Do you want to go on to the other SEP article, or have we treated it sufficiently?

I haven't gone into the detail of the section on Combinatorialism as much as we might .

Thanks for the thread.

Do you want to go on to the other SEP article, or have we treated it sufficiently? — Banno

The second article is about ontology. I think you and I will probably land in the same place regarding that topic. I think we can hold off unless you're charged up to read it.

haven't gone into the detail of the section on Combinatorialism as much as we might . — Banno

Again, it's up to you.

Well, yes, what's real is dependent on the task in hand, so the Possibilism-Actualism Debate is pretty superfluous.

And i doubt present company will make much of such a view.

The extension of "Bridgett Bardot" remains Bridgett Bardot, even if she had started a fish shop instead of going into acting. — Banno

How does that answer the question? I asked you about the difference between "extension" in relation to physical objects, and "extension" in relation to abstract objects.

Are you admitting that you do not recognize that there is such a difference? If so that would explain why you always seem to conflate the "actual world", in reference to a physical thing, and the "actual world" in reference to an abstract object in possible worlds semantics.

Well, yes, what's real is dependent on the task in hand, so the Possibilism-Actualism Debate is pretty superfluous. — Banno

That's exactly what I think. Where ontology leaves practical matters behind, it's a wild goose chase.

How does that answer the question? I asked you about the difference between "extension" in relation to physical objects, and "extension" in relation to abstract objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Bardot who works in the fish shop is...?

Yeah. Send in the clowns.

Premise that only the present exists
My premise is that the world only exists in the present. It may be there is a minimum duration of time, such as Planck's time, It may be that even though clocks show a different time when either near a mass or accelerating, and even though the “present” may be different for each clock, it remains a fact that for each clock there is only one present. In this present we can remember the past but not the future.

Free will vs determinism

This is why we ought not extend the fixedness of the past into the present. Doing this produces a determinist perspective ("perspective" being present), and obscures the truly dynamic nature of the present..........................
If we consider the present to always be a duration of time, we ought to allow that not only does part of the present share the properties of the past (fixed), but we need to allow that part shares the properties of the future (not fixed). This is necessary to allow that a freely willed act, at the present, can interfere with what would otherwise appear to be fixed. — Metaphysician Undercover

That we can remember the past but not the future means that for us there is an arrow of time. Between the past we remember and the future that we cannot remember is the present, the “now”.

Both the past and present are fixed, in that we can only remember one past, and by the Law of Non-contradiction there can only be one present. Therefore, both the past and present must be static rather than dynamic.

As regards the future, also by the Law of Non-contradiction, the future that will exist must be fixed, and thereby static rather than dynamic. As we cannot remember this future, we don’t know what this future will be. However, we do know from the laws of logic, necessary and universal, that this future will be fixed, static rather than dynamic.

A reality that is fixed must be deterministic, meaning that free will must be over and above any deterministic fixed reality, and within a meta-reality. By its very nature, a meta-reality must be unknowable within any deterministic reality. Similarly, the meaning of a language cannot be discovered within the language itself, but can only be known in a meta-language external to the language itself. As we cannot use language to discover meaning within itself, but only through a meta-language, we cannot use a deterministic reality to discover free will within itself, but only through a meta-reality.

Whether one believes in a meta-reality enabling free-will in our reality is a matter of faith rather than logic.

Memories

The reason i am making this distinction is because we experience the present as active, and changing, so we ought not think of it as "fixed".................
"The present" is very difficult because things are always changing, even as we speak. ……………….
Then the statement “there is a truck coming round the corner” is judged to be true, or stated as true, based on that observation which is now past. — Metaphysician Undercover

We experience the present and have memories of the past. If the present has a duration, then it may well be of the order of Plank’s time, but certainly not much more than that. I observe a truck coming round the corner, which quickly becomes a memory. I can then make a judgement, such that the truck was travelling too fast, but this judgement was made in the present and based on a memory of the past.

Imagination

If the Eiffel tower is in Reno, then it is not in Paris. If I believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, then it is implied that I also believe it is impossible that it is in Reno, which is somewhere other than Paris. Therefore to believe that it is possible that it is in Reno, implicitly contradicts my belief that it is in Paris. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see an apple on the table and imagine a yoghurt in the fridge. It is not a contradiction to observe something and imagine a different thing. Similarly, I can see the Eiffel Tower in Paris and imagine the Eiffel Tower in Reno. Neither is this a contradiction.

Both the past and present are fixed, in that we can only remember one past, and by the Law of Non-contradiction there can only be one present. Therefore, both the past and present must be static rather than dynamic. — RussellA

How can you say that the past is fixed, when what I remember as past is changing all the time? The things which have happened within the past are fixed, but that is changing all the time, so the past itself is dynamic.

If the present has a duration, then it may well be of the order of Plank’s time, but certainly not much more than that. — RussellA

Claims of how long the human "now" is vary between a few milliseconds to a few seconds, depending on the purpose of the estimation. Clearly this is a much longer duration than Plank's time.

I observe a truck coming round the corner, which quickly becomes a memory. I can then make a judgement, such that the truck was travelling too fast, but this judgement was made in the present and based on a memory of the past. — RussellA

A "judgement" as your example of something which occurs "in the present", takes a lot longer than Plank time. The average human reaction time is 25 one hundredths (,25) of a second. This is basic reflex, without allowing any time for conscious thought, which is required for judgement.

It is not a contradiction to observe something and imagine a different thing. Similarly, I can see the Eiffel Tower in Paris and imagine the Eiffel Tower in Reno. Neither is this a contradiction. — RussellA

Sure, but that's not the issue. The issue is that you cannot believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, and also believe that it is possibly in Reno, without implied contradiction. One can imagine all sorts of things, and know that these things are contradictory to what is believed, that is not a problem. The problem is when we designate things which are contrary to what we believe as "possible".

That's what produces the contradiction, because "believing X" implies that the possibility of not-X has been excluded. If we quantify "believe" with a Bayesian model of probability, then the belief that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris is represented as a degree of probability, rather than as a truth. This would allow the possibility that it is in Reno. But I don't think this is an accurate representation of common "belief".

When we believe something as true, we assume to exclude the possibility of falsity. When we are uncertain, we say something like "I think that is correct". However, if we all allow that knowledge is fallible, no matter how certain we are, then we'd probably accept that the Bayesian representation would be better representation. But this requires that we reject the attitude of certitude, and "truth" as we know it, which we have not.

How can you say that the past is fixed, when what I remember as past is changing all the time? — Metaphysician Undercover

It cannot be the case that in December 2025 “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” and in December 2026 “Caesar did not cross the Rubicon".
==============================================================

A "judgement" as your example of something which occurs "in the present", takes a lot longer than Plank time. The average human reaction time is 25 one hundredths (,25) of a second. — Metaphysician Undercover

0.25 seconds is a period of time. Similarly, one week is a period of time and one decade is a period of time.

To call 0.25 seconds a present moment in time would be like calling a decade a present moment in time.
==================================================================

The issue is that you cannot believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, and also believe that it is possibly in Reno, without implied contradiction — Metaphysician Undercover

I can believe one thing and imagine another thing.

Believing is not the same as imagining.

0.25 seconds is a period of time. Similarly, one week is a period of time and one decade is a period of time.

To call 0.25 seconds a present moment in time would be like calling a decade a present moment in time. — RussellA

I think I said this already. I believe there is no such thing as "a present moment in time". That is an artificial construct which amounts to a falsity. All time is duration.

Accordingly, the length of the present is dependent on perspective and purpose. We might refer to the current second, minute, hour, day, week, month, year, whatever, as the present, depending on context.

I certainly am not questioning his logic here. However, I am questioning what he thinks science has discovered, that "water is H2O".

In Naming and Necessity he states the following:

"Let's consider how this applies to the type of identity statement expressing scientific discoveries that I talked about before-say, that water is H2O. It certainly represents a discovery that water is H2O."

Again, this is not what science has discovered. The following is a more accurate description of what science discovered and how these terms "water" and "H2O" are actually used in scientific discourse and in ordinary language.

1. Science does not discover statements of identity but statements of composition. For example, it is more accurate to say, “liquids commonly named “water” may be composed of “H2O molecules.” Notice, this nicely leave the possibility of a liquid named “water” may not be composed of “H2O” at all. It is contingent truth whether any liquid named "water" will be composed of H2O molecules. One must go through the exercise of analyzing the liquid to see if some level of H2O molecules are present or none at all. After the liquid is analyzed for its components, a renaming of the liquid may occur depending on the purpose and focus of the scientific investigation. For example, if the pH of the liquid was of interest, the liquid might be renamed as an "Alkaline solution" or "Acidic solution".

2. Does it make sense to say one H2O molecule is water? Well, it depends how you use the term “water”. If the term “water” is used like “dihydrogen monoxide” than the answer is yes because “dihydrogen monoxide" means “H2O”. But this is simply a stipulation.

3. Science often uses the term “water” to mean a collection of H2O molecules. In this case, it does not make sense to say one H2O molecule is water. There are scientific implications in using the term “water” to mean a collection of H2O molecules. Can we still say “water is a collection of H2O molecules.”? But this is not quite right. Depending on temperature or pressure, the collection of H2O molecules might exhibit macroscopic states such as “ice”, “water” or “steam.” Each of these terms serves us well in our daily communication, we do say “I swim in water” but we don't say “I swim in steam”; we do say “I breath in the steam” but we don't say “I breath in the ice”; or we do say “The ice melted when exposed to heat” but we don’t say “The water melted when exposed to heat”

4. One can provide a variety of liquids call “water” and not share a common essence, for example, like “sea water”, “purified water”, and “heavy water”.

5. Chemists will name the same liquid differently depending on the property under examination. For example, the underlying component might be primarily H2O, but the name of the liquid might be something entirely different, 0.0.00001M NaOH solution emphasizes the hydroxide concentration while the same liquid could be named 10 Ci/mmol indicating the specific activity of radioactivity relative to the mass of the chemical in solution.

I do not see Kripke getting to an a posteriori necessary truth.

When you actually look at how these terms are being used, we can land into two natural places:

A. Liquid named "water" may contain "H2O molecules" which is a posteriori and contingent

B. "H2O is H2O" which is analytically true, necessary and a priori

Ok. That still looks to be a misunderstanding of Kripke, and of implication. He's not attacking physics.

I am interested in your opinion on the following and how you would think Kripke would reply.

Take this two terms, "water" and "air". The claim that water rigidly designated H2O in every possible world in which that substance exists.

OK, what about "air"? So, what has science discovered in the case? Again, depending where you look, the composition may be 78% N2, 21% O2, and 1% Ar. OK, in past posts, someone has replied that it does not rigidly designate anything.

But I am puzzled by this response. In the case of "water", which naturally occurs as a mixture everywhere, we somehow can selectively exclude "impurities" to arrive at a single substance. But with "air", this exercise seems not so simple. What justification is given to keep or exclude any particular substance?

All of this feels rather arbitrarily, picking and choosing examples to make your theory work.

I am interested in your opinion on the following and how you would think Kripke would reply. — Richard B

But

Kripke pointed out that if water is H₂O, if they are indeed identical, then necessarily, they are identical. If they are the very same, then they are the very same in every possible world. — Banno

I'll try explaining this again.

See the "if"? that makes it a conditional. If as you seem to think, science did not find that water is H₂O, then ◇water ≠ H₂O.

Kripke is not asserting that water is H₂O; although he, like most folk, took this as granted. He is not telling physicist what water is made of. He is making a point about the interpretation of modal theorems, such that such equivalences, if true, are necessarily true.

So the question concerning air is misbegotten.

He is making a point about the interpretation of modal theorems, such that such equivalences, if true, are necessarily true.

So the question concerning air is misbegotten. — Banno

Right, none of them are actually true when properly analyzed. Identity doesn't work that way. So forget about it, Kripke is just blowing smoke.

Am I not also raising a concern about the process of rigid designation as well?

I don't see it. Can you explain how?

Am I not also raising a concern about the process of rigid designation as well? — Richard B

I think you're looking for some all-purpose meaning to "air" like we might find in a dictionary. We aren't concerned with that with rigid designation. We're analyzing a particular expression. We're just interested in what our speaker means by it.

We're just interested in what our speaker means by it. — frank

Sure, but this implies that whether the speaker wants the meaning to be necessary (the same in all possible worlds) or not, is just a subjective stipulation. And, the ability to whimsically stipulate that the 'identity' of "water" is necessary, and the 'identity' of "air" is not necessary, just defeats the whole purpose of possible worlds semantics.

Am I not also raising a concern about the process of rigid designation as well? — Richard B

Yes you are, and Banno is simply in denial, about the reality that it is incoherent to say that the same object, or person, has contradictory properties at the same time. Putting the same thing into different possible worlds does not provide the premise required to say that these differences are at a different time.

I'll refer you to @Banno's incoherent notion of "change" here. For Banno, change does not require time. So an object might "change" between one possible world and another, from having a property to not having it, while still remaining "the same" object, just like we say that an object changes from one moment to the next, in time, from having a property to not having it, while still remaining "the same" identity as the object which it is.

The problem of course, is that without a demonstrated continuity, the claim of "change" is unsupported, and the two are distinct, separate things, rather than one changed thing. So with a temporally supported "change" we have empirical observation of a continuity of the object from one moment to the next, despite the fact that it changes in that time. With rigid designation, there is absolutely nothing to support the requirement of continuity. So the stipulation of "change", rather than two distinct objects, is completely arbitrary.

This is the issue which Wittgenstein elucidated with the so-called private language argument. First, he lays out the common conditions for "identity" with reference to the chair. The chair in this position today, looks like it's the same chair as the one here yesterday. But, if someone switched it out overnight, then it is not the same chair with the same identity. It is implied that an object, "the same" object, has temporal extension between distinct acts of observation. The identity as "the same object" is therefore supported by an observable (public) temporal continuity.

Then, he plays a little mental trick on us. He goes on to refer to a sensation, which he signifies with "S". Each time that this supposed "same" sensation occurs, he marks an "S". Now the "S" is proposed as referring to "the same" sensation, but it's a trick because there is no continuity between one instance to another. In reality, "S" refers to distinct occurrences of similar sensations.

The problem is that the assumed continuity of the supposed object, referred to by "S", which is necessary for concluding that it is a single object, is private, within the mind of the one who senses it. It is not verifiable by public observation. Therefore the supposed object identified by "S" with its required temporal continuity is a private object, making this language which employs "S" to refer to a single identified sensation, is a private language. The thing referred to by "S" is an imaginary thing, and as such, it doesn't have identity in the common way that the chair has identity.

So this is the issue with rigid designation. The supposed continuity of the object, between one possible world and another, which establishes rigid designation, is completely imaginary, private, like the continuity between one instance of "S" and another. This supposed identity, as rigid designation, cannot be supported by empirical observation. Therefore it is nothing but a private language. "Nixon" refers to the same person in a multiplicity of possible worlds, just like "S" refers to the same sensation. That is, by assumption of a private object. There is no observable temporal extension of the object, and the extension between possible worlds is completely imaginary, unverifiable through (public) empirical observation, therefore the supposed "identity" is private. This constitutes a private language, as we assume an object whose existential extension is completely unintelligible. Now "S", or "Nixon" in the example, refers to a completely unintelligible object, making that private language incoherent.

Let me give a compare and contrast between Kripke and Wittgenstein and let us see where it goes.

From Naming and Necessity,

"Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if that is not the case. Of course we don't require that the objects exist in all possible worlds"

and

"Don't ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its properties? I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it. I don't have to identify it after seeing it through a telescope. If I am talking about it, I am talking about it, in the same way as when I say that our hands might have been painted green, I have stipulated that am talking about greenness."

From Philosphicaal Investigations,

80. I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? - "So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". - But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on. - "So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion". - But suppose that after a time it disappears again - or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases - rules saying whether one may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; and are we to say that we do not really attach meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?"

Both philosophical points, I find, are forcefully made. Kripke's example, I like it because it seems rather apropos for everyday conversations we have about everyday objects. However, when we bring in the metaphysical talk of possible worlds and rigid designation, I start to squirm. As Wittgenstein say in the 81. "All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules." What Wittgenstein is trying to do in 80 is to illustrate that very point. Can Kripke look at Wittgenstein's "chair" and say, "If I am talking about it, I am talking about it"? So, does this object only exist in a possible world when it appears, and is excluded when it disappears? But should we include this object as a "chair" even when it behavior so radically different from typical chairs. And how do we go about saying it is identical every time it appears/disappears/appears? Are we equipped with rules for this possible application?

However, when we bring in the metaphysical talk of possible worlds and rigid designation, I start to squirm. — Richard B

Yes, I can see your discomfort. Can we perhaps work on that?

§80 and §81 concern the extensibility of language. In §80 he is showing how natural languages are open to the unexpected. In §81 he is pretty much expressly rejecting the idea from the Tractatus that our natural languages are approximate to some more perfect formal language, in part because formal languages do not have the openness mentioned. §80 is about how we use natural languages effectively despite the absence of rules that will guide us in every case, and §81 is about how formal systems ought not be considered as showing the true form of our natural languages.

Now this is quite compatible with what Kripke is doing. He's saying that if we are to keep our talk of possibilities consistent, then we must keep our use of proper names and kinds consistent. This is the point made previously, that when we consider how things might have been had Nixon not won the '72 election, our considerations are about Nixon, and not about someone else.

Formal language does not perfect our natural language, but it can guide it.

Another passage I could not but wince at from N&N,

"But what I am concerned with here is a notion which is not a notion of epistemology but of metaphysics, in some (I hope) non pejorative sense. We ask something might have been true, or might have been false. Well, if something is false, it's obviously not necessarily true. If it is true, might it have been otherwise? Is it possible that, in this respect, the world should have been different from the way it is? If the answer is 'no', then this fact about the world is a necessary one. If the answer is 'yes', then this fact about the world is a contingent one." This in and of itself has nothing to do with anyone's knowledge of anything."

This passage seems to offend my Tractatus sensibilities along with a dose of Quinian skepticism towards modal logic. But let us put aside Quine for now, and let me express my Tractatus concerns.

When Kripke says something might have been true or something might have been false, I think it fair to say he is talking about a possible state of affairs. In the Tractatus, the sense of a proposition is simply to picture what might be so, a possible state of affairs. And to grasp the proposition's sense is to grasp both on what it would be like to be true and what it would be like to be false. But what sense can we make of necessarily true proportions, true whatever the circumstance. As Wittgenstein points out, it is necessary that to understand proposition's sense one must understand what it would be like to be true and what it would be like to be false, so this implies that a proposition cannot be true whatever circumstances. So, if a proposition is true whatever the circumstances, whatever might occur in the world, then it pictures nothing in particular. To say something with sense is to picture some definite possibility in particular.

So, from Tractatus point of view, I have these concerns with the Kripke passage:

1. Saying that "....then this fact about the world is a necessary one" seems incorrect. A fact about the world is not because of the nature of logical structure, but whether a possible state of affairs is true or false.

2. Saying that, "Well, if something is false, it's obviously not necessary true." How can proposition that that says nothing, follow from a proposition that says something? From a proposition that says something about the world, how is it obvious that it implies a proposition that shows logical form but states nothing about the world.

The Philsophical Investigations doesn't sanction the rigid designation axiom x=y implies □x=y, because PI didn't sanction the sort a priori metaphysical, formal, or semantic speculation that Kripke was clearly indulging in; for there is simply no compelling epistemic or semantic justification for this axiom.

I suspect that Kripke might have been influenced by early seventies work in Martin-Lof type theory when he proposed his axiom, because it looks suspiciously like the reflection rule of extensional type theories, namely a rule which asserts that computationally equal terms are definitionally equal de dicto.

For example, 1 + x isn't definitionally equal to x + 1 in a typical so-called "intensional" type theory for they are not the same construction, yet these formulas behave identically under evaluation, for clearly the Boolean equality 1 + x == x + 1 evaluates to True for all natural numbers x. In an extensional type theory, the reflection rule when applied to this case says that a proof of 1 + x == x + 1 for any x, de dicto implies that 1+ x = x + 1. The reflection rule isn't very popular because it implies that type-checking is generally undecidable. Hence in most programming languages, 1 + x and x + 1 aren't considered to be definitionally equal, in spite of always evaluating to the same value.

The reflection rule is structurally identical to Kripke's x=y implies □x=y, but is innocously de dicto. By contrast, Kripke proposal is meant de re, in a way that is metaphysically speculative and also debunked by the history of science theory change - indeed, the whole point of theory-change is to render the possibilities implied by the previous theory as inconsistent, as for instance when promoting the equivalence between mass and energy to analytic status or downgrading it to synthetic status.

Ok, think about the logical space of the Tractatus. In that space, any proposition can be stated. Amongst those propositions are some which happen to be true, given the way things are, and a whole lot that happen to be false. Now some of those false propositions might have been true, had things been slightly different. that's what modal logic seeks to make coherent.

1. Saying that "....then this fact about the world is a necessary one" seems incorrect. A fact about the world is not because of the nature of logical structure, but whether a possible state of affairs is true or false. — Richard B

There are some statements that could not be false, no matter how the things in logical space are arranged. Mathematical and logic truths are amongst these. These are in a relevant sense independent of how things are. These are among the necessary truths. They are true in every state of affairs.

2. Saying that, "Well, if something is false, it's obviously not necessary true." How can proposition that that says nothing, follow from a proposition that says something? From a proposition that says something about the world, how is it obvious that it implies a proposition that shows logical form but states nothing about the world. — Richard B

Necessary truths are true in any arrangement of logical space. So if a statement is false, at the very lest, it is not true in every arrangement of logical space. But that doesn't mean that is says nothing. That it is not true that the cat is on the mat does tell us something about how things are arranged in logical space.

Or are you thinking of necessary propositions as saying nothing? That's one notion form the Tractatus. "Well, if something is false, it's obviously not necessary true" is consistent with this. A proposition that is necessary tells us nothing about how things are arranged in logical space, because t is true in every arrangement. A statement that is not necessary will be false in at least some arrangement, and so will tel us something.

The exception is contradictions, which are of course the negation of necessary truths, and false in every arrangement of logical space. Together tautologies and contradictions form the boundary of logical space.

The logical space of the Tractatus is a precursor to possible world semantics. It consists in different arrangements fo the things in the world, and each of these arrangements can be considered a possible world. In those terms, the Tractatus presaged possible world semantics.

Does that help?

My main point with this example is if "air" can be non-rigid, then so can "water". But I am open to hear why one would think otherwise.

Well I don't think it addresses my main concern. My discomfort with Kripke is not merely terminological — it’s that he appears to reify necessity as a worldly fact, whereas for early Wittgenstein necessity belongs to logical form, not reality. (And in later Wittgenstein, necessity is a reflection of grammar and language games, and not facts holding in all possible worlds)

More specifically, Kripke’s phrase “this fact about the world is a necessary one” is exactly what Wittgenstein would reject. Your reply implicitly accepts Kripke’s metaphysical framing instead of explaining why it doesn’t violate Tractarian structures. Also, I don't believe you address how a proposition with sense implies something about a proposition without sense? This violates the saying/showing distinction Wittgenstein stressed throughout the Tractatus.

My main point with this example is if "air" can be non-rigid, then so can "water". But I am open to hear why one would think otherwise. — Richard B

Rigid designation is for proper names. We can use "water" as a proper name like this:

The water in the pool could have been more alkaline.

that bolded section can serve as a rigid designator because we know which water is being discussed. And here:

Water is H20.

as you mentioned, we can't assess this statement one way or the other until we know what the speaker is talking about. Once we determine that here, "water" is being used to refer to a particular chemical, we can treat it like a proper name.

So in all cases where we use rigid designation, it has to be clear which person, place, or thing is being talked about. If there is any confusion at all about that, we can't use rigid designation.

To use "water" non-rigidly, you'd just have to come up with a statement where it's not being used to refer to a particular thing, like

I'm having trouble keeping my head above water.

...he appears to reify necessity as a worldly fact — Richard B

Not at all sure why you would suppose that. Possible worlds are arrangements of how things might be, in logical space, which is pretty exactly in keeping with the Tractaus.

It's not up to others to explain "Kripke’s metaphysical framing doesn’t violate Tractarian structures" so much as up to you to show how it does, if that is what you think.

I don't believe you address how a proposition with sense implies something about a proposition without sense? — Richard B

If you want a reply on this, you are going to have to explain what you are claiming. Are you trying to say something like: "If 'The cat is on the mat' is false (a proposition with sense), how does this imply anything about 'The cat is on the mat or the cat is not on the mat' (a tautology without sense)?" If so, the answer is straightforward: it doesn't imply it in the usual sense. Rather, the tautology is true independently of whether the contingent proposition is true or false. The relationship isn't one of implication but of logical independence—which is precisely the point about necessary truths being "empty" of empirical content.