I think the key is reason. The ability to ask 'why is that?' 'Why should that happen?' 'What does that mean?' I was contemplating the other day that the hallmark of reason is to be able to recognise necessary truths. That is the rational faculty in a nutshell, and the thing that separates us from our simian forbears. The 'rational animal'.

In evolutionary terms, presumably that began to emerge long before any kind of real culture, probably paleolithic. I always took that to be the drift of the famous monolith in 2001: A Space Odyssey.

Well, we see things very differently. For me the key is the arational, when it comes to any knowledge or understanding which is not empirical, discursive, dialectical or logical. if it can be captured in language at all the arational is more akin to the metaphorical, the poetic. It evokes rather than describing, measuring or explaining.

To be sure, that is part of symbolic language, but it is closer to 'symbolic' in the sense meant by Jung than it is the idea of a symbol representing something or other in the sense of strict reference.

The whole point of my argument is the refutation of the idea that an object has an inherent existence absent any mind. — Wayfarer

You have an inherent existence, do you not? You know this because you think, but your existence is surely not merely a phenonenol truth.

Not quite. Absent cognition, the universe is featureless, because features map against the capacities of the ‘animal sensorium’. Again, that what we see as shapes and features has an inextricably subjective basis. — Wayfarer

I used the word "features" in an attempt to generalize beyond our framework. It's non-specific, except it is clear that one feature you can't deny is your own existence. This cannot be the only feature, unless solipsism is true.

If “physical” just means “whatever exists,” then physicalism is no longer a metaphysical thesis but simply another way of talking about ontology. — Wayfarer

In another thread, you challenged what is meant by "physical". I acknowledge that the term is ambiguous (is a gas "physical"? Is a quantum field? What if a "many worlds" interpretation is true?- are the inaccessible worlds physical? )

I embrace reductionism, and reductionism entails the notion that everything that exists is composed of the same kinds of things. Not monism (one thing), but (at least potentially) a set of things. That set of things is what I'm referring to, to avoid a semantics debate about what it means to be "physical".

I'd really like you to respond to this:

But suppose we simply say that physicalism's model applies specifically to phenomenal reality. Your objection vanishes, does it not? I have much more to say about this, but I first want your reaction. — Relativist

You have an inherent existence, do you not? You know this because you think, but your existence is surely not merely a phenonenol truth. — Relativist

Any being does, but already said you think cogito ergo sum proves nothing. The point, which I return to, is that the fact of one's own being is apodictic, cannot plausibly be denied. For to doubt it, one must first exist.

I embrace reductionism, and reductionism entails the notion that everything that exists is composed of the same kinds of things. Not monism (one thing), but (at least potentially) a set of things. That set of things is what I'm referring to, to avoid a semantics debate about what it means to be "physical". — Relativist

That formulation still leaves a hard remainder. The laws of physics, mathematical structures, symmetry principles, and modal constraints are not composed of the same kinds of things as the entities they govern. Are they also things? They are not particles, fields, or energy distributions. Yet physicalism treats them as objectively real and universally invariant (reflecting the theistic heritage, 'divine law', from which it originated). Materialism would like to say that they are dependent on, or emergent from, or supervene on, physical states or processes — but none of those dependency relations can be shown to be straightforwardly physical either. Any attempt to demonstrate such dependence must rely on inference (“if this, then that”), which is itself of a different order from physical causation. Logical necessity does not require or imply a transfer of energy.

But suppose we simply say that physicalism's model applies specifically to phenomenal reality. Your objection vanishes, does it not? I have much more to say about this, but I first want your reaction. — Relativist

What does 'phenomena' mean? It is from the Greek, 'what appears'. And implicit in that term is the subject to whom phenomena appear.

In Aristotelian philosophy, matter (hyle or prima materia) is formless and unknowable until it is informed by an intelligible kind. So, in that sense, the physical (matter) and intelligible (form) can be understood as separate principles, although Aristotle would not say they could exist separately. But the point is, neither can it be used to endorse physicalism, because matter in itself has no determinate form.

So: phenomena already imply subjectivity, and the physical already presupposes form, as if it has no form, it has no identity. The error of physicalism is to say that the physical has determinate reality sans any act of observation or form - that's what I mean by 'inherent reality'. This is also why quantum theory persistently resists being interpreted as a theory of fully determinate, observer-independent objects - “No phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon." That holes physicalism beneath the waterline, something which a lot of people seem not to have noticed.

You have an inherent existence, do you not? You know this because you think, but your existence is surely not merely a phenonenol truth.
— Relativist

Any being does, but already said you think cogito ergo sum proves nothing. The point, which I return to, is that the fact of one's own being is apodictic, cannot plausibly be denied. For to doubt it, one must first exist. — Wayfarer

Yes, but I was using this as an example of "feature": this one indisputable fact is a feature of objective reality (not merely phenomenal reality). Are there other features? If solipsism is false, then it is logically necessary that there are other features. Not(solipsism) is disputable, but do you actually reserve judgement on solipsism?

— Wayfarer

But suppose we simply say that physicalism's model applies specifically to phenomenal reality. Your objection vanishes, does it not? I have much more to say about this, but I first want your reaction. — Relativist

So: phenomena already imply subjectivity, and the physical already presupposes form, as if it has no form, it has no identity. The error of physicalism is to say that the physical has determinate reality sans any act of observation or form - that's what I mean by 'inherent reality'....
The context of my question was Kant's view of TRUTH as a correspondence with phenomenal reality. You said you accepted this. So I'm asking you to assess whether or not physicalism is possibly true, in terms of it possibly corresponding to phenomenal reality, in this Kantian sense. This has nothing to do with "inherent reality". It only has to do with the theory of truth you accepted.

Yes, but I was using this as an example of "feature": this one indisputable fact is a feature of objective reality (not merely phenomenal reality). — Relativist

The whole point of Descartes' meditation, was that he could doubt the existence of objective reality. But even if he doubted everything he thought he knew and sensed about the objective world, he could not doubt that he doubted it. Here is a translation of the original text:

I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my memory tells me lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever happened. I have no senses. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras. So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain. Yet apart from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there is not something else which does not allow even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts into me6 the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts? In that case am not I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something7 then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. — Descartes First Meditation

So, in no way can this be interpreted as 'a feature of objective reality'. It is the grounding truth of Descartes' first philosophy. On this basis he proceeds to then erect his structure of 'clear and distinct ideas'. It was only after Descartes that the ideas of 'objective and subjective'came into common use (ref).

The context of my question was Kant's view of TRUTH as a correspondence with phenomenal reality. You said you accepted this. — Relativist

I didn't say that. This was the exchange in question:

"My understanding is that Kant believed that we only can have genuine knowledge and truth about the phenomenal world, but not about things-in-themselves (noumena) as they exist independently of our experience. However, you acknowledged the possibility of making true statements about the actual mind-independent world, so you must disagree with him on this point."

— Relativist

I do not disagree with Kant on this point. It IS the point! Nothing about scientific method demands that it concerns 'things in themselves'. It is perfectly compatible with the idea that phenomena, how things appear, are governed by rules and principles and behave consistently to a point (as we always have to allow for the fact that nature will confound from time to time.) — Wayfarer

Kant's point is, once again: he is at once and empirical realist AND a transcendental idealist. Empirical realist: the scientific account provides genuine knowledge - Kant would never question the veracity of Newtonian physics. So in that context, we can speak of 'correspondence' of statements and facts - but this is something that Kant describes as 'nominal'.

But he is ALSO a transcendental idealist: "I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves." (ref)

There are two levels or two kinds of understanding - empirical and transcendental - at play throughout this debate. That is why I keep saying, that the empirical truth of the fact that the Universe pre-dates human existence, is not undermined by my saying that our knowledge of the pre-human universe still assumes an implicit perspective - even though we know that it existed for billions of years before we did. That's what I mean by an 'implicit perspective'. Take that out, and we can't make sense of anything, as there is no perspective. So the empirical view is not truly 'mind-independent'. What 'mind independence' is, is an extrapolation based on the scientific principle of bracketing out the subjective view, but mis-applied to reality as a whole. It mistakes the methodological step of 'bracketing the subjective' for a metaphysical principle 'the world we see is the same as would exist were we not in it.'

I'm asking you to assess whether or not physicalism is possibly true, in terms of it possibly corresponding to phenomenal reality — Relativist

To answer in terms of the geneology of the idea of modern physicalism. 'Geneology' is the history and background to an idea, how it developed over time. Harking back to Descartes - his philosophy divided the world into res extensa, extended matter, and res cogitans, literally a 'thinking thing' ('res' being the root of 'reality'.) So, thinking being and extended matter. But, as has been often commented, Descartes himself could never account for how res cogitans and matter interacted, if they're of such radically different kinds. So it was inevitable that the whole concept of 'res cogitans', the so-called 'ghost in the machine', would be jettisoned, in favour of a model which proceeded to explain 'everything there is' in terms of res extensa, extended matter, which has, after all, provided enormous material power. I think that's overwhelmingly what is behind today's physicalism and scientific materialism - which is, as said, powerful, but at the expense of bracketing out the subject to whom it is meaningful, hence 'the meaning crisis.'

Here, the word 'substance' is being used in the philosophical sense i.e. 'bearer of predicates', So he's arguing that while the proverbial apple, tree or chair really do exist, they don't comprise some 'corporeal substance' which is real wholly apart from their phenomenal appearance. So, yes, apples, trees and chairs really do exist, but they lack the inherent reality that naive realism tends to impute to them. Whilst I have differences with Berkeley's philosophy on other grounds, here I'm in agreement . — Wayfarer

I would agree that Berkeley made a cogent critique of Cartesian and Lockean metaphysics, but I’m not sure that those critiques apply to all forms of metaphysical realism. In the more traditional Aristotelian formulation, matter was construed not as res extensa, nor as a bare substrate, but rather as the principle of individuation and potentiality in the world. In this view, a material object is not mere matter (which cannot not exist on its own), but a compound of matter and form. The mind gains knowledge of material objects via the processes of perception and understanding (intentional acts), through which it comes to grasp the very same forms inherent in the material object itself. This approach would seem to dodge Berkeley’s critique by eliminating the gulf between matter and mind that was opened up by Cartesian dualism and Lockean representationalism because the mind comes to grasp the intelligible forms inherent in the object itself.

Well, yes, but notice something - mathematical models are essentially intellectual in nature. Myself, I am sympathetic to Aristotelian realism, which declares that 'intelligible objects' (including numbers) are real - but they're not corporeal (or material). So they're 'mind-independent' in the sense that they are in no way dependent on your mind or mine - but then, they are only perceptible to the rational intellect, so in that second sense, not mind-independent at all. — Wayfarer

Yes, I think we agree on this for the most part. Aristotelian realism does indeed declare that mathematical models are incorporeal intelligible objects (i.e. mathematical forms), but it also allows these forms to ‘inhere” in material objects (which, as discussed above, are compounds of matter and form). So on the Aristotelian account the mind would come to grasp basic mathematical forms (quantity, relation, etc) via abstraction from sense perception. Aristotle’s approach to mathematics was rather “down to earth” in comparison with his mentor’s, and I don’t believe that he would have been in agreement with Augustine on this matter, who seemed to favor a more Platonic theory of mathematical objects.

The genius of modern physics, and scientific method generaly, was to find ways to harness physical causation to mathematical necessity. And this is actually further grounds for a scientifically-informed objective idealism. But this came at a cost - the elimination or bracketing out of the subject in who's mind these facts obtain, with the consequence that they came to be seen as true independently of any mind whatever. Especially when taken to be true of empirical objects, this introduces a deep contradiction, because empirical objects cannot, pace Kant, be understood as truly 'mind-independent'. That is responsible for many of the controversies in these matters. — Wayfarer

I agree that sciences such as physics succeed by abstracting away the subjective aspect of experience, but I think this can be interpreted in many ways. The representationalism of the early moderns created an epistemological chasm between subject and object - namely, the mind can only know representations of empirical objects, which are purely constructions of the mind and which contain nothing of the objects themselves. But again, perhaps the Aristotelian tradition could offer a way out of this impasse. Perhaps what the mind grasps through the physical sciences are the intelligible forms of material objects themselves, abstracted from sense perception. This doesn’t have to lead us back to naive realism, because we can distinguish between knowledge of material objects as they are in relation to our sense faculties (e.g. knowledge of how objects look, feel, taste, etc.) and knowledge of material objects as they are in relation to each other (e.g. quantitative relations of mass, velocity, etc.). While the former is truly relative to our sense faculties (and therefore, does not constitute knowledge of objects “in-themselves”), the latter is not. Perhaps this could be one way for a realist to evade the charge of incoherence.

But, as said, my sympathies are with some form of Platonic realism. And this is consistent with the views expressed in the mind-created world. (It is perhaps best expressed in Husserl's mature philosophy but that is a subject I'm still studying.) — Wayfarer

Ah, I see. I think in one of the comments above you had mentioned you were partial to “Aristotelian” realism, but probably had meant to write “Platonic” realism. I've decided to leave my response as originally written. Apologies for any confusion in my above comments.

This is precisely the 'objection of David Hume'. It was Hume who pointed out that the conjunction of events such as the effects of collisions leads us to believe that these are necessary facts, when in reality, there is no logical basis for such a belief, other than the repeated observation. That is central to the whole 'induction/deduction' split which begins with Hume. But, recall, it was precisely this which awoke Kant from his 'dogmatic slumber' and inspired him to show that these kinds of physical reactions are intelligible precisely because of the categories of the understanding which the mind must bring to them. Again, this calls into question the natural presumption that these kinds of causal relations must be real independently of any mind, as Kant demonstrates that the whole idea of 'causal relations' is not really grounded in observation as such, but in the fact that causal relations are native to the intellect. — Wayfarer

Certainly, Kant’s solution to Hume’s skepticism is ingenious, but I don’t believe it is the only path forward. Hume is reacting to the metaphysical and epistemological choices made by his predecessors and drawing out the somewhat absurd logical conclusions. Kant represents a major advance in modern philosophy, but he is ultimately solving problems that only arise out of choices made by the likes of Descartes and Locke. If we see Descartes and Locke as having taken a wrong turn, then we aren’t obliged to look to Kant for solutions, but can (perhaps) evade those problems at the outset by hearkening back to the classical realism of Aristotle and his successors instead.

That’s not to say that one can’t or shouldn’t ground their own philosophical outlook in the incredibly rich and subtle synthesis that Kant created, only that it isn’t the only way that one might proceed.

More opinion. Like a snake that can go a few days without eating, a sloth that can go a few days without taking a trip to the “bathroom”, so too has it been a few days since I inserted myself without being bidden.

To those who say: Phenomena….how things appear.
I say: Phenomena…..representation of things that have already appeared.
….how things appear is unintelligible in that there is no distinction in it from whether the “how” of the thing is its cause, or, the “how” of the thing it is its effect;
….that things appear indicates only a presence to the senses provided by some thing’s matter, matter alone, as the necessary occassion for, but cannot provide in itself, phenomena;
….phenomena cannot be how things appear.

To those who say: We can only have genuine knowledge and truth about the phenomenal world.
I say: We can only have empirical knowledge of representations of things of the world, and there is no universal criteria for empirical truths.
….phenomenal world is unintelligible; world is external, phenomena are internal; there is no such thing as a phenomenal world; the totality of all possible things is world; the totality of all possible phenomena is consciousness;
….all knowledge is genuine knowledge but nevertheless contingent; only mathematical truths are so necessarily, hence universally genuine, the distinction resides solely in relations to time;
….that this or that about a thing is true is not sufficient criteria for universal truth with respect to every possible thing;
…we cannot have genuine knowledge nor truths about the phenomenal, except those related to a priori mathematical construction which subsequently become things of sense.

To those who say: Kant would never question the veracity of Newtonian physics…
I say: In Kant 1786, if not direct questioning, then at least expressing concern over the lack of metaphysical ground for its justification, from which is deduced the impossibility of annexing absolute space and time to empirical domains on the one hand, and the synthetic a priori judgements necessary for the employment of mathematical constructs sufficient to explain those domains on the other.
….it isn’t the veracity in question; its the lack of proper justification, that is.

To those who say: Kant's view of TRUTH as a correspondence with phenomenal reality…
I say: have mistaken Kant’s view of truth, insofar as that which is true is nothing but a judgement in which the relations of the conceptions contained in it logically correspond to each other, in which case there is nothing therein related to phenomena, re: sensibility, but only to understanding or reason;
….that this or that is or is not true, has correspondence to reality, but this or that being A truth is not Kant’s view of TRUTH itself;
….the truth of any judgement resides in its form irrespective of its content; that which in a judgement is or is not true is the relations of its content. A judgement of correct form remains true or false depending on the relation of its content, but a judgement having incorrect form is a paralogism, in which the judgement is illusory, which is neither true nor false no matter the relations of its content;
….Kant view of TRUTH is not correspondence to phenomena or reality, and from which is found the answer to the question “what is truth”, supposed as being “the accordance with cognition with its object”, is wrong, such answer being exactly that “… which forces logicians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art…”.

To those who say: phenomena already imply subjectivity (…) and the physical already presupposes form…
I say: there is no consciousness in the origin of phenomena, therefore it is not an implication of subjectivity (…) the physical already presupposes matter.
….that the pure intuitions necessary for the synthesis which originate phenomena belong to a subject makes explicit they do not belong to that which provides the occasion for the synthesis of phenomena, or, which is the same thing, the appearance of the thing to the senses subsequently intuited as some undetermined thing;
….under the presumption that subjectivity relates to the capacity of a rational intelligence for its conscious activities, and given that the origin of phenomena are not within the conscious activity of a rational intelligence, it follows as a matter of course that subjectivity does not relate to phenomena, but only the use of them in a subsequent conscious activity, which is transcendentally represented by “I think”;
….phenomena imply a subject to which the employment of them has a purpose in a system. Subjectivity, then, with respect to phenomenon, indicates what purpose the phenomenon is thought to have.
….the representation “I think” already implies subjectivity.
—————-

….the designation of human sensory devices as physiology makes explicit they are susceptible only to the effects of physical conditions. The only property that can belong to all that is physical, is its extension into what is called space. The only extendable in space is matter. Therefore, the physical presupposes that by which it is extendable; the physical, then, with respect to human sensuous receptivity, presupposes matter.
….the shape matter assumes, is not its form by which it is intuited, but merely denotes a limit to its extension.

To those who say: Kant (…) is ultimately solving problems that only arise out of choices made by the likes of Descartes and Locke.
I say: he and all his predecessors….and everybody else…were imbued with the same cognitive system, whatever that may actually be. If it is the case such system is described sufficiently by his transcendental idealism, then it follows that Kant is ultimately solving problems that arise out of any improper use of that system.
….he incidentally solved specific problems, he may even be said to have been inspired by the occassion of certain metaphysical determinations, but is on record as stating his solutions obtain in all otherwise rationally equipped subjects that “…rise to the height of speculation…”, who are not necessarily anything like his peer group except in that way.
….while his philosophy is directed at the scholastically inclined, it pertains to even “those of common understanding”. They just don’t realize it, and may not care even if they did.

I just had a sandwich, I just put the seat down, so all done opinion-ating for a few days.

in no way can this be interpreted as 'a feature of objective reality'. It is the grounding truth of Descartes' first philosophy. — Wayfarer

There are 2 facts that I think you agree with:
1) mind-independent, objective reality exists
2) You (Wayfarer) exist.

I infer that you regard each of these as objective facts. I assumed you would consider #1 a comprehensive fact, and #2 as less comprehensive. I.e : #1 subsumes #2. So I labelled the subsumed, a feature. I don't care about the label. My point is that there is this subsumed relationship of #2 to #1.

Given this relationship, there are 2 possibilites: you are equivalent to objective reality (=solipsism) or you are something less, but included in objective reality. This opens the door for other subsumtions.

The quote from Descartes appears to express an attitude of reserving judgement toward solipsism - not that it's merely a remote possibility, but that there's no epistemic basis to decide yes or no.

Of course, Descartes isn't discussing epistemic bases for beliefs, he's discussing what is provable. If you reject solipsism (believe it likely to be false), as I expect you do, it cannot be because you can prove it, so you must have an epistemic basis. What is the basis? What caused you to believe it? How do you justify the belief?

That's what I mean by an 'implicit perspective'. Take that out, and we can't make sense of anything, as there is no perspective. So the empirical view is not truly 'mind-independent'. — Wayfarer

Making sense of something necessarily entails a perspective. The notion of a "thing as it is" does not imply that there can be no true statements about the thing.

What 'mind independence' is, is an extrapolation based on the scientific principle of bracketing out the subjective view, but mis-applied to reality as a whole. — Wayfarer

It's conceptual analysis, not science. "I think, therefore I am" is a statement of existence- and provides a ground for the concept of existence. If you believe you exist, then you believe there is existence. Reality is existence - so it's not a mis-application.

It mistakes the methodological step of 'bracketing the subjective' for a metaphysical principle 'the world we see is the same as would exist were we not in it.'

I think you're equivocating.
We have a mental world model, and it includes ourselves. We can mentally subtract our presence and envision the revised world, unproblematically.
In the comparison, we are never contemplating "the world as it is" much less "the world as it would be", because it is devoid of information. It's analgous to drawing conclusions based on objects: P1. Marble P2. Water C. Therefore ???


A point I've been trying to make is that "the world as it is" ="objective reality"= "mind-independent reality" can be referenced. I just referred to it 3 ways, and they entail some true statements about it. Same with the point I made at the beginning of this post.

I would agree that Berkeley made a cogent critique of Cartesian and Lockean metaphysics, but I’m not sure that those critiques apply to all forms of metaphysical realism. In the more traditional Aristotelian formulation, matter was construed not as res extensa, nor as a bare substrate, but rather as the principle of individuation and potentiality in the world. — Esse Quam Videri

Quite right—though it’s worth bearing in mind that Aristotelian (and Thomist) realism is a far cry from empiricism or modern scientific realism. It is built on the metaphysical reality of universals, which is precisely what nominalism has since done away with.

Although Berkeley was largely indifferent or even hostile to the Schoolmen, his idealism nevertheless arose as a reaction against the nominalist–empiricist schools that had already severed the older participatory epistemology characteristic of A-T philosophy. That broader historical context is the focus of another OP Idealism in Context.

I think in one of the comments above you had mentioned you were partial to “Aristotelian” realism, but probably had meant to write “Platonic” realism. — Esse Quam Videri

My view is broadly platonic, in that I believe intelligibles (I don't want to describe them as 'objects') are real but immaterial. As to whether and in what way they exist - this is the question! Aristotle, as you say, was more 'down to earth'. But as to the question of whether intelligibles 'exist in a separate Platonic realm', consider this passage on the meaning of separation.

Forms ...are radically distinct, and in that sense ‘apart,’ in that they are not themselves sensible things. With our eyes we can see large things, but not largeness itself; healthy things, but not health itself. The latter, in each case, is an idea, an intelligible content, something to be apprehended by thought rather than sense, a ‘look’ not for the eyes but for the mind. This is precisely the point Plato is making when he characterizes forms as the reality of all things. “Have you ever seen any of these with your eyes?—In no way … Or by any other sense, through the body, have you grasped them? I am speaking about all things such as largeness, health, strength, and, in one word, the reality [οὐσίας] of all other things, what each thing is” (Phd. 65d4–e1). Is there such a thing as health? Of course there is. Can you see it? Of course not. This does not mean that the forms are occult entities floating ‘somewhere else’ in ‘another world,’ a ‘Platonic heaven.’ It simply says that the intelligible identities which are the reality, the whatness, of things are not themselves physical things to be perceived by the senses, but must be grasped by thought. If, taking any of these examples—say, justice, health, or strength—we ask, “How big is it? What color is it? How much does it weigh?”we are obviously asking the wrong kind of question. Forms are ideas, not in the sense of concepts or abstractions, but in that they are realities apprehended by thought rather than by sense. They are thus ‘separate’ in that they are not additional members of the world of sensible things, but are known by a different mode of awareness. — Eric S Perl, Thinking Being: Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition, p28

But again, perhaps the Aristotelian tradition could offer a way out of this impasse — Esse Quam Videri

Yes—Edward Feser makes a strong contemporary case for that in Aristotle’s Revenge, arguing that modern science is quietly rediscovering exactly the kinds of formal and teleological principles that mechanistic metaphysics tried to exclude. And I've noticed neo-Aristotelian (and Platonist!) strands appearing in many discussions of contemporary biology.

To those who say: Kant would never question the veracity of Newtonian physics…
I say: In Kant 1786, if not direct questioning, then at least concern over the lack of metaphysical ground for its justification, from which is deduced the impossibility of annexing absolute space and time to empirical domains on the one hand, and the synthetic a priori judgements necessary for the employment of mathematical constructs sufficient to explain those domains on the other. — Mww

Caveat noted. I agree Kant wasn’t questioning the empirical success of Newtonian physics, only its ultimate metaphysical grounding.

A point I've been trying to make is that we "the world as it is" ="objective reality"= "mind-independent reality" can be referenced — Relativist

Indeed they can, and nothing I've said denies that. But the metaphysical points remain. First, reality is far greater than what we know exists. And also that to imagine the universe as it must be, without any subject, still assumes the implicit perspective of a subject, without which nothing could be imagined. I'm arguing against the attitude which sees humanity as a 'mere blip' (Stephen Hawking's derisive description of man as 'chemical scum'.) We are the 'mere blip' in which the Universe comes to know itself.

In the more traditional Aristotelian formulation, matter was construed not as res extensa, nor as a bare substrate, but rather as the principle of individuation and potentiality in the world. In this view, a material object is not mere matter (which cannot not exist on its own), but a compound of matter and form. The mind gains knowledge of material objects via the processes of perception and understanding (intentional acts), through which it comes to grasp the very same forms inherent in the material object itself. — Esse Quam Videri

Before the idea came into collision with modern philosophy, there is the view of Plotinus who presented 'matter' as a field penetrated by form but never completely occupied by it. All the ways to understand an "individual" had to be looked for on the side of the intellectual soul.

That does not sum up all that the 'scholastics' said but does reflect Augustine's preference for Plotinus over Plato.

Indeed they can, and nothing I've said denies that. But the metaphysical points remain. First, reality is far greater than what we know exists. — Wayfarer

There's certainly much to be discovered, and probably much that isn't discoverable. But this doesn't falsify any metaphysical theories (including, but not limited to, physicalism).

And also that to imagine the universe as it must be, without any subject, still assumes the implicit perspective of a subject, without which nothing could be imagined.

I have not disputed that. What I've noted is that this doesn't preclude making true statements about reality, from a human perspective. The statements would reflect information about reality. For this reason, a metaphysical theory could be possibly true. The notions of perspective and the "world as it is" do not undermine this.

I'm arguing against the attitude which sees humanity as a 'mere blip' (Stephen Hawking's derisive description of man as 'chemical scum'.) We are the 'mere blip' in which the Universe comes to know itself.

The "universe" knows itself? How so? Humans know something about the universe, but humans are not the universe. As we've discussed, knowledge of the universe is distinct from the universe itself. You also agree that the universe existed for billions of years before we existed, which implies there were no minds "knowing" anything. Of course, my observation is based on a human perspective, but it's nevertheless true.

I do value humanity and knowledge, and agree we are more than scum, but the universe doesn't seem dependent on us, or on the existence of knowledge about it.

Quite right—though it’s worth bearing in mind that Aristotelian (and Thomist) realism is a far cry from empiricism or modern scientific realism. It is built on the metaphysical reality of universals, which is precisely what nominalism has since done away with. — Wayfarer

Generally speaking, yes, though it’s worth noting that some contemporary philosophers interpret the Aristotelian tradition in a broadly materialist way (William Jaworski is the only name coming to mind, but I know there are others). While recognizing the reality of form, they maintain that only material substances exist. Form is always yoked to matter and is understood as the principle of structure/pattern within nature. Such an approach denies the existence of Platonic heavens, separable/immortal souls, angelic/spiritual beings, etc.

Although Berkeley was largely indifferent or even hostile to the Schoolmen, his idealism nevertheless arose as a reaction against the nominalist–empiricist schools that had already severed the older participatory epistemology characteristic of A-T philosophy. That broader historical context is the focus of another OP Idealism in Context. — Wayfarer

Looks like an interesting thread. I will take a look.

Yes—Edward Feser makes a strong contemporary case for that in Aristotle’s Revenge, arguing that modern science is quietly rediscovering exactly the kinds of formal and teleological principles that mechanistic metaphysics tried to exclude. And I've noticed neo-Aristotelian (and Platonist!) strands appearing in many discussions of contemporary biology. — Wayfarer

Yes, it seems that classical ideas have been making a bit of a comeback in the last 20 - 30 years, both within science and philosophy, though still very far from being anything like the dominant paradigm. Personally, I welcome the change.

Regrettably, I haven't had a chance to dig that deeply into the work of Plotinus, though I'd like to at some point. I know that there are some figures on the contemporary scene who are heavily steeped in that tradition (John Verveake comes to mind).

Verveake has come up a lot in discussions here. I suggest searching the site regarding Plotinus to get a sense of the disputes underway and what different people make of them, specifically as the issues concern Aristotle.

it’s worth noting that some contemporary philosophers interpret the Aristotelian tradition in a broadly materialist way. — Esse Quam Videri

Considerably easier to defend in the Academy!

But here is where my preferred heuristic distinguishes between what is real and what exists. I maintain that universals, numbers and logical laws are real even if they are not phenomenally existent. They are real as the 'invariant content of reason':

Intelligible objects must be higher than reason because they judge reason. Augustine means by this that these intelligible objects constitute a normative standard against which our minds are measured (lib. arb. 2.5.12 and 2.12.34). We refer to mathematical objects and truths to judge whether or not and to what extent our minds understand mathematics. — Cambridge Companion to Augustine

We can maintain that mathematical objects are mind-independent, self-subsistent and in every sense real, and we can also explain how we are cognitively related to them: they are invariants in our experience, given fulfillments of mathematical intentions. ...

We can evidently say, for example, that mathematical objects are mind-independent and unchanging, but now we always add that they are constituted in consciousness in this manner, or that they are constituted by consciousness as having this sense … . They are constituted in consciousness, nonarbitrarily, in such a way that it is unnecessary to their existence that there be expressions for them or that there ever be awareness of them. (p. 13). — Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics (review)

Bolds added. So: intelligibles are real, but not in the sense of being 'out there somewhere'. They are indispensable constituents of reason, but they are not materially existent. Here is where I would part company with the kinds of interpretation you mentioned.

The "universe" knows itself? How so? — Relativist

Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately. — Julian Huxley, Religion without Revelation

Even if we frame 'the world' as the 'in itself', forever beyond human experience (as Kant would have it) it seems undeniable that if we and the animals didn't know anything the world we would not survive for long, and it seems that that "knowledge" is not discursive knowledge at all, but is given pre-cognitively

In this sense we know about this domain, or arena we find ourselves in. But what is that? And is that the world, or effectively a mirror in which we see ourselves? The world giving us what is apposite to our nature.

So the conclusion would be that we do know things about the world, but cannot prove that we do. It is merely the inference to what seems to be (to me at least) the best explanation for what we do experience.

Yes, we do know things about the world, but we don’t know what it is we know, or what it means, apart from what it is to us and means to us. So again, the mirror.

I’m not suggesting Solipsism, but rather that for whatever reason the world is veiled from us and that veil presents as our nature. We are the veil, it is for us to clear the veil and make it transparent. So we, our being, can see the world through it.

The "universe" knows itself? How so?

Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately. — Wayfarer

It's perfectly fine to have such an outlook on humanity, but projecting this onto the universe as a whole is unjustified: After humans inevitably cease to exist, the universe will return to the state it started as: as unconscious as a rock.

But here is where my preferred heuristic distinguishes between what is real and what exists. I maintain that universals, numbers and logical laws are real even if they are not phenomenally existent. They are real as the 'invariant content of reason': — Wayfarer

It sounds like we would generally agree here, though I'm perhaps more hesitant to posit reason as a transcendental invariant, because if we do so then it seems like it becomes more difficult to explain the fact that we (apparently) have to learn how to reason, or that standards of reason have evolved over time, or that traumatic brain injury can impair the use of reason, etc.

Don't get me wrong, I don't want to idolize reason and rationality. It's more that I think the decline of the classical understanding of the faculty of reason has had hugely deleterious consequences. The decline of scholastic realism has had huge consequences for culture, but they're very hard to discern because nominalism is so 'baked in'.

But you and I have been through that, and this is not our fate (to quote the bard).

↪Wayfarer
Well, we see things very differently. — Janus

Janus & Wayfarer do tend to view the Mind-Matter problem of Philosophy-Science somewhat differently. So I learn different-but-valuable perspectives from each of you. As I graphically indicated in a previous post, Wayfarer seems to view the world through a Platonic lens, while Janus prefers the Aristotelian view. But I think a complete worldview would include elements of both.

Earlier in this thread, Janus' realistic reply*1 to Wayfarer's idealistic take on the Hard Problem rang a bell for me. So, I added a new post*2 to my blog on the topic of a Cosmos Evolved Mind. It's not intended to take sides in the debate, but to look at Both Sides Now*3. :grin:


*1. The question begging presumption :
“If matter, in all its forms, were nothing but mindless substance, then of course it would follow by mere definition that conscious material is impossible. But that is specifically the "question-begging presumption" I was referring to.” ___Janus

*2. Right Stuff to Evolve Consciousness :
The intending, observing & knowing Mind itself is the “question-begging presumption” that needs to be explained, in order to understand how subjective Mind could evolve from objective Matter.
https://bothandblog9.enformationism.info/page10.html
Note --- Perhaps Quantum randomness & probability may be the "arational" element in the evolution of sentient & logical beings from a burst of cosmic energy. Post 147 is just one of many on the Consciousness conundrum that has bugged philosophers for ages. The second page gets more directly to the point of this forum reply.

*3. BOTH SIDES NOW
. . . . . . . . .
I've looked at life Mind from both sides now
From win and lose and still somehow
It's life's illusions I recall
I really don't know life at all
It's life's illusions that I recall
I really don't know life
I really don't know life at all

Songwriter : Joni Mitchell

In this sense we know about this domain, or arena we find ourselves in. But what is that? And is that the world, or effectively a mirror in which we see ourselves? The world giving us what is apposite to our nature. — Punshhh

I don't know the answer to that—we are given what we are given. Are you suggesting Karma?

Yes, we do know things about the world, but we don’t know what it is we know, or what it means, apart from what it is to us and means to us. So again, the mirror.

I’m not suggesting Solipsism, but rather that for whatever reason the world is veiled from us and that veil presents as our nature. We are the veil, it is for us to clear the veil and make it transparent. So we, our being, can see the world through it. — Punshhh

I think we do know what it is we know. I would just say that discursive knowledge will be forever incomplete, and also that discursive knowledge of a thing is not, and cannot be, the thing itself, because the discursive knowledge is an idea and the thing known is not.

We know the world non-discursively and that non-discursive knowledge is not separate from what is known. We always already do know the world non-discursively, it is just a matter of learning to attend to that, rather than being lost in discourse and explanation. Mind you, I'm not saying there is anything wrong with discourse and explanation, just that it needs to take its place alongside our non-discursive awareness, lest we lose ourselves in the confusion that comes form "misplaced concreteness" (Whitehead).

We already do that for much of our days. The "spotlight" of conscious awareness is operative for far less of our time.

:smile: Cheers. I am not averse to Platonism, and I don't think Aristotle was either. The latter viewed the forms, and potentiality and possibility, as immanent rather than transcendent. I think it is our outdated notion of matter as "mindless stuff" that leads to positing a transcendent realm of perfect forms and universals. I like Whitehead's idea of a "world-soul", which I see as being akin to Spinoza's "natura naturans" (nature as a creative force). Spinoza calls that God, but God in Whitehead is not the creator, but rather the first and necessary creation that unifies all experience, and evolves along with everything else.

There is some interesting research being done by Michael Levin et al, which seems to show that not all self-organizing forms must have evolved. It does seem to suggest an inherent self-organization of matter, a kind of pansychism and Whitehead's philosophy also incorporates this idea. But the idea is not that of some eternal, overarching, transcendent mind or consciousness that is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent. For me soul is equivalent to psyche (in line with Jung) not with consciousness. The greater part of the soul or psyche is unconscious. Our consciousness does not create the world, but is always already "thrown into the world", subject to forces of which it can be but dimly consciously aware, but which are nonetheless felt. Whitehead's philosophy makes much of feeling.

Yes. And don't forget, we are stardust, we are golden, we are billion year old carbon. And we got to get ourselves back to the garden.

Our consciousness does not create the world, but is always already "thrown into the world", — Janus

Hey, coral polyps create coral reefs. I think we do something analogous.

One thing Levin is clear about is that physicalism doesn’t accommodate what he is calling the “platonic” elements that he’s talking about. They’re very much more like formal and final causes. They function as real constraints and goal-states that guide biological processes without being reducible to any particular physical mechanism. In that sense, they are not explanatory add-ons but part of what actually does the organizing work in living systems. They are teleodynamic, to use Deacon's term - oriented towards ends - which nothing in physics is, per se, except in the general sense of increasing entropy.

Levin himself says he doesn't have a clear idea of what "platonic space" is. He posits it because mechanistic causation cannot really begin to explain morphogenesis. If the platonic space is not an inherent "minding" within things, then we have a problem of understanding just what and where we should think it is.

Embryogenesis already shows that cells somehow cooperate to produce very specific forms. The idea of a platonic space is, at this stage at least, an explanatory add-on. We know that something non-mechanistic, something livingly organic, must be at work everywhere in the world, but we have no clear idea of what it could be.

Whitehead, whose philosophy you know I have long admired, sees the whole of nature as organic, and in that sense physics would be rightly a part of biology. Whitehead has no room in his philosophy for a "transcendental ego", and I agree with him in that—I think it is a linguistically driven reification—a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness", to use Whitehead's phrase.

But Whitehead, as you will well know, was vociferously critical of the 'bifurcation of nature' and the Cartesian division. Whitehead was really rather pantheistic in his sympathies, believing that the most primitive elements of being were 'actual occasions of experience' rather than the physical forces of atomistic materialism. Me, I've never quite been able to grasp his 'actual occasions of experience', but I certainly agree with his rejection of the bifurcation of nature.

The "bifurcation of nature" can be understood in more than one way. Whitehead specifically had Kant and the German idealists (other than Schelling whose philosophy he admired and was influenced by) when he spoke of the bifurcation of nature. "Phenomenon/ noumenon", "Will and Representation", "Appearance and Reality", "Subject and Object", "Matter and Mind" and so on—he saw all as being philosophically misleading, at least as I read him.

As I understand Whitehead, actual occasions of experience are for him the real existents, and objects are mere hypostatization's. However, he was a "pan-experientialist" in that he did not confine experiencing to humans, animals or even plants. This "experiencing" would explain how Levin's "bots" are drawn (by feeling and not by any sort of imposed-from-above conscious intention) to the self-organizing behaviors they exhibit.

I mean even fundamental particles organize themselves in a profoundly ordered way.

Discussed in another of Gnomon's threads, from which:



Do notice the title of this article: ‘Apart from the Experiences of Subjects There Is Nothing, Nothing, Nothing, Bare Nothingness’—Nature and Subjectivity in Alfred North Whitehead

Seems strangely familar :chin:

So he's re-stating one of the main ideas in mind-created world, i.e. the centrality of the subject. But he conceives of subjectivity on the level of 'actual occasions of experience', which I find an impossible idea to grasp.

I don't have time to read that now to find out whether the article accords with my own understanding of Whitehead, but I'll just note that according to my understanding, for Whitehead the subject is not a transcendental ego, and subjecthood is not confined, as I said above, to humans, animals or even plants.

So, "subjects" for Whitehead does not refer just to us, and he was opposed to human exceptionalism. Actual occasions of experience would count, I think, for Whitehead as subjects, in that there is a subjection to experience. He also speaks of subjection and superjection, but I am not clear enough from memory to explain that right now.

I don't know what you allude to by "strangely familiar" but Whitehead would certainly agree with you that scientific understanding should not be confined merely to thinking in terms of efficient causation.

The other thing to remember about Whitehead is that although his initial training was in physics and mathematics, he though poetic language is of prime importance in philosophy, and that all explanations are more or less inadequate to experience.

Whitehead was really rather pantheistic in his sympathies, believing that the most primitive elements of being were 'actual occasions of experience' rather than the physical forces of atomistic materialism. Me, I've never quite been able to grasp his 'actual occasions of experience', — Wayfarer

Could be as the events of a Block Universe.