I'm arguing what exists without the presence of sentience is bigger than what exists in the presence of sentience, a rare emergent phenomenon. — ucarr

Agreed, however, as epistemology (re: unknown > known) rather than as ontology (which 'knowing qua knowing' only presupposes).

Of course that domain is not spatially vast, as number is not extended in space. But the domain of mathematics is vast in a different way, as it is something which has been explored and expanded by generations of mathematicians since the ancient of days, and seems to be inexhaustible. — Wayfarer

I agree with you. That's what I was trying to say - with the conclusion, which seems obvious to me, that it follows that it doesn't have a clear meaning to say that one domain is bigger than another.

So - those kinds of 'intelligible objects' - numbers, logical laws, and the like - are real. But they're not existent in the sense that phenomenal objects are. — Wayfarer

There's a complication - but a necessary one. There are different kinds or categories of existence. (one could put the same point in another way and say that there are different kinds of object, rather than different kinds of existence. But I think that's the same point from a different perspective. The most commonly identified are - physical, mental, and abstract (cf. Popper). I would posit many more, but I'm not sure that is relevant right now - and it may just be a question of notation.

My partition of existence and reality moves in the easier direction of arguing that representation and imagination create a socially embedded consensus reality, which is radiant in the presence of sentience, and therefore a small subset of what exists in the universe apart from sentient beings. — ucarr

Your problem here is that the consensus reality recognizes many things, especially physical things, as real and mind-independent even when they are not in the presence of sentience (perceived). If we can recognize things as existing and real when we perceive them, we can acknowledge them as existing independently of us and therefore as existing and real when they are not perceived. Dinosaurs, etc.

Does a system with a sub-system nested within itself make sense to you in terms of a possible structure? This is one of the most important claims I'm putting forward: reality (by my usage) is a sub-system emergent from existence (by my usage). — ucarr

The problem here is that the same things are real when seen in one way, but unreal when seen in a different way. Your system seems to oscillate between seeing existence and reality as consisting of different objects and seeing them as the same objects seen from different perspectives. A forged painting is not a real Rembrandt, but it is a real painting.

Only sentients, probably only humans, talk about things being real. On a world without sentience there’s no talk of things being real. — ucarr

Only sentients talk about things existing. So on a world withing sentients, there's not talk of things existing. To put it another way, it is true of many things that they are real and exist whether or not they are talked about.

Your quoted comments are all rendered through the lens of your internal-model-making mind. — ucarr

That doesn't mean that they are false.

Since existence and reality share the same ontology, math applies to both. Therefore, the structures of both existence and sentient-based reality are constrained by what math language narrates. — ucarr

Everything that exists in existence also exists in reality, but not the reverse. That's why reality is a larger category of existence, but a smaller category of instantiation. — ucarr

Are you really saying that not everything that exists in reality also exists in existence, i.e. that some things exist in reality, but do not exist in existence? That looks like a self-contradiction to me.

Only sentients can experience physics, and that experience is always referenced to sentient perishability, and that, coupled with irreversible commitments selected going forward into a time-limited future makes sentience-mediated reality meaning-bearing, whereas the existence of physics is not meaning-bearing. — ucarr

If sentients can experience physics, does that not make physics part of sentience-mediated reality? If physics is part of sentience-mediate reality, does that not make it meaningful? Perhaps you should be looking to find the meaning in physics, rather than meekly accepting its self-presentation as meaningless.

The problem here is that the same things are real when seen in one way, but unreal when seen in a different way. Your system seems to oscillate between seeing existence and reality as consisting of different objects and seeing them as the same objects seen from different perspectives. A forged painting is not a real Rembrandt, but it is a real painting. — Ludwig V

The focal point here shows that what's not present in mind independent existence is meaning based upon memory of an irreversible past and an unstoppable progression forward towards death. This structure creates consequences that have meaning. For example, a man with heart disease becomes shipwrecked on a deserted island. His life preserving medicine went down with the ship. That's a consequence. It means he's probably going to die. Take the man out of the situation. An ship docked unmanned sinks in a storm. It was full of heart medicine. The destruction of the heart medicine is a result, not a consequence. It's part of a causal chain, it has no meaning, that is, until humans get involved.

The problem here is that the same things are real when seen in one way, but unreal when seen in a different way. Your system seems to oscillate between seeing existence and reality as consisting of different objects and seeing them as the same objects seen from different perspectives. A forged painting is not a real Rembrandt, but it is a real painting. — Ludwig V

Whenever you think about an existing thing, try thinking about it within mind independent reality with no living organisms present. With this setup, you must pretend you're not looking at this lifeless world through the lens of your internal-model-building mind. Doing that, you remember there's never any sentient being looking at raw ontology from different perspectives. Doing that is native to sentients. In a mind independent world there are no perspectives.

...it is true of many things that they are real and exist whether or not they are talked about. — Ludwig V

No, what you're saying now is what your mind is projecting onto that mind independent world. You have to imagine being in that world without your mind, or any other mind. Real, exist, good, bad don't have any presence outside of a mind.

Your quoted comments are all rendered through the lens of your internal-model-making mind. — ucarr

That doesn't mean that they are false. — Ludwig V

I'm not saying they're false. I'm saying they're part of a reality attached to how your mind (and my mind) represent the world via internal-model-building.

Everything that exists in existence also exists in reality, but not the reverse. That's why reality is a larger category of existence, but a smaller category of instantiation. — ucarr

Are you really saying that not everything that exists in reality also exists in existence, i.e. that some things exist in reality, but do not exist in existence? That looks like a self-contradiction to me. — Ludwig V

I revised the above quote after you read it. Here's the revised statement:

Existence houses the total ontology. Sentient-based reality, nested within existence, houses a sub-set of ontology experienced; i e., irreversible selection going forward, intentions and, most importantly, meaning indexed to life/death. Mind-independent existence is a larger category; much of what exists is unknown to sentient experience. Sentient-based reality is therefore smaller. Only sentients can experience physics, and that experience is always referenced to sentient perishability, and that, coupled with irreversible commitments selected going forward into a time-limited future makes sentience-mediated reality meaning-bearing, whereas the existence of physics is not meaning-bearing.

If sentients can experience physics, does that not make physics part of sentience-mediated reality? If physics is part of sentience-mediate reality, does that not make it meaningful? Perhaps you should be looking to find the meaning in physics, rather than meekly accepting its self-presentation as meaningless. — Ludwig V

I've been saying from the start physics is part of sentience-mediated reality. The main thrust of my thesis involves me saying, "Sentience makes physics meaningful."

Agreed.

when I use the word "existence," I mean all of the types of things that exist. Existence houses the total ontology. Sentient-based reality, nested within existence, houses a sub-set of ontology experienced; i e., irreversible selection going forward, intentions and, most importantly, meaning indexed to life/death. — ucarr

OK, I think I understand what you're saying. Let me paraphrase. There is the vast universe, which has been disclosed by scientific instruments, which is practically unthinkable in terms of size (who among us can really conceptualise thousands of light-years?) We, as sentient beings, are a small sub-set of that vast reality. It is for us that 'risk and possible death' are realities. For the vast mass of existence, there are no such 'stakes', as you put it. So that is what exists, whereas what is real, is what is real 'for us', the reality of sentient awareness to whom things matter. Hence:

sentience-based reality is contingent upon existence. Existence is the ground from which sentience-based reality emerges. — ucarr

I will observe that this analysis is basically realist in attitude. You are comparing sentient consciousness to the vast expanse of apparently-insentient matter and energy that comprises most of the visible Universe. As people say, we are 'mere blips' against this vast background, the allegorical flaring of a match in the dead of night. Which is how science sees it.

One of the difficulties of metaphysics in general is the fact that examinations of ontology require the examiner to internally model ontology, and it’s fundamentals. The problem is a problem of perspective because the examiner must try to access mind-independent reality within the presence of his own sentience, which is pervasively representational rather than fundamentally ontological. — ucarr

But this is just what I will call into question. First, this comparison, between the 'vast universe' and the minute phenomenon of sentient life, is made as if from a point of view outside both of them. Whereas we can never really see ourselves 'from the outside', so to speak. We're part of the picture.

Your expression 'fundamentally ontological' is important here. It is an attempt to see, to penetrate, what really exists, independently of a perspective, to see what exists as it really is, were there no observer to see it. Hence the distinction you make between 'persuasively representational' and 'fundamentally ontological', the latter being what exists independently of representation.

I think this distinction is erroneous, that we cannot see the Universe as if from outside any perspective or as if there were no sentient beings in it. The comparison you're making between existence and reality also demands a perspective - and perspective is something that only an observer can bring to the picture. We can't step outside appearance in the way you are proposing. This is the characteristic error of modernity. We are and must be part of the picture, we can't attain a perspective of ultimate objectivity or separateness.

//ps - also note that the word 'ontology' is derived from the Greek verb 'to be', and has a specific connotation on that account. Nowadays the word is used to denote the components of an information system or some other classificatory scheme, meaning 'the kinds of things that comprise that system'. But in classical use, ontology was specific to the understanding of the nature of being, which is different to the investigation of an inventory of existing things.//

I think this distinction is erroneous, that we cannot see the Universe as if from outside any perspective or as if there were no sentient beings in it. The comparison you're making between existence and reality also demands a perspective - and perspective is something that only an observer can bring to the picture. We can't step outside appearance in the way you are proposing. This is the characteristic error of modernity. We are and must be part of the picture, we can't attain a perspective of ultimate objectivity or separateness. — Wayfarer

I agree with all of this. As you say, we sentients can't step outside of our internal-model-making minds. When I talk as if I can, I'm pretending that I can, knowing it can't. Even so, it makes sense to me to imagine on a lifeless planet, there's no good or bad, happy or sad, etc. Perishable beings ascribe values to physics. On a lifeless planet, if a boulder rolls down a hill and smashes a smaller boulder to pieces, that result is neither good or bad. If I'm standing near that small boulder and the larger one atop the hill starts rolling towards me, because I can die, I feel the approaching larger boulder to be a bad thing. Since life appears to be a rare occurrence off of earth, the category of physics without meaning is much larger than our socially embedded consensus reality.

This is what I mean when I say learning about the world is really learning about me. What do the things of this world mean to my life?

the category of physics without meaning is much larger than our socially embedded consensus reality. — ucarr

Size isn't everything :rofl:

My simple structure is system (existence) - sub-system (sentient-based reality) — ucarr

The non sequitur here is probably making it impossible to understand what you're talking about.
"sentient-based reality" doesn't represent anything anyone recognises, I suggest.

By naming non sequitur you reference a break in a chain of reasoning. According to my understanding, it's possible for a system to host a sub-system within itself. Example: An automobile is a system. It houses an electrical system as one of its sub-systems.

You say sentient-based reality isn't recognized by anyone. Recognition is not a necessary condition for existence. Example: Einstein's Theory of Relativity. In 1905, when Einstein introduced the theory in a paper, it was not recognized because it was new thinking that required examination and evaluation before understanding. After emergence of understanding, and with circulation of the paper, familiarity and recognition of the theory's tenets began to emerge. The process was gradual over a substantial period of time.

Sentient-based reality as a sub-system can't be characterized as a non sequitur to system until it's examined, understood and evaluated as a non sequitur to system.

Sentient-based reality is perhaps an unfamiliar label, but it's applied herein to a structure of neuroscience well known: internal modeling of the world within the mind.

Sentient-based reality refers to the representation of the world within the mind in the context of observing, learning and understanding. You, like me, know things about the world through the medium of your mind and its representations of the world.

Elaborate a description of the universe and all it's known to feature, and then think about the world on earth, which is most of what humans know through their minds, and show where the break is located disconnecting universe as system from the collective mindset and reality of humanity as sub-system.

I think this distinction is erroneous, that we cannot see the Universe as if from outside any perspective or as if there were no sentient beings in it. The comparison you're making between existence and reality also demands a perspective - and perspective is something that only an observer can bring to the picture. We can't step outside appearance in the way you are proposing. This is the characteristic error of modernity. We are and must be part of the picture, we can't attain a perspective of ultimate objectivity or separateness. — Wayfarer

I have only two mild disagreements with this.
I agree entirely with the proposition that we cannot see the world from outside any perspective. I would put it more strongly and say that the very idea of seeing without any perspective is meaningless. But I don't see that we cannot see the world as if there were no sentient beings in it. We can make reasonable adjustments based on our ability to distinguish facts from values and what we know of what the world was like before the first sentient life appeared. The status of mathematics in such a scenario is a not clear to me. On the other hand, it is true that a philosophical (or even a scientific) understanding does need to take into account our involvement. (I realize that's a bit muddled - sorry).

Sentient-based reality, nested within existence, houses a sub-set of ontology experienced; i e., irreversible selection going forward, intentions and, most importantly, meaning indexed to life/death. — ucarr

I think I understand what you are getting at. But I can't discern whether you are saying that the things that we experience as meaningful in the way you describe are the same as, or different from, the things that exist independently of such meaning. The snow falls, and exists. I experience the snow falling and feel cold and miserable. Is the first snow (existence) the same stuff as the snow I experience?(meaningful, therefore real). I think it is, but sometimes you seem to be saying it isn't.

I'm saying they're (sc. real, exist, good, bad) part of a reality attached to how your mind (and my mind) represent the world via internal-model-building. — ucarr

I'm not clear whether you are saying that my mind has any access to what exists, as distinct from what is real. I want to be able say that, given that my car exists, it is also real, and may be a good or bad car. It seems to me to be obvious that the car that figures in all those statements is the same car. But I can't see whether you agree or disagree with that.

The focal point here shows that what's not present in mind independent existence is meaning based upon memory of an irreversible past and an unstoppable progression forward towards death. — ucarr

That's right. Presumably, you are saying that fact is represented in my internal model. I don't see how any model could ever represent that.

Sentient-based reality is perhaps an unfamiliar label, but it's applied herein to a structure of neuroscience well known: internal modeling of the world within the mind. — ucarr

Thank you so much for that clarification. Now I understand better what's going on. The label "sentient-based reality" seems harmless enough to me, though I would prefer "lived world/reality" or "phenomenal world/reality. But it does seem to me that it does not mean the same as "reality" in the philosophical use of the term (though I doubt that use of it is really coherent).

. I would put it more strongly and say that the very idea of seeing without any perspective is meaningless. But I don't see that we cannot see the world as if there were no sentient beings in it. We can make reasonable adjustments based on our ability to distinguish facts from values and what we know of what the world was like before the first sentient life appeared. The status of mathematics in such a scenario is a not clear to me. — Ludwig V

Good! My point is, it is of course true that we can see the Universe as if there were no beings in it, and also that we know that h.sapiens, our species, has an evolutionary history of around 100k years. So I'm on board with the naturalist account of the matter.

But the status of the 'as if' is what is at issue. I maintain that scientific naturalism wants to 'absolutize' it, as if it enables us to see the universe as it truly would be, without an observer. Then it points to that as having ontological primacy and claims that humans are a product of that. Which is also what the OP is saying. We do this effortlessly and easily, because it's an intrinsic part of the worldview we're born into. And that is why it has become a blind spot. (Because even to see the universe as if there were no observers in it, doesn’t see it as it really would be with no observer.)

Also, regarding the status of mathematics: perhaps you could say it is used to track variance and invariance - what changes and what stays the same in the flux of experience.

The snow falls, and exists. I experience the snow falling and feel cold and miserable. Is the first snow (existence) the same stuff as the snow I experience?(meaningful, therefore real). I think it is, but sometimes you seem to be saying it isn't. — Ludwig V

The snow we experience is (presumably) the same snow that might fall on a planet without life.

I'm not clear whether you are saying that my mind has any access to what exists, as distinct from what is real. I want to be able say that, given that my car exists, it is also real, and may be a good or bad car. — Ludwig V

I think you mind has access to mind-independent things that exist, such as your car. It's also real, as distinguished from merely extant, as it would be on a lifeless planet. Your presence alongside of the car gives it meaning. You can drive it, or sell it, or die in it. All of these meanings in your mind and in your life confer meaning force onto the car.

The focal point here shows that what's not present in mind independent existence is meaning based upon memory of an irreversible past and an unstoppable progression forward towards death. — ucarr

That's right. Presumably, you are saying that fact is represented in my internal model. I don't see how any model could ever represent that. — Ludwig V

Correct. It's your internal model of the car in memory that gives it a variable meaning. The car a year ago had a slightly different meaning than it does now, especially if something important recently happened in the car. Imagine that last week you rushed to your friend's house being alerted to him collapsing into a diabetic coma because of an emergency signaling system that was set up. You get him to the hospital and his life is saved. It's the same car, but it doesn't feel like it. Your memory tracks a radical meaning change from before and after the emergency.

But the status of the 'as if' is what is at issue. I maintain that scientific naturalism wants to 'absolutize' it, as if it enables us to see the universe as it truly would be, without an observer. — Wayfarer

Well, that's clearly a hopeless project. Like putting a blindfold on someone and then asking them to describe the landscape. It's the word "truly" that does it - presenting a doubt as a possibility and then ruling it out.

(Because even to see the universe as if there were no observers in it, doesn’t see it as it really would be with no observer.) — Wayfarer

We have evidence which, admittedly, does not tell us everything, but does tell us something and is open to criticism. If that's not enough, then what you say amounts to refusing to play the game without offering another one.

Then it points to that as having ontological primacy and claims that humans are a product of that. — Wayfarer

"Ontological primacy" is a bit of a mystery to me. I would only claim, what I think you agree with, that the historical story is that our planet was once without life and now is. I freely admit that our knowledge of the world depends absolutely on our existence. But I don't think that's a particularly startling claim and it is not incompatible with the historical account. What else is left to say?

The snow we experience is (presumably) the same snow that might fall on a planet without life. — ucarr

Yes. The only thing that is different is that there are no human beings to think of it in different ways. Which is a difference in the context the snow falls, not a difference in the snow.

I think you mind has access to mind-independent things that exist, such as your car. It's also real, as distinguished from merely extant, as it would be on a lifeless planet. — ucarr

"Real", for you, means meaningful, which I assume means meaningful to people in general. I can, more or less, distinguish between what the car is qua mind-independent object. But I don't see a radical difference between thinking of it as a crucial part of my way of life, as a financial drain, as a pollution of the atmosphere, as a badge of my social and cultural standing and thinking of it as a mind-independent object. It's just one of the many ways I think about the car. So I'm puzzled about why you want to distinguish between that perspective and all the others. What's so special about it?

Your memory tracks a radical meaning change from before and after the emergency. — ucarr

One of the ways of identifying what it is for the car to be a mind-independent object is that the mind-independence is the same what other different perspectives I might have of it. So I think of car differently before and after. But it's the same car. Whatever perspective I may apply to it, its mind-independence does not change - and, paradoxically, that is how I think about it.

"Real", for you, means meaningful, which I assume means meaningful to people in general. I can, more or less, distinguish between what the car is qua mind-independent object. But I don't see a radical difference between thinking of it as a crucial part of my way of life, as a financial drain, as a pollution of the atmosphere, as a badge of my social and cultural standing and thinking of it as a mind-independent object. It's just one of the many ways I think about the car. So I'm puzzled about why you want to distinguish between that perspective and all the others. What's so special about it? — Ludwig V

Now you have asked the most important question that can be directed toward my central claim: no-meaning physics versus meaning-bearing physics. Physics in the presence of sentience acquires meaning in reference to the perishability of the sentients. Meaning, expressed generally, pools within the relationship between the vulnerable sentient and his ability to adapt to the forces of physics and the potentially lethal forces of those self-same physics. The life/death binary fills the reality space propagated by sentient presence amidst physics.

Because you're sentient and thus know yourself via internal self-modeling, and you know the prosperity/harm binary personally, you introduce valuation into the world of physics amidst sentients. As a sentient who knows himself and values the continuation of that self, and must self-bind to commitments that cannot be reversed without loss, your life is infinitely valuable, and all of physics has its value in reference to your life which sets the controlling unit of value: life.

Life establishes value because memory is essential to life. Through memory, you can track value changes in your life. You know which selections will better your life versus worsen you life. The mind-independent world has no perishability indexed memory, and it has no valuation of good or bad attached to phenomena. In a galaxy without life, a supernova happens, but meaning in reference to memory, adaptation and continuing vitality doesn't exist. In a galaxy like ours, which is life bearing, a supernova means grand-scale catastrophe.

I'm saying reality is an interpretation of physics by living organisms. The label for the interpretation is reality. — ucarr

What you label "reality" is what I would label a "world view". We each have a unique world view - different understandings of physics, including gaps in knowledge, misunderstandings, and differences in personal experience. Do you acknowledge these same differences with your (unique) use of the term, "reality"?

We each have a unique world view - different understandings of physics, including gaps in knowledge, misunderstandings, and differences in personal experience. Do you acknowledge these same differences with your (unique) use of the term, "reality"? — Relativist

I think world view and my use of reality are similar. The important difference is the amount of emphasis placed upon objectivity in the normal use of reality and also in my use of reality. As you say, a world view is personal whereas reality usually means a consensus-based belief in objective existence independent from personal perspective.

Things get interesting and become debatable when humans start discussing what's meaningful in life. This question motivates the arts: what's it like to experience: birth, graduation, love, marriage, family, growing old, adjacency to death?

My claim posits a structure that supports this question and its normal answers. Life is a denominator that establishes the unit of meaning: life. Phenomena are the numerators that scale in meaning value in relation to life. Large numerators include: birth, graduation, love, marriage, family, graduation, growing old, adjacency to death.

”Ontological primacy" is a bit of a mystery to me. — Ludwig V

What is fundamental or basic. That from which phenomena arise. Thought to be physical in the physicalist worldview.