Belief, nor justification, nor inference confer truth. — unenlightened
Gettier states:
I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of "justified" in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false.
Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.
Keeping these two points in mind I shall now present two cases in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition.
Gettier wrote:
Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:
(f) Jones owns a Ford.
Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three placenames quite at random and constructs the following three propositions:
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (0, and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence...
Gettier wrote:
S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction...
Gettier:
...Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions...
...S is justified in believing Q.
You wrote:
Well I just waded through all this, and I have to admit to some skimming. I'll make a few preliminary remarks, and see who wants to swallow them whole and who wants to bite their heads off.
1. (p v q) appears to say more than p, but actually says less. 'The glass contains water or the glass contains vodka' says less than 'The glass contains water'.
2. Nobody in the real world forms arbitrary unrelated disjunctions of things they believe and things they have no belief about, or believe to be false, except for rhetorical purposes, or I'm a monkey's uncle.
3. I'm not a monkey's uncle.
There's nothing about Smith's thought/belief regarding the truth conditions of the disjunction. Michael has left that fact sorely neglected. — creativesoul
Believing that (g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f) is not equivalent to believing the disjunctions.
While it is true that (g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f), and it is also true that Smith could accept/believe that all three are valid forms of disjunction. It is not true that Smith could believe anything at all about Brown's location. I mean, Gettier clearly states that Smith is totally ignorant about that. Thus, Smith - himself - would not form belief about Brown's location. One cannot know they are ignorant about Brown's location and simultaneously form and/or hold a belief about where Brown is located.
The mistake here is conflating knowledge of the rules of entailment/disjunction with belief. Believing that (g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f) is not equivalent to believing the disjunctions. — creativesoul
To repeat my earlier question, do you believe that this statement is true?
London is the capital city of England and/or I was born in Leeds. — Michael
Given that it is the case that it rains every day, do you believe that "if I do the rain dance it will rain tomorrow"? — unenlightened
I'm wondering if all the difficulties can be resolved by adding a fourth criterion to the tradition: Knowledge is justified true meaningful belief. — unenlightened
Yes. To believe that this conditional is true is not (necessarily) to believe that the antecedent is the cause of the consequent. — Michael
Gettier states:
I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of "justified" in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false.
Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.
Keeping these two points in mind I shall now present two cases in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition.
Gettier wrote:
Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:
(f) Jones owns a Ford.
Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three placenames quite at random and constructs the following three propositions:
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (0, and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence...
Gettier wrote:
S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction...
Gettier:
...Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions...
...S is justified in believing Q.
When someone says 'Hands up or I shoot', the convention is that if you put your hands up, they don't shoot, and if you put your hands up and they shoot you anyway, you are entitled to be pissed off, and they might as well not have said anything. — unenlightened
I wrote:
Believing that (g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f) is not equivalent to believing the disjunctions.
Michael replied:
How many times do we have to go over this? Smith doesn't just believe that (g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f). He also believes (f), and so also believes (g), (h), and (i). I explained this simple fact to you in the very first reply.
It is if you believe that f is true.
You mean this???
"It is if you believe that f is true." — creativesoul
p1. ((p) is true)
p2. ((p v q) follows from (p))
That's where you get.
It doesn't make Q true. It makes Q the conclusion of a valid inference. — creativesoul
Yes. If I believe that (f) is true and if I believe that (g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f) then I will believe that (g), (h), and (i) are true. That's straightforward rationality.
So contrary to your repeated strawmen, nobody here is saying that "believing that (g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f) is equivalent to believing the disjunctions".
If I believe that 1.(f) is true and if I believe that 2.(g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f) then I will believe that 3.(g), (h), and (i) are true. That's straightforward rationality.
So contrary to your repeated strawmen, nobody here is saying that "believing that (g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f) is equivalent to believing the disjunctions.
If I believe that 1.(f) is true and if I believe that 2.(g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f) then I will believe that 3.(g), (h), and (i) are true. That's straightforward rationality.
p1. ((p) is true)
p2. ((p v q) follows from (p))
That's where you get.
3 in the quote above doesn't follow from p2 unless by "true" you mean being the result of a valid inference. — creativesoul
3 in the quote above doesn't follow from p2 — creativesoul
Being the result of a valid inference isn't equivalent to being true. — creativesoul
If 1 is true and if 2 is true then 3 is true. Modus ponens. Again, elementary logic.
Then why keep calling (g), (h), and (i) "true"? — creativesoul
Modus ponens doesn't help your report of Smith's belief. 1 is false and you know it. So, it is not the case that if 1 is true and 2 is true then 3 is true. 1 is false and yet you want 3 to be true. Your argument requires it.
Again elementary logic. — creativesoul
Gettier states:
I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of "justified" in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false.
Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.
Keeping these two points in mind I shall now present two cases in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition.
Gettier wrote:
Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:
(f) Jones owns a Ford.
Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three placenames quite at random and constructs the following three propositions:
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (0, and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence...
Gettier wrote:
S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction...
Gettier:
...Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions...
...S is justified in believing Q.
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