Mechanism is correct, but is it holding me back?

XanderTheGrey

I remember trying to explain to my psychologist that choice was an illusion when I was ~15 years old. I didn't know of the term "mechanism" then, but it was blatantly obvious to me that there was actually no such thing as free will. The problem is, I also remember not doing a damn thing with my life then, and being on the verge of getting sent into treatment for a stash of drawings my teacher found, along with an experiment I did, which got accedently reported by another child that was really just trying to "talk shit" about me. I notice that I tend to procrastinate allot anytime I think about mechanism, regardless of my efforts not to.

Mechanism, its very simple, what you decide to do is beyond your controll, its dictated by physics, just as any other action or reaction is. People used to insist that clouds chose where to go becuase they couldnt grasp physics to that extent. It just seems obvious that the physics of gravity, biology, biochemistry, electromagnetism, ect. dictates what we decide to do. If someone is underslept or drunk, their choicies will be atleast slightly different. If I spend my life in Russia I will think and feel differently about things then I would if I grew up in Texas. Sometimes people want to change, I don't see how they could just decide to change, something pushed them to want to change. Thats "mechanism" "everything is pushed by something else". Free will is an illusion we dont really have the power to controll what we decide. Even if I say "I need more information and knowladge before I make this decision" something pushed me to feel that way, I will be pushed to look here or there while I do my research, and that research, along with gravity, tempeture, air and blood pressure, ect. will push me to decide whatever I happen to decide. If I stop and say "I made the wrong decision" or "I should never have done this or that" then again, something pushed my feelings in that direction.

This goes back to the post I made about wether or not believing in karma(given it's untrue[which I've not decided yet]) or even just pretending as if its real gives any advatage torwards personal success.

I've been cosidering more experiments with the "tinkerbell effect" eversince @Cavacava mentioned it.

The truth is worthless outside of what it can achieve I think.

BC

I don't know whether we have absolute free will or not. My suspicion is that we can not know whether we are perfectly free to choose.

If I say I freely decided to eat a yellow apple instead of a red apple, someone will say "Ach! It's just physics and chemistry." I can't prove that physics and chemistry weren't directing my behavior a little, some, or altogether. On the other hand, when people portray themselves as puppets of physics, it sounds like a choice to think that way.

The truth is almost certainly somewhere in-between those two extreme positions. Let's say I am very hungry. I am presented with a raspberry / lemon danish on my left and a slice of 100% whole wheat bread on my right. How much free will might I exercise? My guess is that the chemistry of low blood sugar will drive the decision towards the danish. On the other hand, when I am shopping, I'll choose a loaf of 100% whole wheat over a box of danish. I freely decide to avoid the pastry counter.

It's difficult to imagine what kind of chemistry and physics would favor conversion to Buddhism. It would seem that the reasons would be "meta physical" rather than physical or chemical.

XanderTheGrey

It's difficult to imagine what kind of chemistry and physics would favor conversion to Buddhism. It would seem that the reasons would be "meta physical" rather than physical or chemical. — Bitter Crank

Meta-physics simply being "physics not yet within our understanding?"

sime

i think you should give Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations a thorough read, and complement it with a study of the collapse of the analytic-synthetic distinction.

That ought to debunk or slacken your dogmatic intuitions of mechanistic thought.

Hanover

Mechanism, its very simple, what you decide to do is beyond your controll, its dictated by physics, just as any other action or reaction is. — XanderTheGrey

Do you not see the paradox within this sentence? You've arrived at the conclusion that conclusions can't be arrived at. Of what value are any of your philosophical conclusions if you admit they aren't based upon intentional deliberation, but just based on coercive forces?

Metaphysician Undercover

I remember trying to explain to my psychologist that choice was an illusion when I was ~15 years old. I didn't know of the term "mechanism" then, but it was blatantly obvious to me that there was actually no such thing as free will. The problem is, I also remember not doing a damn thing with my life then,

...

. I notice that I tend to procrastinate allot anytime I think about mechanism, regardless of my efforts not to. — XanderTheGrey

See how these two go together, believing that choice is an illusion, and not doing a damn thing? If you're waiting for the universe to make you do something, you might wait a long time.

BlueBanana

Natural sciences can't explain consciousness, sentience. Under such circumstances I don't see how one could consider natural sciences fully explaining their actions, which appear to be made by the mind.

T Clark

Natural sciences can't explain consciousness, sentience. Under such circumstances I don't see how one could consider natural sciences fully explaining their actions, which appear to be made by the mind. — BlueBanana

The "natural sciences" think they have something significant to say about consciousness. In a previous post, StreetlightX referenced Antonio Damasio, a neuroscientist working on consciousness. I got "The feeling of What Happens" from the library. I've just started it, but it looks really interesting. Damasio is not a reductionist. He is not reluctant to talk about "mind."

Do you understand the state of the science about consciousness? If not, your statement is unjustifiable.

T Clark

That ought to debunk or slacken your dogmatic intuitions of mechanistic thought. — sime

I think XanderTheGrey is one of the least dogmatic posters on this forum. By "dogmatic," I think you mean "he disagrees with me."

BlueBanana

Do you understand the state of the science about consciousness? — T Clark

How can you know the difference between knowing and thinking you know?

T Clark

How can you know the difference between knowing and thinking you know? — BlueBanana

I don't understand the question in the context of this exchange.

BlueBanana

↪T Clark

Well, how can anyone know they understand anything? I think I understand it but strictly speaking, a cogito, ergo sum.

Jeremiah

↪XanderTheGrey

Choice is empirically demonstrable, while hard determinism is an unfalsifiable claim. You are grasping at straws, and looking for an excuse to avoid taking control of your life.

T Clark

Well, how can anyone know they understand anything? I think I understand it but strictly speaking, a cogito, ergo sum. — BlueBanana

I still don't get it in relation to what XTG has written.

BlueBanana

↪T Clark

Well, you were the one to ask me whether I understood the scientific stance, to which I'm merely trying to answer. Whether I do understand that or not seems to be relevant to whether my argument is justifiable or not, which is, of course, relevant.

T Clark

Well, you were the one to ask me whether I understood the scientific stance, to which I'm merely trying to answer. Whether I do understand that or not seems to be relevant to whether my argument is justifiable or not, which is, of course, relevant. — BlueBanana

I'll change my question - Are you familiar with the state of the science about consciousness?

BlueBanana

↪T Clark

Same answer - I think I am, to some extent.

T Clark

Same answe - I think I am, to some extent. — BlueBanana

I wasn't trying to put you on the spot. I also wasn't saying you have to be able to fully explicate the current understanding of scientists. I only ask that you know the issues well enough to make an intelligent argument.

BlueBanana

↪T Clark

Sorry but that seems like a logical fallacy. The argument, although briefly, is stated above and I don't see how one's capability to make that argument is relevant to the correctness of that argument.

The answer, by the way, is yes.

javra

Meta-physics simply being "physics not yet within our understanding?" — XanderTheGrey

That would be the favored interpretation of “meta-physics” by anyone who sponsors materialism / physicalism. But, then, in this view, nothing is in factual reality meta-physical; the closest one here can approach the meta-physical is via abstractions of the physical which are themselves physical in their nature.

You sponsor that there is no such thing as will (other than, maybe, a mechanistically emergent illusion); I conclude this through inference that is non-contradictory to what you phrase as mechanism.

However, were there to be some mistake in your currently held reasoning and, in addition, were there to be such a factual reality of will, will itself – regardless of how causally tied into the, here, not-perfectly deterministic causal processes of the physical – would itself be beyond-the-physical (meta-physical in this sense). As would then also logically be its final states of being - were such final states to also be ontically real – alongside other issues such as those of the principles of thought (e.g., the notion of identity and of non-contradiction).

So sponsoring the non-physical meta-physical, then, can lead one toward sub-stance dualism (such as Descartes’) or to some form of monism (such as Schopenhauer’s).

XanderTheGrey

↪Hanover

Do you not see the paradox within this sentence? You've arrived at the conclusion that conclusions can't be arrived at. Of what value are any of your philosophical conclusions if you admit they aren't based upon intentional deliberation, but just based on coercive forces? — Hanover

Exactly, thats what I'm wondering, mechanism no matter how true it appears to me, seems to have less value to me than believing in free will.

As I said: "The truth is worthless outside of what it can achive."

T Clark

Meta-physics simply being "physics not yet within our understanding? — XanderTheGrey

That's not even close to what metaphysics is. This is not the place to go into that.

The truth is worthless outside of what it can achive — XanderTheGrey

I agree strongly. I might go farther. Maybe the truth is meaningless outside of what it can achieve. Maybe not.

And finally, for what it's worth, whether or not there is free will, I will hold you responsible for your actions.

Hanover

That's not even close to what metaphysics is. This is not the place to go into that. — T Clark

If one is a physicalist, then metaphysics would in fact be that which physics has yet to explain.

XanderTheGrey

If one is a physicalist, then metaphysics would in fact be that which physics has yet to explain. — Hanover

I suppose I am a physicalist then; I cannot see how anything outside of physics could exist given that physics is matter, anti-matter energy, time, ect.

Emotions and thoughts are even made of matter and energy.

Marty

Historically, mechanism failed to account for intentional actions and actions-at-a-distance (formal-final causes). I remember reading Schelling w.r.t to these issues in Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, and his three types of motion:

1. Quantitative motion, which is proportional only to the quantity of matter - gravity;
2. Qualitative motion, which is appropriate to the inner constitution of matter - chemical motion;
3. Relative motion, which is transmitted to bodies by influence from without (by impact) - mechanical motion. — Schelling

I'm not sure to what extent the chemical, magnetic and electrical revolutions managed to be reduced down to mechanism, but organisms in general don't seem reducible to me. It at least seems fairly intutive that our actions are at least normative - they purpose failure and intentionality - then you do not have a merely mechanical world. Things maintain to their form (and intentions), which is then indicative of how they act.

↪XanderTheGrey

You'll have to argue for this. Its not a given that anything is just x.

T Clark

If one is a physicalist, then metaphysics would in fact be that which physics has yet to explain. — Hanover

Disagree. As I said, this is not the place to discuss what metaphysics is. Definitely off-post.

Hanover

↪T Clark

Disagree. Definitely on topic. The OP references "mechanism," which is his word for physicalism, which he then argues negates free will, all of which is metaphysics.

Harry Hindu

What is a "will" and what does it mean to be "free"? Most philosophical discussions go no where, and we end up talking past each other, because the terms we are talking about aren't clearly defined. How is it that we can point to certain influences in our decision-making and sometimes not?

Mechanism
- the fundamental processes involved in or responsible for an action, reaction, or other natural phenomenon.

- a natural or established process by which something takes place or is brought about.

There are other definitions of "mechanism" that do refer to explanations of physics and chemistry, but I don't think "mechanism" necessarily has to refer to those things, and necessarily relating it to physicalism.

I also don't take "natural" to necessarily entail physicalism either. "Natural" would simply refer to any fundamental state of affairs. In this sense, reality is nature.

I don't think "physical" or "mental" are helpful terms. They are terms referring to arbitrary boxes we've decided to put things in our categorizing of nature. "Mechanism" can simply refer to causation. We know that our intention/will has a causal influence on other things and itself is influenced by other things. There really doesn't need to make a distinction between "physical" or "mental" here.

T Clark

Disagree. Definitely on topic. — Hanover

I accede to your judgment.

SomXtatis

I think there is a mistake being done, and I think it is implicitly done in the OP, when just by denying the free-will, one assumes the equally absurd unfree will. Whereas free will assumes the possibility of a decision between two things without anything previous determining the will to one or the other, unfree will would imply a subject separate from the will, like it would just tag along as a sort of epiphenomenon, always wanting what the world makes it to want.

But the subject is there looking at the world, being in it, not as a ghost in a cage watching as the body is living the life that's supposed to be the ghosts. The subject is in the body, which I think should be acceptable according to the views expressed in the OP, and the body is a part of the world. Now how does the willing of the subject happen? Obviously through being in contact with objects in order to be able to will at all, and then having the proper motivation for example through the past of the subject himself, through the situation in the world, through all the possibilities and hopes for the future that that she has. The willing out of nothing of anything is impossible, since obviously, there is no need to want anything without a motivation. But the will is not boxed in by the causal chain, but allowed to exist through it.

Marty

↪Harry Hindu

Mechanism" can simply refer to causation. We know that our intention/will has a causal influence on other things and itself is influenced by other things. There really doesn't need to make a distinction between "physical" or "mental" here.

The point isn't whether or not our decisions are motivated (influenced) by the world, the point is whether our decisions are over-determined by external mechanisms. Historically mechanism has been defined as working with material and efficient causes, and ignoring intentionality (formal-final causes).

Mechanism is correct, but is it holding me back?

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories

More Discussions