This isn't the first time I've described the sciences as philosophy's children, and every time the description seems more apt. The sciences are like a son who takes over his dad's garage, but the old man keeps stopping by, getting underfoot, trying to tell his son how to do his job. "Dad, they've got computers in them now! These new cars, they're not like what you used to work on."

And I say this as father. If you've done right by them, they've got the values they need to make their own way. Your example is what counts the most.

I think this a position often held by positivists. Russell makes similar points about philosophy:

As soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science...

Some people hold a view that philosophy is merely speculative, whereas science deals with reality - no doubt there are hard and sift version of this.

I think this a position often held by positivists. Russell makes similar points about philosophy: — Tom Storm

I'd like to differentiate myself from positivists in some way.

Some people hold a view that philosophy is merely speculative, whereas science deals with reality - no doubt there are hard and soft version of this. — Tom Storm

I wouldn't put it like that.

To use Srap's story -- it's not like the grandparents cease to visit in or have influence.

As soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science... — Russell

Ha! I've said this a number of times on the forum, and never knew I was plagiarizing Russell. (I'll check out the source.)

As I said before, this to me is just historical fact. I tend to think of science as the fulfillment of philosophy; some people think of science as, I don't know, second-rate philosophy.

it's not like the grandparents cease to visit in or have influence — Moliere

Hmmmm. Be nice if your parents and grandparents were proud of you, instead of second-guessing everything you do. (Mine were. Randy Newman tells a story about visiting his dad: "Hey Pops! I won an Academy Award!" "Yeah? For what?" Oof.)

I wouldn't put it like that. — Moliere

I would. But perhaps you’re saying that’s not how you see yourself in relation to a claim like: ‘science is what we arrive at when philosophy has been successful and weeded out all the dead ends.'

But perhaps you’re saying that’s not how you see yourself in relation to a claim like: ‘science is what we arrive at when philosophy has been successful and weeded out all the dead ends.' — Tom Storm

Yes.

I'd put it that science shares a genealogy from philosophy, but has become something a bit different than what philosophy has pursued in doing metaphysics. The interests are the same along with various commitments to reason. I don't see philosophy as a dead end at all but as a fruitful activity that will always be around, but I can see how we do science now relates to philosophical influence, and how science has gradually become independent from philosophy -- at least as a discipline (i think philosophy of science is a thing and interesting and worth investigating too).

For me what remains interesting is that science is built upon philosophical axioms ( e.g., reality can be understood) and how strongly these are believed depends on how scientistic we are or whether we are metaphysical or methodological naturalists.

Good post. I think your argument is a bit overstated, but I agree with the spirit of what you've said. Philosophers overstep when they try to legislate rationality, pontificate from the armchair, or tell scientists how to do their jobs.

That said, I don't think Hart is aiming to do any of those things. His arguments are designed to put pressure on a certain metaphysical picture while pointing the way to an alternative that he thinks is more compelling than contemporary intellectual culture gives it credit for. That's it.

Should he be ignored? I don't see that he's doing anything particularly egregious or underhanded. Unlike Zeno, the topics he is addressing are considered "live" within contemporary philosophy and science. Sure, his metaphysical views are idiosyncratic, and he blusters a bit too much, but that doesn't make him unworthy of engagement per se.

That said, I can totally see why certain people would ignore him, whether out of distaste or disinterest. That's fine. I don't think his arguments "demand" an answer, though I think anyone who is interested in the topics should probably grapple with the underlying conceptual issues at some point.

For me what remains interesting is that science is built upon philosophical axioms ( e.g., reality can be understood) and how strongly these are believed depends on how scientistic we are or whether we are metaphysical or methodological naturalists. — Tom Storm

Is science built upon philosophical axioms? Is "Reality can be understood" an axiomatic belief?

My thought is that scientism is the belief that science can resolve philosophical questions or that it has priority in all matter of things regarding reality, ethics, and knowledge. I'd say this is a philosophical belief, though, and not a scientific axiom. I don't think that methodological naturalism is necessary for the sciences, even -- one who believes that the universe is intelligibly structured due to our inability to understand intentionality can still do science with or without that commitment.

Much of my insistence on dividing philosophy from science is that I think both are valuable and different from one another, and I think a multitude of philosophical beliefs which conflict can contribute towards scientific practice: it doesn't matter if we believe we're describing random patterns or nature's structures or the results of a deeper intelligibility which structures reality what matters is that we're able to do science together through a shared practice.

I say "not even methodological naturalism" is necessary because of the different metaphysical frames we can interpret scientific evidence in, and it seems that the practice has evolved to a point that it's somewhat independent of metaphysical beliefs. Rather than necessary preconditions or necessary philosophical presumptions there's a multiplicity of possibles.

And I'd say I'm not committed to positivism or scientism with this because I don't believe science is the end-all-be-all on reality. There's history. There's personal experience. There's art. There are all kinds of ways of knowing reality that aren't bounded by scientific practice or inference.