there seems to be a lot of normative political theory of 'ought to be' rather than any concern for 'what is' or at least no division from ethics as part of our political evaluations. — TimeLine
What standards (other than morality) are available as a basis for political evaluations? — Galuchat
Heh, you're not alone in this concern. Raymond Geuss, among other others, has basically made his career out of criticizing what he calls 'ethics first' political philosophy, and it helps that he is probably among the best and most erudite writers in the English language (check out in particular his little book, Philosophy and Real Politics). — StreetlightX
Mainstream Poli P still tends to labour under the more or less awful influence of Rawls and is indeed a whole of bunch of applied moral theory. — StreetlightX
The most basic source, now that I think about it, would be Machiavelli, who wisely counseled that one of the principal lessons the Prince ought to learn is how not to be good. — StreetlightX
I just bought it online. This occurred to me after just finishing Contemporary Political Philosophy by Will Kymlicka — TimeLine
Ah, preceding him, perhaps Thrasymachus? It is realistic to accept that political decisions have been made that contradict intent for what is best for the people. Any realistic qualitatative observation of social and political affairs would be amorphous when we neglect the possibility that political systems and institutions are not contained within such singular attributes of what they ought to be but are in fact not good intentionally, since those who try "to be good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the great number who are not good." — TimeLine
I am a Platonist to a certain extent but I am at the same time a believer that unless the stars have aligned, so to speak, you will fail in your endeavours. So on the contrary, I absolutely believe in Machiavelli's notion of Fortuna, but that doesn't guide my morality.Also, re: Machiavelli and Thrasymachus: one thing that is often forgotten is that Machiavelli was not, himself, 'Machiavellian' in the sense of simply being a power-hungry schemer. The goal for Machiavelli was never simply power but the cultivation of virtù, the achievement of greatness or excellence (not unlike, by the way, the great deeds of the Homeric heroes). This in turn meant paying attention to the winds of forunta, those opportune moments that arose for the taking (again, not unlike the Greek notion of kairos, which, unsurprisingly, Plato was supremely suspicious of).
There's a deep attention to political reality in Machiavelli, which sets him very much against the 'ideal-theory' orientation of Plato and Rawls. But importantly this doesn't mean that the only thing to be concerned about is power and it's pursuit, even as they at least now become important considerations. Thrasymachus in this sense is a caricature of Machiavelli, who is far more subtle in his understanding of politics than either Plato or Thrasymachus. — StreetlightX
Thrasymachus wants to argue that conventional morality (the morality of Homer) is true morality, and Plato soundly refutes him.Thrasymachus in this sense is a caricature of Machiavelli, who is far more subtle in his understanding of politics than either Plato or Thrasymachus. — StreetlightX
This right here is false. Conventional morality IS the morality of Thrasymachus, not that of Socrates and Plato. Conventional morality does say to do whatsoever is good for you, regardless of whether it is good for others. If you can grab power by assasinating your political opponents without getting caught, then you should do it. That's what conventional morality says, and that's what it has always said. Now people don't speak openly about it (because they think it's better to appear moral), but it doesn't change the fact that this is the morality that governs their soul (meaning their behaviour).All the characters in his history are allowed to exhibit the highest possible intelligence, clarity, and rationality in pursuing their respective enterprises, regardless of the judgments representatives of conventional morality would make on them. Socrates, however, “dragged moralizing into science,” and Plato followed in his wake. — StreetlightX
Also, re: Machiavelli and Thrasymachus: one thing that is often forgotten is that Machiavelli was not, himself, 'Machiavellian' in the sense of simply being a power-hungry schemer. The goal for Machiavelli was never simply power but the cultivation of virtù, the achievement of greatness or excellence (not unlike, by the way, the great deeds of the Homeric heroes). This in turn meant paying attention to the winds of forunta, those opportune moments that arose for the taking (again, not unlike the Greek notion of kairos, which, unsurprisingly, Plato was supremely suspicious of).
There's a deep attention to political reality in Machiavelli, which sets him very much against the 'ideal-theory' orientation of Plato and Rawls. But importantly this doesn't mean that the only thing to be concerned about is power and it's pursuit, even as they at least now become important considerations. Thrasymachus in this sense is a caricature of Machiavelli, who is far more subtle in his understanding of politics than either Plato or Thrasymachus. — StreetlightX
Ahhh you're in for a treat : D. And I know Kymlicka's text - it's an undergrad standard - and you'd definitely come away with the impression that you have re: applied moral theory having read it. — StreetlightX
"The heaviest penalty for declining to rule is to be ruled by someone inferior to yourself" - Plato — Agustino
Conventional morality does say to do whatsoever is good for you, regardless of whether it is good for others. — Agustino
Hmm, that is indeed an interesting scenario. There are two kinds of men who would declare that. Those who really don't care that they are cowards, and want to go on living in that way, and those who do not think they are cowards but reply so nevertheless just to shut up the one who accuses them that they are cowards since they do not want to engage in discussion. They really have no preference whether they appear as cowards, their concern is solely with the reality.I have heard grown men who inject themselves with steroids to appear masculine retort "yep, I am a coward!" — TimeLine
I agree.hence knowledge makes a man unfit to be a slave. — TimeLine
Yes, for the most part. But the exceptions would be if the consequences of following the herd or being enslaved were more fearsome than those of rebelling.The consequences of cowardice is irrelevant to one willing to be enslaved or to follow the herd — TimeLine
Can you expand on what you mean?In everything that I remember reading in the Republic, Thrasymachus was indeed the most appealing to me — TimeLine
Oh, in the behavior of the many who follow it :P . Thrasymachus, in fact, explains this at the beginning of the Republic. Most people know this truth, but maintain a different façade. This truth is in fact part of the behaviour that is considered acceptable in society.Where? — TimeLine
Okay. However please note that politics isn't much the right word, their main difference runs along their ethics. Plato has an ethical disagreement with Thrasymachus - and by extension Thucydides, Pericles, Homer, etc. - and he outlines the bifurcation at the beginning of the Republic as well. This ethical disagreement does have political consequences.Regardless of the specifics, the point was simply to mark a line of bifurcation or divergence between Plato on the one hand, and Thucydides, Pericles, and Homer on the other, with respect to their treatment of politics. — StreetlightX
So do you think Plato assumes a necessary link between politics and ethics? I don't think Plato is that naive.My suggestion is that Thucydides and the like are more attentive to the autonomy of the political, decoupling it from any necessary link to ethics, and as such stand at the beginning of a philosophical lineage that Machiavelli also belongs to. — StreetlightX
Hmm, that is indeed an interesting scenario. There are two kinds of men who would declare that. Those who really don't care that they are cowards, and want to go on living in that way, and those who do not think they are cowards but reply so nevertheless just to shut up the one who accuses them that they are cowards since they do not want to engage in discussion. They really have no preference whether they appear as cowards, their concern is solely with the reality. — Agustino
In everything that I remember reading in the Republic, Thrasymachus was indeed the most appealing to me
— TimeLine
Can you expand on what you mean? — Agustino
Where?
— TimeLine
Oh, in the behavior of the many who follow it :P — Agustino
Indeed, a philosopher seeks to articulate moral standards in an attempt to ascertain the most effective political system, but there appears some hesitation to confront legitimacy within these standards imposed. — TimeLine
One thing to watch out for when considering questions of legitimacy is to what extent any discussion remains at the level of procedures and rules. One has to always consider to what extent one can/should make a so-called 'illegitimate' claim to governmental redress - think about the sit in protests during the civil rights era, or the occupation of public space during the recent Occupy protests and so on. Certain forms or conceptions of illigitimacy (because not done though the 'right' channels of political participation) may serve as covers for the denial of political representation or redress and undermine democratic expression. — StreetlightX
There are generally two ways to approach this: say that we need more ideal mechanisms so that we don't need such eruptive moments, or to accept that these eruptions are part and parcel of politics and need to be afforded a place. If it isn't obvious I think the former is quite obviously an utterly naive approach to things. — StreetlightX
The constitution of 'the people' is - for me anyway - the key problem to be worked though in political theory. It also nicely mediates between 'real politics' and philosophical approaches quite nicely. — StreetlightX
the central discourse ....being the subject of justice rather than legitimacy — TimeLine
there seems to be a lot of normative political theory of 'ought to be' rather than any concern for 'what is' — TimeLine
Hmm, yes I see your meaning now, and I would agree.To me cowardice is a type of feeble-mindedness, a person who lacks will and prefers others to think on his behalf and a man who needs to bulk up by taking steroids is a coward because they are following a false image, what makes one in the Thrasymachian sense appear as a 'man' when subjectively they are worms. It is no different to those women who use botox and get implants etc because it is all a game, a competition of who can pull off the best lie. Add a touch of superficial kindness to that mask and everyone applauds and congratulates it - look at the Kardashians, a bunch of psychotic people that everyone defends tooth and nail. Being cowardly does not mean being scared or afraid in the way that we often interpret it, but succumbing to that lack of self-esteem that makes one enslaved by the need to garner other people's approval. They sacrifice their own identity and hand their souls over for others to think on their behalf. It disgusts me. — TimeLine
Oh I see. Well, Plato also knew that that is the case for most people. I'm sure he wasn't that naive, given that Athens was responsible for the unjust death of his master Socrates. That's in fact why he wrote the Republic. If what Thrasymachus said wasn't the conventional morality of the times, Plato wouldn't have bothered.Why do you need me to expand? Thrasymachus was most appealing because of his interpretation of injustice hiding behind the appearance of justice, the very purpose of this thread in that he did not impose moral ideals but rather interpreted politics through a realism of human motivation. — TimeLine
It is conventional because that's the morality of most people. Not their proclaimed morality, but rather their lived morality. When Plato calls it conventional he asserts his total opposition to what most people think in their souls. Indeed, the Republic is his attempt to prove most people, who think like Thrasymachus, that they are wrong, and that the good man will come out victorious in this life and in the next as well.No, I meant where or who states that conventional morality is to do whatsoever is good for you, regardless of whether it is good for others. As in, why conventional morality? — TimeLine
The latter momentum or fluidity may be an inevitable requisite that contests the standards that form our understanding of the properties or quality of legitimacy, but in doing so would mean that there is no legitimacy in legitimacy and that therein would contain no properties or quality at all. How do we draw the line? — TimeLine
What is your take on referendums? — TimeLine
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