can look inside the box. It might help if you studied what you a e attempting to critique.

Look again, with care. That is precisely what it does allow for - the smell is recognised, but the matching word is not: — Banno

No, forgetting the word is a different case. I'm talking about the case where the smell is not recognized.

Then is it anything other than what is commonly called a "sensation"? If not, let us use that term rather than invent a new one. It will suffice. — Banno

"Sensation " is not good enough. It is almost completely specialized to bodily feelings. "Red sensation", "oboe sensation", "angry sensation", "imagining a green sensation". are awkwardly disconnected from established usage.

It is clear in the text that the owner can look inside the box. — Banno

no one can look inside the box. — Banno

No, forgetting the word is a different case. I'm talking about the case where the smell is not recognized. — hypericin

A trivial distinction. To not recognise the smell is to not be able to place it, especially in terms of language.

(Added: but moreover, this shows the poverty of reliance on phenomenal investigations; there is no independent way to choose between your view and mine; no public criteria to which we might appeal. )

"Sensation " is not good enough. It is almost completely specialized to bodily feelings. "Red sensation", "oboe sensation", "angry sensation", "imagining a green sensation". are awkwardly disconnected from established usage. — hypericin

It's unclear to me what this is claiming. Are you now saying that anger and imaginings are also qualia? Odd. Perhaps the next question is, what for you isn't a quale?

no one can look inside the box. — Banno

Read Philosophical Investigations again.

A trivial distinction. To not recognise the smell is to not be able to place it, especially in terms of language. — Banno

Not recognizing something and forgetting the word for something are entirely different. You can know what a smell is, what produces it, while the name of what produces it might be elusive. Or you may know the smell is familiar, but have no clue what it is. Or, you may have never encountered the smell before at all.

Are we really arguing this?

It's unclear to me what this is claiming. Are you now saying that anger and imaginings are also qualia? Odd. Perhaps the next question is, what for you isn't a quale? — Banno

Yes. This is really standard, and it is odd to me that you have read papers on qualia, hosted topics on qualia, opine frequently on qualia, without even knowing that. Qualia applies to anything that has a felt, subjective character. "Qualia" specifically picks out only that felt, subjective character, discarding everything else. There is no suitable word that can be used in it's place.

Not recognizing something and forgetting the word for something are entirely different. — hypericin

You seem very confident about that. Fine. To me they are instances of the same sort of thing, and distinct from the sensation of that aroma. On the one hand is the sensation, on the other it's recognition. Go back to where this line of thought originated:

But the quale plays no role. You want an explanation that goes odour→qual→table →coffee when one that goes odour→coffee will suffice. — Banno

When someone smells coffee, it's coffee that I smell, recognised or not.

Notice again that there is no public criteria here to help us decide who is correct.

But you want to add, in addition to the smell of coffee, something more: the quale of coffee, here, now, perhaps. Something of that sort. And the simple request is, why?. To what end?

Yes. This is really standard, and it is odd to me that you have read papers on qualia, hosted topics on qualia, opine frequently on qualia, without even knowing that. Qualia applies to anything that has a felt, subjective character. "Qualia" specifically picks out only that felt, subjective character, discarding everything else. There is no suitable word that can be used in it's place. — hypericin

What a grand vision! Compounding error with illusion. Rhetoric dressed as precision. The raw sensation by itself doesn’t explain why you identify it as "coffee." Therefore, "qualia" does no explanatory work in the theory of perception or cognition. It’s a label, not a mechanism.

I think if someone was going to strip away your qualia...
— Patterner
Oddly irrelevant. — Banno

Tell me you would not object to living with no color.

Let's take it away, and hook up an electronic eye that can differentiate wavelengths, and tap your skin in certain patterns to indicate to you what color you used to see. Go to the paint store, and you'll be able to have the same conversations. *tap tap tap* "Three taps. That's sky blue. But I'm looking for royal blue." Scan another can. *tap tap taaaaaaap* "There it is! I love royal blue."

Your conversations with the store clerk and your spouse will be exactly the same as they would have been when you could see color. It's all irrelevant.

It remains for advocates of qualia to explain what qualia add to the conversation that is not already found in our talk of sensations, colours, odours and sounds. — Banno

Those things are qualia. The physical is the body's interactions with the environment, which causes various electrical signals to go from various parts of our exterior to our brain, where they are compared with stored information from previous exposures, etc. Talk about that all you want, and it will never hint at sensations, colours, odours and sounds.

Tell me you would not object to living with no color. — Patterner

That presumed equivalence between qualia and colour is... unjustified.

Those things are qualia. — Patterner

Then qualia do not act as advertised; they are not private and ineffable. You have defended qualia to such an extent that they are no longer qualia. They are just colours and smells.

But your parable is cute. What it shows is that what matters for colour-talk is functional discrimination, not a private qualitative feel. You preserve the entire public language-game of colour, nothing is lost except the internal “what it’s like.” And crucially: nothing about the language-game depends on the missing qualia. You've shown that qualia do not do explanatory work. Cheers. "Colour experience” is a role in a language game, not some private essence. What we call “seeing blue” is just discriminating this from that, and responding appropriately in action and speech.

Notice that in loosing all my qualia, I did not loose consciousness. You should find that odd, if being conscious is having qualia.

You want the message to be “Ah! so there is something missing, something ineffable and private…”. But what is missing is the illusion that there needs must be a private feel doing causal or explanatory work - you've inadvertently shown that the private feel does no work at all.

If I can lose all the qualia and still use colour words perfectly, then what’s ‘missing’ never did any work and isn't needed. The something something over and above behaviour drops away. Presumably the "feel" bit is important here; that all Chalmers would now be saying is that the emotional reactions of the organism are the marker for consciousness. but importantly, when you actually examine what that “something” amounts to, it collapses into an impression, a way of talking, or an attitude toward the experience—not a metaphysical ingredient. The “feel” isn’t an extra entity; it’s just how we react, respond, or are disposed to speak in certain situations.

Being conscious is not possessing a certain metaphysical item, a quale. Being consciousness is being a creature that lives, reacts, expresses, interacts, and speaks in certain ways.

And that embeddedness is what is in danger of being lost by the simplistic expedient of treating consciousness as a thing.



But it's a good parable.