Okay, then answer this: unfortunate for who? Can something be unfortunate simpliciter, without being unfortunate for anyone? Think carefully, and consider what you yourself have said, before you call something 'idiotic.' — The Great Whatever

I missed this one. By the way, I've edited some of my replies for sake of clarity - not that I expect it'll do much good.

It's important to note that I can only speak hypothetically with regards to certain things here. I don't find the prospect of the early extinction of humanity appealing. I don't approve of the consequences. So I think that it'd be unfortunate for humanity. It would be unfortunate for some amongst the living - those who had wished otherwise; and, if you imagine a different parallel universe in which humanity did not go extinct after this generation, but lived on through subsequent generations in which some people lived worthwhile lives; and if you then reflect that in this world, that is a possible future, then it's unfortunate in that sense also. It would be unfortunate if no one else got the opportunity to live a worthwhile life, but instead had the possibility taken away by the purposeful actions of the living.

I don't think that that's unintelligible nonsense. It's understandable, it makes sense, and people can relate to it, and agree with it.

You cannot take away an opportunity to live, without taking it away from someone. It makes no sense to say it is just 'taken away.' What does that even mean? — The Great Whatever

I already explained what I meant in the quote that you replied to. I meant that, as a consequence, what was a possibility would become an impossibility. The opportunity for the opportunity to even arise. Right now there is an opportunity to procreate and thereby grant others the opportunities in life. This would be taken away, removed, it would cease to exist as a result of our own actions.

This is not what anti-natalism is about. It is about birth. — The Great Whatever

C'mon, we all know that it's about more than just that. I suspect you're being a tad disingenuous. It involves other things, too. Pessimism. The two go hand in hand. Like I said earlier, it relies on certain premises about life and the world: about the effect that the suffering that exists in the world has on the quality of life.

At the same time, though, if you can't take away the opportunity to live from a potential person, then neither can you save them from future suffering. This was Cabrera's criticism of Benatar's misuse of counterfactuals. — darthbarracuda

Indeed, and that's a good point. It cuts both ways.

But I'm not claiming that anti-natalism saves people from suffering.

At the same time, though, if you can't take away the opportunity to live from a potential person, then neither can you save them from future suffering. This was Cabrera's criticism of Benatar's misuse of counterfactuals. — darthbarracuda

I do think that we can still say those sorts of things, without speaking gibberish, to get the point across, though. It's like saying that so-and-so is turning in his grave. So-and-so isn't literally turning in his grave; he isn't actually disapproving. No one's literally being robbed or saved. That isn't actually the case.

That isn't the point of figurative language or counterfactuals.

What are you saying, then?

That giving birth forces someone to undergo incredible amounts of suffering, and so it's better not to do that.

So you are essentially saying that it's better to save them from the pains of life. You say it's better not to give birth, but how do you get around the lack of pleasure being a bad thing?

I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you.

So you are essentially saying that it's better to save them from the pains of life. — darthbarracuda

He can't agree with that without conceding much of what he fervently disputed in the recent disagreement between him and I. Despite my qualification, he maintained that the only sensible interpretation of such a claim implies that unborn people exist. Any nuance is nothing more than unintelligible nonsense, apparently.

Benatar's asymmetry argument was something along the lines of the following:

A state of affairs where there is a deprivation of pleasure is bad only if someone actually exists to be deprived. Otherwise, it is not bad (or good) if there is no actual person already born to experience good.

A state of affairs where there is a deprivation of pain is good in either the case where someone actually exists or the case where there is no actual person that the lack of pain is happening to.

At its core, the argument is saying that in the specific case of procreation, there is no duty to create people that may experience pleasure, but there is a stronger case that there is a duty to not create people that may experience harm. That is the logical crux of the argument. The rest of the book goes on with conclusions that derive from this initial asymmetry.

A state of affairs where there is a deprivation of pain is good in either the case where someone actually exists or the case where there is no actual person that the lack of pain is happening to. — schopenhauer1

Benatar actually doesn't say this specifically, he uses counterfactuals to get around the absurd conclusion that the barren, icy wasteland of Pluto is overwhelmingly good because of the lack of pain. Unless of course you are willing to say that a barren, icy wasteland is good simply because there is no pain.

Unfortunately, this also leads to problems as we usually do not leap out of bed for joy when contemplating the lack of pain on Pluto. It's a "good thing" in an impersonal, "if-then" counterfactual sense, not in the actual sense.

However, if we use counterfactuals for the lack of pain, then we are obligated to use counterfactuals for the lack of pleasure. Otherwise it's begging the question.

However, if we use counterfactuals for the lack of pain, then we are obligated to use counterfactuals for the lack of pleasure. Otherwise it's begging the question. — darthbarracuda

But, his point was that it is not bad if there is no actual person who is deprived of good. That is the counterfactual. It is good that there is no actual person who is experiencing pain.

The implication with both of these is that you must believe that possibilities exist and that something different could have been the case. Really it should be expanded:

If there is a possibility of a state of affairs where an actual person could exist, and they do not actually exist, it is not bad if there is no actual person that exists and is deprived of good.

If there is a possibility of a state of affairs where an actual person could exist, and they do not actually exist, it is good if there is no actual person that exists that is experiencing pain.

I am not saying that. There is no one to save.

how do you get around the lack of pleasure being a bad thing? — darthbarracuda

Lack of pleasure is neither good nor bad, it is indifferent.

Special pleading is not nuance. You can claim that your position has been qualified intelligibly to avoid a bad result, but this does not mean you succeed in doing so or understand how to do so.

But, his point was that it is not bad if there is no actual person who is deprived of good. That is the counterfactual. — schopenhauer1

If it is not bad if there is no actual person who is deprived of good, then it is not good if there is no actual person who is deprived of bad.

That is correct. But generally it is not a good idea to inflict harms when the alternative is something indifferent. Thus, the fact that I am not being hit by a hammer is neither good nor bad, it causes neither pain nor pleasure. But it is a bad idea to cause myself pain (a bad) by smacking myself with a hammer.

If it is not bad if there is no actual person who is deprived of good, then it is not good if there is no actual person who is deprived of bad. — darthbarracuda

That only makes sense if you think that pain is good. Clearly Benatar and others think that pain is bad. Again, you also must include possibilities. If good could have occurred to an actual person but did not (because a state of affairs where a possibility could have occurred but did not), this is not bad because nothing was affected by the non-experience of good. If bad could have occurred to an actual person but did not (because a state of affairs where a possibility could have occurred but did not), this is good because there was no one affected by the experience of bad.

That only makes sense if you think that pain is good. Clearly Benatar and others think that pain is bad. — schopenhauer1

And it only makes sense to say that a deprivation of pleasure is not-bad if you don't consider pleasure to be good.

I say, scrap the asymmetry, it's made things more confusing than anything and there's better arguments for antinatalism anyway.

Agreed. Thus, the "asymmetry" of Benatar (which isn't really an asymmetry but rather a symmetry) depends on the fact that life is filled with suffering, or at least can be filled with suffering. When I abstain from jumping out of a two story building, it is because I am avoiding pain. The potential, unknown amount of pain avoided is more important than the potential, unknown amount of pleasure I may feel for the split second I experience a sensation of flight. Apply this to the "asymmetry" (symmetry), and you get that it is really all about a risk-assessment and a greater-emphasis being placed upon harm rather than pleasure. The avoidance of pleasure may be a bad thing, but the imposition of pain is an even worse thing.

This avoids the absurd conclusion that a pinprick voids a birth that would otherwise be filled with an omega-sequence of happiness.

Your accusations are baseless, though. All you have shown is that a misinterpretation leads to absurdity: a clear example of attacking a straw man. You might also be committing an argument from incredulity, unless you have something other than your failure in understanding to go by in order to show that my claims, correctly understood, are nonsensical.

At its core, the argument is saying that in the specific case of procreation, there is no duty to create people that may experience pleasure, but there is a stronger case that there is a duty to not create people that may experience harm. That is the logical crux of the argument. The rest of the book goes on with conclusions that derive from this initial asymmetry. — schopenhauer1

I agree that there is no duty to create people that may experience pleasure, but I don't think that the morality of it depends upon it being a matter of duty. I don't agree that there is a duty to not create people that may experience harm. So, I'd argue that there is a symmetry, rather than an asymmetry, in terms of there being no duty in either case. I'd further argue that there is an asymmetry in terms of morality, for example, in that good can arise from the lives of subsequent generations, but no such good can arise from the extinction of humanity after the current generation.

I reject this:

A state of affairs where there is a deprivation of pain is good in either the case where someone actually exists or the case where there is no actual person that the lack of pain is happening to. — schopenhauer1

For a similar reason to this:

Benatar actually doesn't say this specifically, he uses counterfactuals to get around the absurd conclusion that the barren, icy wasteland of Pluto is overwhelmingly good because of the lack of pain. Unless of course you are willing to say that a barren, icy wasteland is good simply because there is no pain.

Unfortunately, this also leads to problems as we usually do not leap out of bed for joy when contemplating the lack of pain on Pluto. It's a "good thing" in an impersonal, "if-then" counterfactual sense, not in the actual sense. — darthbarracuda

The complete absence of pain, e.g. on Pluto, strikes me as amoral. The complete absence of pain from life strikes me as detrimental. And the complete absence of pain where that entails the early extinction of life also strikes me as detrimental. The cost outweighs the benefit. Reducing excessive suffering: good, but not at any cost. Wiping suffering out altogether: bad, especially when it entails the extinction of life.

And it only makes sense to say that a deprivation of pleasure is not-bad if you don't consider pleasure to be good. — darthbarracuda

But that is not the full argument. Benatar agrees that deprivation of pleasure is bad for actual people (or rather, the state of affairs where someone possibly could exist and they actually do).

However, the state of affairs where a new person could possibly exist and does not actually occur, means that the possibility of pleasure without it actually being experienced is not bad. This is unlike pain "not happening" to anyone being good even if there is no individual experiencing the pain "not happening" to them.

The asymmetry is that there needs to be an actual person for deprivation of pleasure to be bad. There does not need to be an actual person for the deprivation of bad to be good. It is simply "good" that no new person experiences pain. It is not bad or good if there is no new person to exist to experience good.

This also leads to the idea that during the procreation decision, one does not have a duty to create beings with happy lives, but one does have a duty to prevent beings who suffer.

The asymmetry is that there needs to be an actual person for deprivation of pleasure to be bad. There does not need to be an actual person for the deprivation of bad to be good. — schopenhauer1

I'm curious about what the argument for that is, because on the face of it, it looks like special pleading. But don't feel like you have to explain it. I suppose I could look it up myself.

However, the state of affairs where a new person could possibly exist and does not actually occur, means that the possibility of pleasure without it actually being experienced is not bad. This is unlike pain "not happening" to anyone being good even if there is no individual experiencing the pain "not happening" to them.

The asymmetry is that there needs to be an actual person for deprivation of pleasure to be bad. There does not need to be an actual person for the deprivation of bad to be good. It is simply "good" that no new person experiences pain. It is not bad or good if there is no new person to exist to experience good.

This also leads to the idea that during the procreation decision, one does not have a duty to create beings with happy lives, but one does have a duty to prevent beings who suffer. — schopenhauer1

Again, though, this falls into the counterfactual abuse. If there does not need to be an actual person for the deprivation of bad to be good, then there does not need to be a person for the deprivation of good to be bad. Benatar is putting the cart before the horse, i.e. begging the question. If you read Cabrera's paper on this, he shows how Benatar relies on a pessimistic outlook to validate the asymmetry.

You are correct, we have a duty not to impose sufficient harm upon another individual. But, I think you will agree with me that if we have a scenario in which we know (for sure, 100%, no doubt), that the person born will experience a single pain in their life (a pinprick) and then proceed to experience a limitless omega sequence of pleasure, we might feel the urge the have this child. In fact, we might even feel sad if we don't have this child, because we missed an opportunity. To not have this child because they would experience a pinprick would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

What this shows is that there is an asymmetry in the value we place upon pain and pleasure. If we use counterfactuals, the absence of pain is good and the absence of pleasure is bad, but we place more emphasis on the absence of pain. We consider the pain before we consider the pleasure. We do not take unnecessary risks. And so while the absence of pleasure may be a bad thing, the imposition of extreme suffering is an even worse thing, one that seems to completely over-rule the badness of the absence of pleasure.

Thus, the asymmetry heavily relies on a pessimistic outlook on life, in which life is filled with suffering (or the potential thereof).

Benatar uses the "not-bad" label for the absence of pleasure because it is a quick and handy heuristic, not because it actually reflects upon the reality of our ethical intuitions.

In fact, we might even feel sad if we don't have this child, because we missed an opportunity. To not have this child because they would experience a pinprick would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater. — darthbarracuda

That's basically what I've been saying, but I don't think that it's necessary to go to such extremes. The point applies to any case in which the suffering doesn't render life unworthy of continuance over generations. We can cope with a hell of a lot more than a pinprick and still see the value in continuing life.

Although I agree with this partly, there are certainly cases in which people who were living life normally were thrust into conditions in which they could not endure.

There is a difference between confronting opposition and rising above in triumph, and just mucking around in mediocrity as most people do in life. Ultimately the pleasure that life brings is not enough to justify the pain that life also brings, despite what the television shows tell you.

If you read Cabrera's paper on this, he shows how Benatar relies on a pessimistic outlook to validate the asymmetry. — darthbarracuda

I never said there were not any initial assumptions. His assumptions are that ethics in the decision for procreation are only relevant when considering the prevention of someone from experiencing harm. He also seems to imply that the promotion of happiness in individuals that can possibly exist, but does not exist yet and is not relevant to ethics. Once born, then it is too late for wholesale prevention of a being that experiences harm, now the calculus changes to conventional maximizing of good and minimizing of harm as much as one could or wants.

To not have this child because they would experience a pinprick would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater. — darthbarracuda

I think he said something to the affect that, according to his logic, even a pinprick would not justify being born, if the initial state was not existing in the first place. Again, that is the assumption that preventing harm is an absolute intrinsic ethical line he is not willing to cross in this matter. However, he does not leave it there as he realizes most people will not agree to that. Therefore, he lightens it up by describing how we indeed do experience much harm but that coping and adjusting to harms is not an excuse for actually experiencing them in the first place. Hence, he goes into ideas about how we cope such as Pollyainism, adjusting to non-ideal outcomes, and comparing to people who are worse off to try to mitigate our own harm.

What this shows is that there is an asymmetry in the value we place upon pain and pleasure. If we use counterfactuals, the absence of pain is good and the absence of pleasure is bad, but we place more emphasis on the absence of pain. We consider the pain before we consider the pleasure. We do not take unnecessary risks. And so while the absence of pleasure may be a bad thing, the imposition of extreme suffering is an even worse thing, one that seems to completely over-rule the badness of the absence of pleasure. — darthbarracuda

I think that is what he is kind of getting at. If you want to split hairs over "not bad" and a longer version of what you said to the effect of we place more emphasis on the absence of pain and we consider pain before we consider pleasure, then in effect, the logic is the same.

I do think he has a point though that since there is no perspective to even feel deprived, there is literally no harm done to anything by the possibility of happiness remaining not actual. However, since the possibility did not become actual, there is no perspective to even feel harm. This can be considered a good thing, as preventing actual harm from occurring is a good thing.

Again, the premium is that prevention of harm is the core of the ethics. The child did not need happiness. As I have said in the past, no one needs to live life to experience "x" this or that principle, especially when we know harm is almost always a guarantee.

I don't think that there is much of any obligation to prevent harm, rather than not be the cause of it. The former implies a smothering involvement in the lives of others. When we happen to be there, and could prevent some harm without putting ourselves out too much, then it is definitely a good thing to do -- but failing to catch the rock thrown at the head of someone you're standing next to just clearly isn't even remotely in the same league as having thrown the rock.

I think that it's contorting things, and inserting one's self in the business of others too much to say that we have a moral obligation to prevent harm, or suffering. Much craziness and abuse seems to follow from that. Though I can see how this unreasonable extension may be necessary to make antinatalism sound more reasonable.