Yes, it's about the apples. But how does one talk about the apples? By talking (and understanding), nothing more. The point I am trying to make is that realism is not required to talk about the apples. We can talk about things that aren't words and aren't experiences and aren't ideas even if anti-realism holds. — Yahadreas

It's both true and trivial that we talk about the apples by talking (and understanding). But if nothing more is required, then the apples don't need to exist. And if the apples don't exist, then how does one truly talk about the apples? Although it might seem that such statements are about the apples, wouldn't such statements actually be about something else or nothing, or not about anything?

I'm not. I mentioned gesturing. — Yahadreas

But you keep making statements which exclude it.

When we gesture the act of reference is a visual experience. To gesture at the apple only requires that I see you gesture at the apple. — Yahadreas

No, it's not necessarily a visual experience, and it doesn't need to be seen by anyone. I can gesture at an apple whilst unseen with my eyes closed.

I'm not saying that they're not there. — Yahadreas

I know. But you implied that there need be nothing more involved in referring to the actual apples on my table than speaking certain sounds or writing certain symbols. That is not the case, since there needs to be the actual apples on my table, and since I can refer to them without speaking certain sounds or writing certain symbols.

The actual apples can be on your table even if anti-realism holds. Because for there to be actual apples on your table is for "there are actual apples on your table" to be true, and "there are actual apples on your table" can be true even if anti-realism holds (e.g. if the coherence theory of truth is correct). — Yahadreas

Agreed. However, anti-realism requires an unusual interpretation of language which I reject.

That's just quote mining. — Wosret

That's just your excuse for when you don't want to admit that you meant something different to what you said.

I go on to clarify that they just mean the same thing, and then further clarify that they can mean the same thing, but can also mean different things. — Wosret

But they clearly don't mean the same thing as language and things like apples are normally understood. And I see no good reason to abandon this understanding. I don't mean to talk about the word "apple" when I talk about the thing that is called an apple. They are not one and the same; they are one thing and another different thing.

No, I meant what I said, I just said more than that, which is being ignored so that that part can be misinterpreted. Clearly a mistaken, unclear choice of words, easily misinterpreted on my part though. I do think that it is difficult to maintain the misinterpretation in light of what else was said in the same post. It isn't as if I back peddle, or change what I said later. The post taken as a whole, it is clear that I wasn't calling spoken apples, written apples, drawings of apples, or tasty apples in every way identical.

But they clearly don't mean the same thing as language and things like apples are normally understood. And I see no good reason to abandon this understanding. I don't mean to talk about the word "apple" when I talk about the thing that is called an apple. They are not one and the same; they are one thing and another different thing. — Sapientia

Obviously you don't mean to talk about tasty apples when you mean to talk about the word "apple", but most uses of the word "apple" aren't meta, and do mean to talk about tasty apples, and not the word "apple".

Obviously you don't mean to talk about tasty apples when you mean to talk about the word "apple", but most uses of the word "apple" aren't meta, and do mean to talk about tasty apples, and not the word "apple". — Wosret

Then we agree about that. It's weird that I agree with you about that, yet you said something completely different and contradictory that you're clinging on to. It's also weird that you both meant what you said and meant something different. I'm going to reject the former possibility in favour of the latter.

Because I meant it in a single sense, but it doesn't hold in other senses, which is what I said in that post, by saying that they can mean the same thing, or different things. As I said, it was clearly a poor choice of words.

Ok, but what's the supposed significance of that point? I can use the words "dog" and "cat" to mean the same thing too. Big whoop.

It's funny that you ask me that, as I didn't see anything that I was replied to about as being all that significant to my point really. The point that I was trying to make was that meaning isn't a matter of reference back to some particle, or neutral object, but rather is a constantly changing, flowing relationship with people and the world, that we, and things take part in, or participate in. The big whoop is that the world apple doesn't refer to any particular apples, and when one does refer to an apple, it is being brought into participating with discourse for some purpose, and isn't the origin of the meaning of any terms, or the meaning maker.

The point that I was trying to make was that meaning isn't a matter of reference back to some particle, or neutral object, but rather is a constantly changing, flowing relationship with people and the world, that we, and things take part in, or participate in. The big whoop is that the world apple doesn't refer to any particular apples, and when one does refer to an apple, it is being brought into participating with discourse for some purpose, and isn't the origin of the meaning of any terms, or the meaning maker. — Wosret

I'm not sure I understand what you mean or what it entails. I was going to ask you some questions in the hope of getting a better understanding, but I think I'll just leave it be. I'm tired.

Good, good. I thought that you might see through my ruse.

But you keep making statements which exclude it. — Sapientia

That's because in those cases I'm specifically talking about reference in the context of using words to talk about things that we can't see. It's slightly different to reference in the context of pointing to a thing. I'm more interested in the former.

It's both true and trivial that we talk about the apples by talking (and understanding). But if nothing more is required, then the apples don't need to exist. And if the apples don't exist, then how does one truly talk about the apples? Although it might seem that such statements are about the apples, wouldn't such statements actually be about something else or nothing, or not about anything?

...

I know. But you implied that there need be nothing more involved in referring to the actual apples on my table than speaking certain sounds or writing certain symbols. That is not the case, since there needs to be the actual apples on my table, and since I can refer to them without speaking certain sounds or writing certain symbols.

This topic is more or less a continuation of the one on PF where I was arguing over the coherency of the coherence theory of truth. @aequilibrium argued that if we accepted such an account then even though the statement "there are apples on the table" could be true it wouldn't refer to the apples on the table, but to the speaker's words or ideas. My point is that this a misunderstanding. When I use the name "Frodo" I am referring to the hobbit, not to the word "Frodo" or my idea of Frodo. Realism is not required for words to refer to more than just our words and our ideas.

In the case of referring to the apples on the table one might say that using and understanding words is not sufficient; it is also required that there are apples on the table -- and so it is also required that "there are apples on the table" is true. And as the coherency theory of truth allows for "there are apples on the table" to be true it allows for there to be apples on the table. So the coherency theory allows for the statement "there are apples on the table" to truly talk about the apples on the table.

Agreed. However, anti-realism requires an unusual interpretation of language which I reject.

Unusual in the sense of not common, yes. But I think it far more sensible than the traditional realist account where there's some metaphysical relationship between the sounds we speak and things which are ontologically independent of language and experience and ideas.

I must admit I did not read this thread extremely in depth.

@Michael

Unusual in the sense of not common, yes. But I think it far more sensible than the traditional realist account where there's some metaphysical relationship between the sounds we speak and things which are ontologically independent of language and experience and ideas.

I take it you agree with Derrida, then that words can only refer to other words? Deconstructionism lies on the path towards anti-realism. I started a thread related to this yesterday in the philosophy of language section.

I take it you agree with Derrida, then that words can only refer to other words? — Sentient

No. "Frodo" refers to a fictional hobbit, this fictional hobbit is not a word, and so "Frodo" doesn't refer to a word. Does this entail realism regarding Frodo? Of course not. Frodo is not ontologically-independent of our language and our ideas.

The idea that only realism allows for words to refer to things (which aren't words) is mistaken. Anti-realism allows for this too. To say that "X" refers to X is to say that X is the subject of "X". If the subject isn't defined as a word then the subject isn't a word and so "X" doesn't refer to a word. I don't need to be a realist to claim that bachelors are not words but unmarried men (and for this claim to be true).

What I find interesting is the distinction between words refering to 'objects' and words refering to 'characters'. Then, what IS ontologically independent of language and ideas? I see a contradiction here. Anti-realism rejects the notion of an actual ontology, does it not?

The idea that only realism allows for words to refer to things is mistaken. Anti-realism allows for this too.

I never suggested the above, to the best of my knowledge.

I never suggested the above, to the best of my knowledge. — Sentient

I didn't mean to suggest that you had. That was more of a general comment to those who think otherwise.

Anti-realism rejects the notion of an actual ontology, does it not?

Rejects ontological independence of language and experience and ideas, yes.

How would anti-realism mesh with deconstructionism?

Just a quick (and perhaps half-baked) thought regarding this. It seems like we need to distinguish between anti-realist ontologies and anti-realist theories of reference. An anti-realist ontology is typically understood as one that is committed to the actual existence of only "mental" or "experiential" entities such as ideas, propositions, sensations, percepts, emotions, etc. An anti-realist theory of reference, on the other hand, is a theory of reference that can be explained without recourse to any particular ontology at all.

With that in mind, it seems to me that you are running these two senses of the word "anti-realist" together, which is leading to a bit of confusion. It seems like what you are really doing here is arguing for a realist theory of reference that can be explained entirely in terms of your anti-realist ontology.

Thoughts?

With that in mind, it seems to me that you are running these two senses of the word "anti-realist" together, which is leading to a bit of confusion. It seems like what you are really doing here is arguing for a realist theory of reference that can be explained entirely in terms of your anti-realist ontology. — Aaron R

I don't think I'd consider it a realist theory of reference. It's effectively a disquotational theory of reference; "chairs" refers to chairs. It's a parallel to the disquotational theory of truth.

Realism and anti-realism only come into the picture when considering the ontological status of chairs (and truth).

An anti-realist ontology is typically understood as one that is committed to the actual existence of only "mental" or "experiential" entities such as ideas, propositions, sensations, percepts, emotions, etc.

I think that's a far too simplistic account of anti-realism. I don't find it at all problematic for an anti-realist to accept the truth of "chairs exist" and "chairs are not experiences, ideas, or words" (e.g. by arguing for the coherence theory of truth and showing that these two statements cohere with some other set of specified sentences). The fact that one is arguing for a non-correspondence account of truth is why it is not realist.

I don't find it at all problematic for an anti-realist to accept the truth of "chairs exist" and "chairs are not experiences, ideas, or words" (e.g. by arguing for the coherence theory of truth and showing that these two statements cohere with some other set of specified sentences). The fact that one is arguing for a non-correspondence account of truth is why it is not realist. — Michael

Put like that, it looks like a matter of taste whether you want to call that position anti-realism or merely something like deflationary realism. What makes the difference is when you say that objects are ontologically dependent on experiences, ideas, or words.

What makes the difference is when you say that objects are ontologically dependent on experiences, ideas, or words. — jamalrob

Yes, and I think that this depends on the nature of truth. If one accepts the coherence theory of truth then the truth of "chairs exist" depends on linguistic conventions, and so the existence of chairs is ontologically dependent on linguistic conventions (which includes the experiential contexts which influence and measure such conventions). Hence anti-realism. If one accepts the correspondence theory of truth then the truth of "chairs exist" does not depend on linguistic conventions, and so the existence of chairs is ontologically independent of linguistic conventions. Hence realism.

Put like that, it looks like a matter of taste whether you want to call that position anti-realism or merely something like deflationary realism.

I don't see why it would be deflationary realism. It's just deflationary. It has nothing to do with realism (or antirealism).

I don't see why it would be deflationary realism. It's just deflationary. It has nothing to do with realism (or antirealism). — Michael

I see what you mean.

When I use the name "Frodo" I am referring to the hobbit, not to the word "Frodo" or my idea of Frodo. Realism is not required for words to refer to more than just our words and our ideas. — Michael

Ok, so there are fictional characters too. But a fictional character can be boiled down to just words and ideas, can it not? That can't be done with apples. Not realistically, anyway.

In the case of referring to the apples on the table one might say that using and understanding words is not sufficient; it is also required that there are apples on the table -- and so it is also required that "there are apples on the table" is true. And as the coherency theory of truth allows for "there are apples on the table" to be true it allows for there to be apples on the table. So the coherency theory allows for the statement "there are apples on the table" to truly talk about the apples on the table. — Michael

I'd argue that although the coherency theory of truth allows for "there are apples on the table" to be true, it doesn't have as a prerequisite, that it necessarily follow that there are in fact apples on the table in reality, in accordance with how we normally understand words such as "fact" and "reality". I think that that's problematic.

I'd argue that although the coherency theory of truth allows for "there are apples on the table" to be true, it doesn't have as a prerequisite, that it necessarily follow that there are in fact apples on the table in reality, in accordance with how we normally understand words such as "fact" and "reality". I think that that's problematic. — Sapientia

What you mean here is that the coherency theory of truth doesn't have apples existing in the realist sense as a prerequisite. And so your criticism of antirealism is that it isn't realism. That's question-begging.

I don't think I'd consider it a realist theory of reference. It's effectively a disquotational theory of reference; "chairs" refers to chairs. It's a parallel to the disquotational theory of truth.

Realism and anti-realism only come into the picture when considering the ontological status of chairs (and truth). — Michael

What I am saying is that it becomes a realist theory of reference when you attempt to explain it in terms of some ontology, even if the ontology is an anti-realist one.

I think that's a far too simplistic account of anti-realism. I don't find it at all problematic for an anti-realist to accept the truth of "chairs exist" and "chairs are not experiences, ideas, or words" (e.g. by arguing for the coherence theory of truth and showing that these two statements cohere with some other set of specified sentences). The fact that one is arguing for a non-correspondence account of truth is why it is not realist. — Michael

What you seem to be saying is that the anti-realist can genuinely accept as true, claims such as "chairs actually exist, and they are not experiences, ideas, or words" because their theory of truth commits them only to the actual existence of such things as experiences, ideas and words. I'd be interested to see how you handle the fact that, prima facie, this leads to a situation in which the anti-realist is committed to two claims about what actually exist that don't cohere. It would seem that the anti-realist's own commitment to the coherence theory of truth would necessitate the rejection of one or the other statement.

I'd also be interested to see if you can explain coherence without ultimately appealing to claims about the behavior of rational agents in the physical world. Would you mind offering an explanation of what the coherence between two statements consists in?

What you mean here is that the coherency theory of truth doesn't have apples existing in the realist sense as a prerequisite. And so your criticism of antirealism is that it isn't realism. That's question-begging. — Michael

Not quite. You've assumed quite a bit there, given that I merely said that I think that it's problematic. Like I said in my first post, realism is required to give an account of reference that is more plausible than alternatives. I think that realism is similarly required to give a more plausible account of truth than alternatives.

It just doesn't make sense to have a true statement about reality that doesn't reflect reality. You could have an elaborate web of true statements that don't in fact reflect reality.

What I am saying is that it becomes a realist theory of reference when you attempt to explain it in terms of some ontology, even if the ontology is an anti-realist one. — Aaron R

I don't see how it's explained in terms of some ontology. And even if it was, how does explaining it in terms of an anti-realist ontology make it realist?

What you seem to be saying is that the anti-realist can genuinely accept as true, claims such as "chairs actually exist, and they are not experiences, ideas, or words" because their theory of truth commits them only to the actual existence of such things as experiences, ideas and words. I'd be interested to see how you handle the fact that, prima facie, this leads to a situation in which the anti-realist is committed to two claims about what actually exist that don't cohere. It would seem that the anti-realist's own commitment to the coherence theory of truth would necessitate the rejection of one or the other statement.

I don't think that their theory of truth commits them to the actual existence of only such things as experiences, ideas, and words, so there aren't two contradictory statements.

I'd also be interested to see if you can explain coherence without ultimately appealing to claims about the behavior of rational agents in the physical world. Would you mind offering an explanation of what the coherence between two statements consists in?

Appealing to the behaviour of rational agents in the physical world doesn't entail realism (as one will take an anti-realist approach to behaviour and physics), so this isn't a problem. And coherence between statements consists in one statement following from another (or at least not contradicting one another). It has nothing to do with realism.

It just doesn't make sense to have a true statement about reality that doesn't reflect reality. You could have an elaborate web of true statements that don't in fact reflect reality. — Sapientia

Anti-realism doesn't entail that we have true statements about reality that don't reflect reality. It entails that reality isn't to be understood in realist terms. So, again, you're begging the question by assuming that reality is that which is ontologically-independent of language, experience, and ideas and remarking that this is inconsistent with anti-realism.

Like I said in my first post, realism is required to give an account of reference that is more plausible than alternatives.

I don't see how requiring an ontological separation between sentences and subjects makes for a more plausible account of reference. It seems far more complicated. One has to explain the nature and origin of the relationship between words and the sort of things that satisfy realist metaphysics such that the former "denote" or "are about" the latter.

Anti-realism doesn't entail that we have true statements about reality that don't reflect reality. It entails that reality isn't to be understood in realist terms. So, again, you're begging the question by assuming that reality is that which is ontologically-independent of language, experience, and ideas and remarking that this is inconsistent with anti-realism. — Michael

Of course when I said that the coherency theory of truth doesn't exclude the possibility of having true statements about reality that don't reflect reality, I was speaking of reality as per realism. I've already said that your anti-realist interpretation is problematic and ought to be rejected.

My argument is a counterargument, as opposed to one which just points out purely internal faults. I'm not just saying that your position is problematic; I'm saying that there is a better alternative, and that your position is problematic in light of it.

I don't see how requiring an ontological separation between sentences and subjects makes for a more plausible account of reference. — Michael

What do you mean by "an ontological separation between sentences and subjects"? That, for example, apples are separate from sentences which include the word "apple"? I thought that we agreed about that, so perhaps there's more to it than that.

It seems far more complicated. One has to explain the nature and origin of the relationship between words and the sort of things that satisfy realist metaphysics such that the former "denote" or "are about" the latter. — Michael

You have to do the same with regard to anti-realist metaphysics. And, in any case, I'd much rather have a more complicated position if it was also more plausible. In seeking a less complex position, one might exclude something of importance.

But anyway, what more is needed than to say that we use names to denote things? We have both done this countless times, since a very young age, so we already have the know-how.

I don't see how it's explained in terms of some ontology. And even if it was, how does explaining it in terms of an anti-realist ontology make it realist? — Michael

The distinction is based on my understanding of the difference between realist and anti-realist theories of reference. The former attempt to explain reference in ontological terms, whereas the latter don't. As far as I can tell, the theory you have presented explains truth/reference in terms of an ontological relationship between entities; namely a coherence relation between propositions or sentences. Unless you are saying that your theory of truth does not require that either coherence relations or propositions actually exist, then I'd say that your theory qualifies as a realist theory of truth/reference.

Things only get confusing when we fail to distinguish the two senses of the word "realist" that are in play here. Ontological realists (which I am here defining in opposition to ontological idealism/anti-realism) often also hold a realist theory of truth/reference that is based on correspondence. However, the correspondence theory of truth/reference is not a realist theory of reference in virtue of its appeal to correspondence, but rather in virtue of the fact that it attempts to explain reference in ontological terms (i.e. in terms of things that are taken to actually exist).

I don't think that their theory of truth commits them to the actual existence of only such things as experiences, ideas, and words, so there aren't two contradictory statements. — Michael

I thought you had appealed to this very fact as a means of demonstrating how the anti-realist can consistently make statements that are apparently realist in the ontological sense. It's hard to see how someone could qualify as an anti-realist in the ontological sense while maintaining that they are committed to the actual, irreducible existence of the very entities that their ontological anti-realism denies the actual, irreducible existence of.

Appealing to the behaviour of rational agents in the physical world doesn't entail realism (as one will take an anti-realist approach to behaviour and physics), so this isn't a problem. — Michael

But to take an anti-realist approach to things like behavior and physics is to attempt to explain those things in terms of some alternative ontology that limits itself to the actual, irreducible existence of things other than what are referred to by the scientific theories of behavior and physics. To accept the actual, irreducible existence of the entities referred to by the theories of behavior and physics is just what it means to be a realist with repect to them. I imagine you will respond by saying that since you are an anti-realist with regard to reference, you don't have to worry about the realist implication of accepting the actual, irreducible existence of such things that are referred to by those theories. But I don't think you really are an anti-realist with respect to reference, as I tried to explain above, and so I think it is necessary for you to explain things like behavior and physics in terms of whatever ontology you actually adhere to.

And coherence between statements consists in one statement following from another (or at least not contradicting one another). It has nothing to do with realism. — Michael

It does have to do with realism if you can't explain coherence without being a realist about the physical world. Again, I think it's important to keep the two different senses of the word "realist" distinct.

I think [anti-realism is] far more sensible than the traditional realist account where there's some metaphysical relationship between the sounds we speak and things which are ontologically independent of language and experience and ideas. — Michael

What's wrong with that account? We speak certain sounds when we say the name of an object that we're indicating for some communicative purpose, and the existence of that object does not depend on language, experience, or ideas. As a consequence, the object, and others like it, wouldn't simultaneously cease to exist if we (as beings with linguistic, perceptual, and mental capabilities) ceased to exist.

The relationship is that there is the world, and within that world there are people and things, and the people are intelligent and have linguistic capabilities such that they can refer to things. And the world is such that many things don't depend on us or our capabilities. There were things before us, and there'll be things after us.

Is that not more plausible than the alternative?