In both cases we are referring to something that does not exist. — RussellA

You keep saying that. But I don't understand what it is that we are referring to. What's worse is that you are saying on one hand that this object must exist and that it doesn't.

We can talk about Sherlock Holmes who does not exist, and Meinong’s logic can deal with non-existent objects, such as round-squares — RussellA

In a sense, both halves are true. The difficulty is that Meinong, IMO, doesn't explain anything, but simply assigns names (labels) to the problems. What we need is a way of seeing through the problems so that we can understand that they are illusions created by our misunderstanding of language. That's what the logical analysis is intended to do.

I agree that on the micro scale, such as a second, I do feel that I experience a duration of time, even though intellectually I believe that there can be only one moment in time. Very mysterious. — RussellA

Very mysterious indeed, and when thoroughly analyzed, along with the ability to direct one's own actions through choice, it becomes very complicated.

The state of affairs is an apple falling with an acceleration of 9.8m/s². — Banno

Sure, that's a state of affairs meant to describe a specific situation, but it would be false in any particular case. Due to resistance from the air, friction, the apple does not actually accelerate in the way of your statement.

Put simply, states of affairs can be dynamic. — Banno

What you have done is reduced a dynamic situation to a state of affairs. But your state of affairs is false because it does not properly account for the dynamics of the situation. In reality, the rate of acceleration varies over time, due to the forces of friction from the air, and probably some other factors. As the apple accelerates, the force of friction increases and counteracts the acceleration, until a balance would be reached when there would be no more acceleration. In the true dynamics of the situation acceleration would not be constant. Therefore the state of affairs which you stated is false because it does not describe the dynamics of the situation.

You reduce a dynamic situation to a state of affairs, "an apple falling with an acceleration of 9.8m/s²", but that state of affairs is actually false because it does not adequately account for the true dynamics of the situation. You have provided a very good example of why states of affairs cannot provide an adequate representation of a dynamic world. Describing a dynamic situation as a state of affairs will always fail to capture the true dynamics of the situation.

If you like, we can include an error: the apple accelerates at 9.8±0.1m/s².

Your objection is vacuous.

If you like, we can include an error: the apple accelerates at 9.8±0.1m/s². — Banno

It's still incorrect, for the reasons explained. And as a philosopher, your attempts to avoid the reality of the situation through denial are unconscionable.

Seems to me the best way to proceed is by differentiating Combinatorialism and Abstractionism, and at the core the difference is that while Abstractionism sets up possible worlds in terms of states of affairs, Combinatorialism sets it up by combinations of individuals, relations and universals. Trouble is that Combinatorialists go on to talk about states of affairs. But if we are to make sense of the distinction those states of affairs for Combinatorialists consist in combinations of individuals and relations, but for Abstractionists they are fundamental.

It's still incorrect, for the reasons explained. — Metaphysician Undercover

You didn't explain anything.

You made a category mistake, confusing idealised description with false description. Physics routinely abstracts stuff like constant acceleration without asserting completeness.

You tried a straw man; Physics doesn't claim that some state of affairs is maximally detailed or “accounts for all forces”.

You used a non sequitur, since from “it does not capture all dynamics” it does not follow that it is captures none.

You missed the point entirely: the example was precisely to show that a state of affairs can be temporally extended and dynamic.

In short, you mistook modelling for misdescription, and abstraction for error.

You used a non sequitur, since from “it does not capture all dynamics” it does not follow that it is captures none. — Banno

You are neglecting the point I was making. The point was that the entirety of the observed world cannot be described by states of affairs. I readily admit that states of affairs capture some of reality, but there is a very significant and real portion which cannot be described this way.

You might prefer Wittgenstein's logic "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent", but I prefer to think that when we reach the current limitations of our language, and there is still reality which we cannot describe, then we must devise new ways of speaking.

When we reach the limits of what "states of affairs" can do for us, and there is still more reality to describe, we must devise a new way to speak about it.

You missed the point entirely: the example was precisely to show that a state of affairs can be temporally extended and dynamic. — Banno

I've always agreed that states of affairs are temporally extended. In fact, I insist that they must be temporally extended. That's why I object to concepts like "instantaneous velocity" which are not really instantaneous states of affairs, but just use that word, And, I do not deny that "states of affairs" are very useful to describe a significant part of the empirical world. The issue is with the rest of the observed empirical world, the part which sound logic demonstrates cannot be described with states of affairs.

In short, you mistook modelling for misdescription, and abstraction for error. — Banno

You continue with your straw man. The point is that modeling the observed empirical world as states of affairs and nothing else is an error. Above, you accept that states of affairs "does not capture all dynamics". So how does the other, the part not captured by states of affairs fit into the abstractionist's model of possible worlds? If you reject the sound logic, and simply refuse to accept that there is any part of empirical reality which cannot be describe as states of affairs, then you are in denial.

I readily admit that states of affairs capture some of reality, but there is a very significant and real portion which cannot be described this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

So how do you know it even exists, pardon my juvenile abutment.

You seem to be very capable of describing just about anything, things known and unknown. So, how do you differentiate between "a very significant and real" portion you have absolute proof or reasonable belief to exist, versus that of some unknown "oh who knows" cop-out of things that simply might or might not exist.

If you can refer to something, it can be described. If you have proof of something, or reasonable belief of said something, it can be referred to. Therefore, it can be described.

Are you just using these expressions to refer to the non-descript "unknown" or perhaps even possibility itself? What is "that which exists, could exist, will exist, or might exist, yet cannot be described?" :chin:

Is this something like qualia who we can all acknowledge the color red, perhaps even the idea of "redness" yet never truly agree on something that is intrinsically subjective to the person experiencing it? No, right? It has to be different than that. But is it as simple as a child who builds a perfectly functioning Lego roller coaster toy kit attempting to describe in detail the physics and engineering behind a real roller coaster at a theme park? Does this imply lack of current (perhaps eternal) knowledge that one day (if not hypothetically) can be obtained? Or is this simply walled off, in a way, from the human experience altogether?

If you reject the sound logic, and simply refuse to accept that there is any part of empirical reality which cannot be describe as states of affairs, then you are in denial. — Metaphysician Undercover

When we reach the limits of what "states of affairs" can do for us, and there is still more reality to describe, we must devise a new way to speak about it. — Metaphysician Undercover

It all depends on how you define "state of affairs". "Description" is simply a name for specific kinds of language, mostly those that are true or false. "State of affairs" is simply a name for what the description is a description of. It has very little content, like the word "thing".
There are also metaphorical descriptions, which are more complicated - but are often the engine that generates new kinds of description. When we have invented new kinds of description, "state of affairs" is extended to include those new kinds of description.
In other words "state of affairs" is just a correlative to "description", and is no more limited than "description".
You seem to have a more limited idea of what a state of affairs is. But it is just a question of definition, not of the nature of reality.

You are neglecting the point I was making. — Metaphysician Undercover

When the point you are making changes with your every post, it's not neglect.

And when you contradict yourself in the one paragraph - as were you say first that "the observed world cannot be described by states of affairs" then that "when we reach the current limitations of our language, and there is still reality which we cannot describe, then we must devise new ways of speaking"... and thereby say what was previously unsayable, presumably.

I've always agreed that states of affairs are temporally extended. — Metaphysician Undercover

That, now, despite your previously using Zeno's argument, in which they are not temporally extended... Make up your mind.

The point is that modeling the observed empirical world as states of affairs and nothing else is an error. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, since the state of affairs is how things are, not a model of how things are. You even misunderstand that.

So how do you know it even exists, pardon my juvenile abutment. — Outlander

I know it exists through the logic which I outlined, derived from Aristotle. If we describe the temporal world as a succession of states of affairs, then we notice that change has occurred between two distinct states of affairs. This implies that something very real happened between those states, and we desire to understand what it was. The "change" cannot be described as another state of affairs because this would lead to an infinite regress of intermediary states of affairs, without ever getting to a description of the change which happens between the distinct states of affairs.

If you can refer to something, it can be described. If you have proof of something, or reasonable belief of said something, it can be referred to. Therefore, it can be described. — Outlander

It definitely can be referred to, as I've been doing, and I believe it can be described or we can devise ways to describe it. it cannot be described as states of affairs though.

"State of affairs" is simply a name for what the description is a description of. It has very little content, like the word "thing". — Ludwig V

Right, so what I am talking about is something which cannot be placed in that category. The name "state of affairs" cannot be used to refer to this.

When we have invented new kinds of description, "state of affairs" is extended to include those new kinds of description. — Ludwig V

Not in this case, that would lead to the issue describe, potential infinite regress without ever describing the thing we want to describe. The thing we want to describe is something which demonstrable cannot be described as a state of affairs.

In other words "state of affairs" is just a correlative to "description", and is no more limited than "description". — Ludwig V

No it isn't If we insist that all description must be as a state of affairs, then we deny ourselves the capacity to describe this part of reality which cannot be described as a state of affairs. that would be a mistake.

And when you contradict yourself in the one paragraph - as were you say first that "the observed world cannot be described by states of affairs" then that "when we reach the current limitations of our language, and there is still reality which we cannot describe, then we must devise new ways of speaking"... and thereby say what was previously unsayable, presumably. — Banno

Where's the contradiction?

Indeed, since the state of affairs is how things are, not a model of how things are. — Banno

Reread the section in the SEP. The state of affairs is a description, that's how possible worlds can consist of states of affairs. If the state of affairs corresponds with "how things are" in the concrete world, it is said to "obtain". Come on Banno, you are falling right back into your bad habits of that other thread. This is "abstractionism", get with the program.

The state of affairs is a description — Metaphysician Undercover

:grin:

The state of affairs is that the apple is on the table. It is, for the purposes of the Abstractionist, an abstract object. It is not a description.

Where's the contradiction? — Metaphysician Undercover

You can't see it. That's a problem for you. Fine.

Right, so what I am talking about is something which cannot be placed in that category. The name "state of affairs" cannot be used to refer to this. — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought so. Can you give me a reason for restricting the term in that way?

EDIT
On reflection, there is a bit more that I can say.

I have no doubt that change can be accommodated as a "state of affairs".
@Banno has already given an example, I offer "The plane is flying from London to Edinburgh" is clearly a state of affairs. But it is a process which will not change (much) as long as it is flying. That is, it is a continuous process, which occupies time.
We can also easily accommodate changes in the process. The plane may fly faster or slower, lower or higher, but all these changes are easily accommodate as states of affairs.
"The plane is taking off" also seems like a state of affairs. But it is accelerating, which means that its speed is changing. In this case, the speed is not just changing but the rate of change is changing. )The place accelerates faster as it travels down the runway.
But none of that presents a problem. What might present a problem is the fact that to speak of accelerating involves a concept of speed at an instant, But speed is defined as distance covered in a period of time, If the period of time is infinitely close to zero, it seems problematic. But the calculations work perfectly well, so I don't see that as a problem either.
But there is a problem here. If the plane started moving at 1:00, are the wheels turning at 1:00? In which case, it has already started at 1:00. Or are we to say that the wheels are stationary at 1:00? In which case, the plane has not yet started moving at 1:00. We may end up saying that the wheels were moving at infinite velocity at the moment of starting.
In other words, limits and boundaries do present problems and we may have difficulty saying what the state of affairs is at 1:00. This is not really a problem about states of affairs, but about boundaries and limiis. We need to recognize that they belong to neither of the states of affairs that exist on either side of them; these are in a different category and do not occupy space or time.
I think that this is the problem you have in mind when you talk of change between states of affairs.. But, I hope you can see that the problem is not about all changes, particularly not about changes that are processes and occupy time. It is about a certain kind of change, which is a boundary or limit. Nor is it a problem that affects just talk of "states of affairs". The same problem occurs whenever those changes occur and would face us whatever notation we decide to use.

What we need is a way of seeing through the problems so that we can understand that they are illusions created by our misunderstanding of language. That's what the logical analysis is intended to do. — Ludwig V

:up:

Quantification is not reference. So “there is no apple on the table” is ~∃x(Ax ^ Tx). But "There is no apple in the set” is ambiguous between ~∃x(Ax ^ Tx) and ∃(x)(~A(x) ^ T(x)) This last asserts that there are no apples at all. it's as if we read "There is no apple in the set” as saying that there is a non-existent apple on the table. — Banno

I am slowly working through your posts.

Yes, the word “obtain” is redundant in possible worlds, although still relevant in First Order Logic.

Yes, we cannot list all possible positions between two points, as such a list would be infinite.

What makes an apple the same apple in different possible worlds?
Russell’s Theory of Descriptions may have a flaw that truth is not always the property of a sentence. Kripke’s Rigid Designator may have the flaw in that names can still be used non-rigidly. Gareth Evans in his own theory of names attempts to combine a theory of descriptions with rigid designation.

As regards Plantinga
I can understand that in a possible world there may or may not be an apple. I can understand that if there is an apple, then this apple has its own unique haecceity. But I cannot understand that if in a possible world there is no apple, there still is the apple’s haecceity (though I listened on YouTube to a talk he gave at New York University about Naturalism and Evolution, and his arguments seemed quite weak)

As regards states of affairs being dynamic.
An apple falls off a branch and hits the ground. We cannot describe the movement of the apple from tree to ground by listing each position it will be in, as this list would be infinitely long, but we can describe its position knowing it is falling under a gravitational force of 9.8 m/s sq

What exactly is a state of affairs.

SEP - States of affairs

According to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the totality of states of affairs exhausts the space of possibilities; the totality of states of affairs that obtain are the (actual) world.

Wikipedia - State of Affairs (philosophy)

In philosophy, a state of affairs (German: Sachverhalt),[1] also known as a situation, is a way the actual world must be in order to make some given proposition about the actual world true; in other words, a state of affairs is a truth-maker, whereas a proposition is a truth-bearer

This suggests that a state of affairs is part of the actual world.

But the actual world can only exist at one moment in time. There is one moment in time when the apple leaves the tree, there is one moment in time when the apple hits the ground, and many moments in time between the two. At each moment in time, the apple will be at one position.

Even so, it may be that this moment in time has a duration, such as Planck time, and a position in space has an extension, such as Planck length.

Even if time has a minimum duration and space has a minimum extension, if a State of Affairs does exist in the actual world, then it can only exist as something within a moment in time, meaning that it is static rather than dynamic.

The equation s = 0.5 f t sq, which describes a change in position with a change in time, cannot exist as a State of Affairs in the actual world, as a State of Affairs can only exist in one moment in time, and a change in time cannot exist within one moment in time.

If a State of Affairs is something that is part of the actual world, because in the actual world time can only exist as a series of moments, a State of Affairs can only be something static.

What are the implications that existence is not a predicate
In a possible world, there may or may not be an apple.

If there is a single apple in this possible world, it would be redundant to say that “the apple exists in this possible world”, as this would be equivalent to saying “an existent apple exists in this possible world”. It would be better to say “there is an apple in this possible world”.

In there are no apples in this possible world, it would be redundant to say that “the apple does not exist in this possible world”, as this would be equivalent to saying “a non-existent apple does not exist in this possible world”. It would be better to say “there is no apple in this possible world”.

If existence is not a predicate, then neither can non-existence be a predicate

Similarly with the mind. I may or may not have the concept of an apple.

If I have the concept of an apple in my mind, it would be redundant to say that “the concept of an apple exists in my mind”, as this would be equivalent to saying “an existent concept of an apple exists in my mind”. It would be better to say “there is the concept of an apple in my mind”.

If I don’t have the concept of an apple in my mind, it would be impossible to say that “the concept of an apple does not exist in my mind”, as it would be impossible to say “a non-existent concept of an apple does not exist in my mind”. One cannot say anything.

Even though there is no apple in my actual world, I can still have the concept of an apple in my mind. Then when I refer to an apple, I am not referring to something in the world but am referring to something in my mind.

Seems to me the best way to proceed is by differentiating Combinatorialism and Abstractionism, and at the core the difference is that while Abstractionism sets up possible worlds in terms of states of affairs, Combinatorialism sets it up by combinations of individuals, relations and universals. Trouble is that Combinatorialists go on to talk about states of affairs. But if we are to make sense of the distinction those states of affairs for Combinatorialists consist in combinations of individuals and relations, but for Abstractionists they are fundamental. — Banno

I wrote a whole freakin' essay. :grimace:

Modal logic's touchstone is the way we think about the world around us. Simple stuff like: "What if I'd never been born?" That's the theme of a famous Christmas movie called "It's a Wonderful Life" starring Jimmy Stewart and Donna Reed:



In the movie, an angel shows the protagonist what the world would be like without him. He does this by literally putting the character into this alternate world, where he walks around learning what's happened to people he wasn't there to help. Some died. Some became alcoholics. Some took over the town and turned it into a dark hellhole.

Why is it so easy to follow the events of the movie? Why don't we become profoundly confused? Apparently it's because we routinely think this way. We look back and imagine a multitude of paths leading up to the singular present, and from there, we imagine a multitude of futures. Time is shaped like an hour glass in our minds. We're at that place in the middle where grains fall one at a time.

The old question appears, though. What is the relationship between the way we think and the way things really are? The first recorded philosopher to testify that we can't know the answer to that was Socrates in Plato's Crito. What is the role of the logician here? Is she supposed to answer the question that Socrates himself warned can't be answered?

I think abstractionism, concretism, and combinatorialism are three ways of exploring how extravagant we want to get with answering the question.

Concretism: I think this version forgets the original touchstone: the way we think. In the movie It's a Wonderful Life, that's not an alternate Jimmy Stewart. The whole point of the movie is that our Jimmy learns what the world would be like without him. If it turns out that that's a different Jimmy, then we really would become confused and turn the movie off. For all its advantages, I have to nix this one.

Abstractionism: This is a modest approach that enjoys roots in Frege. It gets thumbs up from philosophy of math. It says alternate worlds are figments of thought. How does that relate to the way the world really is? We don't know. We talk about sets, propositions, states of affairs, etc. because it's handy to use those ideas. When God Almighty steps in and reveals the true nature of Everything to us, we'll modify as needed.

Combinatorialists Some people say dreams are just memories that have been jumbled and recombined. Combinatorialists are saying the same thing about possible worlds. A possible world is just components of the actual world pulled apart and put back together in a new way. Is that true? They seem to be saying that I can't dream up anything truly new. I'm not fired up to argue about that. If an orbiting satellite wasn't really something new, it was just the same old stuff reorganized, then ok. It seemed new when they first thought of it, though.

The state of affairs is that the apple is on the table. It is, for the purposes of the Abstractionist, an abstract object. It is not a description. — Banno

So, "the apple is on the table" is an abstract object. That looks to me, like the type of abstract object which would be correctly called "a description". "Description" is defined as a spoken or written representation. Can you explain why I am wrong to call this type of abstract object a description?

Can you give me a reason for restricting the term in that way? — Ludwig V

The reason is the argument presented by Aristotle. Suppose at some time we have state of affairs A, and at a later time state of affairs B. Since these two are different we can conclude that change has occurred in the time between A and B. As philosophers we desire to know and understand this change. We might explain the change with a third, distinct state of affairs, C, which occurred between A and B, but then we have a change which occurred between A and C, and between C and B. We might posit two more states of affairs, D and E, to account for these changes, but then we have changes between A and D, D and C, C and E, and E and B, requiring more states of affairs. And so on.

As you can see, we are headed toward an infinite regress of states of affairs between A and B, without ever addressing the actual change which occurs between two states of affairs. So, what Aristotle proposed is that we recognize "change" or "becoming" as something distinct and incompatible with "states of affairs", or "being". This implies that something occurs between two successive states of affairs which cannot be accounted for with a state of affairs, and we know this as "change". This is the principal reason for Aristotle's duality of matter and form in his physics. When one state of affairs changes to another, the form or formula changes, but matter provides for the underlying continuity between the two.

If you look at combinatorialism in the SEP article, you'll see that the "particular", takes the place of matter. So we have the "universal" which serves as the descriptive (abstract) form or formula, and the "particular" which is explicitly separate from the formula which is a universal. In this way, the particular is allowed to be independent from every universal, and since identity is obtained from the universal formula. the problem of transworld identity is thereby avoid. The particles of matter, or even space-time points ("Quine (1968) and Cresswell (1972)") in this way, do not have an identity so their transworldliness does not violate the law of identity. The problem here of course, is whether the particulars, and the idea of "simples" in general, have any real substantial existence, or are they merely convenient fictions.

The reason is the argument presented by Aristotle. Suppose at some time we have state of affairs A, and at a later time state of affairs B. Since these two are different we can conclude that change has occurred in the time between A and B. As philosophers we desire to know and understand this change. We might explain the change with a third, distinct state of affairs, C, which occurred between A and B, but then we have a change which occurred between A and C, and between C and B. We might posit two more states of affairs, D and E, to account for these changes, but then we have changes between A and D, D and C, C and E, and E and B, requiring more states of affairs. And so on. — Metaphysician Undercover

So it does depend on the definition of "state of affairs". Aristotle's argument is indeed a good reason for changing that definition, to allow that states of affairs can comprise change. Problem solved!

This is the principal reason for Aristotle's duality of matter and form in his physics. When one state of affairs changes to another, the form or formula changes, but matter provides for the underlying continuity between the two. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I knew that was why Aristotle constructed his system. But I don't think it would be helpful to adopt it now that we have other ways of explaining it.

So it does depend on the definition of "state of affairs". Aristotle's argument is indeed a good reason for changing that definition, to allow that states of affairs can comprise change. Problem solved! — Ludwig V

The problem is not quite solved because you haven't produced the definition. And it's not that simple. If we redefine "state of affairs" as you suggest, such that 'state of affairs" covers all of reality, then all you have done is produced a false description of reality. Redefining things to suit your purpose, instead of to provide an understanding of reality doesn't solve the problem mentioned.

Yes, I knew that was why Aristotle constructed his system. But I don't think it would be helpful to adopt it now that we have other ways of explaining it. — Ludwig V

What other ways? Do you mean to define words so that they reflect the way that you want reality to be, rather than the way that it is? That's not very good ontology.

We might posit two more states of affairs, D and E, to account for these changes, but then we have changes between A and D, D and C, C and E, and E and B, requiring more states of affairs. And so on. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's the argument. What's your solution? To posit that all change takes place instantaneously between states of affairs? That's absurd. It is clear that most changes take place continuously over a period of time. Look around you.

And it's not that simple. If we redefine "state of affairs" as you suggest, such that 'state of affairs" covers all of reality, then all you have done is produced a false description of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know that reality is different from my version? Because of that argument? It is not a description of reality, but a reductio ad absurdum of a certain way of thinking about reality.
I did not say that "state of affairs" covers all of reality. I did allow that there are some events that do not fit in to that category.

This is the principal reason for Aristotle's duality of matter and form in his physics. When one state of affairs changes to another, the form or formula changes, but matter provides for the underlying continuity between the two. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. So there is no need to insist that all change occurs between states of affairs. I don't agree with his metaphysics, but it does solve the problem he was facing.

What other ways? Do you mean to define words so that they reflect the way that you want reality to be, rather than the way that it is? That's not very good ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

I like to define words so that they do not produce absurdities.

That's the argument. What's your solution? To posit that all change takes place instantaneously between states of affairs? That's absurd. — Ludwig V

Nothing is instantaneous. It would be equally absurd to say that one state of affairs instantaneously changed into another. I believe the solution is as recommended by Aristotle, we allow for an aspect of reality which defies the fundamental laws of logic. He called it "matter", "potential", and we know it as possibility, what may or may not be.

Exactly. So there is no need to insist that all change occurs between states of affairs. — Ludwig V

it's not that change necessarily exists between states of affairs. The two coexist. The absurdity of "between states of affairs" is just what occurs if you insist that all of reality can be conceived of as states of affairs. Then we'd have the situation of distinct states of affairs, and no explanation of how one state ends and one starts, or any relation between them.

So you don't seem to understand the problem. Here is another way to look at it. Suppose we propose that all of reality could be accounted for by states of affairs. I'm sure you would agree that there is a difference between distinct states of affairs. Isn't the difference between states of affairs also a part of reality? Therefore, in our account of reality we need to also account for the difference between states of affairs as well as the states of affairs.

Consider now that each possible world is a different state of affairs. The difference between each possible world is what "possibility" is. So we'll never understand the reality of what possibility is unless we recognize as real, that aspect which cannot be accounted for by states of affairs.

I like to define words so that they do not produce absurdities. — Ludwig V

Good luck with that!

An eloquent appraisal. Your differentiation of the three looks pretty much right to me.

I'm not keen on any of the three. I've mentioned that the use of "maximal" strikes me as problematic. The idea is introduced in the first paragraph and then more or less presumed throughout. It varies a bit, but the idea is something along the lines of a complete account of how things are. It's presumed, and perhaps erroneously, that a world is in some fashion complete.

In concrete approaches a world is defined as the maximally connected object. If we turn to abstractions, we have the world defined by every state of affairs being either included or excluded - again, a maximal (or total) account. If worlds are thought of as combinations, then possible worlds themselves are maximally consistent sets of sentences.

Each of these serves to delimit the extent of a possible world. Each excludes some possibilities and so serves to seperate one world from the others. And it is presumed that we need to do this in order to understand what a possible world is.

But I don't see why this is needed. We do not need a complete account of the world in order to consider what things would be like were Anne not at her desk. Ordinary counterfactual reasoning of this sort just is partial, local, and tolerant of indeterminacy elsewhere.

So what happens if we drop this requirement?

The function of maximalism is to differentiate absolutely between possible worlds, so if we drop maximalism we reduce that ability. We might for example have two partial descriptions of the same world, or not be able to decide if two descriptions are of one world or many.

We may have some propositions whose truth value is undecided. Part of maximalism is that every statement is either true or it is false. But "Anne is not at her desk" leaves "The neighbour is mowing his lawn" undecided.

We are departing from the complete systems like S4 and S5. rather than axioms we'd have a model-theoretical account. Necessity might be seen as true in all accessible situations rather than all accessible worlds. There would be consequences for identity.

We'd have no guarantee of global global consistency. Instead we would have consistency only for what we have access to. And what we have access to becomes somewhat arbitrary - do we consider just Anne's office, or do we consider her house? Her neighbourhood? Her town? Were do we stop?

Despite these issues i find the idea of a localised modal logic appealing.

So it does depend on the definition of "state of affairs". Aristotle's argument is indeed a good reason for changing that definition, to allow that states of affairs can comprise change. Problem solved! — Ludwig V

Yep. States of affairs include change.

Meta has a conceptual difficulty with limits and infinitesimals, and sometimes pictures states of affairs as descriptions at an instant, disallowing change within states of affairs. Sometimes, because his view changes from post to post. Or at least it appears to - there may be some obtuse way in which he can make it coherent, but so far as I can make out, it remains unexpressed.

I am slowly working through your posts. — RussellA

Cheers. I hope they are worth the effort.

But I cannot understand that if in a possible world there is no apple, there still is the apple’s haecceity — RussellA

Yep. There is something quite odd about such ghost-apples.

This suggests that a state of affairs is part of the actual world. — RussellA

Rather, of all the possible states of affairs, the ways things might be, only some are actual. So the picture is of the actual state of affairs being a subset of all the possible states of affairs.

But the actual world can only exist at one moment in time. — RussellA

I don't agree with that. Or rather, it's bringing in a sort of phenomenological or temporal view that only serves to restrict what is true unnecessarily. I'll go along instead with the view that things existed in the past and will continue to do so into the future, or if you prefer, with the view that there are truths about the past and the future.

And that dissolves your qualms about states of affairs being static.

Try this: that we only experience now does not change the truth value of statements about the past. That Caesar crossed the Rubicon remains true even if one insists on considering it only as a fact seen form the present. Even if the actual world only exists in the present, Caesar still crossed the Rubicon. And the situation only improves for facts that are not temporally dependent. That water is H₂O is true regardless of when it is spoken.

But I think you will resist that, and I'll leave you to it. It strikes me as an error. In the same vein, there will be apples, even if you do not "have them in your mind". There is a big difference between "The apple is on the table" and "Russell thinks there is an apple on the table". And it seems to me that in trying to make sense of both logic and mind, you mix these two.

And it seems to me that in trying to make sense of both logic and mind, you mix these two. — Banno

Some thoughts:

For Wittgenstein, States of Affairs (SOA) are the fundamental building blocks of reality in the world, and are about how objects can be arranged. The parts of these SOA’s naturally go together, such that it is in the nature of Socrates to be wise. If a SOA exists in the world then it is a fact.

Using brackets to try to make things clearer. IE, “snow is white” is true IFF (snow is white).

There are two aspects

Aspect one - a State of Affairs is not an object’s action

A State of Affairs is the relation between an object and a property, such as (snow is white).
An action is not a property. Therefore, (snow is melting) cannot be a State of Affairs.
As crossing the Rubicon is an action, (Caesar crossing the Rubicon) cannot be a State of Affairs.

Aspect two - a State of Affairs is an object’s property

Situation one, an existent object in the present
Consider the proposition “Sir James Hockenhull is a General”

“Sir James Hockenhull is a General” is true IFF (Sir James Hockenhull is a General).

This is true, as (Sir James Hockenhull is a General) is a State of Affairs that obtains..

Situation two, a non-existant object in the present
Consider the proposition “Caesar is a General”.

This can be neither true nor false, as Caesar does not exist in the present. Therefore, (Caesar is a General) cannot be a State of Affairs.

Situation three, a non-existant object in the past
Consider the proposition “Unicorns were white”

This can be neither true nor false, as Unicorns do not exist either in the present or past. Therefore, (Unicorns were whitel) cannot be a State of Affairs.

Situation four, an existent object in the past
Consider the proposition “Caesar was a General”.

1 - On the one hand
States of Affairs exist in a mind-independent world.
The world only exists in the present.
Past events cannot exist in a world that only exists in the present
Therefore the past event (Caesar was a General) cannot exist in a world that only exists in the present.

Therefore, (Caesar was a General) cannot be a State of Affairs

2 - On the other hand
We may have the concept of a possible world where there is the State of Affairs (snow is white), and we may also have the concept of a possible world where there is the State of Affairs (snow is black).

If we can have the concept of a possible world where there is the State of Affairs (snow is black), it seems to follow that we could also have the concept of a possible world where there is a State of Affairs (Caesar was a General).

The problem

As you say, “There is a big difference between "The apple is on the table" and "Russell thinks there is an apple on the table". And it seems to me that in trying to make sense of both logic and mind, you mix these two.”

We can only know about a State of Affairs in a mind-independent world through concepts in the mind, yet we are trying to determine States of Affairs independently of the mind

Ultimately, States of Affairs cannot be about what exists in a mind-independent world, but must be about our concepts of what exists in a mind-independent world .

If that is the case, then the enquiry is not about the State of Affairs in the world (Caesar was a General) but more about the State of Affairs in the mind “Caesar was a General”.

For Wittgenstein, States of Affairs (SOA) are the fundamental building blocks of reality in the world, and are about how objects can be arranged. — RussellA

I would say leave out the word "reality." Wittgenstein (in the Tractatus) is saying that the boundaries of what we call the world are precisely the same as the boundaries of thought.

When we talk or think about the world, we don't usually think of it as a collection of objects, but rather as a complex of relationships and events. We'll call these complexes states of affairs. They're closely kin to propositions.

The basic point of the Tractatus is that since language and the world are meshed together, language can't be used to talk about what's beyond the world (that's the interpretation I favor anyway.)

States of Affairs exist in a mind-independent world. — RussellA

A realist would say an obtaining state of affairs is mind-independent. Realism is tacked on to the basic idea of a state of affairs. The idea itself is compatible with any ontological outlook.

that is the case, then the enquiry is not about the State of Affairs in the world (Caesar was a General) but more about the State of Affairs in the mind “Caesar was a General”. — RussellA

It's one state of affairs that either obtains or doesn't.

Yep. States of affairs include change. — Banno

It doesn't matter how you define change, and states of affairs, the problem I described remains, because the difference between distinct states of affairs cannot be accounted for by reference to further states of affairs. Therefore we need to conclude that the reality of the world, any possible world, must consist of more than just states of affairs. Once we commit to using "states of affairs", we must accept that the possible worlds thus created are necessarily incomplete.

Meta has a conceptual difficulty with limits and infinitesimals, and sometimes pictures states of affairs as descriptions at an instant, disallowing change within states of affairs. Sometimes, because his view changes from post to post. Or at least it appears to - there may be some obtuse way in which he can make it coherent, but so far as I can make out, it remains unexpressed. — Banno

I'd say that you don't seem to understand what is required of the concept "limit", what a real limit must consist of.

Ultimately, States of Affairs cannot be about what exists in a mind-independent world, but must be about our concepts of what exists in a mind-independent world .

If that is the case, then the enquiry is not about the State of Affairs in the world (Caesar was a General) but more about the State of Affairs in the mind “Caesar was a General”. — RussellA

I think that this is a very important point. Possible world semantics necessitates that the propositions, states of affairs, or whatever, reference our ideas, not any independent physical world. This is why truth by correspondence is excluded. Then a further judgement of correspondence is usually required, what the SEP calls whether the statement "obtains". The issue though is that this is not a judgement of 'truth", it is a subjective judgement made relative to the purpose of, or what is intended by, the model. That is why I claim that possible worlds semantics is fundamentally sophistry. If you don't like that word, we might try "rhetoric".

A very high percentage of the stuff you post is completely wrong, like maximally bonkers.

You keep making posts like this with absolutely nothing to support these very strange assertions. If it's true that I appear to you as "completely wrong" "maximally bonkers", then I can only conclude that you appear to me as highly uneducated.

I would say leave out the word "reality." — frank

But TLP 2.063 The sum-total of reality is the world
And 2.12 A picture is a model of reality
If Wittgenstein is a major source for the meaning of a state of affairs, we will need to consider reality
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Wittgenstein (in the Tractatus) is saying that the boundaries of what we call the world are precisely the same as the boundaries of thought. — frank

Yes, TLP 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world
But how can I know states of affairs in the world if my knowledge of the world is limited by my language. Does this infer that states of affairs only really exist in my language.
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When we talk or think about the world, we don't usually think of it as a collection of objects, but rather as a complex of relationships and events. We'll call these complexes states of affairs. They're closely kin to propositions. — frank

But TLP 2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)