Can I surmise that each of these same propositions is about the same states of affairs? — creativesoul
I believe that I am shorter than the Eiffel Tower. Do you want to call that one state of affairs? Two? Three? How would you decide?
Do you still hold that every proposition has it's own unique truth conditions such that no two propositions have the same truth conditions? — creativesoul
You see what's happening here regarding the clear distinction being drawn between believing that a proposition(p v q) is validly inferred, and believing that a proposition(p v q) is true? — creativesoul
...You're the one conflating...
Interesting mischaracterization... — creativesoul
If one believes that either this(p) or that(q) is true, then one believes that both cannot be.
Believing that (p v q) is true, if based upon belief that p, and accepting the rules of correct inference, is to know that if p or q is true then so too is (p v q), and to believe that both cannot be.
Believing that "Either 'Jones owns a Ford' or 'Brown is in Barcelona'" is true, if based upon belief that Jones owns a Ford, and accepting the rules of correct inference is to know that if either 'Jones owns a Ford' or 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true, then so too is "Either 'Jones owns a Ford' or 'Brown is in Barcelona'", and to believe that both 'Jones owns a Ford' and 'Brown is in Barcelona' cannot be. — creativesoul
You're the one conflating, arguing that Smith believing that p ∨ q is true is just believing that p ∨ q is validly inferred.
That's an oversimplification. See my last post. I think that that sums up my notion of what Smith's belief that (p v q) is true consists in. — creativesoul
I wrote:
Smith cannot believe that both p and q could be true.
You objected:
Yes he can. Take, for example:
1. My name is Michael or my girlfriend is having a shower (p ∨ q)
2. My name is Michael or my girlfriend is having a bath (p ∨ r)
I believe that my name is Michael. If my name is Michael then both of 1 and 2 are true. Therefore, I believe that both 1 and 2 are true. Furthermore, I believe that my girlfriend could be having a shower, and so believe that both p and q could be true. And I believe that my girlfriend could be having a bath, and so believe that both p and r could be true.
Granted, I can't believe that p, q, and r are all true, as I can't believe that both q and r are true, but that's irrelevant to Gettier's argument.
No, he cannot.
Gettier claims that Smith is totally ignorant about Brown's location. That is a problem for the inclusive notion. Smith does not believe any of the Q's. In order for Smith to believe that both p and q could be true, Smith must believe q. — creativesoul
He needs to believe that both could be. He cannot for the reasons I've been giving. — creativesoul
In order for Smith to believe that both p and q could be true, Smith must believe q. — creativesoul
He needs to believe that both could be.
Believing that (p v q) is true, if based upon belief that p, and accepting the rules of correct inference, is to know that if p or q is true then so too is (p v q). — creativesoul
Smith's knowing that if p or q is true, then so too is (p v q) and still believing that (p v q) is true despite not believing any of the Q's, is for Smith to believe that (p v q) is true because p is. — creativesoul
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