Most of your post is just rehashing the Euthyphro Dilemma. — Ram

None of my post is. Now prove me wrong.

"No it isn't. The Euthyphro dilemma is "Is the good loved by the gods because it is good, or is it good because it is loved by the gods?". I'm not asking that. I'm asking you what you would do if killing blasphemers is good."

Okay, you got me. It's a slight variation of the Euthyphro Dilemma.

Prove me wrong by actually discussing the topic and refuting the thread's claim rather than going on about a weird version of the Euthyphro Dilemma where it's basically the exact same thing as the Euthyphro Dilemma but you pretend it isn't

It's a slight variation of the Euthyphro Dilemma. — Ram

It has nothing to do with the Euthyphro Dilemma.

What would you do if pre-martial sex is immoral?
What would you do if charity is a moral obligation?
What would you do if watching TV is immoral?
What would you do if killing blasphemers is a moral obligation?

I'm asking you if you will commit to being moral regardless of what the moral facts actually are. It has nothing to do with asking about the relationship between being good and being liked by the gods.

I would happily break the moral rules if I find them distasteful. I wouldn't kill blasphemers even if I had a moral obligation to do so. I would continue to have pre-marital sex even if it's immoral. What about you?

Prove me wrong...

I've provided an example of an objective secular morality. Kant's categorical imperative isn't some "arbitrary" framework. It's arrived at by reason, much like logic and maths.

... by actually discussing the topic

This is rich. You refuse to support your own assertion and insist that it's our responsibility to prove you wrong. If you have no intention of arguing in good faith by actually providing an argument then what is it you're doing here?

Ram, Michael is trying to reason with you but you are evading his discourse. It is obvious that you're afraid to answer his questions, and this is dishonest. It's difficult but thinkers have to go in the direction of refutation, it's one of the ways we grow. He has in fact pulled your card. If you're serious and you honestly think you have a strong position then you shouldn't be trying to evade him.

As per my claim about Objective Morality, what you don't understand is that there is nothing in the universe like your definition of Objective Morality. The way you define Objective Morality ends up excluding it from existence. So, by all means, prove that Object Morality exists as you define the term.

:up:

What do I mean by believe in? I don't know, I'm not a dictionary. I'm not webster.

[ ... ]

As for definition of "believe", I don't know, I don't care. — Ram

Neither do I. Won't waste any more of your time, Ram, or my own.

Whether you're Christian, Taoist, Muslim, Hindu, etc.- all these groups believe in an underlying natural law. The only dispute is over the details but the existence of an inherent natural law is a premise that is common to all of them. — Ram

You're onto something here. If all these groups would simply get together and work out their differences - that would be an amazing event that could change the course of world history.

I suggest that instead of engaging in pointless on-line debates you do something to make this happen. Start a GoFundMe to - I would enthusiastically donate to that worthy cause.

Religious morality is not based on objective facts, but on revealed truths, in some cases, or transcendent knowledge in others. — Wayfarer

Aren't revealed truths relative or subjective?

The way the matter is considered in modern culture entails that it is viewed within the frame of it being 'either subjective or objective'. There are 'facts about the world' which are intersubjectively validated and verifiable by any observer, or 'beliefs' which are subjective or socially validated. The larger framework is like this:

"Descartes systematised what Galileo had begun. Taking the measurable world as the paradigm of objective knowledge, he posited a strict ontological division between res extensa—the extended, mechanical substance of nature—and res cogitans—the unextended, thinking substance of the mind. This dualism safeguarded human subjectivity from the reductionism of mechanism, yet it did so at the cost of severing mind from world. Thought was now a private interior realm looking out upon an inert, external nature. The result was a self-conscious spectator of a disenchanted universe: the modern subject—liberated from dogma yet exiled from a cosmos stripped of inherent meaning.'

'Revealed truths' are said to arise from insight into a larger domain which transcends the subject-object division, to put it in modern philosophical terms - not as private psychological states, but as disclosures accessible in principle through shared forms of practice and understanding.

The result was a self-conscious spectator of a disenchanted universe: the modern subject—liberated from dogma yet exiled from a cosmos stripped of inherent meaning. — Wayfarer

That seems to mean that meaning can only be found in religious dogma. That's not true.

'Revealed truths' are said to arise from insight into a larger domain which transcends the subject-object division, to put it in modern philosophical terms - not as private psychological states, but as disclosures accessible in principle through shared forms of practice and understanding. — Wayfarer

The problem with this is that Revealed Truths differ greatly. Or perhaps the revealers access an assortment of 'larger domains'?

That seems to mean that meaning can only be found in religious dogma. — praxis

That is the way that 'Praxis' will invariably respond any arguments of these kinds. That's your 'dogma'. And I know this from very long experience, so you will forgive me if i decline to pursue the argument.

The result was a self-conscious spectator of a disenchanted universe: the modern subject—liberated from dogma yet exiled from a cosmos stripped of inherent meaning.
— Wayfarer

That seems to mean that meaning can only be found in religious dogma — praxis

Or in hermeneutic historical life, or phenomenological intentionality, or poststructural becoming.

Then perhaps you can argue it with Joshs?

I agree with Joshs.

European philosophy will consider these perspectives, which Anglo philosophy barely does.

Analytic (i.e. 'Anglo') philosophy as a historical movement has not done much to provide an alternative to the consolations of religion. This is sometimes made a cause for reproach, and it has led to unfavorable comparisons with the continental tradition of the twentieth century, which did not shirk that task. I believe this is one of the reasons why continental philosophy has been better received by the general public: it is at least trying to provide nourishment for the soul, the job by which philosophy is supposed to earn its keep. — Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament

Existentialism, by its very nature, is prepared to tackle those very questions of contextuality and transcendence and meaning and so on, in a way that most Anglo philosophy doesn't. And it straddles both theistic and emphatically atheistic perspectives, such as Sarte's.

It's not a matter of religion, per se, but notice that as soon as the presumed soveriegnty of objective fact is called into question, it provokes the question 'is this religious dogma'? That says something about the cultural dynamics.

it is at least trying to provide nourishment for the soul, the job by which philosophy is supposed to earn its keep. — Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament

I hope philosophy is not expected to do any such thing. It would be as if a zookeeper had the job of pushing food into a cage when there was no evidence that there was an animal inside.

It's not a matter of religion, per se, but notice that as soon as the presumed soveriegnty of objective fact is called into question, it provokes the question 'is this religious dogma'? That says something about the cultural dynamics. — Wayfarer

I asked about revealed truths being relative or subjective. Then commented on your line about "a disenchanted universe: the modern subject—liberated from dogma yet exiled from a cosmos stripped of inherent meaning."

You didn't respond to my comment that the problem with Revealed Truths is that they differ greatly, and my speculation that perhaps the revealers access an assortment of 'larger domains'.

My interest isn't the sovereignty of objective fact vs the sovereignty of religious dogma or whatever.

It seems to me that revealed truths are relative or subjective.

'Revealed truths' are said to arise from insight into a larger domain which transcends the subject-object division, to put it in modern philosophical terms - not as private psychological states, but as disclosures accessible in principle through shared forms of practice and understanding. — Wayfarer

Okay, looking at it differently, are not shared forms of practice and understanding private psychological states to the community that shares whatever these forms of practice and understanding are?