how to put the subject back into the scientific picture, where he’s always been on the one hand, and overlooked on the other. — Mww

:100:

His statement (cogito ergo sum) does not account for WHY we believe in our own existence.
— Relativist

He says: my existence is apodictic (impossible to doubt) because in order to doubt, I must first exist. — Wayfarer

Irrelevant to my point. He is not establishing that I exist. Our belief in our own existence is, as you put it, a "pre-commitment", although not in any active sense of committing - it's not derived from prior beliefs. It is a properly basic belief.

Similarly, the belief in a mind-independent world is also properly basic. The correct question to ask about properly basic beliefs is: what caused it?

You're right, but only in the strict sense of knowledge (beliefs that are true, and justified so strongly that the belief is not merely accidentally true). We could perhaps agree that the phenomenology of sensory input and the brain's creation of a world model establishes the impossibility of knowledge (in this strict sense) about the world.
— Relativist

You're getting close to the point now, but still brushing it aside. What do we know of 'the world' apart from or outside the mind or brain's constructive portrayal of the world? — Wayfarer

I'm well beyond your point. Try to grasp mine: the "mind created world(model)" is a belief (a compound one) and it's core is properly basic. Please acknowledge this, instead of brushing it aside by simply reiterating what I"ve already agreed to. Make an attempt to understand what I'm saying. You can then challenge it, and explain why you disagree. But so far, you've mostly ignored it.

survival entails having a functionally accurate view of reality.
— Relativist

Functionally accurate in what sense? — Wayfarer

It means sufficiently accurate (i.e. consistent with the actual world) to successfully interact with it. A predator doesn't need to distinguish the species of his prey, but it needs to be able to recognize what is edible. Animals with superior mental skills can discriminate more finely. The most intelligent demonstrate an ability to think reflexively. But in all cases - a correspondence is maintained with reality - that's never lost.

But evolutionary biology is not concerned with epistemology in the philosophical sense. — Wayfarer

Of course it isn't, but it nevertheless is a discipline that consists of a set of "facts" (any discipline fits this model). But what is a fact? A fact is a belief, and rational beliefs have justification. Science progresses through testing and confirming explanatory hypotheses that explain a set of data (which are also facts/beliefs)- this is the justification. If we were to conduct a thorough logical analysis of the discipline - justifying every fact, we would inescapably hit ground at the level of our sensory input and properly basic beliefs. You deny those ground floor beliefs; so you have no foundation for accepting any science as true. And yet you do. You're inconsistent.

Their behaviours need not be understood in terms of their ability to grasp or express true facts. It is only necessary that their response is adequate to their circumstances. A bacterium's response to its environment is 'functionally accurate' when described this way, but plainly has no bearing on the truth or falsity of its ideas, as presumably it operates perfectly well without them.

I sincerly doubt that bacteria have ideas. I covered the issue your alluding to:

When we evolved the capacity for language, the usefulness of language entailed it's capacity to convey that same functionally accurate view of reality; had it not then it would have been detrimental to survival. So our ancestors accepted some statements (=believing them as true), without needing the abstract concept of truth. — Relativist

You referred to "true facts", but you haven't defined what it means to be true.

I've given you mine: correspondence with reality - objective, mind independent, reality. This is the concept, not the methodology for seeking/verifying truth.

You still haven't answered my question about whether of not there exists objective, mind-independent reality. Without it, truth can only be relative to perspective. So...are you the "relativist"?

Try to grasp mine: the "mind created world(model)" is a belief (a compound one) and it's core is properly basic. Please acknowledge this, instead of brushing it aside by simply reiterating what I've already agreed to. Make an attempt to understand what I'm saying. You can then challenge it, and explain why you disagree. But so far, you've mostly ignored it. — Relativist

I understand it, I am not ignoring it, and I'm saying it's mistaken. The 'mind created world' thesis is a rational and defensible argument based on philosophy and cognitive science. It's is not appropriate to describe it as a belief, as the subject is a factual matter. That is not to say we can't have beliefs, but beliefs are only a part of what the mind entertains - it also has concepts, intentions, reasons, passions, and much else besides.

This is the last time that I'll say it, but I don't deny the reality of the external world nor the validity of objective facts. I say that throughout the original post. What I deny is that the world would appear in the way it does to us, in the absence of any observer or mind, and that this is a fact that is generally ignored.
.

Functionally accurate in what sense? As said, non-rational animals can and have survived ever since the beginning of life without a rational grasp of truth. — Wayfarer

Rational grasp of truth is not the point. If our senses did not give us an adequately true picture of what is going on around us we wouldn't survive for long. And by "we" I mean animals also.

Rational grasp of truth is not the point. — Janus

If that’s not the point, then we need to be clear about what the point actually is. You’ve shifted the discussion from rational grasp of truth to perceptual adequacy for survival. Those are not the same thing.

Yes—animals must have perceptual systems that are adequate to guide response. That’s a claim about functional adequacy. It says nothing about truth in the rational sense: about propositions, validity, necessity, or justification.

A frog can track flies, a bat can echolocate, a bacterium can follow a chemical gradient. All of that can be adaptively successful without any grasp of truth, falsity, inference, or contradiction. Survival only requires that responses work—not that they be true.

The issue under discussion (which is tangential to the 'mind-created world' argument) is not whether perception must be good enough to survive, but whether survival explains the existence of a faculty that can grasp what must be the case—logical necessity, valid inference, contradiction, mathematical truth. That kind of truth does no direct survival work at all, and yet as the rational animal we are answerable to reason.

So if “rational grasp of truth is not the point,” then the question is: what, exactly, is being offered as an explanation of the authority of reason itself, rather than merely of adaptive perception? And if there isn’t any such explanation, then what point can be made?

Yes—animals must have perceptual systems that are adequate to guide response. That’s a claim about functional adequacy. It says nothing about truth in the rational sense: about propositions, validity, necessity, or justification. — Wayfarer

Functional adequacy, in fact extremely precise functional adequacy, does say something about what our rational truth propositions are based upon, which you would know if you have ever seen a bird flying at high speed through a forest. The bird has a true picture of where the trees are, of the "state of affairs", otherwise it would smack into them and die.

The issue under discussion (which is tangential to the 'mind-created world' argument) is not whether perception must be good enough to survive, but whether survival explains the existence of a faculty that can grasp what must be the case—logical necessity, valid inference, contradiction, mathematical truth. That kind of truth does no direct survival work at all, and yet as the rational animal we are answerable to reason. — Wayfarer

Logical necessity, valid inference, contradiction, mathematical truth are symbolically enabled elaborations of that functionally adequate picture of the world that is enabled by the senses. Reason has no authority beyond consistency, and must remain true to that which supports it, i.e. actual experience, or lose all coherency.

Functional adequacy, in fact extremely precise functional adequacy, which you would know if you have ever seen a bird flying at high speed through a forest, does say something about what our rational truth propositions are based upon. — Janus

The bird example again shows the equivocation I was pointing to. Yes—its perceptual system must be exquisitely tuned to environmental structure. But that gives us sensorimotor covariance, not truth in the rational sense. The bird does not entertain propositions about where the trees are, nor does it distinguish between correct and incorrect judgments—only between successful and unsuccessful action. You can say that its responses 'are true' but that is because you already have the conceptual ability to to that.

Experience can show us what is the case. It can never show us what must be the case. And logical necessity lives in that second domain.

Reason has no authority beyond consistency — Janus

You'd be well advised to heed your own advice!

Experience can show us what is the case. It can never show us what must be the case or what should be And logical necessity lives entirely in that second domain. — Wayfarer

Experience shows us what is the case. Due to our symbolic linguistic ability we can reflect upon and generalize about the features of our experience to derive what must be the case in regards to anything we would count as perceptual experience. What should be the case is another matter, and concerns the pragmatics of the relations between individuals and communities, such that each may thrive. Social animals are always already instinctivley good to their own, for the most part.

You'd be well advised to heed your own advice! — Wayfarer

If you think I've been inconsistent please point it out by quoting the relevant material. You never seem to be able to resist making personal slurs. That tells me you must feel threatened.

Here, Janus, a special one for you.

For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).

Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is 'sugar' or what is 'intruder'. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And his (the dog's) field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

Good old Aristotelian Thomism.

That tells me you must feel threatened. — Janus

Terrified. Shaking in my boots.

As usual: quotes from your authorities and attempts to dismiss what I've said by associating it with empiricism or positivism instead of addressing what I've actually said. You claim I've been inconsistent but apparently can't point out any inconsistency. :roll:

The 'mind created world' thesis is a rational and defensible argument based on philosophy and cognitive science. It's is not appropriate to describe it as a belief, as the subject is a factual matter. — Wayfarer

It's unclear what you mean by a "factual matter", since I regard facts as true beliefs. I'll elaborate of "facts" later, but first discuss "belief".

You are applying a different definition of "belief" than I. Here's a rough outline of my definition:


Belief: a mental state that encompanses an intentional stance - it makes one apt to behave or think in a way that is consistent with the belief; it entails an assumed correspondence with reality.

It includes, but is not limited to, propositional beliefs - which are intentional stances toward the meaning of the proposition. Many, but not all, non-propositional beliefs can be expressed as propositions.

Even the meaning of a word would constitute a belief, because it is the meaning that influences the thoughts or behavior. Adopt a different definition of the word, and the subsequent behaviors and thoughts will shift.

A sensory perception is a belief: it produces behavioral reactions consistent with whatever it is the perception represents. Your driving along a road and you see a person in your path, and you react by slowing or stopping your car. You implicitly believe a person is in your (believed) path, and you implicitly believe you will injure this person if you maintain your path and speed.

From this point of view, a "mind created world (model) is a belief - a complex one.
‐-------------
The mental construct I have labeled "belief" is present, irrespective of any definition you may use for belief. I don't want to debate semantics (what is the proper definition of belief?), I simply ask that you accept that this is what I mean when I use the term. I'd be happy to clarify any issues you see.

‐--------------

This is the last time that I'll say it, but I don't deny the reality of the external world nor the validity of objective facts — Wayfarer

What is a "fact"? Is it mind-independent? I define it as a true proposition. Scientific facts are propositions that describe some aspect of physical reality (if the proposition is true). "God created the universe" is considered a fact by theists. So what a person regards as "fact" is, actually a belief. You and I could intersubjectively agree to certain facts.

Some philosophers (e.g. Wittgenstein) treat "facts" as elements of reality, rather than as descriptions of (what is assumed to be) reality. And yet, we often refer to a scientific discipline as embodying a set of "facts", even though these alleged "facts" are falsifiable and possibly false. That makes it cumbersome. Clarity is needed when using the term.

Yet another semantic issue. I asked you, "whether or not there exists objective, mind-independent reality." You responded with different words: "I don't deny the reality of the external world nor the validity of objective facts".

I shall interpret your answer as "yes" - that you agree there exists objective, mind independent reality. No need to respond if you agree.

But please answer my other question about the meaning of "true". In particular, do you accept my definition - that "true" = corresponds to objective, mind-independent reality? If not, then provide your definition.

All of this has bearing on your acceptance of "scientific facts", and whether or not you can justify belief in those facts.

You are applying a different definition of "belief" than I. — Relativist

I use the regular definition.

All of this has bearing on your acceptance of "scientific facts" — Relativist

I am not disputing the scientific account, but attempting to reveal an underlying assumption that gives rise to a distorted view of what this means. What I’m calling attention to is the tendency to take for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth.

do you accept my definition - that "true" = corresponds to objective, mind-independent reality? If not, then provide your definition. — Relativist

I've posted several objections to the idea of correspondence previously, but you seemed not to notice them. They're all textbook examples I have found over the years.

According to [correspondence], truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view […] seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by “agreement” or “correspondence” of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense.

1- In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don’t know the reality, how can we make a comparison?

2- The making of the comparison is itself a fact about which we have a belief. We have to believe that the belief about the comparison is true. How do we know that our belief in this agreement is “true”? This leads to an infinite regress, leaving us with no assurance of true belief. — Randall, J. & Buchler, J. Philosophy: An Introduction, 1957, p133

Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognising it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. — Kant, 1801. in Lectures on Logic.

Reason has no authority beyond consistency, and must remain true to that which supports it, i.e. actual experience, or lose all coherency.

And this Reason can tell us that we, or the animals being discussed, don’t and can’t know anything about the world. Other than what is presented to us via our senses. Which necessarily includes experiences. That we can deduce some things about the structure of the world by experimentation. But that is all. And yes we can philosophise about it all to our hearts content, but those philosophical thoughts can’t get past the limits I’ve just pointed out.
Except in one thing, the basic philosophical calculation that we know our mind, our being exists. So we do know one thing, this can not be doubted. Yes, we know there appears to be something else, but all we have is appearances, so how can we know anything about it.

We are like the crocodile surviving very efficiently in the world, while not understanding anything about it. The only difference being, we have worked out one of two more things about what is going on.

1957

…..truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality…. — Randall, J. & Buchler, J. Philosophy: An Introduction, p133

1787
“….The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this: “What is truth?” The definition of the word truth, to wit, “the accordance of the cognition with its object”, is presupposed in the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition. (…) Now a universal criterion of truth would be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient, and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found.…”

Questions of this or that truth, or that this or that is or is not true, is hardly the same question asked of truth itself.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.
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Reason has no authority as such, re: invariance according to law; it is one of two definitive conditions of being human, alongside and likely subservient to, morality. While it may be the source of pure principles a priori in some speculative metaphysical theories, the necessity for its employment always relates to pure rational thought alone, experience be what it may.
—————-

Experience doesn’t show the case of anything. It is merely that representation of the fullest account of the systemic functionality relative to a particular intellect. Each member of the system shows the case for that function of which it is the condition; experience, having no function in itself, being its termination. And then to posit that experience shows the case that the system has run its course, and that some relevant determination results from it, becomes trivially tautological.
—————-

Metaphysics was never meant to be a convenience. But it remains curious that metaphysical science disavows the integration of hypotheticals in its prescriptions for empirical knowledge, which just is its fullest account, yet, the expression of those prescriptions, insofar as all of them are grounded in transcendental speculation, must always be mere opinion. And what is an opinion if not subjectively convenient.

You are applying a different definition of "belief" than I.
— Relativist

I use the regular definition. — Wayfarer

You seem to have not read this part:

The mental construct I have labeled "belief" is present, irrespective of any definition you may use for belief. I don't want to debate semantics (what is the proper definition of belief?), I simply ask that you accept that this is what I mean when I use the term. I'd be happy to clarify any issues you see. — Relativist

The "mind created world (model)" is a mental construct that fits my definition. You argue that this construct is distinct from objective reality (I agree), but raise doubts that it is an accurate image of objective reality. The implication: it is (strictly speaking) a false image of reality. If it were a true image, your theory would be moot. You also agreed that it is possible to make true statements about objective reality. So true/false is applicable to this construct, just as it is with beliefs (in a typical definition). It is this fact that the truth-condition applies that is relevant; I simply choose to apply the word "belief" to any intra-mind construct that can be considered true/false. I'm open to an alternative term, but not to simply brushing it away due to a semantics dispute.

The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by “agreement” or “correspondence” of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense. — Randall, J. & Buchler, J. Philosophy: An Introduction, 1957, p133

I

Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object..... For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. — Kant, 1801. in Lectures on Logic.

You're quoting Kant out of context. He accepted correspondence theory, but noted an implication. I rebutted that point earlier, you must have skipped over it. What I said was that "testing" or "judging" a truth is an act of truth verification, and is thus irrelevant to the concept.

My understanding is that Kant believed that we only can have genuine knowledge and truth about the phenomenal world, but not about things-in-themselves (noumena) as they exist independently of our experience. However, you acknowledged the possibility of making true statements about the actual mind-independent world, so you must disagree with him on this point.

I also had asked that if you reject correspondence theory that you identify which truth theory you DO embrace. You use the term, "truth", but you reject correspondence theory - so how do you define the term?

I am not positing 'metaphysical beliefs'. I am pointing out the inherent contradiction in the concept of the mind-independent object. It's actually physicalism that is posing a metaphysical thesis (and a mistaken one.) — Wayfarer

Hi Wayfarer. I just finished re-reading your essay in order to refresh my memory on the thrust of the argument. Much as I enjoyed reading the article, and much as I agreed with many of the points you made in it, I don't think it succeeds in showing that the concept of a mind-independent object is inherently contradictory.

You rightly point out that the brain is an active participant in the construction of the familiar world of shaped and colored objects, the world of experience. This would seem to undermine the naive realist's assumption that the objects we experience exist out there in the world just as we experience them. Fair enough, but this doesn't seem to undermine the weaker claim that experience provides us with at least some information about the entities that exist out there in the world and, therefore, gives us some epistemic purchase on those entities. While those entities perhaps cannot objectively look, feel and smell as presented in experience (since these qualities only exist relative to our perceptual apparatus), we are nevertheless warranted in thinking that those entities exist and that we know something about them.

Consider the mathematical models that we build to predict and explain the phenomena we experience. While it is certainly true that these models require experience and intelligence to construct, these models describe quantitative relationships rather than qualitative properties, and therefore are not relative to our perceptual apparatus in the way that qualitative descriptions are (unless you are willing to argue that mathematics has no purchase on world). I would argue that knowledge of these quantitative relationships constitutes genuine knowledge of mind-independent entities because it is knowledge of relationships between those entities irrespective of their relationship to us.

To take a well-worn example, consider the case of two billiard balls colliding. While it may be true that the billiard balls do not objectively "look" and "feel" like they do in our experience, I would argue that we can rightly claim that there are two entities out there in the real world that have mass and velocity, and that they will exert force upon one another upon collision in a way that described by the laws of physics regardless of whether anyone is there to witness it.

Anyway, I've already written more than I had intended. Would be interested to get your thoughts.

The "mind created world (model)" is a mental construct that fits my definition. — Relativist

The “model” is not a representation standing over against a separately existing world. The modeling activity and the world it yields are the same process viewed from two aspects. There is no second, independently formed object for the model to correspond to. The very features by which something counts as an object—extension, mass, persistence, causal interaction—already belong to the structured field of appearance itself. We can test and refine the model and develop new mathematical terminology and even new paradigms (as physics has since Galileo), but this testing takes place entirely within the same field of appearances, through coherence, predictive stability, and intersubjective invariance—not by comparison with a mind-independent reality as it is in itself.

I'm well aware that this sense of separateness or otherness to the world is innate. This is what makes it so hard to challenge! It is, to quote Bryan Magee, 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' (Schopenhauer's Philosophy, p106.) Magee notes, in that passage, that this is why Kant's philosophy is so hard to grasp, saying that 'Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices' (ibid).

My understanding is that Kant believed that we only can have genuine knowledge and truth about the phenomenal world, but not about things-in-themselves (noumena) as they exist independently of our experience. However, you acknowledged the possibility of making true statements about the actual mind-independent world, so you must disagree with him on this point. — Relativist

I do not disagree with Kant on this point. It IS the point! Nothing about scientific method demands that it concerns 'things in themselves'. It is perfectly compatible with the idea that phenomena, how things appear, are governed by rules and principles and behave consistently to a point (as we always have to allow for the fact that nature will confound from time to time.)

Again, in interpreting it, you have a 'mental construct' of your own - that of the mind's model of the world, 'in here', and the purportedly real world 'out there' which pre-exists you and will outlive you. But that too is part of the way the mind construes experience. Your implicit perspective is from outside both your mind and the world you live in, as if you were seeing it from above - but we really can't do that.

Fair enough, but this doesn't seem to undermine the weaker claim that experience provides us with at least some information about the entities that exist out there in the world and, therefore, gives us some epistemic purchase on those entities. While those entities perhaps cannot objectively look, feel and smell as presented in experience (since these qualities only exist relative to our perceptual apparatus), we are nevertheless warranted in thinking that those entities exist and that we know something about them. — Esse Quam Videri

Thanks for your very perceptive comments! I am not insisting that because of the constructive activities of the mind, that the objects of perception are non-existent or illusory. I recall a quote from George Berkeley, with whom I am in agreement in some respects:

I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call ‘matter’ or ‘corporeal substance’. — Berkeley

Here, the word 'substance' is being used in the philosophical sense i.e. 'bearer of predicates', So he's arguing that while the proverbial apple, tree or chair really do exist, they don't comprise some 'corporeal substance' which is real wholly apart from their phenomenal appearance. So, yes, apples, trees and chair really do exist, but they lack the inherent reality that naive realism tends to impute to them. Whilst I have differences with Berkeley's philosophy on other grounds, here I'm in agreement .

Consider the mathematical models that we build to predict and explain the phenomena we experience. While it is certainly true that these models require experience and intelligence to construct, these models describe quantitative relationships rather than qualitative properties, and therefore are not relative to our perceptual apparatus in the way that qualitative descriptions are (unless you are willing to argue that mathematics has no purchase on world). I would argue that knowledge of these quantitative relationships constitutes genuine knowledge of mind-independent entities because it is knowledge of relationships between those entities irrespective of their relationship to us. — Esse Quam Videri

Well, yes, but notice something - mathematical models are essentially intellectual in nature. Myself, I am sympathetic to Aristotelian realism, which declares that 'intelligible objects' (including numbers) are real - but they're not corporeal (or material). So they're 'mind-independent' in the sense that they are in no way dependent on your mind or mine - but then, they are only perceptible to the rational intellect, so in that second sense, not mind-independent at all.

Intelligible objects must be incorporeal because they are eternal and immutable. By contrast, all corporeal objects, which we perceive by means of the bodily senses, are contingent and mutable. Moreover, certain intelligible objects for example, the indivisible mathematical unit – clearly cannot be found in the corporeal world (since all bodies are extended, and hence divisible). These intelligible objects cannot therefore be perceived by means of the senses; they must be incorporeal and perceptible by reason alone. — Augustine, Book 2, De libero Arbitrio

The genius of modern physics, and scientific method generaly, was to find ways to harness physical causation to mathematical necessity. And this is actually further grounds for a scientifically-informed objective idealism. But this came at a cost - the elimination or bracketing out of the subject in who's mind these facts obtain, with the consequence that they came to be seen as true independently of any mind whatever. Especially when taken to be true of empirical objects, this introduces a deep contradiction, because empirical objects cannot, pace Kant, be understood as truly 'mind-independent'. That is responsible for many of the controversies in these matters.

But, as said, my sympathies are with some form of Platonic realism. And this is consistent with the views expressed in the mind-created world. (It is perhaps best expressed in Husserl's mature philosophy but that is a subject I'm still studying.)

I would argue that we can rightly claim that there are two entities out there in the real world that have mass and velocity, and that they will exert force upon one another upon collision in a way that described by the laws of physics regardless of whether anyone is there to witness it. — Esse Quam Videri

This is precisely the 'objection of David Hume'. It was Hume who pointed out that the conjunction of events such as the effects of collisions leads us to believe that these are necessary facts, when in reality, there is no logical basis for such a belief, other than the repeated observation. That is central to the whole 'induction/deduction' split which begins with Hume. But, recall, it was precisely this which awoke Kant from his 'dogmatic slumber' and inspired him to show that these kinds of physical reactions are intelligible precisely because of the categories of the understanding which the mind must bring to them. Again, this calls into question the natural presumption that these kinds of causal relations must be real independently of any mind, as Kant demonstrates that the whole idea of 'causal relations' is not really grounded in observation as such, but in the fact that causal relations are native to the intellect.

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Kant’s position is best described as empirical realism combined with transcendental idealism. He is an empirical realist because, within experience, the world is objectively real: objects in space and time exist with lawful regularity, causal order, and public objectivity — science is entirely valid in describing them. But he is a transcendental idealist because space, time, causality, and objecthood themselves do not belong to things as they might exist “in themselves,” independent of all experience; they belong to the conditions under which anything can appear to a finite knower at all. So Kant is not saying that the world is an illusion, nor that reality is merely subjective. He is saying that the world of experience is genuinely real, while its form reflects the structure of cognition rather than a mind-independent metaphysical substrate.

Ref:

The “model” is not a representation standing over against a separately existing world. The modeling activity and the world it yields are the same process viewed from two aspects. There is no second, independently formed object for the model to correspond to. The very features by which something counts as an object—extension, mass, persistence, causal interaction—already belong to the structured field of appearance itself. We can test and refine the model and develop new mathematical terminology and even new paradigms (as physics has since Galileo), but this testing takes place entirely within the same field of appearances, through coherence, predictive stability, and intersubjective invariance—not by comparison with a mind-independent reality as it is in itself. — Wayfarer

You're assuming, without support, that the actual world lacks objects, or any aspects that a human perspective might consistently identify as an object.

I have argued that our senses, and the mental image of the actual world, is a reflection of the actual world- because it's caused by that world and because we necessarily interact in that world to survive. These are reasons to believe these reflections have a degree of accuracy. You rule this out even as a possibility. That is unwarranted. It is making too much of a mere possibility.

You are right that we can't compare the phenomenal world to the mind-independent reality, but that follows from the observation you made that we necessarily have a perspective. The mental act of understanding necessarily entails a human perspective, but perspective does not entail falsehood. I suggest that the success of science validates our perspective as being fairly accurate.

We have previously discussed the fact that the smallest particles (in the standard model of particle physics) do not have certain definite properties, such as position and momentum. This is not an indictment of our perspective, because we have been able to make this detemination FROM our human perspective. I could easily agree that there's much we don't know, and that the models we've created (such as the standard model, which is a particle perespective of QFT) are not necessarily correct. I have never argued that science gets everything right, nor that science is somehow destined to eventually figure everything out. I merely argue that successful science is giving us some true information about actual reality- and I can't imagine how you could deny that.

Nothing about scientific method demands that it concerns 'things in themselves' — Wayfarer

How could it? You have defined '"things in themselves" in terms of an absence of perspective, which strikes me as incoherent. Descriptions are necessarily in terms of a perspective. Successful science entails accurate predictions. It does not entail accurate ontology. Consider Quantum Field Theory, a model that theorizes that all material objects are composed of quanta of quantum fields. The math and heuristics are successful, but that doesn't necessarily mean it is a true ontology. It will never be possible to establish a fundamental ontology through science - the best we can hope for is a model that is successful at making predictions. If it does that, then it is giving us some true facts - facts that correspond to reality.

Your implicit perspective is from outside both your mind and the world you live in, as if you were seeing it from above - but we really can't do that. — Wayfarer

I have never said that our perspectives are from "outside our minds". Rather, I embrace our perspectives and argue that we can develop true beliefs about aspects of objective reality. This includes scientific models, like QFT - but they should be considered in terms of what they are, and what they are not.

I'll go further: we are also justified in proposing ontological models, for the same reason it's justifiable to propose scientific models: prediction, analysis, and discourse. The true, fundamental ontology is not accessible, but we can still utilize a hypothetical model that is coherent and has all necessary explanatory power. Different models can be compared, and we can justifiably choose one that we judge to be the "best explanation".

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I had asked you to define truth. You replied:

I do not disagree with Kant on this point. It IS the point! Nothing about scientific method demands that it concerns 'things in themselves'. — Wayfarer

So...you do accept correspondence theory, where the correspondence is limited to phenomenal reality. What you haven't done is to account for phenomenal reality. I argue that phenomenal reality is a direct consequence of objective reality. Do you deny that?

You do seem to accept that there is an intersubjective human perspective - a view that depends on a 3rd person point of view. I explain this in terms of our common machinery - our brains and sensory apparatus are similar, we have commonslity in languages (translation is generally feasible), so I infer that we all have similarities in our perspectives about the world at large. How do you reconcile it? It seems inconsistent with your 1st-person view of perspective? You think, therefore you are- but you can't say that about anyone else except by indirect evidence.

You're assuming, without support, that the actual world lacks objects, or any aspects that a human perspective might consistently identify as an object. — Relativist

First, kudos for a very well-written post.

But my argument is well-supported. I’m not saying that the actual world “lacks objects” in the sense of being chaotic or structureless. What I’m denying is that object-hood itself—given as discrete, bounded, enduring units—is something we are entitled to project into reality as it is in itself. As Charles Pinter shows in Mind and the Cosmic Order, the mind (and not only the human mind) operates in terms of the cognitive gestalts by which anything shows up as an object at all.

Let’s begin with a thought-experiment: Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed. Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now, there is sunlight, there are stars, planets and galaxies—but all of it is unseen. There is no human or animal eye to cast a glance at objects, hence nothing is discerned, recognized or even noticed. Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds. Nor do they have features, because features correspond to categories of animal sensation. This is the way the early universe was before the emergence of life—and the way the present universe is outside the view of any observer. — Mind and the Cosmic Order, Chap 1

I’d also add that what counts as an object for h.sapiens need not be what counts as an object for another kind of being. We pick out and stabilise “things” within our own contextual scheme—our Lebenswelt, to use the phenomenological term—with its specific sensory capacities, practical interests, and biological needs (and, yes, perspectives). Another animal, or another kind of intelligence altogether, could inhabit the same underlying reality while carving it up into entirely different unities, boundaries, and saliencies. In that case it would still be “the same reality,” but not the same objects

You have defined '"things in themselves" in terms of an absence of perspective, which strikes me as incoherent. Descriptions are necessarily in terms of a perspective. Successful science entails accurate predictions. It does not entail accurate ontology. Consider Quantum Field Theory, a model that theorizes that all material objects are composed of quanta of quantum fields. The math and heuristics are successful, but that doesn't necessarily mean it is a true ontology. — Relativist

Right! But don’t loose sight of where this all started - with the argument over physicalism. And acknowledging this surely undermines physicalism. Physicalism isn’t just the claim that physics is successful or that scientific models work (which incidentally is not in question); it’s the stronger metaphysical claim that the fundamental constituents of reality are physical. But if we also say (as you’ve just done) that science doesn't, in principle, establish a final ontology, that its models don’t guarantee true ontology, and that all description is perspectival, then the core physicalist claim has been abandoned.

(I don’t think the notion of the in-itself is incoherent at all. It is, by definition, what lies outside any perspective — that’s what the term is doing. The confusion arises when empirical reality is assumed to possess an inherent reality, which is precisely what scientific realism does — as if the conditions under which objects appear could simply be projected into reality as it is in itself.)

You might find this interesting:

https://theforensicfunnel.com/p/all-truth-is-relative?utm_source=theforensicfunnel.com&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=all-truth-is-relative&_bhlid=5191cc823ff078c9e62297fdb0862389e04c99b8

What I’m denying is that object-hood itself—given as discrete, bounded, enduring units—is something we are entitled to project into reality as it is in itself. — Wayfarer

You are damning knowledge for being what it is. Knowledge can only be a reflection, or interpretation of what exists. It's logically impossible for knowledge to be what reality "is in itself". Propositional knowledge can only be descriptive. Perceptual knowledge (e.g. familiarity with visual appearance, sound, smell) can only be a sensory memory. The proper questions are: is the description accurate, and complete - these are the ideals to strive for with propositional knowledge. (We can never know that a description is complete, of course, that's why I call it an ideal).

You skipped a key point I made:

You're assuming, without support, that the actual world lacks objects, or any aspects that a human perspective might consistently identify as an object. — Relativist

If we can consistly identify something as an object, then we are warranted in applying the label to represent the concept and use it as a reference. The concept is useful for studying the world- it is a component of our perspective that has led to fruitful exploration, and discovery.

Let’s begin with a thought-experiment: Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed. Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now, there is sunlight, there are stars, planets and galaxies — Mind and the Cosmic Order, Chap 1

The universe we are imagining DOES have the same shapes, there is sunlight, stars, etc- because we're imagining this world from our perspective, and as we understand it, simply unoccupied by us. And this understanding is not false, it's simply a description in human terms - as a description must be.

So what he seems to be saying is there would be no humans to describe the universe this way. This reiterates my point that descriptions are not the object described. The only question we should be asking is: is the description accurate and complete?

Another animal, or another kind of intelligence altogether, could inhabit the same underlying reality while carving it up into entirely different unities, boundaries, and saliencies. In that case it would still be “the same reality,” but not the same objects — Wayfarer

Of course! But that does not invalidate our descriptions. It's analogous to comparing Newton's gravity theory to General Relativity: they are both correct, within a certain context. More extreme: pre-Copernican descriptions of the motions of stars and planets-they could correctly predict the motions. Neither Newton's nor pre-Copernican methods were entirely correct, but they had a degree of accuracy. Even if modern physics isn't precisely correct, it's clearly closer to correctness than its predecessors.

Right! But don’t loose sight of where this all started - with the argument over physicalism. And acknowledging this surely undermines physicalism. Physicalism isn’t just the claim that physics is successful or that scientific models work (which incidentally is not in question); it’s the stronger metaphysical claim that the fundamental constituents of reality are physical. But if we also say (as you’ve just done) that science doesn't, in principle, establish a final ontology, that its models don’t guarantee true ontology, and that all description is perspectival, then the core physicalist claim has been abandoned. — Wayfarer

I have not been defending physicalism in this thread, I have been defending the discipline of ontology, of which physicalism is but one example. You haven't undermined any ontological theory at all, you've simply shown that an ontology can only be described from a human perspective. The fact "the thing itself" is distinct from a complete description of the thing doesn't matter, because no one would claim a description IS the thing. You've provided a reason to be skeptical of any ontolological theory, but you haven't falsified any.

Regarding physicalism: it's a tautology to say everything is physical, because its just a label for the things that exist- objects, or states of affairs: the theory that everything that exists is an object, with intrinsic properties and relations to other things that exist. The labels are descriptive.

But suppose we simply say that physicalism's model applies specifically to phenomenal reality. Your objection vanishes, does it not? I have much more to say about this, but I first want your reaction.

(I don’t think the notion of the in-itself is incoherent at all. It is, by definition, what lies outside any perspective — that’s what the term is doing — Wayfarer

The notion of something existing without there being a description of it is coherent. The notion that we can conceive something that way is incoherent, in that there's nothing to make sense of; it can't be a topic of discussion beyond the point of referring to "the thing in-itself". Our conceptions are necessarily descriptive. I suggest that we capture the same point by simply acknowledging that there's a distinction between an existent and a description of that existent. Then we can discuss it's attributes in the usual manner.

It is, but a very concentrated piece of work. I doubt I’ll be able to take it on, at any given time there’s a whole bunch of stuff I should read.

If we can consistly identify something as an object, then we are warranted in applying the label to represent the concept and use it as a reference. The concept is useful for studying the world- it is a component of our perspective that has led to fruitful exploration, and discovery. — Relativist

You’re right, I did miss the bolded part. I agree, of course. The whole point of my argument is the refutation of the idea that an object has an inherent existence absent any mind.

So what he seems to be saying is there would be no humans to describe the universe this way... — Relativist

Not quite. Absent cognition, the universe is featureless, because features map against the capacities of the ‘animal sensorium’. Again, that what we see as shapes and features has an inextricably subjective basis. I do recommend Pinter’s book - it’s a compelling essay in cognitive science, physics and philosophy. Not much noticed in academia because of Pinter’s background as a math professor, but I think an important book.

The fact "the thing itself" is distinct from a complete description of the thing doesn't matter, because no one would claim a description IS the thing. — Relativist

Scientific reductionism is not merely the view that life and mind can be described in physical terms, but that they fundamentally comprise nothing over and above the elements and laws described by fundamental physics.

If “physical” just means “whatever exists,” then physicalism is no longer a metaphysical thesis but simply another way of talking about ontology. And the other million-dollar question is whether laws and principles are themselves physical or reducible to the physical.

And this Reason can tell us that we, or the animals being discussed, don’t and can’t know anything about the world. — Punshhh

Even if we frame 'the world' as the 'in itself', forever beyond human experience (as Kant would have it) it seems undeniable that if we and the animals didn't know anything the world we would not survive for long, and it seems that that "knowledge" is not discursive knowledge at all, but is given pre-cognitively (if what is cognitive is defined as that to which we have conscious rational access). So the conclusion would be that we do know things about the world, but cannot prove that we do. It is merely the inference to what seems to be (to me at least) the best explanation for what we do experience.

I can see why you would think that approach resonates with me, which it does, to an extent, but what I keep coming back to is the active way the mind (or brain) constructs its sense of reality, not as a passive recipient of sensory data, but as a generative, world-forming process. That article operates more at the level of propositional analysis. So, some aspects in common with it, but also some diversions.

Is the "brain constructing reality" a brain-constructed reality?

From the perspective of neuroscience and physiology, it's the brain. From the perspective of philosophy and the humanities, it's the mind. I don't agree with the idea of brain-mind identity, though, because the terms are meaningful in different domains of discourse.

But, yes, looked at neurobiologically, the brain certainly 'constructs' the 'lived world' of creatures including h.sapiens . That is basic to enactivism and embodied cognition. But it doesn't mean mind should be reduced to neurology.

I wasn't trying to suggest mind/brain identity―the same question applies to mind as to brain: is "the mind constructing reality" itself a "mind-constructed reality"? "The mind constructing reality" seems to be a judgement and hence a much more conceptually mediated "thing" than our perceptual experience itself.

In relation to mind/ brain identity I think it makes no sense to say they are identical. I think the way it is usually understood by those who don't take mind to be a separate substance is that mind(ing) is an activity of the brain.

I would say it is an activity of the whole (enbrained) body, with perhaps some of the minding going on without requiring brain activity at all. Levin's work (with "zenobots" and "anthrobots") suggests that cells do their own "minding" without requiring a brain, and that even these zenobots and anthrobots (which are just clumps pf cells) are able to do some coordinated minding. It has long been known that jellyfish are colonies of cells with no central brain.

I think of it more as metacognitive insight, knowing how we know. It's been a central question of philosophy since its inception.

I suppose you could say that enactivism says that that all organisms 'enact their world' in this way, but that humans alone are capable of meta-cognitive insight.

"Meta-cognitive insight" is always given in symbolic language. So the question then becomes "what can it be insight into beyond linguistically mediated conceptual relations?". I prefer to think of insight which is beyond language as being both primordially pre-cognitive and pre-linguistically cognitive―and it seems to follow that anything we say about will be a distortion. So, it follows that what I just said is also a distortion.