He would say the ultimate truth is the Absolute, which is a state of unity in which there is no thought because there are no divisions. Thought is the realm of partial truths. In that realm, you can't really escape dualism. — frank

Not sure I understand this but is the point that, at an ordinary level of thinking, dualities appear to us?

The fact that our sense organs and brains are similarly constituted can explain how it is that we see things in similar ways, but it cannot explain just what we see. The content of perception, that is what is perceivable which animals also perceive in their different ways, is contributed by the world, whether that world is physical or mental.

If it's physical then the mind-independent physical existents explain how it is that we and the animals see the same things. If the world is mental then the human independent mind that constitutes the things we perceive explains it. If mind is fundamental then all our minds must be connected (below the level of consciousness, obviously) via that universal mind.

We've been over all this many times and you have never been able to explain how just the fact of our minds being similar, but not connected, could explain a shared world. — Janus

Good question. Isn't the idea that the “world” we perceive is not independent matter imposing itself on us, but a manifestation of mind, or a universal rational structure, so the consistency of perception across subjects reflects the inherent order of this mind?

Good question. Isn't the idea that the “world” we perceive is not independent matter imposing itself on us, but a manifestation of mind, or a universal rational structure, so the consistency of perception across subjects reflects the inherent order of this mind? — Tom Storm

Yes, if they are manifestations of a universal mind. But that seems to be the point that Wayfarer is denying. In fact he has written on here that it is the very point he disagrees with Kastrup about, and yet hat is the very posit, as also with the role of God in Berkeley's idealism that has explanatory power.

I've also heard it argued that objects persist in idealism (not because a mind is always perceiving them) but because experience unfolds according to stable, law-like patterns. To say the table is still there when no one is looking means that whenever someone does look again, experience will reliably present the same table in the same place, behaving the same way. Object permanence is therefore a continuity of structure and availability, not constant observation by some Great Mind. I imagine that this could be developed into a much more complex account of object permanence, but I'm not fully across the idea.

The question remains why has thought manifested in this way to begin with; why are there inanimate objects or things in a realm of consciousness?

I think @wayfarer may be arguing that an object is just a durable pattern within a set of constraints, so to say it continues to exist means that the same pattern will reappear whenever the relevant experiential conditions are met, even if it is not currently experienced. This reminds me a bit of phenomenology.

Not sure I understand this but is the point that, at an ordinary level of thinking, dualities appear to us? — Tom Storm

Dualities necessarily appear to us. We think in pairs, up/down, left/right, male/female, etc. In every case, the meaning of any word contains it's opposite. So if we deleted 'down' from your mind, "up" would also disappear for lack of anything to compare it to.

Interesting, I always assumed that binary, dualistic or black-and-white thinking was a human flaw and, perhaps, unnecessary. If we do privilege duality, I wonder if that is simply a function of biology, we have two eyes, ears, arms, legs, so we tend to bifurcate our experience.

The fact that our sense organs and brains are similarly constituted can explain how it is that we see things in similar ways, but it cannot explain just what we see. The content of perception, that is what is perceivable which animals also perceive in their different ways, is contributed by the world, whether that world is physical or mental. — Janus

I’m not claiming that perceptual convergence explains what ultimately exists; I’m claiming that any account of what exists has to start from the fact that the world is first given as a shared
field of perception, not as a metaphysical posit. And that there is no self-existence material substance in terms of which the nature of experience can be explained. No account that treats matter as a self-existent, third-person substance can explain experience, because experience is not one of the things that substance-description captures (which is, of course, stating the hard problem of consciousness again).

I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call ‘matter’ or ‘corporeal substance’. — Bishop Berkeley

And besides, we do now know what happens when you drill down on apparently solid matter to the most fundamental elements. I don't have to say again what has been discovered.

He (Hegel) would say the ultimate truth is the Absolute, which is a state of unity in which there is no thought because there are no divisions. — frank

That rings true to me, even though I can't claim to really understand it.

That rings true to me, even though I can't claim to really understand it. — Wayfarer

Plato would say you're remembering the wisdom of the Anima Mundi.

Plato would be right.