No.

I've said nothing about what Smith does not believe.

Salva veritate

I'm saying that that account is inadequate.

Let's talk about something else for a moment.

Smith believes Jones owns a Ford. — creativesoul

Notice anything odd here:

Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:

(f) Jones owns a Ford.

Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three placenames quite at random and constructs the following three propositions:

(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is.

But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does not own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold, then Smith does not KNOW that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.

Where does Gettier say that Smith believes that Jones owns a Ford?

Continue...

Gettier states:

Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.

I think I'd read somewhere before that there are doubts about how Gettier's original cases are constructed, but I hadn't though much about it, as we had other fish to fry in this thread. (As I said before, no one particularly cares because it's the not these particular cases but the pattern that's of interest.)

At any rate, none of us paid much attention to this.

So the form of the argument is actually this:

1. Smith has strong evidence for (f)
2. If (f) entails (h), evidence for (f) is evidence for (h)
3. (f) entails (h)
4. Smith's evidence for (f) is evidence for (h) (from 1-3)
5. Smith accepts (h) on the basis of the evidence he has for (f)

He certainly could accept (f) on the basis of the evidence he has. If that evidence is strong enough for him to accept (h), it's certainly strong enough for him to accept (f). But as it happens, Gettier never says that he does.

6. Smith's evidence for (f) justifies his belief that (h)
7. (h) is true

6. Smith's evidence for (f) justifies his belief that (h) — Srap Tasmaner

Should probably change that to:
6a. If the evidence for (h) is strong enough, it justifies Smith's belief that (h)
6b. Smith's evidence for (h) is strong enough (from 1 and 4)
6c. Smith's evidence for (h) justifies his belief that (h)

That's all about justificatory ground.

I have an unconventional view regarding that. Does that surprise you?

And yeah... 6 immediately jumped out at me.

The pattern?

Hmmm...

Doesn't that involve p's being believed with strong ground but false? Each and every time?

The disconnect happens between P and Q. Are there any other example besides Gettier's that place JTB under suspicion?

Are there any other example besides Gettier's that place JTB under suspicion? — creativesoul

Do you mean besides all of the cases inspired by Gettier?

Do they all involve disjunction?

Do they all involve disjunction? — creativesoul

No. Many involve something like faulty definite descriptions along the lines of Case I, and many involve more than a passing resemblance to the argument from illusion.

I suppose the SEP article is good, but I haven't looked in a while. I remember finding this article helpful.

...for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.

More specifically, do they all follow Gettier's above formulation and if so, do all the Q's involve disjunction?

The upshot for our discussion here:

Everywhere I said all Smith's troubles flow from his having a false belief that Jones owns a Ford, I was wrong.

Everywhere you suggested that Smith really only believes that Jones owns a Ford, you were wrong.

More specifically, do they all follow Gettier's above formulation and if so, do all the Q's involve disjunction? — creativesoul

Yes to the first, no to the second.

For instance, there's the dog-sheep:

You see in a field what looks to be a sheep and form the belief, based on direct observation, that there is a sheep in the field you are observing. But what you observe is actually a dog disguised (?) as a sheep. But there is in fact a sheep in that field; it's just behind a rise where you can't see it.

Your direct observation of the dog-sheep justifies your that there is a sheep in the field, and there is, but this doesn't seem like knowledge.

X-)

I'm not even sure what that means Srap. I don't remember ever saying that. False belief does not make a good starting point...

I don't remember ever saying that. — creativesoul

Good one.

I'm not sure where I went 'wrong'...

Seriously. Show me.

Srap:

You see in a field what looks to be a sheep and form the belief, based on direct observation, that there is a sheep in the field you are observing. But what you observe is actually a dog disguised (?) as a sheep. But there is in fact a sheep in that field; it's just behind a rise where you can't see it.

Your direct observation of the dog-sheep justifies your that there is a sheep in the field, and there is, but this doesn't seem like knowledge.

Yeah. I vaguely remember reading something like this before... and barns. Never really gave it much thought though. Today's the day...

Gettier:...for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q

It doesn't follow that formulation.

I'm corn-fused.

:P

Edited to add: Oh yeah... it satisfies JTB. Epistemic luck. Yup. It does place justification under duress though, doesn't it?

I don't know though. On second thought, S believed that that was a sheep. It wasn't.

I'm not sure where I went 'wrong'...

Seriously. Show me. — creativesoul

Those are from the first 5 pages:

So, Smith's belief is that Jones owns a Ford, and that each of the three propositions derived from that follow the rules of logic. — creativesoul

He believes that all three are true by virtue of believing p and accepting the rules of valid inference. — creativesoul

His believing that they are true is nothing more and nothing less than his believing that the rules of disjunction allow him to randomly add any other statement to his belief that p and then call it "true" as a result of his believing that p. — creativesoul

Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston

These are both valid inferences from a belief that p. Because p is false, they cannot both be true. They cannot both be true, because p is false and they state contradictory locations regarding the whereabouts of Brown. Smith believes that p, and has no idea of Brown's location. — creativesoul

He believes that p v q is true because he believes that p, and he believes that the rules of correct inference allow him to derive p v q based upon p. — creativesoul

There's nothing more to believing that (p v q) aside from believing that p, knowing that p v q follows from p, and knowing that if p is true, then so too is (p v q). — creativesoul

I have been at pains to show that belief that (p v q) is nothing more than believing that the rules of correct inference say that (p v q) follows from p. — creativesoul

Believing that (p v q) is true, if based upon belief that p, is to believe that if p is true then so too is (p v q). — creativesoul

These are from the last five pages:

p1. ((p) is true)
p2. ((p v q) follows from (p))
p3. ((p v q) is true if either (p) or (q) is true)
C1. ((p v q)) is true because (p))(from p1,p3) — creativesoul

So, Smith believes p, and deduces (p v q) from p and accepts (p v q) as a result of this deduction. — creativesoul

Smith believes Jones owns a Ford. — creativesoul

He believes that 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' follows from 'Jones owns a Ford'. He believes Jones owns a Ford. He believes that 'Jones owns a Ford' is true. — creativesoul

He believes that 'Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' follows from 'Jones owns a Ford'. He believes that 'Jones owns a Ford' is true. He believes Jones owns a Ford. — creativesoul

Smith believes Jones owns a Ford. Smith believes that 'Jones owns a Ford' is true. Smith believes that 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' follows from 'Jones owns a Ford'. Smith believes that 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true if either 'Jones owns a Ford' or 'Brown is in Barcelona' is true. Smith believes that 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true because Jones owns a Ford. — creativesoul

You can't seriously suggest that you haven't been arguing that Smith believed P∨Q only because he believed P, and that you almost continually, with a few momentary lapses, refused to allow that Smith actually believed P∨Q.

We were both wrong there. Gettier never attributes to Smith the belief that Jones owns a Ford. The only beliefs he ever attributes to Smith are (g), (h), and (i).

We were both wrong. Let's leave it at that.

These are both valid inferences from a belief that p. Because p is false, they cannot both be true. They cannot both be true, because p is false and they state contradictory locations regarding the whereabouts of Brown. Smith believes that p, and has no idea of Brown's location.

I was most certainly wrong regarding the above...

X-)

I stand by all the rest. Gettier most certainly attributes belief that Jones owns a Ford to Smith. The entire case fills out his formulation preceding the cases in his original paper.

and barns — creativesoul

From the Lycan paper I linked:

Fake Barn Country: Henry is looking at a (real) barn, and has impeccable visual and other evidence that it is a barn. He is not gettiered; his justification is sound in every way. However, in the neighborhood here are a number of fake, papiere-mâché barns, any of which would have fooled Henry into thinking it was a barn.

The idea here is that Henry's belief is too lucky -- if he had happened to form the same belief looking at one of the other "barns", he'd be wrong. So there is some doubt about whether his current belief counts as knowledge.

This is a slightly different way of putting the pieces together, but is still a Gettier descendant.

...There's nothing more to believing that (p v q) aside from believing that p, knowing that p v q follows from p, and knowing that if p is true, then so too is (p v q).

That one's wrong too!

:P

Gettier most certainly attributes belief that Jones owns a Ford to Smith. — creativesoul

No he really doesn't and I suspect it was deliberate.

No, he really does...

Gettier states it all rather clearly:

...I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if "has adequate evidence for" or "has the right to be sure that" is substituted for "is justified in believing that" throughout.

I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of "justified" in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. Keeping these two points in mind I shall now present two cases in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition.