This is the most fun I've had with a discussion in a long time. — T Clark

Very good discussion!

we just differ on the solution. We don't even disagree much on that. — T Clark

Especially because I see a lot of latitude in interpreting what Sider recommends. To say it again -- his main concern is to draw some kind of distinction (that matters) between a term and its reference. One way of doing that is to use some version of Ontologese, but a curious, flexible willingness to "try on" another's terminology might accomplish much the same thing.

how can we interact with, experience, the Tao without being able to consciously, i.e. verbally, think about it? What is non-verbal consciousness? What is awareness without consciousness? — T Clark

Yes, these are aspects of the consciousness question that are often ignored when Western philosophers talk. You'd think, reading the literature on consciousness, that no one had ever tried to meditate -- much less entire centuries-long traditions of it!

"Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking" by Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander. — T Clark

Thanks, I'll check it out. I've read a bunch of Hofstadter with pleasure.

Yes, but there is a distinction between technical language and jargon. — T Clark

My concern is what is advocating for is a massive jargonization of philosophy. — hypericin

You're both pointing to the problem -- what's the difference between defining operators and domains in logic, versus a similar operation in ordinary language? Sider is a good writer, but his background is what I'd call technical. I agree, we don't want jargon, and we don't know how far we can push this idea before Ontologese becomes unintentionally comic. Heidegger is an interesting example. I think he was absolutely right to invent some new coinages to talk about his idea of Being, and amazingly enough, at least one (Dasein) has actually stuck. But his way of using those new terms . . . not easy, and often not clear, which was supposed to be the whole point. Sartre too, with pour-soi and en-soi.

it seems a fantasy that a singular set of terms, with universally agreed definitions, could ever be achieved. — hypericin

Yes, but . . . isn't that what happened, more or less, with several logical languages? So it can be done, and done usefully. The problem, once again, is whether ordinary language is flexible enough, and its users willing enough.

I don't really see an alternative to what is sometimes done already: for individual philosophers to rigorously define their terms from the outset, as best they are able. — hypericin

I think that's fine, as long as everyone steers clear of arguing whether they're the right definitions. Maybe that could come later, after the participants have gotten a better look at what sort of structure you can build using those definitions. This presupposes that structure is to a significant degree independent of language, so I'm with Sider there.

Yes, but . . . isn't that what happened, more or less, with several logical languages? So it can be done, and done usefully. — J

Logical languages have basic concepts that are very well agreed upon. Ontologese would not. Everyone would have their options on what should and shouldn't be included. And everyone would have their own definitions. This would lead to either the wrangling we are trying to avoid, or an explosion of terms, designating multiple takes for each term.

amazingly enough, at least one (Dasein) has actually stuck. But his way of using those new terms . . . not easy, and often not clear, which was supposed to be the whole point. — J

Dasein is particularly opaque. But this is the general problem. The idea that all of these terms would be transparent, clear, and agreed upon seems highly optimistic.

I don't believe that this can end terminological debates. The best is that it can keep them mostly substantive.

I really can't disagree with this. An actual adoption of Ontologese is utopian, or possibly dystopian, as you point out. But if, having taking Sider's ideas on board, we can do a better job of keeping debates substantive, that would be significant. The question of substantivity is what motivated Sider in the first place, and it certainly drives us nuts when we get pulled away into terminological wrangles.

I think there are interesting questions remaining about reference magnetism. @T Clark has articulated the issue with fundamentality very well. I find myself pulled both ways on it. I don't want reference magnetism (or joint-carving) to depend on a perception of ontological structure that is completely independent of human conceptualization. Rather, I want it to do what Sider (mainly) asks of it: to help us separate terms from what they refer to. Is there more? It's worth quoting Sider again:

Epistemic value: joint-carving languages and beliefs are better. If structure is subjective, so is this betterness. This would be a disaster. . . If there is no sense in which the physical truths are objectively better than the scrambled ["bizarre"] truths, beyond the fact that they are [true] propositions that we have happened to have expressed, then the postmodernist forces of darkness have won. — Sider, 65.

That last phrase is silly rhetoric, but the rest is provocative. Sider brings in the idea that some languages and beliefs are epistemically better. He doesn't elaborate on what "betterness" is, but we could probably fill in the story using the successes of science, at the very least.

So maybe we should concentrate on epistemology rather than ontology. There is no knowing without a knower. If joint-carving terms are better for us in knowing the world, isn't that consistent with agnosticism about Fundamental-with-a-capital-F ontology? Turning the question around: Is "knowing better" a fundamental ontological category? I don't see how, and that's good.

The other question that Sider's thought highlights is the role of truth in epistemology. He's not the first to have noticed that "truth is not enough" -- that we don't want just any truths, but truths that carry a certain perspective or depth. Giving content to that additional "oomph" isn't easy. For Sider, it has to do with the references of the true statements -- whether they're reference magnets and carve at the joints. I think this is a promising line of inquiry. It's always going to be helpful to remind ourselves that what is true and what matters are different issues.