But how can I know states of affairs in the world if my knowledge of the world is limited by my language. Does this infer that states of affairs only really exist in my language. — RussellA

This is why I suggested we leave out the word "reality" because it connotes mind-independence. Russell was a neutral monist, and the Tractatus has the same character.

But TLP 2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things) — RussellA

He sort of mystically says that in a state of affairs, things are like links in a chain. Since the Tractatus is dense and enigmatic, I prefer to just use a logic textbook for determining what state of affairs is.

But I cannot understand that if in a possible world there is no apple, there still is the apple’s haecceity — RussellA

Is it possible that the haecceity in question is the haecceity of the possible apple?
Really, there is no making sense of this. I know it is not proper philosophy. Some poets make fun of similar issues.

Yesterday, upon the stair,
I met a man who wasn't there
He wasn't there again today
I wish, I wish he'd go away...
etc. — Hughes Mearns

Or there's "The Railroad Station" by Wilawa Szymborska.

Yep. There is something quite odd about such ghost-apples. — Banno

Wittgenstein makes a major feature of what he calls "shadow" objects in the Blue and Brown books.

The next step we are inclined to take is to think that as the object of our thought isn't the fact it is a shadow of the fact. There are different names for this shadow, e.g. "proposition", "sense of the sentence". — Page 32 Blue Book

He explores the idea in some detail.

But the actual world can only exist at one moment in time. — RussellA

The idea that only the present exists is really very odd. "Present" only has meaning in the context of "Past" and "Future". They all exist in the fashion that's appropriate to them. They form a conceptual system, and claiming that only one of them exists is like forgetting that "North" only has meaning in the context of "South" (and "East" and "West").

A State of Affairs is the relation between an object and a property, such as (snow is white).
An action is not a property. Therefore, (snow is melting) cannot be a State of Affairs.
As crossing the Rubicon is an action, (Caesar crossing the Rubicon) cannot be a State of Affairs. — RussellA

A couple of things. Actions are usually differentiated from events, such that an action requires an actor and is intended by that actor. So your turning on the light might be an action. But snow melting might be better thought of as an event. Actions are usually considered a sub-class of events.

Events can be put in subject -predicate form. So, in a rough extensional semantics along the lines of Tarski, "snow melts" would be true IFF the extension of "snow" was in the extension of "things that melt".

Further, there is more to states of affairs than objects and properties. The drop back to the intensional, Aristotelian notion of properties and objects is retrograde. Substance-property ontology is far too simplistic. Much better to continue to use extensionality.

So a state of affairs is how things are. This is something that the T-sentence captures: the sentence ont he left is true if the extensional sentence on the right is true. If snow is in the extension of things that melt, then that snow melts is a true state of affairs. If Caesar and the Rubicon are in the extension of "...crossed..." then that is a states of affairs.

Aspect two - a State of Affairs is an object’s property — RussellA

There's that slip back into object-property ontology, again. Have a go at reconsidering what you have written here using an extensional logic instead, dropping (or if you prefer, very much simplifying) the metaphysics.

“Sir James Hockenhull is a General” is true IFF Sir James Hockenhull is in the extension of "...is a General"

"Caesar is a General" is true IFF Caesar is in the extension of "...is General".

Note that time does not enter into these sentences. We could incorporate it by adding a few extra bits to the FOPL, if it were needed - but it doesn't seem to be. The substantive point is the extensionality. Temporality does not force a return to object–property talk

Same for "Unicorns were white”, which is true iff the extension of "unicorns" is included in the extension of white things.

“Sir James Hockenhull is a General”, "Caesar is a General", "Unicorns were white” are all states of affairs in that they would be true under some interpretation.

So to this:

States of Affairs exist in a mind-independent world.
The world only exists in the present.
Past events cannot exist in a world that only exists in the present
Therefore the past event (Caesar was a General) cannot exist in a world that only exists in the present.

Therefore, (Caesar was a General) cannot be a State of Affairs — RussellA

Mind-dependency is irrelevant to the truth by extensionality of the sentences being considered, as is past, present and future. All that is considered is the extension. So all the seemingly profound "Past events cannot exist in a world that only exists in the present" says is that if we only talk about the present, then we can't talk about the past. And the odd result of stipulating the restriction of putting all our sentences int he present tense is that a simple sentence such as "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" ceases to have a truth value... no small problem.

Ultimately, States of Affairs cannot be about what exists in a mind-independent world, but must be about our concepts of what exists in a mind-independent world . — RussellA

Nuh.

The grain of truth here is that sentences are produced by minds. Yet they are very much, very regularly, about what is the case in the world - about states of affairs. The truth value of "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" cannot be found without considering the difference between a state of affair in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon and one in which he didn't. Unless you would deny that such truths involve the world at all...

A very high percentage of the stuff you post is completely wrong, like maximally bonkers. — frank

Indeed.

Wittgenstein makes a major feature of what he calls "shadow" objects in the Blue and Brown books. — Ludwig V

Yes, from what I've understood he uses it as a stepping stone towards dropping meaning in favour of use. So if we think in terms of the meaning of a statement, we reify that meaning into a shadow of some sort; but if we think in terms of use the shadow disappears. It seems to me to be much the same point as Davidson makes,

In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false. — On the very idea of a conceptual schema

We may have the concept of a possible world where there is the State of Affairs (snow is white), and we may also have the concept of a possible world where there is the State of Affairs (snow is black). — RussellA

I looked up the SEP - States of Affairs
In section 1.1, I discovered that states of affairs are in fact expressed by gerund clauses, as in "Charlie’s eloping with Ginger was surprising" or "Mary’s divorcing Charlie caused Charlie’s demise" or "Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s being more than seven feet tall is well-known". I was somewhat relieved that they are related to facts and thoughts.
I think that this is all a philosophical mare's nest around a grammatical device in language. I don't say there is nothing here, and I'm prepared to be convinced.

he (sc. Wittgenstein) uses it (sc. the shadow metaphor)as a stepping stone towards dropping meaning in favour of use. — Banno

Since it doesn't occur in the Phil. Inv., one thinks it must be some sort of stepping stone. It didn't make the cut. But I think that's a pity - though no doubt he had his reasons. His discussion of pictures and sentences show traces of the TLP with its similarity of structure. Perhaps that's why it didn't survive into the PI.
He articulates meaning as use on pg. 4 of the Blue Book, but doesn't mention shadows until pg. 36. So whatever kind of step it was/is, he had meaning as use when he made it.

"Caesar is a General" is true IFF Caesar is in the extension of "...is General". — Banno

I'm a bit bothered about this. Caesar was not always a General, so would ("Caesar is not a General" is true IFF Caesar is not in the extension of General) also count as timelessly true?
It is clear that there is no contradiction here. Yet contradiction seems only to require that p and not-p are never true of the same object simultaneously. We need time to apply that law, but timelessness doesn't have time.
It's just that necessary/analytic/a priori truths are clearly timelessly true. Both hypotheses are true, but it is the formula as a whole (p IFF p is true) that is timelessly true, not the constituent sentences.

In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false. — On the very idea of a conceptual schema

Yes. One remembers that sentence. I'm still a bit hesitant, because I think that the distinction is useful, even if it is not always apposite.

I'm a bit bothered about this. Caesar was not always a General, so would ("Caesar is not a General" is true IFF Caesar is not in the extension of General) also count as timelessly true? — Ludwig V

Yep. If Caesar was a General, even if only for a short time, then it follows that Caesar was a General. Any issues here come form trying to talk about time without first developing a temporal grammar.

We can construct, after Gillian Russell, a quick temporal logic in which primitive expressions of our language are sentence letters, truth-functors, ☐ and ◇, and four unary tense logical operators: F, G, P, and H, meaning at some time in the future, at all times in the future, at some time in the past, and at all times in the future, respectively.

Models are 5-tuples, ⟨W,T,@,n,I⟩, with
1. W a non-empty set (worlds)
2. T the set of integers (times)
3. @ ∈W (the actual world)
4. n∈T (the now)
5. I assigns each sentence letter an intension: a function from T ×W into
{1,0}.

Such a structure has the capacity to set out Caesar was a General, Caesar is a General, Caesar will be a General, and so on.

Caesar is a General now → I(Caesar_is_General)(n,@) = 1
Caesar was a General at some time in the past → P(Caesar_is_General)
Caesar is not a General now → ¬I(Caesar_is_General)(n,@)

Possible world semantics necessitates that the propositions, states of affairs, or whatever, reference our ideas, not any independent physical world.……………This is why truth by correspondence is excluded…………………That is why I claim that possible worlds semantics is fundamentally sophistry. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would have thought that the main purpose of Possible World Semantics (PWS) is to reference the world, meaning that correspondence is a core part of PSW. The terms possibly, necessarily, ought, could, might, etc are central to understanding the meaning of ordinary language, and ordinary language is useful when it does refer to the world. “If I cross the road now, there might be a truck around the corner, and I could be knocked down” is a real world situation where modal terms are critical.

In your own writing, an understanding of modal terms is necessary if we are possibly to understand the meaning of the paragraph.

We should look at combinatorialism. It's a bit more complicated, but I think it may provide the best approach out of the three. The problem which jumps out at me, is the issue with substantiating the proposed "simples". This idea of simples is similar to the ancient atomists. That the concrete world could actually be composed of such simples as the fundamental elements, is shown by Aristotle to be problematic.

I agree that some philosophers may be more interested in publishing articles than coming up with an agreed solution, but that is always the case. However, it does not take away from the day to day relevance of PSW.

I would have thought that the main purpose of Possible World Semantics (PWS) is to reference the world — RussellA

Yes!

Sad that this has to be said!

In section 1.1, I discovered that states of affairs are in fact expressed by gerund clauses — Ludwig V

There is the SOA (snow is white)
There is also the SOA (snow, being white, is well known)

There is the problem of disconnecting the world from the thought of the world, when we only know the world through our thoughts.

Being known is a thought, but then being white is also a thought.

Actions are usually differentiated from events, such that an action requires an actor and is intended by that actor. — Banno

Properties - actions - events

Property = the characteristic of a being, such as “John is a walker”

Action = something done by a sentient being, such as “John is walking”

Event = something that is done to either a sentient or insentient being, such as “John is winning” or “snow is falling”.

States of Affairs (SOA)

A SOA is the way the world is.

Some consider a SOA to be a static truth rather than a dynamic process.

Being a static truth, the predicate will be a property, such as “John is a walker”

The predicate cannot be an action, which is dynamic, such as “John is walking”.

An action changes one SOA into a different SOA, such that the action “John is walking” changes one SOA, “John is at the entrance to the park” into a different SOA “John is at the exit to the park”.

The predicate cannot be an event, which is dynamic, such as “John is winning” or “snow is falling”

An event changes one SOA into a different SOA, such that the event “John is winning” changes one SOA, “John is poor” into a different SOA “John is rich”.

You say that a SOA can be dynamic. It seems to me that a SOA is static. Is there any authoritative judgement?

There is the SOA (snow is white)
There is also the SOA (snow, being white, is well known)
There is the problem of disconnecting the world from the thought of the world, when we only know the world through our thoughts.
Being known is a thought, but then being white is also a thought. — RussellA

I'm really quite confused. I lazily though that that-clauses would work - after all, thinking that snow is white and the fact that snow is white are perfection in order grammatically. But the state of affairs that snow is white doesn't sound right. Your way of doing is comprehensible, but not standard English. Which doesn't mean it's wrong. But there must be a standard English way of doing it. On the other hand this gerund business is very curious, yet seems to make grammatical sense. I had thought vaguely that "the state of affairs that snow is white was all one needed.
Then there's the business about states of affairs obtaining rather than existing. My intuition tells me that there is no need for that, but isn't certain.

Have a look at the relevant part of the article:-
SEP - States of affairs 1.1

Yes!

Sad that this has to be said! — Banno

Indeed. — Banno

That makes two very uneducated people participating in this threat. Not surprising.

The thread seems to have sort of come off the rails. Instead of assessing the problems which possible worlds semantics poses, as the SEP directs us, the thread has become a worship of the Platonist presuppositions which support possible worlds semantics.

I would have thought that the main purpose of Possible World Semantics (PWS) is to reference the world, meaning that correspondence is a core part of PSW. — RussellA

Yes!

Sad that this has to be said! — Banno

Obviously this is false. Clearly allowing that counterfactuals are "possibilities" is a violation of "truth" by correspondence. Probably the reason for so much misunderstanding about "possible worlds", which has been demonstrated by principal participants in this thread, is that they think it is possible to make counterfactuals consistent with truth by correspondence.. If correspondence was the purpose, we wouldn't be describing counterfactuals as possible worlds, as counterfactuals are clearly expressions of "worlds" which violate correspondence..

As the opening of the SEP article states, there is a limit to "the actual world", yet we wonder how things could have been different. The empirical gap between the way things are in the world, and the fictional, "different"', along with the the desire to relate these two in a rational way, is the purpose of "possible worlds semantics". Clearly correspondence cannot be the first principle, as establishing a relation between the world and fictional worlds must be the first principle.

That's is why "possible worlds" is so problematic. To establish a relation between the possible and the actual, "the actual" must be assigned the same status as the possible. Banno clearly recognizes this when he says that the actual is one of the possible, but he fails to respect this principle in his interpretations.

The SEP describes three ways in which this is done. 1. Concretism, within which each world is concrete, 2. Abstractionism, within which each world is abstract, 3. Cobinatorialism, within which each world is a combination of concrete and abstract.

Notice, correspondence is not a fundamental principle. It cannot be, or else that first principle would alter the relation between the true (by correspondence) world, and the other worlds. This would leave the other worlds as nothing but fictions. That's the point we discussed in the other thread which Banno seems incapable of comprehending. If we have a true (by correspondence) world, the other proposals which contradict are false, and they cannot be considered as possibilities. Therefore, we must alter the status of the supposed "true" (by correspondence) world, to allow that the possible worlds are something other than false. In other words, to allow that the possibilities are in fact possible, which is the intent of "possible worlds", we must rid ourselves or "true" (by correspondence), and this produces a compromised representation of "the world".

The terms possibly, necessarily, ought, could, might, etc are central to understanding the meaning of ordinary language, and ordinary language is useful when it does refer to the world. “If I cross the road now, there might be a truck around the corner, and I could be knocked down” is a real world situation where modal terms are critical. — RussellA

This is why I think we need to define the different senses of "possible", each of which requires a different type of logic, and enforce those distinctions. I differentiated three significant difference earlier in the thread.

1. Ontological possibility. This is real possibility in the world which necessitates the need for decision making. Ontological possibility is in relation to propositions about the future and the important feature is that there is no truth or falsity to such propositions. By your example, "I will cross the road within the next minute" has no truth or falsity because it is undecided. Such propositions, when ontological possibility is involved, must defy either the law of non-contradiction or the law of excluded middle. Common language use has the law of excluded middle violated, we say that it is neither true nor false, the action which is undecided, and may go either way. Some ontologies however, prefer a violation of the law of non-contradiction.

2. Epistemic possibility. In this case, we assume that there is an actual truth or falsity to the situation, yet the person posing the possibility does not know which. So the possibility of "there is a truck around the corner" is a case of epistemic possibility. You, as the person deciding whether or not to cross the road, does not know if the proposition is true or false, yet you believe there is a truth or falsity to it. Unlike the decision to cross the road, in which case there will only be a truth or falsity after the appropriate time passes, the fundamental laws of logic are not violated here because ask about something which is supported by the past.

3. Counterfactuals. Counterfactuals are often called "possibilities", so I include this in the senses of "possibility", but they are not truly "possible" in any rational way, so they need to be excluded, as not possibilities at all. They reference the past, where there is a truth or falsity (by correspondence) so there is no ontological possibility. Also, as the name "counterfactual" indicates, the truth of the matter is assumed to be known, so there is no epistemic possibility here either. So "counterfactuals" are not possibilities in either of the two principal senses of "possibility", and to avoid confusion ought not be called that. Counterfactuals are very useful, especially in designing experiments, and aiding in predictive capacity, but they ought not be confused as "possibilities".

I propose that if we maintain the above principles, we can keep truth as correspondence, as the first principle. Notice that I produced the definitions of "possible" in a way which corresponds with our experience of "the world". The fundamental problem with possible worlds semantics is that it allows for counterfactuals which are not actually "possible" in any true (by correspondence) sense, to be considered as possibilities. Therefore "possible worlds" has at its very basic level, a violation of "truth" as correspondence.

Most of us also believe that things, as a whole, needn't have been just as they are. Rather, things might have been different in countless ways, both trivial and profound. History, from the very beginning, could have unfolded quite other than it did in fact: the matter constituting a distant star might never have organized well enough to give light; species that survived might just as well have died off; battles won might have been lost; children born might never have been conceived and children never conceived might otherwise have been born. In any case, no matter how things had gone they would still have been part of a single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing situation, a single world. Intuitively, then, the actual world is only one among many possible worlds. — SEP

Everything which has already occurred, cannot be altered. In that sense it is necessary, and this is the foundation of truth as "correspondence". To propose that things which have already occurred, in the past, could be otherwise, as a possibility, is to violate "truth" as correspondence. Allowing that counterfactuals are possibilities violates the principle of truth as correspondence in a fundamental way.

Further, there is more to states of affairs than objects and properties. The drop back to the intensional, Aristotelian notion of properties and objects is retrograde. Substance-property ontology is far too simplistic. Much better to continue to use extensionality. — Banno

As I see it so far:

Truth by T-sentence
“Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is true IFF Caesar crossed the Rubicon. But this does not tell us whether Caesar crossed the Rubicon or not

Extensional truths
Suppose there are two sets
Set 1 = {not Caesar, Mario, Francesco}
Set 2 = {Caesar, Mario, Francesco}

Suppose there is the proposition “a person crossed the Rubicon”.

We don’t know which set is the domain of the proposition.

But if we did know that set 2 is the domain of the proposition, then “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is true because Caesar is within the domain {Caesar, Mario, Francesco}. This is an extensional truth. But in this case, this extensional truth is analytic, as we included Caesar because we know it is true that he did cross the Rubicon.

Intensional truths
Given the proposition “Caesar crossed the Rubicon”, this is either true or not true, but it may be that we never know.

Necessary a posteriori truths
We could have a necessary a posteriori truth. It is necessarily true that either Caesar either did or did not cross the Rubicon (assuming Caesar existed). We may not know the truth today, but we may know the truth in the future. Then “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” will be a necessary a posteriori truth.

Necessary contemporaneous truths in the mind
The only real truths are necessarily contemporaneous in the mind.

I see a red postbox and it is true that I see a red postbox. But the fact that I see a red postbox does not mean that it is true that in the world is a red postbox. In the world may be a green bollard.

But the state of affairs that snow is white doesn't sound right. — Ludwig V

In Wikipedia State of affairs (philosophy)

For example, the state of affairs that Socrates is wise is constituted by the particular "Socrates" and the property "wise".

I have been assuming that a State of Affairs is something like “Socrates is wise”

I cannot see a reference to States of Affairs In SEP Possible Worlds 1.1. Do you mean 2.2.1. But 2.2.1 is part of 2.2 Abstractionism.

If we have a true (by correspondence) world, the other proposals which contradict are false, and they cannot be considered as possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

That my thoughts do correspond with my actual world is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities.

In my mind is the thought that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. In my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris.

There is a correspondence between the thought in my mind that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and the fact that in my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris

In my mind is the thought that it is possible that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno. In a possible world the Eiffel Tower is in Reno.

There is a correspondence between the thought in my mind that it is possible that the Eiffel Tower is in Reno and a possible world where the Eiffel Tower is in Reno

That there is a correspondence between my mind and my actual world does not nullify any correspondence between my mind and a possible world.

That my thoughts do correspond to my actual world (I think that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and in fact it is in Paris), is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities (I think that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno).

Yes, it can be.

A SOA is the way the world is. — RussellA

Better, a way the world might be.

The predicate cannot be an action, which is dynamic, such as “John is walking”. — RussellA

Yes, it can. Extensionally, "John is walking" is true IFF john is found in the extension of "...is walking"

An action changes one SOA into a different SOA, such that the action “John is walking” changes one SOA, “John is at the entrance to the park” into a different SOA “John is at the exit to the park”. — RussellA

Here is a state of affairs: John walked from the entrance to the park to the exit.

There simply is no requirement that a state of affairs must be a temporal instant. We can talk about a state of affairs at an instant or a state of affairs over time.

That makes two very uneducated people participating in this threat. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or one. We might apply Occam at this stage.

Notice, correspondence is not a fundamental principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. Modal logic makes use of extensionality within possible worlds, not the dubious notion of correspondence.

The only real truths are necessarily contemporaneous in the mind. — RussellA

No.

But the rest is pretty good.

That my thoughts do correspond with my actual world is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities. — RussellA

I don't think this is true at all. Thoughts are primarily guided by intention, and this is not based in correspondence. We think about what we want and how to get it, without necessarily thinking about the way things are. That's why mistake is common and unsound arguments are abundant. To base our thoughts in correspondence requires a special type of effort, which does not come naturally to the mind of an animal.

In my mind is the thought that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. In my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris.

There is a correspondence between the thought in my mind that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and the fact that in my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris

In my mind is the thought that it is possible that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno. In a possible world the Eiffel Tower is in Reno. — RussellA

You contradict yourself. If, in your mind the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, you contradict yourself to say that in your mind it is also possible that the Eiffel Tower is in Reno.

That is the point which I had great trouble to get through to Banno in the other thread. If you believe that the Eiffel tower is actually in Paris, you cannot also believe that it is possibly in Reno. That would be self-contradiction. Therefore you must alter your belief about the Eiffel tower being in Paris, to "the Eiffel Tower is possibly in Paris", to allow that it is possibly in Reno, without contradiction.

This is why, when designating counterfactuals as "possibilities", it is necessary to make what you believe as the actual world, merely a "possible" world. Correspondence cannot have status, or else the supposed "possible worlds" which are really just counterfactuals, would have to be rejected as false, rather than "possible". This is also why I proposed as #3 above, that counterfactuals must be rejected as a proposed form of "possibility" in order to maintain consistency between "possibility" and correspondence. The use of "possibility" to refer to a counterfactual is an incorrect and misleading use of that word.

That my thoughts do correspond to my actual world (I think that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and in fact it is in Paris), is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities (I think that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno). — RussellA

As explained above, this is clearly incorrect. It is only by denying the fact (truth by correspondence) that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, that we can allow that it is possibly in Reno. If we accept as a (truth by correspondence) fact, that the Eiffel tower is in Paris, then we must reject the proposition that it might be in Reno. That it is in Paris makes it impossible that it is in Reno.

Modal logic makes use of extensionality within possible worlds, not the dubious notion of correspondence. — Banno

Then why did you say the following:

Yes!

Sad that this has to be said! — Banno

In reply to the following statement from RussellA concerning correspondence?

I would have thought that the main purpose of Possible World Semantics (PWS) is to reference the world, meaning that correspondence is a core part of PSW. — RussellA

You seemed so emphatic, now you explicitly change your mind.

Then why did you say the following: — Metaphysician Undercover

Because extension is about reference. The extension of "Banno" is me. And it was in response to your

Possible world semantics necessitates that the propositions, states of affairs, or whatever, reference our ideas... — Metaphysician Undercover

You really are lost.

Allowing that counterfactuals are possibilities violates the principle of truth as correspondence in a fundamental way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Using your term “ontological possibility”. As regards the proposition “there will be a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, we cannot know whether this proposition will be true or not. However, we can know that either it will be true or won't be true. This is a future possibility

Using your term “epistemic possibility”. As regards the proposition “there is a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, it may be that we don’t know whether this proposition is true or not. However, we can know that either it is true or is not true. This is a present possibility.

You base your claim on counterfactuals. You say “but they are not truly "possible" in any rational way, so they need to be excluded, as not possibilities at all.” It is true that both the past and present are fixed. The present is as fixed as the past. If there is a truck coming round the corner then it is true that “there is a truck coming round the corner”

There are two senses to the word “possible”, one used in logic and one used in ordinary language.

In the sense of logic, if “the truck is coming round the corner” then it is not possible that “the truck is not coming round the corner”. This would break the Laws of Non-contradiction and Excluded Middle.

In the sense of ordinary language, if “the truck is coming round the corner” then it is possible that “the truck is not coming round the corner”. In ordinary language we use possibility all the time. It depends on whether present facts are necessary or contingent. It is certainly not the case that it is a necessary fact that “the truck is coming round the corner”, as the driver could have over-slept, been caught in a traffic jam, had a flat tyre, etc.

It may be argued that counterfactuals which violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck was travelling faster than the speed of light” must be necessary and therefore not possible, whilst counterfactuals which don’t violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck is not coming round the corner” are contingent and therefore possible.

Counterfactuals don’t necessarily violate the principles of truth if they are contingent rather than necessary.

We think about what we want and how to get it, without necessarily thinking about the way things are. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have the thought that there is an apple on the table.

If I did not believe that there was not a correspondence between my mind and the way things are in the world, I would not attempt to pick the apple up.
====================================================

You contradict yourself. If, in your mind the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, you contradict yourself to say that in your mind it is also possible that the Eiffel Tower is in Reno. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is possible to think about different states of affairs in the world.

I can believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, whilst also imagining the Eiffel Tower being in Reno. These are not contradictory thoughts.

Here is a state of affairs: John walked from the entrance to the park to the exit. There simply is no requirement that a state of affairs must be a temporal instant. We can talk about a state of affairs at an instant or a state of affairs over time. — Banno

I have been assuming that a state of affairs is to be understood as something existing in the world rather than in the mind.

If states of affairs exist in the mind, I can understand that in the mind there can be a state of affairs over a period of time, such as “John walked from the entrance to the park to the exit.” We do have memories of the past. I understand that we can talk about a state of affairs at an instant and over time if it is a concept in the mind. If states of affairs exist in the mind, they can be both static and dynamic.

But how can a state of affairs exist in the world over a period of time when in the world a period of time does not exist. In the world only the present exists. In the world the past and present don’t exist at the same time. If the past and present don’t exist at the same time, there can be no existent period of time in the world. If states of affairs exist in the world, they can only be static.
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So all the seemingly profound "Past events cannot exist in a world that only exists in the present" says is that if we only talk about the present, then we can't talk about the past. — Banno

Even though we only exist in the present, we can talk about the past because we have memories of the past.

I have a memory of being at the entrance of the park and have another memory of being at the exit of the park. This allows me to say “I walked from the entrance of the park to the exit of the park”.
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And the odd result of stipulating the restriction of putting all our sentences int he present tense is that a simple sentence such as "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" ceases to have a truth value... no small problem. — Banno

My memory allows me to put my sentences in the past. I remember that “I was at the entrance to the park”.

The proposition “I was at the entrance to the park” is true because I remember that I was at the entrance to the park.

Propositions in the past tense still have truth values because of present memories.

Because extension is about reference. The extension of "Banno" is me. And it was in response to your — Banno

You just got finished describing how "extension" in possible worlds relates to abstract objects. Now you use "me" as an example of extension. No wonder you think I'm lost, you're giving me arrows pointing in two different directions. When I choose neither, you think that means I'm lost, when actually I've just decided on something reasonable.

Using your term “ontological possibility”. As regards the proposition “there will be a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, we cannot know whether this proposition will be true or not. However, we can know that either it will be true or won't be true. This is a future possibility — RussellA

This is correct, but it doesn't quite capture the complexity of "ontological possibility". Because things can happen, between now and that future time, which would influence the future true or falsity, and those things could be affected by human choices, it does us very little good to say that there will be a truth or falsity.

Using your term “epistemic possibility”. As regards the proposition “there is a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, it may be that we don’t know whether this proposition is true or not. However, we can know that either it is true or is not true. This is a present possibility. — RussellA

I would not call this a "present possibility". The judgement would be based on observation, and observation is always past by the time it is judged. The reason i am making this distinction is because we experience the present as active, and changing, so we ought not think of it as "fixed".

If we consider the present to always be a duration of time, we ought to allow that not only does part of the present share the properties of the past (fixed), but we need to allow that part shares the proerpties of the future (not fixed). This is necessary to allow that a freely willed act, at the present, can interfere with what would otherwise appear to be fixed.

You base your claim on counterfactuals. You say “but they are not truly "possible" in any rational way, so they need to be excluded, as not possibilities at all.” It is true that both the past and present are fixed. The present is as fixed as the past. If there is a truck coming round the corner then it is true that “there is a truck coming round the corner” — RussellA

"The present" is very difficult because things are always changing, even as we speak. That is why I stressed that we ought not think of the present as fixed. So, for example, a person might observe that there is a truck coming around the corner. Then the statement “there is a truck coming round the corner” is judged to be true, or stated as true, based on that observation which is now past. However, in the time that it takes the person to judge and make the statement, the truck could have slammed on the brakes or gone off the road.

This is why we ought not extend the fixedness of the past into the present. Doing this produces a determinist perspective ("perspective" being present), and obscures the truly dynamic nature of the present. This becomes very important with fast moving things like computers, and quantum physics. Notice that the wave function of quantum physics deals with possibilities (the future side of the present), rather than factual statements about the position of a particle.

In the sense of ordinary language, if “the truck is coming round the corner” then it is possible that “the truck is not coming round the corner”. — RussellA

This is not consistent with any ordinary use I am familiar with. How does it make sense to you, that a person would say both, a truck is coming around the corner, and also it's possible that the truck is not coming around the corner?

It may be argued that counterfactuals which violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck was travelling faster than the speed of light” must be necessary and therefore not possible, whilst counterfactuals which don’t violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck is not coming round the corner” are contingent and therefore possible. — RussellA

That time flows in one direction, and the past cannot be changed, is the most basic law of nature. Any counterfactual which proposes a different past violates this fundamental law of nature.

I have the thought that there is an apple on the table.

If I did not believe that there was not a correspondence between my mind and the way things are in the world, I would not attempt to pick the apple up. — RussellA

It's pointless to do this with examples. I can make just as many counter examples. I wanted an apple, so I got up and looked for one. It's just a difference in the way that you and I believe animals think. I think they want something and so they go look. You think they see something, and want it.

Of course, thinking consists of both ways. But you said that correspondence was a necessary condition, and this claimed necessity would exclude the possibility of what I claim. Therefore to allow that the way of thinking which I describe is a real way of thinking, you need to relinquish your claim that all thinking is based in correspondence.

I can believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, whilst also imagining the Eiffel Tower being in Reno. These are not contradictory thoughts. — RussellA

I really don't understand how you can make this claim. If the Eiffel tower is in Reno, then it is not in Paris. If I believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, then it is implied that I also believe it is impossible that it is in Reno, which is somewhere other than Paris. Therefore to believe that it is possible that it is in Reno, implicitly contradicts my belief that it is in Paris.

Because extension is about reference. The extension of "Banno" is me. — Banno

Do you actually believe that "extension" in the case of physical objects is the same as "extension" in the case of abstract objects?