Every object has a quality - a piece of unstructured stuff. The qualia of consciousness are qualities too, but that doesn't mean that all qualities are qualia. Which qualities are qualia depends on the definition of consciousness. If you define that all qualities are qualia, then you have panpsychism. But in any case, it is qualities in and qualities out.

But if a thing has qualia, then it has consciousness. So I'm not seeing how you're not simply attributing consciousness to the base materials.

I am not saying that base materials have qualia. I am saying that base materials have qualities. Whether these qualities are qualia is a matter of definition.

But then you're getting consciousness out without putting it in.

Yeah but it seems kind of arbitrary what consciousness is. We may agree that consciousness consists of qualities without agreeing which qualities. It's like getting a nice thing out of ugly things or vice versa. Which things are nice and which things are ugly is arbitrary; objectively there are just things.

I don't think it's arbitrary at all. Consciousness picks out a clear phenomenon: there being something it is like for a subject. Pain, visual experience, felt thought, and so on.
Anyway, one can't get it out without putting it in, is my point. One can't construct it from that which does not have it at all - that would be no different from trying to get a thing of size by assembling things of no size. It's just not going to work.

There is no example of a feature strongly emerging. If you know of one, say. Strong emergence is ruled out a priori by reason, and there is no example of it either to challenge what our reason tells us. — Clarendon

I'm not sure how to proceed here.

Against my better judgment, I glanced at the SEP article on emergent properties to see if I could get a handle on the terminology here, but it's a nightmare, as usual.

Your principle that "you can't get out what wasn't put in" seems much too strong.

Living things grow, they metabolize nutrients and excrete waste, some of them move around, and eventually they die. Their organs and tissues don't do those things on their own, and certainly the chemicals, the molecules, the atoms those components are composed of don't. An engine can give motion to a vehicle it is installed in; the components of an engine cannot do that. One atom and another might be roughly the same size, but when combined with others of their kind, one forms a hard substance, one a liquid, another a gas. Mountains create micro-climates around them, but the dirt and rock they are made of do not, and the plain next door might be made of the same dirt and rock. Any ecosystem is sensitive to changes in its climate or changes in the population of the organisms that in part constitute that ecosystem in a way that no individual or species is. Crowds routinely behave in ways that do not reflect the individual choices of their members. A central bank might lower interest rates with the intent of lowering mortgage rates, but cause the yield on bonds to rise, thus causing mortgage rates to rise — or not, you never can tell. I'm about to use a microwave to heat my coffee, but my microwave manages this not by being made of things that can heat coffee; I cannot get the same effect by removing the glass platter and just sitting my cup on that.

It seems to me everywhere you see more than what was put in, wholes that are not the sum of their parts, unintended consequences.

I expect you'll say all of these are "weak emergence", by which you don't so much seem to mean what your size and shape analogies would suggest, as that you think you understand them. I think consciousness is just like all these, and it is brought about by evolution, which is notably proficient at producing novelty.

Every thing is "something it is like" because every thing has some properties and that's what it's like. A more precise definition of consciousness involves unstructured qualities - qualia of consciousness.

By the way, I agree that you cannot deduce what is not contained in assumptions.

You wrote:

But you can't get weight from that which has none. — Clarendon

I responded:

Matter, which has mass, is created out of energy, which has no mass, — T Clark

Now you respond:

E = mc2 is not a case of something coming from nothing. Energy has mass equivalence. Mass is not conjured out of an absence of all relevant properties. — Clarendon

You didn't say "something coming from nothing." You said "You can't get weight from that which has none." Energy has no mass and thus no weight. You can get mass, and thus weight, from energy. Instead of responding to my criticism, you're misrepresenting the issue you originally raised. You're not playing fair.

But then you're getting consciousness out without putting it in. — Clarendon

I think the main problem with saying this is that it presumes more knowledge about consciousness than we actually have.

Strong emergence is a bare beginning of a theory. As the theory progresses, we would say more and more about what consciousness is such that it is the type of thing that emerges where there was none before.

If the theory subsequently breaks down, it will be because it's colliding with facts. There isn't a fundamental logical problem with the hypothesis.

If energy truly had no mass-relevant properties, then E = mc2 would be false.
So your example presupposes the very principle you think it refutes.

Yes, the truth of logic that it is invalid to have in your conclusion something not contained in the premises is just a special instance of the general truth of reason I'm appealing to: that one cannot get out what has not been put in.
We can be surprised by a conclusion of a valid argument, just as we can be surprised at the shape that combining some shaped things gives us. But that's weak emergence, not strong. A strongly emergent conclusion is just another name for an invalid conclusion.

Re the 'something it is like' of conscious states - it seems unique to them; their defining feature.

We know enough about consciousness to know that it is a state quite unlike size or shape. We know that it is a subjective state, that there is something it is like.

Strong emergence is not a provisional scientific hypothesis. It is the claim that a wholly new kind of state can arise from ingredients that entirely lack that kind. That's not a thesis that can be confirmed empirically.

In my original response I wrote:

the term was well defined — T Clark

This was a mistake. I should have written "was not well defined."

I don't believe that consciousness is something which can be defined clearly. — Corvus

I strongly disagree. The problem isn't that it can't be defined, it's that it hasn't been in this discussion. Note that in my original post I wrote "

Clarendon wrote:

'problems' of consciousness only arise if you assume that physical things are what ultimately exist, such that consciousness has to be found a home in that picture — Clarendon

When they say "problems of consciousness," I assume that includes the so-called hard problem, an idea originated by David Chalmers. He wrote "The 'Hard Problem of Consciousness' is the problem of how physical processes in the brain give rise to the subjective experience of the mind and of the world." That's a pretty clear definition and it is not the same as:

Consciousness means that you are awake, and able to see things around you, and respond to others in rational linguistic manner in interpersonal communication. You are also able to do things for you in order to keep your well being eating drinking good food, and sleeping at right times caring for your own health, your family folks and friends. — Corvus

It's not that your definition is wrong, it just seems to be something different than what Clarendon is talking about. It's certainly different from what Chalmers was saying.

If energy truly had no mass-relevant properties, then E = mc2 would be false.
So your example presupposes the very principle you think it refutes. — Clarendon

You're doing it again--Misrepresenting what you originally said and acting as if that addresses my comment.

I'm all done with this conversation.

We know enough about consciousness to know that it is a state quite unlike size or shape. We know that it is a subjective state, that there is something it is like. — Clarendon

It's like with gravity. We knew basically that it's the reason apples fall. Beyond that, we knew nothing. The first hypothesis was that it's some kind of force. That turned out to be wrong.

Likewise, we know what we're referring to when we talk about consciousness, but we have no scientific theory that explains what it is.

The first hypothesis was that it's a little bit of God. Another is that it's strongly emergent. The theory does entail that consciousness is the kind of thing that can be strongly emergent.

You're saying nothing can be strongly emergent, but your reasoning also rules out weak emergence, which numerous posters have been trying to point out.

Energy is not an absence of mass relevant properties. It has mass energy equivalence by law. That is exactly why E = mc2 is true!

So your example was never a counterexample. It presupposes[/i] the very principle you're trying to use it to refute.

Walking away does not change that.

It doesn't rule out weak emergence as I have pointed out numerous times now. Weak emergence is fine. Strong emergence is magic. Weak emergence in no way licenses strong emergence. By combining shaped things you can create something that has a different shape from any of the shaped things you combined. That's weak emergence and its fine. Why is it fine? Because you don't have a new kind of property arising (as I've said again and again). What's not fine is thinking that by combining lots of shaped things you can create a wholly different kind of property - that's alchemy and it is as contrary to reason as supposing that from these premises - 1. If it is tuesday, it is raining, and 2. it is tuesday, one can validly derive the conclusion "therefore I will have fish for dinner tonite"

The gravity analogy misses the point. Gravity was always a physical magnitude governed by laws. What changed was the theory, not the kind of thing being explained. No new ontological category appeared.

Consciousness is already fixed as a kind: a subjective state, something it is like. Any theory must account for that.

Strong emergence does not propose a better theory of a known kind. It proposes that a new kind appears from ingredients that wholly lack it. That is not a scientific hypothesis but a metaphysical stipulation.

The real problem - one that I, at least, can see 'is' a problem - is that you can't get out what you don't put in. For example, you can't make something that has size by combining lots of sizeless things. That's just not going to work. The only way to make a sized thing, is to combine things of size - no size in, no size out. — Clarendon

You can't make non-physical things out of physical things.

Similarly then, you aren't going to be able to make a conscious object out of objects that are not already conscious (or at least disposed to be). For that would be alchemy. Call it 'strong emergence' if one wants - but that's just a label for what is in fact something coming from nothing. Thus, as our brains are made out of atoms, then either atoms have consciousness (or are disposed to) or brains simply can't have consciousness.
— Clarendon

Have you read any cognitive science or evolutionary psychology related to the origin of intelligence? This is a well studied subject, although there are lots of questions that remain unanswered. Your explanation comes across as more “seems to me” science without any particular evidence backing it up. Seems to me it’s wrong. — T Clark

Clarendon was talking about consciousness. Are you saying intelligence and consciousness are the same thing?

This discussion has a problem which is common to this type of discussion— they fail to define what they mean by “consciousness.” — T Clark

That is one of the two main problems. The other is that few agree on any definition.

Examples are not only plentiful, I suspect almost everything, living or nonliving, that everyone on this site has ever interacted with has properties its constituents lack. It is the norm. It is what nature does. Criminy. — Srap Tasmaner

But those properties can be explained by the properties of the constituents. Individual atoms aren't solid. But we know how the properties of individual atoms explain solidity in groups of atoms. We know how the properties of individual molecules of H2O explain the fact that solid water floats in liquid water.

We know how the properties of the atoms and molecules of living things account for metabolism.

We have no guess as to how the properties of atoms, or molecules, or cells, or any kind of structures, explains consciousness.

We know how the properties of the atoms and molecules of living things account for metabolism. — Patterner

"Account for"? Meaning what, exactly? That you could deduce the great variety of living things on earth just from studying carbon and hydrogen and oxygen and so on? Could you instead study electrons and neutrinos and photons and whatnot, and get even better results?

Gravity was always a physical magnitude governed by laws. What changed was the theory, not the kind of thing being explained. No new ontological category appeared. — Clarendon

Right. Despite not knowing how gravity came about, its effect could be measured. Newton was able to write a mathematical formula, which could be used to predict where things, even astronomical bodies, would be in the future, as well as figure out where they were in the past. There's nothing measurable about consciousness or its effects.

That is not a scientific hypothesis but a metaphysical stipulation. — Clarendon

Clarke's Laws:

When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is very probably wrong.

The only way of discovering the limits of the possible is to venture a little way past them into the impossible.

Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.

"Account for"? Meaning what, exactly? That you could deduce the great variety of living things on earth just from studying carbon and hydrogen and oxygen and so on? Could you instead study electrons and neutrinos and photons and whatnot, and get even better results? — Srap Tasmaner

Meaning things like redox reactions and the electron transport chain. We understand how those things work, and how they cause protons to build up in one area, the way electrons are gathered in one area of a battery. We understand how the buildup of particles with the same charge builds up pressure in that area, and how the release of that pressure is used to make ATP. We understand how breaking the bond between phosphate groups of the ATP releases energy, which is used to power cell functions.

If the properties of primary particles were different than they are, we would not have the atoms, molecules, cells, or anything else in the universe, that we have.

Are you saying intelligence and consciousness are the same thing? — Patterner

No. You’re right. I used the wrong word, although what I said applies to consciousness as well.

Okay, I think I get it now. You and @Clarendon believe that all natural science can be reduced to physics, and that all natural phenomena can be explained by physics, with the sole exception of consciousness. Yes?

No. You’re right. I used the wrong word, although what I said applies to consciousness as well. — T Clark

Applying consciousness to what you said:
"Have you read any cognitive science or evolutionary psychology related to the origin of consciousness? This is a well studied subject, although there are lots of questions that remain unanswered."
Which questions have been answered? Do you have any reading suggestions on this? I can't make head or tail of Peter Tse, but he starts The Neural Basis of Free Will by dating:

The deepest problems have yet to be solved. We do not understand the neural code. We do not understand how mental events can be causal. We do not understand how consciousness can be realized in physical neuronal activity. — Peter Tse

"We do not understand how consciousness can be realized in physical neuronal activity" is an important thing. If someone has written that we do understand this, I am extremely interested.

Okay, I think I get it now. You and Clarendon believe that all natural science can be reduced to physics, and that all natural phenomena can be explained by physics, with the sole exception of consciousness. Yes? — Srap Tasmaner

And, of course, anything that owes its existence to consciousness. For example, poetry, music, and art.

Can you give me an example of anything other than consciousness and its creations that cannot be explained by physics?

Can you give me an example of anything other than consciousness and its creations that cannot be explained by physics? — Patterner

Almost everything, depending on how you flesh out "explained by".

Not really a discussion I was looking to have, but this has been really helpful, so thanks!

I've never quite gotten the fascination consciousness has for people around here, why it seems so super special, and it's because we start from very different ideas about—among other things, probably—the unity of science.

I've never quite gotten the fascination consciousness has for people around here, why it seems so super special, and it's because we start from very different ideas about—among other things, probably—the unity of science. — Srap Tasmaner

Why do people everywhere have fascination for mathematics, quantum physics, music, philosophy, history? What is it confusing that people have a fascination for this particular topic?

It's the very last thing anybody would give up. If someone was going to strip you of one off the following - vision, hearing, ability to do even simple math, all memories of some particular topic, anything what you would care to name - OR your consciousness, which would you rather keep than consciousness? You have to lose one of those things OR consciousness. What would the other option have to be for you to say, "I absolutely cannot give that up. Take my consciousness."

I strongly disagree. The problem isn't that it can't be defined, it's that it hasn't been in this discussion. Note that in my original post I wrote " — T Clark

You cannot understand the problem of consciousness without understanding what consciousness means and implies. My point was consciousness is function and ability of the living biological agents, not something emerges from matter. Do you still disagree on the point?