2, How can we know, that there is something which isn’t here? Or in other words, how can we say that there really is something which isn’t here and now, whilst the only things we can be certain about (say something about) are what is here and now? — Punshhh

So I would challenge this assumption. Why is the only thing we can be certain of in the “here and now”?

But in any case, for everything that is here and now, how many things are NOT here and now? Far more. From the workings of our bodies to all activity outside our scope of vision, what’s absent and unknown is simply much bigger than what is present and “known.” Yet this is what’s been privileged historically, and has even come to define human beings, from zoon echon logon to res cogitans.

The influence of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and even Kant is immeasurable when it comes to thinking about and defining human being (and thus what a good life, propose, and happiness mean). Yet to me it’s like defining a screwdriver as a paint can opener. Our capacity to think, speak, and be consciously aware (as in Descartes’ definition of thought) are secondary characteristics.

Crudely put here, these familiar time terms are really a unity. — Constance

In my understanding, it’s a unity in the sense that these traditional terms are really an abstraction from human activity. It’s all happening, and so the future is just as much the past and the present as the past is also the future. Which from a traditional Aristotelian sense of time is a gibberish statement. Nevertheless, there it is.

Not sure what this has to do with the metaphysics of presence. — Constance

To me, a consequence of privileging the present, and substance ontology generally, is a modern form of materialism that eventually reduces the goal of human life to consumption. Why? Because human beings become a substance, an object, like everything else— with perhaps the added trait of “reason” or language or thought. Which isn’t entirely untrue, of course. But any spiritual content — which once existed — is now gone, replaced with scientism, nihilism, capitalism. These now become the moral context in which society operates, from its mores to its laws.

Obviously these are sweeping statements and need much more examples and elaboration to fill them out. But that’s the connection I see— and the reason I find the metaphysics of presence an important and relevant philosophical concept.

Also, I am not advocating a return to Christian or Hellenistic religion. Just to be clear.

Why is the only thing we can be certain of in the “here and now”?

But in any case, for everything that is here and now, how many things are NOT here and now? Far more. From the workings of our bodies to all activity outside our scope of vision, what’s absent and unknown is simply much bigger than what is present and “known.” — Mikie

I don’t think this is what Derrida is getting at in his deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. What he means is that the present isn’t something that can turn back to look at itself. To be present is to be a change, a hinge, a transit. The present doesn’t ‘occupy’ a moment of time, as if it subsists itself briefly as itself before it changes into a new present. When we talk about or imagine things outside consciousness, beneath consciousness , simultaneous with consciousness, like a body performing processes we are unaware of, we are still treating these things and this time as present at hand.

This blurb suggests that it's not primarily about time. It's about presence versus absence. Do you have a quote that contradicts this?

Derrida characterizes as the “metaphysics of presence.” This is the tendency to conceive fundamental philosophical concepts such as truth, reality, and being in terms of ideas such as presence, essence, identity, and origin—and in the process to ignore the crucial role of absence and difference. — Britannica

. here

According to my daimon Marcus Tullius Cicero "[t]here's nothing so absurd but some philosopher has already said it." And that was in 44 BCE!

I would amend that statement, or perhaps it would be more correct to say expand on in light of the subject matter: There's nothing more otiose but some philosopher has already proclaimed it.

And now some words from John Dewey: "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device
for dealing with the problems of philosophers
and beomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men."

— Britannica

This blurb suggests that it's not primarily about time. It's about presence versus absence. Do you have a quote that contradicts this?

Derrida characterizes as the “metaphysics of presence.” This is the tendency to conceive fundamental philosophical concepts such as truth, reality, and being in terms of ideas such as presence, essence, identity, and origin—and in the process to ignore the crucial role of absence and difference.
— Britannica — frank

The way that absence and difference are internal to presence what time is. Difference isnt a static fact, it’s an event , an activity. It is temporalization.

The way that absence and difference are internal to presence what time is. — Joshs

If you mean presence and absence are aspects of change, then yes. But presence and absence go eat beyond that, so we don't have to confine ourselves to time.

If you mean presence and absence are aspects of change, then yes. But presence and absence go eat beyond that, so we don't have to confine ourselves to time. — frank

No, they don’t go beyond time, since they are inextricable. from it. They are incoherent without it.

No, they don’t go beyond time, since they are inextricable. from it. They are incoherent without it. — Joshs

Nevertheless, Derrida's critique is about a tendency to ignore ABSENCE and DIFFERENCE in favor of presence, as in the presence of the color blue, versus the absence of that color.

I don’t think this is what Derrida is getting at in his deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. — Joshs

You could be right, but I don’t care much about Derrida. I think he was mostly a windbag. I mention him in the OP because he popularized the phrase and occasionally said some interesting things, but it’s Heidegger that I’m building off of here.

“William James's "specious present" describes our experience of the present as a short, flowing duration, not an instantaneous point, acting like a "saddle-back" of time with a bit of the immediate past and future held together, allowing us to perceive motion and succession rather than just isolated moments, a key idea in his Principles of Psychology (1890). He contrasted this "thick" experience with the "knife-edge" mathematical present (a single point) and the "stream of consciousness," arguing that our awareness always carries a sense of "now" that's extended and contains felt duration.” — Joshs

I see the point and I agree with the principles, but it looks to me like a misuse of "specious". What James argued is that the common conception of "present", when "present" is defined as the divisor between past and future is a faulty concept. So, that thin, instantaneous, "knife edge" present which separates past from future, is what ought to be referred to as the "specious present". "Specious" because it is false and misleading. The common concept of an instantaneous present moment, is false and misleading, therefore it ought to be called "the specious present".

The thick present, which James proposes, is a combination of past and future, and it is supposed to be the true present, what Derrida calls "pure actuality", and therefore not "specious". The difference being that one description of "present" is as a division between past and future, the other one has the present as a unity of past and future. That's a substantial difference. Since the former is the conception which is false and misleading, we ought to say that it is the specious present.

So I would challenge this assumption. Why is the only thing we can be certain of in the “here and now”?

Forgive me, I’m new to all this phenomenology malarkey. I thought the idea was that everything is always here and now and it is our experiences which give us the impression that it is otherwise. Namely that everything isn’t here and now, except the few things we are concentrating on, in any one moment.

And now some words from John Dewey: "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device
for dealing with the problems of philosophers
and beomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men." — Ciceronianus

Quantum physics started with Einstein wondering why iron glows when it gets hot. I think you'd tell Einstein to stop lollygagging and get back to making doughnuts.

Mmmmmm. Donuts. Their presence is so satisying. Their
absence, though, is never unnoticed, but instead much regretted.

:lol:

I thought the idea was that everything is always here and now and it is our experiences which give us the impression that it is otherwise. — Punshhh

I think our impressions give us the sense that everything is here and now, and the rest is unknown. At least that’s the emphasis of various types of phenomenology: our own conscious awareness is what we can be sure of, whether representation or not.

Husserl and his school of phenomenology is relevant here only in the sense that it was an influence on Heidegger, but otherwise isn’t that important.

And now some words from John Dewey: "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and beomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men." — Ciceronianus

:up:

Largely, yes. But not because the theory is necessarily “wrong.”

You’re right to push back on such a big claim. But try to think of it less as reinventing the wheel and more of talking about the chariot. Doing so doesn’t negate the wheel’s invention, it’s simply talking about something else, albeit adjacent. — Mikie

You're supposed to dig deeper into the philosophers' work you cited in your OP. Then you can make an argument for or against it. This is what I wanted to say. But if you're not at all threading into their waters, but just want to name the subject, I don't think it's fair to name drop either.

I see that there's still confusion happening on this thread, at two pages of it.

Now you can make an argument that everything from gravity to behavior that’s “second nature” all happen in the present, but that’s begging the question. It’s essentially saying “x is present because it happens in the present.” From one perspective, this makes perfect sense: everything happens in the present, then becomes past in memory while pushing into the unknown future. Like a moving point on a number line. But this perspective is exactly what’s being questioned. — Mikie

That's the thing -- we can't even make a memory out of something that's outside of our consciousness. And no, the argument in quotes "x is present because it happens in the present" is not even a proper argument. I'm just pointing out to you when I used the ANS that what's hidden from consciousness may not necessarily be at a disadvantaged given that humans have a propensity to favor the clear and present perception.

According to my daimon Marcus Tullius Cicero "[t]here's nothing so absurd but some philosopher has already said it." And that was in 44 BCE!

I would amend that statement, or perhaps it would be more correct to say expand on in light of the subject matter: There's nothing more otiose but some philosopher has already proclaimed it.

And now some words from John Dewey: "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device
for dealing with the problems of philosophers
and beomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men." — Ciceronianus

Oh the irony! :lol:

Or hypocrisy?

we can't even make a memory out of something that's outside of our consciousness. — L'éléphant

That’s a good point. The here and now of conscious awareness is the absolute starting point for Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger and Derrida as well accept the absolute primacy of the experienced now. Their deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence aims to show that within the now itself there is a bifurcation or hinge even more intimate than pure presence. So they dont look outside of the now to what is beyond our immediate awareness, but within this assumed immediacy.

You're supposed to dig deeper into the philosophers' work you cited in your OP. — L'éléphant

Second paragraph:

There’s much more detail involved which I can get into depending on how the thread develops, but I wanted to keep this relatively brief. — Mikie

I feel like I’ve elaborated further, as necessary. But to each their own.

That's the thing -- we can't even make a memory out of something that's outside of our consciousness. — L'éléphant

I fail to see the relevance. Plenty of behavior involves no conscious awareness, yet it happens. We may have no memory of turning the doorknob to event a room, but we know it must have occurred. We’re all in agreement about that, I think.

All of these are examples of absence, which is exactly what isn’t privileged— and that was your initial question.

I'm just pointing out to you when I used the ANS that what's hidden from consciousness may not necessarily be at a disadvantaged given that humans have a propensity to favor the clear and present perception. — L'éléphant

Fine— but I never said anything about being at a disadvantage. I think that defining a human being (and the world, or “reality”) in terms of conscious awareness, “thinking,” reason, logos, or in Heidegger talk as “presence at hand,” does lead to problems, but this particular state of being isn’t harmful in itself. It’s only that it isn’t primarily what we are (or what the world is) — and privileging it has lead to various unintended consequences that continue to the present day.

I fail to see the relevance. Plenty of behavior involves no conscious awareness, yet it happens. We may have no memory of turning the doorknob to event a room, but we know it must have occurred. We’re all in agreement about that, I think.

All of these are examples of absence, which is exactly what isn’t privileged— and that was your initial question. — Mikie

Yes, but this distinction between what we are paying attention to and what is outside of this awareness is not what Heidegger or Derrida are getting at with their deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. They are directing their focus on what is taking place within that very beam of direct attention, that it is not simply a staring at something but being thrown into engagement with it. Attention is a kind of displacement.

I’m not sure Heidegger even used the phrase too often. It was Derrida who popularized it. So whether be deconstructs it or not, I don’t know.

In any case, I think my reading is more interesting. I don’t want to start quoting chapter and verse, but a major concern of Heidegger’s is the dehumification of human beings, and I think it’s that piece that’s most relevant today. Presence and its privileged position within Western philosophy has played a large role in that.

(2) We’re in a period of technological nihilism, where we view human beings as essentially machines. The world itself is thought of as a machine, one reduced to substances — a collection of atoms. Our current variant of materialism, where humans are animals with language who go through life with needs to satisfy (inevitably leading to the human being as consumer), is particularly harmful. One consequence is capitalism in various forms. These ideas permeate politics, religion, and business. We did not get here by accident— the objectification of the world (in its modern form starting with Descartes) is an outgrowth of substance ontology. — Mikie

I'm interested in this paragraph. Forgive my meandering and uninitiated response.

We often hear this kind of criticism of the present era from religious people and popular intellectuals like Jordan Peterson and John Vervaeke, both of whom are unlikely to be influences on your thinking. I understand some of their ideas are derivative of Heidegger.

I've often thought that we are living in an anti-modernist, neo-Romantic period where everything is centred around emotionalism and we are no longer generally convinced by reasoning or science, which seem to be widely understood as joy killers, the enemy of the human. Lived experience is seen as overriding institutional knowledge, with self-expression and personal freedom framed as moral imperatives.

I don’t see widespread objectification of the world as an emerging trend so much as a mystification of everything: a vanquishing of certainty, a privileging of subjective experience, an obsession with authenticity and a re-enchantment of nature, bordering on its worship. To me, this looks like a legacy of the 1960s counterculture that never really went away despite the best efforts of the 1980's.

I am assuming that the antidote to our situation (for you) is some kind of deeper connection to being and nature? What might that look like?

I think my reading is more interesting. I don’t want to start quoting chapter and verse, but a major concern of Heidegger’s is the dehumification of human beings, and I think it’s that piece that’s most relevant today. Presence and its privileged position within Western philosophy has played a large role in that. — Mikie

I just think that, if you want to define the metaphysics of presence as a thinking which doesn't take into account what is completely outside of awareness you should leave Heidegger and Derrida out of the discussion and focus on those accounts which illustrate, rather than challenge, your argument, such as psychoanalysis and cognitive science.

if you want to define the metaphysics of presence as a thinking which doesn't take into account what is completely outside of awareness — Joshs

It’s a thinking that privileges the present. It’s not that it doesn’t take anything else into account.

I've often thought that we are living in an anti-modernist, neo-Romantic period where everything is centred around emotionalism and we are no longer generally convinced by reasoning or science, which seem to be widely understood as joy killers, the enemy of the human. Lived experience is seen as overriding institutional knowledge, with self-expression and personal freedom framed as moral imperatives.

I don’t see widespread objectification of the world as an emerging trend so much as a mystification of everything: a vanquishing of certainty, a privileging of subjective experience, an obsession with authenticity and a re-enchantment of nature, bordering on its worship. T — Tom Storm

Yes, yes! :100:

I've often thought that we are living in an anti-modernist, neo-Romantic period where everything is centred around emotionalism and we are no longer generally convinced by reasoning or science, which seem to be widely understood as joy killers, the enemy of the human. Lived experience is seen as overriding institutional knowledge, with self-expression and personal freedom framed as moral imperatives.

I don’t see widespread objectification of the world as an emerging trend so much as a mystification of everything: a vanquishing of certainty, a privileging of subjective experience, an obsession with authenticity and a re-enchantment of nature, bordering on its worship. To me, this looks like a legacy of the 1960s counterculture that never really went away despite the best efforts of the 1980's. — Tom Storm

The anti-modernist, neo-Romantic thing seems apt to me up here in Nimbin. :wink: I don't know what's its like in the cities these days―I haven't lived right in a city for nearly thirty years. I visit Sydney about once a year, but the people I catch up with there are friends from Sydney Uni and artists―philosophical, creative and literary types.

I think the story is very different for the everyday person, that is the majority―they seem hypnotized by TV and social media, and preoccupied with paying their mortgages or rent, while being keen in their precious time off to do as much in the way of 'fun' leisure activities as possible. I don't see much re-enchantment of nature there. Certainly there is a privileging of the individual, of the over-riding importance of being entertained and having a good time as much as possible.

I don't think philosophical materialism is the problem―I think it is consumerism, the obsession with material "goods" and personal comfort that is really the problem. I don't think loss of meaning, in the sense of loss of the ability to be convinced by overarching narratives is the problem either―I think it likely that most people only ever gave lip-service to such religious institutions in the interest of conforming with their social milieu. Those interested in philosophy or spirituality are a rare breed―most people thing it is a load of crap, just a waste of time.

The anti-modernist, neo-Romantic thing seems apt to me up here in Nimbin — Janus

Fuckin' weed smoking hippie!

Pretty big in my city of five million as well. Of course, it’s mainly the middle classes and the literate blue-collar types who get on board, like any widespread movement. I recently had a plumber lecture me about how science is the cause of most problems and that we need more people like America’s visionary RFK. I think the culture war we often talk about also unfolds as a battle between the seen and the longed for. Or something like that.

I don't think philosophical materialism is the problem―I think it is consumerism, the obsession with material "goods" and personal comfort that is really the problem. I don't think loss of meaning, in the sense of loss of the ability to be convinced by overarching narratives is the problem either―I think it likely that most people only ever gave lip-service to such religious institutions in the interest of conforming with their social milieu. — Janus

Yes, I think we’ve agreed on this too. I wonder if the fear stirred by issues like climate change, AI, and technological change has helped spark a fresh retreat into comforting stories as a way of avoiding a perceived reality.

I recently had a plumber lecture me about how science is the cause of most problems and that we need more people like America’s visionary RFK. I think the culture war we often talk about also unfolds as a battle between the seen and the longed for. Or something like that — Tom Storm

It gets a bit tricky to sort out where anti-vacc-ers and other rejecters of scientific consensus are coming from. Much of the rejection of covid recommendations coming from the CDC and Fauci in the U.S. emanated from the same groups who reject climate change models. I wouldn’t characterize this group as anti-science. On the contrary, they are science idealists. They would tell you that they very much believe in science as a method. But they have a traditional, romanticized view of how science method works, and the actual ambiguities and complexities of scientific practice don’t fit their idealized view of it. Their worshipful, dogmatic view of science is about as non-relativized as can be.

At the opposite end of the political spectrum are new age and postmodernist types who are suspicious or dismissive of the limits of Western medicine. Unlike the traditionalists, they directly question the authority of scientific methodology. By contrast, traditionalists accuse the scientific establishment of choosing political ideology over ‘scientific truth’ as the traditionalists idealize it. Traditionalists believe in a pure separation between scientific truth and politics, whereas postmodern types believe all science is inherently political.

I think the postmodernists have a point about needing to question the authoritative approach to doing science. And I don’t find that postmodernists deny the benefits of scientific medicine. They are not arguing that western medical advances and climate change research are untrue or not useful. Their issues are more subtle than this.

To sum up, traditionalists embrace an older, idealized conception of science which causes them to treat climate change and covid recommendations as simply bad or corrupt science. New age hippie types embrace non-Western alternatives to scientific medicine which integrate body , mind and cosmos holistically. At times this leads them to dangerously reject the Western component rather than finding a way to accommodate it to their alternative practices. Postmodern types dont advocate for an alternative to science. They accept it for what it is , useful in a sense. They simply want to point out that it is intrinsically political. I think hippie-types have a point about the need to integrate body and mind perspectives, but without simply rejecting Western approaches. And I think postmodernists have a point about needing prominent body and mind with the socio-cultural dynamics within which science functions.

It gets a bit tricky to sort out where anti-vacc-ers and other rejecters of scientific consensus are coming from. Much of the rejection of covid recommendations coming from the CDC and Fauci in the U.S. emanated from the same groups who reject climate change models. I wouldn’t characterize this group as anti-science. On the contrary, they are science idealists. They would tell you that they very much believe in science as a method. But they have a traditional, romanticized view of how science method works, and the actual ambiguities and complexities of scientific practice don’t fit their idealized view of it. Their worshipful, dogmatic view of science is about as non-relativized as can be. — Joshs

Interesting. This analysis surprises me. I hadn't thought about science-idealists who reject models when they are uncertain. It does make sense.