His line is that he is a messianic jew who thinks it is important to read the Bible every morning and meditate on its meaning — apokrisis

Oh yeah, and also 'Tour holds more than 120 United States patents plus many non-US patents.[36] He has more than 600 research publications,[37] with an H-index = 119 (100 by ISI Web of Science) and i10 index = 484 with total citations over 67,000 (Google Scholar).' But I guess the former outweighs the latter, right? You want to be careful about the kinds of aspersions you're engaging in, though.

It all starts when the ontically distinct thing of information enters the world. — apokrisis

The overall aim of which is: to hasten the heat death of the universe. Of course, we can entertain yourselves with other ideas whilst so doing. So it's not really ontically distinct.

It's not lumpen materialism, but it's still materialism, insofar as the overall principle is physical, namely, entropification, which just happens to throw up apparently meaningful things, like people, in the process.

Whereas I am sure there is an implicit dualism in the 'epistemic cut', which remains outstanding, which Howard Pattee frankly acknowledges in that paper on the physics and metaphysics of biosemiology.

I think your model is very much what would be needed to simulate life. But it doesn't have much to say about the actual problems of philosophy, apart from deflating them or subjectivising them.

But I guess the former outweighs the latter, right? — Wayfarer

Jeez, I gave Tour points for being upfront and honest about his metaphysical prejudices. I then pointed out the obvious flaw in his reasoning. Thousands of workable lipid options make abiogenesis more comprehensible, not less.

Deal with my actual answers, don't just divert.

And yes, any number of research patents and papers in his field of synthetic chemistry don't outweigh faulty arguments motivated by a metaphysical prejudice.

It's not lumpen materialism, but it's still materialism, insofar as the overall principle is physical, namely, entropification, which just happens to throw up apparently meaningful things, like people, in the process. — Wayfarer

It's stronger than "just happens". I said - as a metaphysical opposite or complementary thing - it would count as "meant to happen". It is another necessary fact. We can only know entropy to be a metaphysical thing because there is its metaphysical "other" from which it can measure its own existence.

Of course, if we are just speaking from a human point of view, I can agree that you are objectively right if you want to argue our entropic contribution to the Cosmos is infinitesimal, while our negentropic significance seems way out of scale.

The amount of actual entropy produced by human civilisation hardly registers in the big picture. Who cares if some random planet has a sudden temperature rise of 3 or 4 degrees?

And when it comes to negentropy, we might well be the most complex, intelligent, and creative beings ever to exist in the Universe - or at least until we went 'poof' after the short, bright flare of an anthropocene.

So yes, I am certainly a physicalist - a naturalist seeking immanent explanation with no spooky substances of any kind. And that rules out traditional notions of material substances as well as immaterial ones, as you know.

But it doesn't matter how often I remind you of such subtleties, you will still want to lump me as "other" - the necessary move to make some variety of idealism come out as right for you.

Again, I am neither idealist nor realist, materialist nor dualist.

One has the choice. Either remain trapped eternally in the standard "philosophical" culture wars - the WWE of reductionists and theists thumping chests and banging heads - or find the very small door marked exit. Walk through and discover the third option that is naturalism, organicism, systems science.

At face value there appears to be some support for the idea of a thermodynamic gradient that favours the direction of life. If the logic of this holds scrutiny then this is quite a big deal. It starts a whole series of cause and effect chains after 'the hump' that tend to run away. The fact that we don't know how all the molecules or membranes in the cell came to be there is an important point, but is weakened by the observation that they could be placed on the gradient. Based solely on thermodynamics, if the arguments presented by Apokrisis hold, it is feasible at least to suggest the molecules formed naturally somewhere at some point.

Of course this all only points in the direction of life, and says Life could be that'a'way. It does not demonstrate 'life'. So, I think a key approach at this point is to find examples of molecular and cellular interactions that do not make sense in terms of cause and effect, while also scrutinising the thermodynamic claims about life a lot closer - If we can find an apparent sentience beyond the chemistry the table is turned once more.

The sentience of the mind is a strong fallback position as Rich has highlighted, but I also think there is plenty of stuff to work with lying around in the world of molecules and cells. It should be noted that the idea of the mind as a holographic field was first proposed by noted Quantum Mechanist David Bohm.

One such example that might constitute evidence of a sentience would be the organelle called mitochondria inside eurkaryotes. This is commonly thought of as the battery of the cell. Theory has it that the mitrochondria, who have their own genetic code (mitochondrial DNA, as opposed to nuclear DNA), invaded our cells, but our cells trapped them in a process known as endosymbiosis.

So we all have symbiotes inside us! Because these symbiotes have their own mtDNA (mitochondrial DNA), this means that they should be free to multiply inside us like a virus. The thing is, the expression, replication and maintenance of mtDNA is :

" Expression, replication, and maintenance of mtDNA require factors encoded by nuclear genes. These include not only the primary machinery involved (eg, transcription and replication components) but also those in signaling pathways that mediate or sense alterations in mitochondrial function in accord with changing cellular needs or environmental conditions. " quote

: our cells stole their machinery and enslaved them.

But my argument allows humans to invent their own meanings if they like - so long as they are intelligent enough to understand the constraints that have formed their nature so far. — apokrisis

That was a good post.

Looking further into entropy and living systems I see there is no net positive gradient toward life afterall. I must have misunderstood what was being suggested. The lowered entropic states (the bonds and concentration gradients) come at a higher entropic cost. The environment is simply flushed through the container to achieve a cause.

But my argument allows humans to invent their own meanings if they like - so long as they are intelligent enough to understand the constraints that have formed their nature so far.
— apokrisis

That was a good post. — MikeL

There is always some magic hidden in any materialistic research explanation of life. There has to be, because there is nothing there.

In one breathtaking leap we go from some soup of chemicals to "humans inventing their own meaning". So you have chemicals, which satisfy Big Pharm (which pretty much determined academic curriculum nowadays) and then out of no where you have humans inventing meaning?? to make it digestible for those who are experiencing life as it unfolds. What is missing from the materialist-scientific description of life is one iota of intellectual honesty. It is a game of hide and seek. Where is the mind injected in this paper?

Ultimately it is only a packaged story designed to satisfy the intended readership - usually to raise some money. Always, we are almost there.

And yes, any number of research patents and papers in his field of synthetic chemistry don't outweigh faulty arguments motivated by a metaphysical prejudice. — apokrisis

So having a religious view amounts to a prejudice, but having an aversion to religious philosophy does not.

I think the philosophical and historical issue that underlies this particular matter, has to do with what constitutes a 'naturalist explanation'. Due to the history behind the question, there are certain kinds of ideas, and certain kinds of understanding, that are tacitly prohibited by so-called naturalist explanations. One of the factors that seems has to be ruled out, is the notion that there is any kind of intentionality in the creation and evolution of life. Life has to be understood as 'self-generating', for ideological reasons, not for empirical reasons. Or rather, if life is seen as something that is not self-generating, or as something which can't be understood in terms of the physical sciences, then that undermines the very basis of empiricism itself; it inevitably suggests some manner of vitalism, which is the kiss of death to naturalism. That's what is behind the dismissal of anything that could be seen as 'spooky'.

A question I have for naturalism is this: what would be an empirical test for orthogenesis? ('orthogenesis' being any theory variations in evolution follow a particular direction and are not merely sporadic and fortuitous.) In the past, I have said that evolutionary processes tend towards producing greater levels of self-awareness; I was told there is 'no evidence' that this is the case.

Thomas Nagel suggested, in his book, Mind and Cosmos, that there might be some kind of universal telos towards the development of life and mind. This idea was one of his most despised. It seems that there is a strong cultural predisposition to the notion that life must be essentially fortuitous, and the universe essentially meaningless, as a presupposition of science. Whereas I think it is more a presupposition of the kind of culture that produced this kind of science. I think it is a presupposition which is impossible to either validate or refute on the basis of what science is considered to be, because it's essentially a metaphysical presupposition, one that lies beneath science, and therefore dictates what ought to be taken seriously by scientists. Ultimately, it is no more supported by science, than the opposite.

Creationism and Buddhism.

Interestingly, Buddhism doesn't have a dog in the creationism fight. The reason why, is that 'the origin of the world' never played a big part in the Buddhist religion. (It's there, but it's kind of apocryphal.) As far as Buddhists are concerned, the life we experience is solely the result of the kind of karma we have created, and also a result of ignorance, i.e. our inability or refusal to see the reality of the human situation. However it's interesting that Buddhist scholar Bikkhu Bodhi observes that the notion of 'fortuitous origins' - that the life we have is a result of chance - is the view of 'the vast majority of Western people, who believe it is supported by science'. This has ethical consequences - ultimately because what we do, or don't do, doesn't actually matter in the end, because we arise out of nothing, and return to nothing. So long as we obey the law, seek self-fulfilment and meaningful relationships, there is nothing beyond that to aspire to. However, even that kind of secular philosophy of 'Eudaimonia' seems a tall order for many people. And in any case, in the end, it doesn't matter, because nothing can matter; 'what matters' is simply social convention, a human invention.

So having a religious view amounts to a prejudice, but having an aversion to religious philosophy does not. — Wayfarer

Yep. There is a world of difference between a prejudice and a hypothesis. One accepts measurement, the other strives to avoid it.

Life has to be understood as 'self-generating', for ideological reasons, not for empirical reasons. — Wayfarer

Nope. Metaphysical reasoning leads us to crisp either/or hypotheses. Then those alternatives can be weighed.

So either existence is self-generating, or ... the other thing.

And actually, the other thing doesn't even make rational sense. Talk of divine causes or transcendent being collapses in the usual familiar fashion. It becomes in the end just another way of saying "I don't know what makes existence self-generating, so there must be something more".

So we would pursue a story of self-generation and see how far it gets us. As science has demonstrated, that is a huge way indeed.

Maybe your creating God had some choices about the strength of a handful of natural constants. You often trumpet that as the best evidence of "the crisis" of modern physics.

But a God free only to change a few physical parameters - pick one universe out of a multiverse of other options he didn't invent - is not much of a creator really.

It seems that there is a strong cultural predisposition to the notion that life must be essentially fortuitous, and the universe essentially meaningless, as a presupposition of science. — Wayfarer

But that is hardly my position is it? I argue that entropy and negentropy are two sides of the one coin. The essence of pansemiosis would be seeing that the Heat Death of the Universe is just as much a state of exceptional order as disorder.

There is nothing spiritual about this view to be sure. But dualism is precisely what is being rejected here. Again, the two-ness of matter and symbol is a mutually formative deal. It is the third thing of their interaction which is the process making a world.

It is the third thing of their interaction which is the process making a world. — apokrisis

And where the hidden dualism lies- the Cartesian theater you wish to avoid. @Rich was right. Sleight of hand. I don't even have a stake in the game. In fact, I WANT it to just be physicalism with some overriding theory- but the sticky situation of hidden Cartesian theaters keep arising.

You constantly change the goal post. My guess is you are in the camp that thinks a newborn has no internal sensation (inner experience) because they have not learned distinction (between sensory nuances like "green" and "blue") etc. But you already moved the goal post from qualia in general to some particular qualia (i.e. green, blue, etc.).

There is a world of difference between a prejudice and a hypothesis. One accepts measurement, the other strives to avoid it. — apokrisis

If all you have is a hammer.....

As science has demonstrated, that is a huge way indeed. — apokrisis

...in a culture, a vast number of whose inhabitants have no sense of purpose whatever. They're literally killing themselves for want of purpose. (They do have good surgery and medicine, I'll grant that).

Talk of divine causes or transcendent being collapses in the usual familiar fashion. It becomes in the end just another way of saying "I don't know what makes existence self-generating, so there must be something more". — apokrisis

Which might even - shock, horror - amount to an admission that there is something we don't know. The very fact that the nature of life and mind might elude the quantitative sciences ought to suggest simply a sense of humility, although I know it's a big ask.

It seems that there is a strong cultural predisposition to the notion that life must be essentially fortuitous, and the universe essentially meaningless, as a presupposition of science.
— Wayfarer

But that is hardly my position is it? — apokrisis

It is, though. You just said, up-thread, that humans are capable of 'devising their own meanings'. But the 'meaning' you see in 'pan-semiosis' doesn't really express any meaning, other than the running-down of entropy; 'negentropy' is a kind of sleight-of-hand of dumb stuff, appearing to be smart, so it can get to non-being that much faster :-)

And where the hidden dualism lies- the Cartesian theater you wish to avoid. — schopenhauer1

Do I really have to walk you through the reasons why semiosis or a modelling relation is not representationalism all over again?

You constantly change the goal post. — schopenhauer1

Nope. Still in the same place. It's just you tumbling randomly in space that makes it look like they dance about.

My guess is you are in the camp that thinks a newborn has no internal sensation (inner experience) because they have not learned distinction (between sensory nuances like "green" and "blue") etc. — schopenhauer1

In fact what makes me think that is a lack of cortical connections in the newborn brain. The wiring hasn't even grown.

It takes time for the newborn brain to form its discriminatory circuits. We can tell that from EEG recordings. Early on, a stimulus creates generalised firing. The brain reacts much the same to any environmental source of energy. Then the firing of individual cells starts to correlate with an ability to make perceptual discriminations. The brain does get specific and consciousness thus becomes a high contrast qualitative state. We can definitely be seeing red as we are not seeing green, etc.

My reading is, the whole reason Peirce's semiotics became so influential, was because of the manifest and obvious inadequacies of mechanistic materialism. So the fact that life is language-like rather than machine-like, and all the metaphorical opportunities that provides, is a huge leap forward from lumpen materialism. But Peirce's philosophy was an idealist philosophy - if you google the term 'objective idealism', Peirce comes up as the #1 hit. So when I raise that, oh well, that's the aspect of Charlie that's a bit of an embarassment - Uncle Charlie's been raiding the Christmas plonk again. We can do with all his methodology, the hard-nosed pragmaticist, but the starry-eyed idealist Charlie - let's not mention that.

Nevertheless semiotics is a step in the right direction. But the other shoe has yet to drop.

If all you have is a hammer..... — Wayfarer

But you are speaking for those who don't even have a hammer....only an axe to grind.

Which might even - shock, horror - amount to an admission that there is something we don't know. — Wayfarer

That misses the point. You don't even have a hypothesis. You just have a belief that you claim as knowledge. Yet it is a belief that falls into the class of ideas that are "not even wrong" as there is no method to fix that belief in a formalised fashion. The belief is merely a habit - an accident of social circumstance.

If you are brought up in Yoruba or Salt Lake City, it is pretty predictable how you will think existence works. That doesn't seem a very secure way of fixing your beliefs, does it.

...suggest simply a sense of humility. — Wayfarer

In the end, fuck humility. Or rather I like a method that builds humility in formally in agreeing it is "only testable models". Then it become possible to say my model fucks your model. Check the numbers.

You just said, up-thread, that humans are capable of 'devising their own meanings'. But the 'meaning' you see in 'pan-semiosis' doesn't really express any meaning, other than the running-down of entropy; 'negentropy' is a kind of sleight-of-hand of dumb stuff, appearing to be smart, so it can get to non-being that much faster. — Wayfarer

I get it. You still need me to be the "other" of Scientism so your New Age mysticism can seem the good guy here by comparison. It's just rhetoric not argument. But rhetoric is fun too.

But Peirce's philosophy was an idealist philosophy - if you google the term 'objective idealism', Peirce comes up as the #1 hit. So when I raise that, oh well, that's the aspect of Charlie that's a bit of an embarassment - Uncle Charlie's been raiding the Christmas plonk again. We can do with all his methodology, the hard-nosed pragmaticist, but the starry-eyed idealist Charlie - let's not mention that. — Wayfarer

These are your wishful binaries that must be projected on to Peirce. I get it. We must divide ourselves into opposing camps. We must be team materialism or team idealism. Peirce becomes one more team mate to squabble over.

At a rhetorical level, perfectly entertaining. Just don't mistake it for proper philosophical discussion.

was right. Sleight of hand. — schopenhauer1

Whenever I'm told to read a physicalist paper on this topic, the only thing I look for is the phrase or word, (they are constantly changing) that slips mind into the thousands of words that surround it. Information, symbols, signs?? These are all a product of a mind! A computer doesn't contain information, it contains on/off switches designed by a mind. It is the mind that creates information from these on/off switches.

There is absolutely no way to get around it, somewhere, somehow, in any physicalist paper describing life, mind miraculously appears somewhere. The only way to avoid this miracle, is to make mind fundamental and irreducible. It may be hard for physicalists to swallow, but anyone who embraces their own mind readily accepts this. I have no problem recognizing my mind as me.

One of the factors that seems has to be ruled out, is the notion that there is any kind of intentionality in the creation and evolution of life. Life has to be understood as 'self-generating', for ideological reasons, not for empirical reasons. Or rather, if life is seen as something that is not self-generating, or as something which can't be understood in terms of the physical sciences, then that undermines the very basis of empiricism itself; — Wayfarer

Well, it does undermine the very basis of empiricism. Is that what you mean by "ideological reasons?" It's more a methodological reason. Science can only deal with things that are falsifiable in a scientific context. Although I come from science, I recognize it is like that old joke - I lost my keys. Where? Over there. Why are you looking for them here? Because the light's better.

On the other hand, that's a choice that makes sense to me. I recognize that a deity could have created this universe by fiat 27 years ago and could come back and fiddle with things any time she wants, but that's not how I see the world. I see it as continuous with my own experience over the last 65 years. The universe seems pretty consistent. Science seems to work pretty well. I'm comfortable here. But I'll throw it all away in a second if I'm given a reason. I would love to.

The only way to avoid this miracle, is to make mind fundamental and irreducible. — Rich

Love the confused thought process. Materialists can't explain mind and idealists can't explain matter. You substance dualists really deserve each other. Go at it, boys!

I recognize that a deity could have created this universe by fiat 27 years ago and could come back and fiddle with things any time she wants, but that's not how I see the world. — T Clark

A Christian ought to say that that's not the point of their faith. It's not 'proposing an hypothesis' in the sense of a falsifiable, abstract description of how particular things will behave under given conditions. The point of a Christian life, I would have thought, was to live in relationship with the organising principle of the Cosmos, although I admit, that is not a particularly Christian way of expressing it. Nevertheless I would like to think that this is what they mean.

Karen Armstrong gives an excellent account of how Christianity made a fatal mistake by trying to present itself in terms of the natural sciences, from the late medieval times. This is when it was common to believe that scientific discoveries 'shewed God's handiwork'. This was a sword that cut two ways. It's a long and detailed argument, presented in her book,
Case for God.

If you are brought up in Yoruba — apokrisis

RIght! Either get with the naturalist program - or you're a shamanist! And I'm accused of 'dichotomising'!

In the end, fuck humility — apokrisis

Speak volumes, don't it.

Material arises exactly as explain in Bohm's quantum mechanics. The wave is real and it creates patterns that manifest as perceived particles. One only has to conceive of quanta as waves of consciousness. Immaterial yet real.

The universe seems pretty consistent. Science seems to work pretty well. I'm comfortable here. — T Clark

Here's the thing - given the order we observe, we can explain a great deal. But we can't explain the order. That is a serious and important point.

Either get with the program - or you're a shaman! — Wayfarer

Shamanism is an example of getting with the program. That was the point.

You are standing up for uncritical belief. And when that doesn't give answers, you say the "humility" of not even trying should be good enough.

Well, it does undermine the very basis of empiricism. Is that what you mean by "ideological reasons?" It's more a methodological reason. — T Clark

I think I get what Wayfarer is saying. Empiricism these days addresses only the materialist notions of that which can be perceived through the physiological senses + logic/maths; is, in a way, itself at times a kind of placeholder for materialism, implicitly at least.

However, I grew up on the empiricism of, first and foremost, David Hume - a very different basic understanding of what empiricism entails. Given this background, here, to me, there's a potential convergence between the methodology of modern science (e.g., falsifiability) and the very old-time foundations of empiricism as interpreted by the philosophical skeptics (a kind of falsifiability applied to logic tempered by experience, including various inferences as applied to experience itself). Well, I'm showing my own partialities.

I don't have anything to definitively prove here - it would also be a different topic than that of this thread's. Just wanted to say that the philosophical skepticism of someone like Plato and his Academia can, as methodology, be rather complimentary to the methodology of the empirical sciences. Both hold as foundation an absence of obtainable absolute certainty; both seek justifications for greater strength of conviction. And, in a sense, both are founded upon inductive (with today's concepts, also abductive) reasoning.

Basically, for what its worth, imo, its not the methodological reasoning that would be undermined, but the very metaphysical foundations upon which today's global community is, for the most part, materialistically built.

You are standing up for uncritical belief. — apokrisis

Au contraire, this is all an example of where you draw your lines, of the division you see between the naturalist, which to all intents is 'things which science can explain', and then all the boo-word metaphysics that you think belongs to anyone who questions naturalism. I am not uncritical in the least, I have a post-graduate degree, I work in a demanding technical field, I integrate thoroughly with technological society (sometimes too well, I glumly think). But you have this clear border or boundary, which every time it is questioned, produces a predictable response of sarcasm and dismissal. If you wanted to take seriously the opportunities provided by interactions such as these, you would do well to consider that.

Basically, for what its worth, imo, its not the methodological reasoning that would be undermined, but the very metaphysical foundations upon which today's global community is, for the most part, materialistically built. — javra

(Y) You get my drift.

I think I get what Wayfarer is saying. Empiricism these days addresses only the materialist notions of that which can be perceived through the physiological senses + logic/maths; is, in a way, itself at times a kind of placeholder for materialism, implicitly at least......Basically, for what its worth, imo, its not the methodological reasoning that would be undermined, but the very metaphysical foundations upon which today's global community is, for the most part, materialistically built. — javra

For me, it has always seemed that the scientific assumptions - processes operating today are the same as those that have been operating forever and at comparable rates - are the strength of the scientific method. Generally, I buy into those assumptions, but I recognize it takes a leap of faith. It seems to have worked out pretty well.

I guess that sets up Hume's problem of induction. Based on induction from historic behavior, I believe that induction from historic behavior provides a good guide to understanding.

Generally, I buy into those assumptions, but I recognize it takes a leap of faith. — T Clark

Why a leap of faith? It's the very conclusion that inductive reasoning would result in – and it, as conclusion, would remain true and untarnished until in any way falsified … this by something that would then hypothetically point toward what is even closer to (absolute) objectivity.

If I interpret you right, it doesn’t seem like this process of induction poses a problem for you. As it doesn’t for me. Though it’s a problem for those that want absolute certainty, neither was it a problem for Hume.

Empiricism these days addresses only the materialist notions of that which can be perceived through the physiological senses + logic/maths — javra

But is it still materialism when the "belief" is epistemically grounded in the logic/maths? And the physiological senses are relegated to the job of simply reading a number off a dial?

To be a materialist is to believe in the reality of substances. Stuff that exists in some brute fashion and has inherent properties. Dualists are just believers in two kinds of material - a matter stuff and a soul stuff. Panpsychists believe in the one kind of material, but with two kinds of inherent properties.

Science - especially where it is clear about its epistemology - just says it is all models. We construct qualitative concepts that we then seem to be able to quantify in some useful way.

So if physicists mention entropy, or information, or energy, or quanta, or particles, what is really going on inside their heads?

The lay-person thinks of it as being a claim about "the existence of real substantial being". But really, the words become just placeholders to talk about some observable invariance of nature.

"What is energy? It's this quality the Universe seems to have. Something is conserved as something also changes. I can see a metaphysical contrast between what seems invariant - fixed and solid - in a situation and what is merely contingent, the bit to which we would instead attach some particular number to quantify its degree."

That is all in the end a physicist can say about the Universe. One can see what is generally symmetrical or invariant about experienced reality in relation to what is then the contingency of its possible symmetry breakings - the range of particular ways the invariance can be particularised.

If a physicist is really pushed (and I am talking about the metaphysically informed ones, of whom there are plenty) then the question of "what is real?" does become pretty Platonic. A particle is a point. Unless we consider it as a string, or a loop, or a knot - each of those conceptions speaking to some different set of symmetries or invariances that seem to explain the symmetry breakings we actually then measure.

So any usual notion of "material" goes right out the window. The image left in the physicist's mind is of a pure mathematical object. And then even the object gets chucked out as what the mind's eye "sees" is really all the possible rotations and translations that are the set of possible actions such an object would have. The mind's eye is left only with the ghostly kinesthetic play of pure relata.

This is why you need a mathematically trained brain to understand metaphysics from a truly scientific point of view. Materiality has been left far behind to be replaced by mathematico-logical conceptions. Nothing is left of the Cheshire Cat except its grin. Or in this case, a sense of some structure of invariance which can also only be broken with certain moves. You can bend and fold and twist. Those relations then tell of the heart of existence - the reason why it exhibits "materiality" in some well-behaved and measurable way.

...this is all an example of where you draw your lines, of the division you see between the naturalist, which to all intents is 'things which science can explain', and then all the boo-word metaphysics that you think belongs to anyone who questions naturalism. — Wayfarer

And no matter how many times I say the opposite, you will trot this nonsense out.

There are three camps here. The reductionist, the idealist and the naturalist - natural philosophy being the systems approach that both accepts the reality of all four Aristotelean causes, and sees them as part of the one world.

So reductionism rejects the reality of formal and final cause.

Idealism - if it follows its own logic - rejects material and efficient cause. Or it is forced to dualise them.

Naturalism accepts all four causes and sees them as complementary aspects of the same reality. Semiosis is then the metaphysics that cements the deal by explaining the "how".

Being a natural philosopher, I of course don't in fact accept a hard boundary between metaphysics and science. They are different levels of the same discipline. The theory and the applied.

But never mind, go back to accusing me of Scientism. That way you can be in the right by standing on the other side of the dualistic divide.

Heh, I think you've misdiagnosed Wayfarer here: the problem is not one of accepting or not accepting one or another variety of cause - its to do with very fact of explanation at all, which Wayfarer sees as a kind of existential threat to his worldview. The unexplained is not an expanandum but a desideratum. This is why he'll be eternally caught in inconsistency: he can provide no explanation for the fact of inexplicability on pain of negating his entire worldview. Hence the need to absolutize a 'line drawn in the sand' beyond which cannot be crossed. But beyond is just the glaring inability to account for the tautologically unaccountable - it cannot be explained because it cannot be explained. The last step is simply to give this yawning abyss a name - God, Mind, or whathaveyou.

In fact what makes me think that is a lack of cortical connections in the newborn brain. The wiring hasn't even grown. — apokrisis

But notice I didn't disagree with you regarding the idea of learning making the distinction occur. It is you who have placed a strawman. Pay attention to what I'm saying rather than purely reacting to stock answers.

It takes time for the newborn brain to form its discriminatory circuits. We can tell that from EEG recordings. Early on, a stimulus creates generalised firing. The brain reacts much the same to any environmental source of energy. Then the firing of individual cells starts to correlate with an ability to make perceptual discriminations. The brain does get specific and consciousness thus becomes a high contrast qualitative state. We can definitely be seeing red as we are not seeing green, etc. — apokrisis

Here again, you completely bypassed what I was saying. I said that you are moving the goal posts from qualia in general to distinct qualia. I already agreed that distinct qualia are created by learning (i.e. perceptual discriminations), but I did not agree that qualia itself was not there in some fashion as an event that is occurring. In other words SOME event of internal aspect is occurring to the newborn, even if not the one we are familiar with as discriminatory perception. There is some internal aspect of what it is like to be a newborn. Your major problem is replacing the HARD PROBLEM with EASY PROBLEMS and then constantly dodging the real question when it goes back to it. The result is that now we have semi-absurd answers like newborns do not have inner sensations.

Why a leap of faith? It's the very conclusion that inductive reasoning would result in – and it, as conclusion, would remain true and untarnished until in any way falsified … this by something that would then hypothetically point toward what is even closer to (absolute) objectivity.

If I interpret you right, it doesn’t seem like this process of induction poses a problem for you. As it doesn’t for me. Though it’s a problem for those that want absolute certainty, neither was it a problem for Hume. — javra

The underlying metaphysical underpinning of science is the assumption that things are as they have always been and will always be. That's the leap of faith. I have no problem with it. Stephen J. Gould wrote - "In science, ‘fact’ can only mean ‘confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent." He was speaking in particular about the scientific support for evolution, but it applies generally. So, putting our faith in uniformity is a bet, but why not?