I don’t understand why that would be a problem. — T Clark

If Science is based on the presuppositions which can be either true or false, then it is unable to provide useful knowledge. It then relegates to superstition or guess work, hence it needs help of Metaphysics? - hence the reason Kant wrote CPR.

Plus the title of the OP "absolute" sounds not what it says, if the founding presuppositions are "not absolute".

If Science is based on the presuppositions which can be either true or false, then it is unable to provide useful knowledge. It then relegates to superstition or guess work, hence it needs help of Metaphysics? - hence the reason Kant wrote CPR. — Corvus

Your understanding of metaphysics is different from mine.

Your understanding of metaphysics is different of mine. — T Clark

That is interesting. What is my understanding of Metaphysics? And what is yours?

That is interesting. What is my understanding of Metaphysics? And what is yours? — Corvus

That's a very long story which I have discussed in many threads in the past. I don't want to go into it in detail here, but here's a brief summary from a previous thread:

R.G. Collingwood wrote that metaphysics is the study of absolute presuppositions. Absolute presuppositions are the unspoken, perhaps unconscious, assumptions that underpin how we understand reality. Collingwood wrote that absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false, — T Clark

R.G. Collingwood wrote that metaphysics is the study of absolute presuppositions. Absolute presuppositions are the unspoken, perhaps unconscious, assumptions that underpin how we understand reality. Collingwood wrote that absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false, — T Clark

I think I agree with Colingwood on his concept of Metaphysics. Then there emerges questions. Is Metaphysics a part of Science? Or Is Science a part of Metaphysics? Or Metaphysics is Science? Or Science is Metaphysics?

So, one “presupposition” underlying all science – still today - is that it is a way to accumulate knowledge – that science is a process, conducted according to the rigor of the scientific method – — Questioner

Sure but interestingly there are different views on the scientific method.

Susan Haack (a philsophy of science and epistemology stalwart) takes the position that there is no single, special “Scientific Method” that sharply distinguishes science from other forms of inquiry. In her paper Six Signs of Scientism Haack writes there is "no mode of inference or procedure of inquiry used by all and only scientists, and explaining the successes of the sciences." Essentially science shares its approaches to reasoning with everyday inquiry. What distinguishes science is not a unique method but the more rigorous, systematic, and socially organized application of ordinary evidential standards such as responsiveness to evidence, logical consistency, and openness to criticism.

I think I agree with Colingwood on his concept of Metaphysics. Then there emerges questions. Is Metaphysics a part of Science? Or Is Science a part of Metaphysics? Or Metaphysics is Science? Or Science is Metaphysics? — Corvus

To oversimplify—metaphysics is the owner’s manual for science.

The presuppositions supposedly set out how the world must be in order for us to do science. The transcendental argument at play, for at least some of these presupposition, is along the following lines: we are able to understand such-and-such; the only way that we are able to understand such-and-such is if the universe were so-and-so; therefore the universe must be so-and-so.

So for example our understanding the universe implies that the universe is understandable.

But some appear instead to set out how we ought go about the business of doing science. Rather than telling us how things must be they tell us what to do. So "[4] Scientific laws are mathematical in nature" might be understood as saying that that the Universe follows mathematical principles or telling us to use mathematics in constructing our laws; while "[5] The same scientific laws apply throughout the universe and at all times" might tell us that the universe is globally consistent, or to apply the same principles everywhere.

Which of the presuppositions are ontological, others are methodological? Can we even make such a distinction?

We don't know for sure that "[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy" is true. Should we make such an unjustified presumption? Perhaps what this is, is not a truth about how things are so much as an instruction as to what sort of explanations one should look for.

There's potential to mistake methodological injunctions for ontological presumptions. We might at least be clear as to which is which. But might we not also do science if we followed these methodological rules:

[1] Presume that the universe is ordered and understandable.
[2] Construct explanations only in terms of matter and energy.
[3] Explain things by constructing scientific principles, laws.
[4] Construct those laws using mathematics.
[5] Construct Laws that apply throughout the universe and at all times.
[6] Presume that behaviors of substances are caused.
[7] Presume that substances are indestructible.
[8] Presume continuous mathematics.
[9] Treat space and time as separate and absolute.
[10] Presume that substance can not be created from nothing.

Then we would not be making presumptions as to how things are, but choosing what sort of explanations we prefer. But this treats them as voluntary, whereas Collingwood treats them as ineluctable within an epoch. Perhaps Collingwood’s absolute presuppositions are mere heuristics.

So, one “presupposition” underlying all science – still today - is that it is a way to accumulate knowledge – that science is a process, conducted according to the rigor of the scientific method –
— Questioner

Sure but interestingly there are different views on the scientific method. — Tom Storm

That’s not a presupposition, it’s a definition.

Susan Haack (a philsophy of science and epistemology stalwart) takes the position that there is no single, special “Scientific Method” that sharply distinguishes science from other forms of inquiry. In her paper Six Signs of Scientism Haack writes there is "no mode of inference or procedure of inquiry used by all and only scientists, and explaining the successes of the sciences." Essentially science shares its approaches to reasoning with everyday inquiry. — Tom Storm

I think that’s right, but it misses the point. In order to say you’re following the scientific method, you have to follow procedures that are rigorous, formal, documented, validated, and replicated. Could those same standards be applied to non-scientific thinking? Of course. Science isn’t the only way to know things or the only good way to know things, but when it’s done right, it is a good way to know things. Isn’t that good enough?

To oversimplify—metaphysics is the owner’s manual for science. — T Clark

I feel that Metaphysics must investigate the presuppositions for their truth, falsity, unknowns and borders with knowable, and then present them to Scientific inquiries as the preliminary foundation for their embarking the researches and experiments and coming to establishing Scientific laws and principles, and further hypothesis on the subject of their inquiries.

For that reason, Metaphysics is the central and critical part of Science. Science must not accept what is listed as "absolute presuppositions" without critical analysis and investigation into them before finding out on their truth and validities.

Could those same standards be applied to non-scientific thinking? Of course. Science isn’t the only way to know things or the only good way to know things, but when it’s done right, it is a good way to know things. Isn’t that good enough? — T Clark

I think you’re making the point that Haack argues: there is nothing intrinsic to the scientific method that other disciplines cannot also employ. We sometimes fetishize science, which can lead to scientistic worldviews: the belief that only science can deliver truth to human beings. This is a foundational presupposition of old-school physicalists. I thought it worth tabling given the discussion.

the only way that we are able to understand such-and-such is if the universe were so-and-so; therefore the universe must be so-and-so. — Banno

Well put.

Which of the presuppositions are ontological, others are methodological? Can we even make such a distinction? — Banno

Good point. This is something I’ve wrestled with. I used to say epistemology should be considered part of metaphysics. I mostly stopped saying that because it just caused fruitless arguments, which isn’t to say it doesn’t still make sense to me.

We don't know for sure that "[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy" is true. Should we make such an unjustified presumption? — Banno

Collingwood and I say yes, although saying it’s unjustified might not make sense considering an absolute presupposition is neither true nor false. It just has what Collingwood causes “logical efficacy.” It helps us get stuff done.

There's potential to mistake methodological injunctions for ontological presumptions. We might at least be clear as to which is which. But might we not also do science if we followed these methodological rules: — Banno

As I noted just previously, I don’t have a final answer for this. I’m still working on it. What are your thoughts?

Then we would not be making presumptions as to how things are, but choosing what sort of explanations we prefer. But this treats them as voluntary, whereas Collingwood treats them as ineluctable within an epoch. — Banno

That’s not how I understand what Collingwood said. This is from his essay on metaphysics:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out
what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

Collingwood doesn’t what to specify what absolute presuppositions people in a particular period have to apply. He wants to figure out which ones they actually did use.

I feel that Metaphysics must investigate the presuppositions for their truth, falsity, unknowns and borders with knowable, and then present them to Scientific inquiries as the preliminary foundation for their embarking the researches and experiments and coming to establishing Scientific laws and principles, and further hypothesis on the subject of their inquiries. — Corvus

Your understanding of metaphysics is different from Collingwood’s and mine. Or at least my understanding of Collingwood’s understanding.

For that reason, Metaphysics is the central and critical part of Science. Science must not accept what is listed as "absolute presuppositions" without critical analysis and investigation into them before finding out on their truth and validities. — Corvus

This is not how I see it.

there is nothing intrinsic to the scientific method that other disciplines cannot also employ. — Tom Storm

Agreed. When I say “science” I think of searching for knowledge following rigorous standards— more rigorous than most of our everyday thinking. Science is important, so its rigor is important. There are certainly other things where such rigor is required, but that doesn’t mean science isn’t something special.

We sometimes fetishize science, which can lead to scientistic worldviews: the belief that only science can deliver truth to human beings. This is a foundational presupposition of old-school physicalists. — Tom Storm

Sure, but I’ll say it again. Just because some guys have screwed up and sold a highfalutin version, that doesn’t mean science isn’t something special.

Collingwood and I say yes, although saying it’s unjustified might not make sense considering an absolute presupposition is neither true nor false. It just has what Collingwood causes “logical efficacy.” It helps us get stuff done. — T Clark

Cheers. I don't have such a strong grasp of Collingwood, so please set me to rights. You know I'm going to be critical here.

There's an obvious and it seems to me insurmountable difficulty in saying that these presuppositions are neither true nor false. The result is that we cannot use them in our arguments.

So if @Wayfarer or someone comes along and says that there is also in the universe a spirit of some sort, it will do no good to retort with "The universe consists entirely of physical substance" unless we add that it is true. Telling him that "The universe consists entirely of physical substance" is neither true nor false says exactly nothing, and adds nothing to the discussion.

But telling him that as an issue of method, we are only going to look at physical substance, and just see how far that will take us - that would work.

Further, directives, unlike assertions, do not have a truth value. They are not true or false, but followed or dismissed.

So if we look at the presuppositions as directives, they serve to rule out certain sorts of explanations without engaging in a discussion of metaphysical truth.

But telling him that as an issue of method, we are only going to look at physical substance, and just see how far that will take us - that would work. — Banno

Yes! That will show us that we have a clear and distinct idea of 4% of the Universe.

Yes! That will show us that we have a clear and distinct idea of 4% of the Universe. — Wayfarer

Yes! Much better than having a vague and indistinct idea of 100% of the universe.

But there is nothing stopping us from having another discussion, using different methodologies. We could call those discussions Aesthetics or Ethics.

The method here might be to reverse the direction of fit, so that rather than making assertions bout how things are, we seek instead to make assertions about how we would have them be.

We might for instance suppose that there ought be something like fairness or justice in the universe, and so act as to bring such things about.

And do this without denying that for the purposes of describing, the universe consists of physical substance. Since within that physical substance we might build fairness. So for the purposes of doing, we might act fairly.

There's an obvious and it seems to me insurmountable difficulty in saying that these presuppositions are neither true nor false. The result is that we cannot use them in our arguments.

So if Wayfarer or someone comes along and says that there is also in the universe a spirit of some sort, it will do no good to retort with "The universe consists entirely of physical substance" unless we add that it is true. — Banno

So let’s look at it from the other direction. Collingwood and I say an absolute presupposition doesn’t have to be true, it has to be logically efficacious. But it goes further than that. Anything that can be demonstrated empirically can’t be an absolute presupposition. For example, how do you go about demonstrating the universe is made up of only physical substances—matter and energy. Describe the experiment you would use. Do you think @Wayfarer would agree.

But I'm missing something from Collingwood. He is suggesting that were we to look at what counted as explanation, evidence, and intelligibility in classical physics, we'd find that these presuppositions were operative — whether anyone articulated them or not. Collingwood seems to be telling us how things were understood, not how they ought be understood.

Collingwood seems to be telling us how things were understood, not how they ought be understood. — Banno

Exactly.

For example, how do you go about demonstrating the universe is made up of only physical substances—matter and energy. — T Clark

We can't.

See Confirmable and influential metaphysics. That the universe is made up of only physical substances might be falsified by presenting a ghost - perhaps @Wayfarer thinks this is what he is doing - but not demonstrated. No matter were we look for non-physical substances, they may be hiding somewhere else, or undetectable by our present equipment... And this is a result of the logical structure of "the universe is made up of only physical substances".

But if we instead chose to look only for explanations in terms of pysical substance, then there's no need for such a demonstration.

And we can keep in mind that this is a methodological choice, so that if it happens that we come across something that does not appear to be physical substance, we can either reject the chosen method or we can look for further explanation.

I don't know how to understand "it has to be logically efficacious" unless somehow A implies B; but this means that if A is true, then B must be true. How does Collingwood get being "logically efficacious" without truth functions? Ans so, how can something that is neither truth nor false be logically efficacious?

Exactly. — T Clark

Ok - then Collingwood is not telling us what to do.

That the universe is made up of only physical substances might be falsified by presenting a ghost - perhaps Wayfarer thinks this is what he is doing — Banno

It is what Banno thinks that Wayfarer thinks he is doing, which he is not doing, but which conviction no amount of patient explanation will ever suffice to overturn.

Anyway - going back to Collingwood - I've only read bits and pieces here and there, but the feeling I get is that Collingwood was a philosopher for whom I have considerably more sympathy than Glibert Ryle, who replaced him upon the former's early death. There's a rather good magazine article on this topic which I've pointed to previously.

Other than that, Collngwood's ideas are a precursor to later philosophy of science e.g. Kuhn and Polanyi, in particular, although with Collngwood's background in archeology, he took a more historical approach to the topic. He has a much broader view of philosophy than did Ryle or Ayer, who were contemporaries. He tended towards idealism but resisted being characterised as such.

That's all I have on Collingwood.

//ps// Oh, and that his critique is very similar to that of A N Whitehead's Science and the Modern World.//

Your understanding of metaphysics is different from Collingwood’s and mine. Or at least my understanding of Collingwood’s understanding. — T Clark

The absolute presuppositions listed in the OP are all metaphysical statements deeply contentious in nature, nothing to do with or provable by Science itself.

As I pointed out previously, if they were denied, and opposites were claimed, it wouldn't be necessarily untrue.

You need to explain, how the contentious metaphysical statements can be claimed as "absolute presuppositions" in science, and what benefits they would bring into science.

This point is not about understanding Collingwood's or your understanding of Collingwood. It is about a general rational inquiry on the issue.

But if we instead chose to look only for explanations in terms of pysical substance, then there's no need for such a demonstration. — Banno

Yes. Commitment to an ontology limits the kinds of questions we can ask.

And we can keep in mind that this is a methodological choice, so that if it happens that we come across something that does not appear to be physical substance, we can either reject the chosen method or we can look for further explanation. — Banno

This is the issue I’m struggling with. Is there a difference between a methodological and an ontological absolute presupposition. My intuition is telling me no, but I don’t think I have good arguments for that yet.

How does Collingwood get being "logically efficacious" without truth functions? Ans so, how can something that is neither truth nor false be logically efficacious? — Banno

I’ll take a swing at this, although I am on a bit of thin ice. If I am a physicalist, if I believe that all there is in the world is physical substances, that will guide me to look for answers in the physical world and to, perhaps, ignore subjective phenomena. We have found that approach to be pretty effective over the last few hundred years although we have also sometimes worried about its shortcomings.

It is what Banno thinks that Wayfarer thinks he is doing, which he is not doing, but which conviction no amount of patient explanation will ever suffice to overturn. — Wayfarer

Perhaps this is right. Or perhaps what you have had to say is not so coherent as you suppose?

We'd be better off talking about the ideas of these folk, rather than their personalities.

Is there a difference between a methodological and an ontological absolute presupposition. — T Clark

I think there is, but in terms of what we do with each rather than what they say. So Someone like @Wayfarer is quite right to point out that those who insist that the world consists of only physical substance have not made their case. But he might be mistaken if he thinks it wrong to set up a game in which we look only for physical explanations, just to see what happens. He'd then be like someone who insists on moving the bishop along a column instead of a diagonal. Yes, he can do that, but it's not what we set out to do.

I’ll take a swing at this, although I am on a bit of thin ice. If I am a physicalist, if I believe that all there is in the world is physical substances, that will guide me to look for answers in the physical world and to, perhaps, ignore subjective phenomena. We have found that approach to be pretty effective over the last few hundred years although we have also sometimes worried about its shortcomings. — T Clark

A good explanation. It's a bit like setting up the domain of discourse to only include the physical, and sticking to that rule. What we ought keep in mind is that setting up the domain of discourse is making a choice as to what we include and exclude.

I've mixed my metaphors here. Sorry.

Or perhaps what you have had to say is not so coherent as you suppose? — Banno

If I had believed that the criticisms you offered had truly understood what was being proposed, I might be inclined to so believe. But, no.

Meanwhile I've downloaded Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics and am pleased to report that it is quite an easy read, written in an admirably clear and brief style. How's this for a pungent analogy:

In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles; we fish up a thought out of our minds like an anchor foul of its own cable, hanging upside-down and draped in seaweed with shellfish sticking to it, and dump the whole thing on deck quite pleased with ourselves for having got it up at all. Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess, and reducing a knot of thoughts in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or series of thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the connexions between them. — R G Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, Pp22-23

This, in the context of explaining what he means by the presuppositions of thinking.

@T Clark,
I htink we've answered this objection:

You need to explain, how the contentious metaphysical statements can be claimed as "absolute presuppositions" in science, and what benefits they would bring into science. — Corvus

...Collingwood is not saying these presuppositions are true, but that they underpin the method that was, historically, adopted. Further, if we instead of treating them as metaphysical truths treat them as methodological prescriptions, their truth is irrelevant.

The absolute presuppositions listed in the OP are all metaphysical statements deeply contentious in nature, nothing to do with or provable by Science itself. — Corvus

Agreed—none of them are provable. But keep in mind that neither Burtt nor I claim the absolute presuppositions in the list are correct or the best ones to use. We only say they are the ones that have been used by physicists between about 1600 and 1905.

You need to explain, how the contentious metaphysical statements can be claimed as "absolute presuppositions" in science, and what benefits they would bring into science. — Corvus

I’ll say this again— for Collingwood metaphysics is the study of the absolute presuppositions that people actually used for particular purposes. What Burtt put in his book is something similar. It’s not what should be, it’s what he, a renowned, historian and philosopher of science, determined to be the case. If you want to disagree with him, that’s fine. I found his ideas interesting and convincing.

This point is not about understanding Collingwood's or your understanding of Collingwood. It is about a general rational inquiry on the issue. — Corvus

Let’s be clear. I wrote the OP. In it, I laid out my intended point for this discussion. If you want something different, have at it, but don’t tell me what I need to do.