Yes, I know that you think that 2 is as far as we need to go, but it isn't. Since you objected to 4 on semantic grounds, and you hold that 2 is as far as we need to go, then tell me where the following argument for 4 goes wrong...


Believing that 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true, if based upon belief that 'Jones owns a Ford' is true, and accepting the rules of correct inference, requires knowing that if 'Jones owns a Ford' or 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true then so too is 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona'. Smith's knowing that and still accepting that 'Either Jones own a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true despite not believing that 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true, is for Smith to believe that 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true because 'Jones own a Ford' is true.

4 follows from 1, 2, and 3 as far as I can tell.

2 is what matters. It's the whole point of Case II.

We already have, as a premise, a justified false belief for Smith, namely p, which for some reason you don't like to talk about.

4 annoys me, but I'm not even sure it matters, unless the idea is to pretend that Smith doesn't believe that p.

You're right. 2 is what matters. I've set out precisely what it takes. Gettier did not.

The Gettier case annoys everyone since '63. That doesn't matter. Show me where that argument for 4 goes wrong.

Show me where that argument for 4 goes wrong — creativesoul

As I said before, I think "A because B" is just shorthand for a modus ponens:
If B then A;
B;
therefore A.
As it happens, you had included the conditional in your premises (1 I think), but p was nowhere to be found.

If we have the conditional explicitly, that means p is presupposed by 4, and there's no need for that, because we've been told in so many words that Smith believes that p.

Oh come on Srap.

Natural language isn't shorthand for logical notation. It's quite the other way around, and if logic cannot take proper account of Smith's belief that (p v q) is true because p is true, then it's not a problem with Smith's belief(which happens to be belief about the rules). It's a problem for logic.

I granted Smith's belief that p. So yes, p is presupposed by 4. The focus is what Smith's belief that (p v q) requires in order for it to even be held by Smith. That's what the argument sets out, and it shows Gettier's error in his report of Smith's belief.

Natural language isn't shorthand for logical notation. — creativesoul

I presented it in natural language.

Point taken.

My friend arrived at the same question Srap...

What's because?

Arrrgh! :P

I do not know how else to describe it.

Believing that 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true, if based upon belief that 'Jones owns a Ford' is true, and accepting the rules of correct inference, requires knowing that if 'Jones owns a Ford' or 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true then so too is 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona'. Smith's knowing that and still accepting that 'Either Jones own a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true despite not believing that 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true, is for Smith to believe that 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true because 'Jones own a Ford' is true.

Smith is aware of what it takes for (p v q) to be true. He knows that (p v q) can only be true if either p or q is. He does not believe that q is true. He does believe that (p v q) is true. He does not believe that (p v q) is true because q is true. He does believe that p is true. He believes that (p v q) is true because p is true.

P's being true or Q's being true is what makes (p v q) true.

Logicians... :-}

;)

knowing that if 'Jones owns a Ford' or 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true then so too is 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona'. — creativesoul

You've mentioned this several times. I see this as knowing the definition of "or".

If A or B, then A-or-B.

It seems interesting if you throw in "is true", but it's really not.

If A is true or B is true, then A-or-B is true.

But again that's just the definition.

I'm attempting to be as concise as possible with ordinary language.

And yes Srap, it pains me to be as deliberate as I have to be to set this out long-form. Usually "is true" is redundant.

knowing that if 'Jones owns a Ford' or 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true then so too is 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona'.

You've mentioned this several times. I see this as knowing the definition of "or".

I see it as knowing what makes (p v q) true.

I see it as knowing the what makes (p v q) true. — creativesoul

We're not actually disagreeing. :-)

"p ∨ q" has three semantic components: p, q, and ∨. You have to know what they all mean to know what "p ∨ q" means; you have to know whether p and q are true to know whether "p ∨ q" is true.

Agreement is good.

"p ∨ q" has three semantic components: p, q, and ∨. You have to know what they all mean to know what "p ∨ q" means; you have to know whether p and q are true to know whether "p ∨ q" is true.

Understood. Invoking meaning could be helpful here, for you do not have to know whether p or q are true to know what makes (p v q) true.

1.Smith knows that (p v q) is true if either p or q is true
2.Smith believes that (p v q) is true.
3.Smith does not believe that q is true.
4.Smith believes that (p v q) is true because p is true.
5.(p v q) is true because q is true
6.Smith holds false belief

What are you denying? — creativesoul

2 and 4 are two separate, albeit related, beliefs. 2 is a true belief and 4 is a false belief.

Yet again, it doesn't matter if I believe that Donald Trump is the President for a false reason. My belief that Donald Trump is the President is true. And it doesn't matter if Smith believes that p ∨ q is true for a false reason. His belief that p ∨ q is true is true.

I don't think the Trump example is an adequate comparison...

I also do not think that "(p v q) is true" adequately explains Smith's belief. I'm saying that Smith's belief is false because it is belief about what makes (p v q) true as compared/contrasted to belief that (p v q) is true. The former is prior to the latter during actual thought/belief processes.

Smith's belief isn't properly accounted for by 2. That's the need filled by arguing for 4. Smith's belief that (p v q) is true is belief that (p v q) is true as a result of p's being true. In other words, Smith's belief that (p v q) is true consists of belief about what makes it so. It's belief about the truth conditions. That's the only way he could believe g, h, and i. It's not belief that (p v q) is true, per se. It's belief about what makes them so. He believes that they are true because p is true.

Believing that 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true, if based upon belief that 'Jones owns a Ford' is true, and accepting the rules of correct inference, requires knowing that if 'Jones owns a Ford' or 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true then so too is 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona'. Smith's knowing that and still accepting that 'Either Jones own a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true despite not believing that 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true, shows us that Smith accepts that 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true because Smith believes that 'Jones own a Ford' is true. He believes that 'Either Jones own a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true because 'Jones owns a Ford' is true. However, it is true because 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true.

Smith is aware of what it takes for (p v q) to be true. He knows that (p v q) can only be true if either p or q is. He does not believe that q is true. He does believe that p is true. He does believe that (p v q) is true. He does not believe that (p v q) is true because q is true. He believes that (p v q) is true because p is true.

P's being true or Q's being true is what makes (p v q) true.

Let me take a stab at this. Be warned I did not read the entire thread (I'm not reading through multiple lines of thought and arguments about philosophy just to reach this point):

I am on the jury of the trial of Mr. X. Mr. X Is accused of killing Bob. I sit in the courtroom and see all the evidence. Everything points to Mr. X- he has no alibi, he was seen in the area during the murder, he owns the murder weapon, and all the forensic evidence indicates he killed Bob. He has a motive and multiple witnesses confirm his motive and the other facts surrounding the case.

Would you say I am justified in believing Mr. X committed the murder and killed Bob?

To some extent, you're agreeing with Gettier: the reliance on Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford is the source of Gettier's claim that Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is justified.

Almost everyone feels something is wrong here. Some accept that it's a refutation of the JTB theory of knowledge, but many don't. So the question is what is going wrong here?

You say that (h) is not an adequate characterization of the belief Smith holds. You want (h) to drag (f) along with it. (BTW, your argument was my very first reaction too, so I sympathize.)

I think now that going down this road eviscerates entailment in a way we don't want. If we have a web of beliefs, connected by various degrees of the relation "is a reason for", we still need to individuate those beliefs, even if they confront reality in groups or as a totality, not singly, because we have to be able to revise them individually.

I think the usual approach to Gettier is probably right: we feel that the justification Smith has for believing (f) turns out to be irrelevant to the truth of (h). It's that irrelevance we want to capture. We need rules about how justification passes from one belief to another, something more precise than Gettier's principle that entailment preserves justification just as it preserves truth.

You wrote:

To some extent, you're agreeing with Gettier: the reliance on Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford is the source of Gettier's claim that Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is justified.

Almost everyone feels something is wrong here. Some accept that it's a refutation of the JTB theory of knowledge, but many don't. So the question is what is going wrong here?

You say that (h) is not an adequate characterization of the belief Smith holds. You want (h) to drag (f) along with it. (BTW, your argument was my very first reaction too, so I sympathize.)

Hey Srap.

Interestingly enough, I am agreeing with Gettier, at least as far as the justification aspect goes, and as everyone will soon see - it is not a problem for justified true belief, because Smith's belief is not true. I mean, I do think that Smith is completely justified in his belief that: ((p v q) is true because p is true). The difference between everyone(it seems) and myself is that I find very good reason to say that Smith's belief is false. Thought/belief is my forte, so to speak, and it is informing my approach here.

As you've noted, and is shown immediately above, I've argued that (h) is not an adequate characterization of the belief that Smith forms/holds. What Gettier claims is Smith's belief is utterly inadequate in it's explanatory power regarding what Smith's belief consists in/of. As I've been working through this, along with the help of others - including yourself - I'm beginning to realize something curious. My earlier thoughts were put into a rough argument. While reading through the objections...

What I'm attempting to set out is that the belief that Smith holds prior to his acceptance of g, h, and i ought be the focus. That belief is required in order to accept any and/or all three, and it seems to me that it is only that approach that puts a much needed finer point upon what Smith's belief that (p v q) actually consists in/of. However, in my earlier rough outline, that timeline wasn't adequately represented. As a result, you and others have rightly said that we could stop at 2. Or better yet - that the issue is/was Smith's JTB that (p v q) is true, and that that is prior to what I've set out.

I'm working on how to show that Smith's arrival at (p v q) is true is nothing more and nothing less than that it is true because p is true, as compared/contrasted with Smith's believing it is true because belief that p, and realizing that (p v q) follows from p. The former is Smith's belief about (p v q). The latter is Gettier's report of Smith's belief, and it leaves out the former. The former sets out what realizing that (p v q) follows from p, and then accepting g, h, and i as a result of that realization entails and/or implies.

That would put what I'm arguing for prior to what Gettier arrives at. An appropriate outline ought show that Smith's belief that: ((p v q) is true because p is true) is temporally prior to and therefore effectively exhausts Smith's belief that: ((p v q) is true). That would dissolve the problem.

That is to say that Smith's belief that: ((p v q) is true) is existentially contingent upon Smith's belief that: ((p v q) is true because p is true).

I think now that going down this road eviscerates entailment in a way we don't want. If we have a web of beliefs, connected by various degrees of the relation "is a reason for", we still need to individualize those beliefs, even if they confront reality in groups or as a totality, not singly, because we have to be able to revise then individually.

I think the usual approach to Gettier is probably right: we feel that the justification Smith has for believing (f) turns out to be irrelevant to the truth of (h). It's that irrelevance we want to capture. We need rules about how justification passes from one belief to another, something more precise than Gettier's principle that entailment preserves justification just as it preserves truth.

Interesting. My approach is from a completely different direction, namely a focus upon the belief aspect, it ignores the aforementioned irrelevance and instead sheds much needed light upon the fact that Gettier doesn't properly account for Smith's belief about (p v q). Smith's belief about (p v q) necessarily predates and informs Smith's belief that: ((p v q) is true). Smith's belief about (p v q) is that: ((p v q) is true because p is true).

There's another consideration at hand here. There's something at work - within our accounting for Smith's belief - that renders us unable to properly account for Smith's belief. It involves the difference between belief and belief that.

Let me explain...

Smith's belief that: ((p) is true) is Smith's believing "Jones owns a Ford". Smith's belief does not consist in/of believing that: (the statement "Jones owns a Ford" is true), unless Smith himself has learned to isolate his own thought/belief. In other words, unless Smith is actively involved in thinking about thought/belief. This comes to bear when attempting to properly account for Smith's belief that:((p v q) is true because p is true).

Smith's belief that: ((p v q) is true because (p) is true) is inferred from his belief that: ((p) is true), ((p v q) follows from p), ((p v q) is true if either (p) or (q) is true), and ((q) is not true).

To, me that makes perfect sense, although I do not have a good grasp upon logical notation, so if there's something incorrect about that aspect that is germane to the point being made, by all means, please let me know...

Doesn't that effectively dissolve the 'problem' with case II?

I'll have lots more to say in a little while, but first there's this: if you're still talking about all this as adding a step before Smith gets to (h), it doesn't matter. It doesn't even matter if it's false. You have to block Smith's belief that (h) or block it from being justified.

Are you going back to denying that he ever believes (h)?

Smith gets to (g), (h), and (i) just fine. It's the step after, namely Smith's realizing the entailment, and accepting all three as true - as a result of that realization - that I'm unpacking.

I'm not denying that Smith believes (h). I'm providing excruciating detail of exactly what that consists in/of.

It does matter if Smith's belief is false. I'm not even sure how you could possibly think/believe that it doesn't.

It does matter if Smith's belief is false. — creativesoul

Because it all starts with a false belief, (f).

That's the case regardless.

Gettier wants to show that Smith arrives at JTB from a false p as a means of placing the notion of justification in question. I have no skin in the game, so to speak. It seems to me that you very well may. I haven't given the justification aspect any thought at all to speak of.

As I mentioned earlier, my forte is thought/belief. I hold that the whole of philosophy has gone horribly wrong regarding thought/belief, and that many - perhaps most - of the historical philosophical issues/problems share that hinge point. That is, that they are all logical consequences of getting thought/belief wrong. With that in mind...

Taking the justification of Smith's belief into consideration requires getting Smith's belief right.

If Smith believes that (h), and is justified in his belief that (h), then if (h) is true, which it is, then Smith should know that (h), which he clearly doesn't.

For judging Case II, nothing else is relevant.