Never said you assumed BIVs. I merely used the case of BIVs to demonstrate what I think is a wild assumption with your approach. — Alec

My assumption is no dualism, not necessarily true, but hardly a wild assumption. I consider BIV to be dualism, essentially a mind being fed lies about its true nature.

As far as I see it, the only way for your argument to undermine the simulation argument to work is for you to somehow point out some feature or element about the nature of our understanding of the world (or our experience of it) that cannot in principle be replicated by a computer program.

I'm not undermining the argument. I'm listing additional possibilities than the three listed. I have no problem with a computer program simulating consciousness.

If it can be, then we cannot ascertain whether or not we are looking at a simulation when talking about the world we live in.

This statement presumes that the simulation is the simulated. Not sure if I've driven home the difference. The simulation is a tool for yielding information to the simulator (the creator of the simulation). So if say a human set up and ran a simulation of a bat, the running of the simulation would behave like a bat, but would not impart the human with knowledge of what it is like to be a bat. Meanwhile, the bat in the simulation would know what it is like to be a bat, whether or not the simulation is actually run or not.

Hope this helps.

Of course, this sort of discovery seems as likely as the discovery that there is a feature of our experience that is impossible to replicate, whether by a BIV, or demon, or a vivid dream scenario. Now you may not be alone in thinking this. I believe this is the sort of suggestion made in the "Answering the Skeptic" thread, but as for my own take on it I find it to be a bit too extraordinary for my own liking.

Hence my disclaimer/presumption about experience being essentially a macroscopic physical process. If it isn't, not sure if such simulation is possible, so I'm considering only the case where it is.

Your example deals with a conscious person, but again, I must point out that the simulation argument (as well as the BIV argument) is more about the world we find ourselves in rather than who we are.

The simulation runs on macroscopic rules, and suddenly the simulated guy starts doing non-macroscopic experiments in his simulated lab and the simulation cannot handle that. He'd be able to tell. So the simulation has to be good enough to mimic even that, and at that point I have a hard time agreeing that it is possible even in principle.
Likewise, the simulation needs to be confined somehow, limiting resources. An infinite universe cannot be fully simulated even macroscopically. The simulated guy would possibly notice that he is in the center of a finite place, just like we were centuries ago. So I have a hard time with the assertion that the simulation could be so good that we can't know we're in one.

My assumption is no dualism, not necessarily true, but hardly a wild assumption. I consider BIV to be dualism, essentially a mind being fed lies about its true nature. — noAxioms

I believe there are a couple of assumptions that you've made that I've pointed out below. I am not sure what you mean by dualism though, if you consider BIV to require it. As far as I can tell BIV works perfectly fine with most positions about the mind.

I'm not undermining the argument. I'm listing additional possibilities than the three listed. — noAxioms

Your possibility tries to undermine the simulation scenario just as much as the first two possibilities do. That's just how it is.

This statement presumes that the simulation is the simulated. — noAxioms

Okay, then we are not sure if we are talking about something simulated when we are talking about the world we live in. Whichever way you word it, the fact is that we still have no clue.

The simulation runs on macroscopic rules, and suddenly the simulated guy starts doing non-macroscopic experiments in his simulated lab and the simulation cannot handle that. He'd be able to tell. So the simulation has to be good enough to mimic even that, and at that point I have a hard time agreeing that it is possible even in principle. — noAxioms

The simulation's macroscopic rules don't necessarily have to be the same as the rules in the world of the simulation. And even if the simulation world's rule do mimic the macroscopic rules, there is no requirement that it has to be an exact representation. Though either way, if we are living in the simulation we will not be able to determine what those macroscopic rules are so from our POV we can't compare them to our own world's rules.

Likewise, the simulation needs to be confined somehow, limiting resources. An infinite universe cannot be fully simulated even macroscopically. The simulated guy would possibly notice that he is in the center of a finite place, just like we were centuries ago. So I have a hard time with the assertion that the simulation could be so good that we can't know we're in one. — noAxioms

The true universe (the world that isn't simulated) does not necessarily have to be infinite either. If we find out that our universe is finite that does not mean we live in a simulation, that could just mean that the true universe is finite. But of course we aren't able to know either way, so that doesn't help in deciding the issue.

And even if that isn't the case (and that the true universe must be infinite), there is nothing in principle that says that we should be able to determine ourselves if the universe is finite and thus simulated. Assuming we are in a finite simulation, if the creators of that simulation really wanted to play the role of Descartes's Demon, then they can probably do something to prevent us from being able to tell.

As for determining if the universe is infinite and therefore not a simulation, I am not sure what kind of experiment could be done to even determine such a fact anyways (though I am open to hearing proposals), so it seems like we're lost there too.

Sorry for slow reply. Been busy and I wanted to not post this until I reviewed it a couple times.

I believe there are a couple of assumptions that you've made that I've pointed out below. I am not sure what you mean by dualism though, if you consider BIV to require it. As far as I can tell BIV works perfectly fine with most positions about the mind. — Alec

I don't consider BIV to require it. There is a mind, and it has zero access to the nature of itself or reality, so it can trust no knowledge. I am discounting that scenario from my discussion.

A more dualistic BIV scenario is a very immersive video game. You are Lara Croft in Tomb Raider, and so convinced of it that you forget you're something else. But you can tell: Lara's head is empty and contains no mechanism for thought and experience, which is served by the 'immaterial' player. The physics of Tomb Raider is obviously not deterministic, so no simulation of Lara physics will result in her acting like she does with the player component.

This statement presumes that the simulation is the simulated.
— noAxioms
Okay, then we are not sure if we are talking about something simulated when we are talking about the world we live in. Whichever way you word it, the fact is that we still have no clue.

Don't know how to explain it better. The simulation is of a real thing. The simulation is not the thing, and thus at no point are we in a simulation, be we simulated or not. So my stance is that we cannot be a simulation. If a simulation is run and it is not perfect (does not simulate what was intended), then the simulation is just of something else with different physics, but the simulated thing is still not a simulation.

It perhaps comes down to a language quibble, but one I feel is important. I can be simulated in principle, but I cannot be a simulation. Running a simulation is not an ontological act any more than the running of a 'real' universe. All it does is execute a simulation process.

Your possibility tries to undermine the simulation scenario just as much as the first two possibilities do. That's just how it is.

Yea, I guess it does. It seems that my position is not just another possibility, but it debunks the whole argument. The argument works from the presumption that the states universe are things (objects??) that happen or are executed, which I find absurd.

The simulation's macroscopic rules don't necessarily have to be the same as the rules in the world of the simulation.

Agree, but is it an 'ancestor simulation' as described by the OP if the simulation is of a different world that the one running the simulation? Conway's Game of Life is a simulation, but not one of our physics. No structure in that game can detect that it is in a simulation because no structure is actually in one. They are being simulated, but are not simulations. See what I'm saying?

And even if the simulation world's rule do mimic the macroscopic rules, there is no requirement that it has to be an exact representation.

It indeed cannot be exact, and yes, it works fine that way. I suppose our universe could be simulated down to the quantum level, but not on any simulating equipment that I can envision. It seems unnecessary unless there is a quantum amplifier (like the one that kills Schrodinger's cat) that needs to be simulated. Biology seems not to have them, nor does electronics for the most part. History cannot be reproduced, but a functional world of sorts can be simulated. It would work. A transistor for instance has very simulatable macroscopic behavior, and I've actually worked with transistor simulations which are cheaper to test than real chips. But transistors rely on quantum effects to function. They wouldn't work without that. Doesn't matter: The simulation does not simulate at the quantum level. It simply simulates it as a macroscopic switch with this and that delay, threshold, and EM noise. The neuro-chemical nature of brain cells seem to have similar macroscopic function. The simulation need not be more detailed than that.

So I have a hard time with the assertion that the simulation could be so good that we can't know we're in one.
— noAxioms

I have to correct my own comment there. If the simulation is so 'imperfect' or size-limited, then it is simply a different thing being simulated. The thing can know it is not in a simulation. It simply exists in a small limited simpler universe.

The true universe (the world that isn't simulated) does not necessarily have to be infinite either.

A true universe I would say, or 'ours'. I speak repeatedly of other universes (say the Conway GoL one) in this post. There is our universe, but I don't think ours is any more or less true than another. Perhaps we need a more concrete definition of 'universe'.

As for determining if the universe is infinite and therefore not a simulation, I am not sure what kind of experiment could be done to even determine such a fact anyways (though I am open to hearing proposals), so it seems like we're lost there too.

My solution solves this problem. Can't be a simulation because things are not simulations (by definition), even if simulated.

Don't know how to explain it better. The simulation is of a real thing. The simulation is not the thing, and thus at no point are we in a simulation, be we simulated or not. So my stance is that we cannot be a simulation. If a simulation is run and it is not perfect (does not simulate what was intended), then the simulation is just of something else with different physics, but the simulated thing is still not a simulation. — noAxioms

And my point is that it doesn't matter. Sure, a simulation of Paris is not the same as Paris. That is why it's called a simulation. But that doesn't affect the fact that we do not know if the Paris we know is one or the other. Apart from that, I must admit I don't see your point.

And again, I must stress that you move away from talk about the self. The simulation argument deals more with the world we are in rather than ourselves and I feel like ignoring that would lead to more confusion than not.

It indeed cannot be exact, and yes, it works fine that way. I suppose our universe could be simulated down to the quantum level, but not on any simulating equipment that I can envision. It seems unnecessary unless there is a quantum amplifier (like the one that kills Schrodinger's cat) that needs to be simulated. Biology seems not to have them, nor does electronics for the most part. History cannot be reproduced, but a functional world of sorts can be simulated. It would work. A transistor for instance has very simulatable macroscopic behavior, and I've actually worked with transistor simulations which are cheaper to test than real chips. But transistors rely on quantum effects to function. They wouldn't work without that. Doesn't matter: The simulation does not simulate at the quantum level. It simply simulates it as a macroscopic switch with this and that delay, threshold, and EM noise. The neuro-chemical nature of brain cells seem to have similar macroscopic function. The simulation need not be more detailed than that. — noAxioms

Didn't know you were implying quantum phenomena here by the use of "macroscopic". I must first start off by saying that my knowledge of physics is only basic (some Pop Sci. Books and a rough knowledge of the history), but I do not see how quantum phenomena cannot in principle be simulated. Indeed, aren't some physicists already simulating quantum phenomenon in their research? I can imagine it is impractical sure but not impossible. In addition, we should not imagine that the world running a simulation of our physics needs to run on the same rules. That was the point of what I said earlier. The ancestor world can run on an entirely different set of laws, one that makes the simulation of the quantum more practically feasible. However, the simulation would still run on the same fundamental principles of computation that we have for our own computers.

And that is the key point in all this. In order to demonstrate that something cannot in principle be simulated, it must not be able to run on a computer. Computers, as far as I can tell, are digital, they run on binary, they use an algorithm and are finite.

You mentioned infinity, which is something that our ideal computer cannot simulate,due to its limitations. Other examples of phenomena which cannot be simulated are continuity and true randomness. Unless the intelligent race is somehow able to tap into the infinity and create the ultimate computer, then we can safely assume that their simulations are limited (thus excluding the infinitely small and the infinitely big). And the same goes for true randomness, as computers are necessarily deterministic. However, the problem with these possibilities, when I was thinking about them, was that it was impossible for us to know whether or not they were true. Unless we are able to go to the ends of the universe, then we cannot determine if there really is an end to space or not. Same for continuity and randomness. Unfortunately, I don't see how quantum mechanics fits the bill in all this. All in all, I remain unconvinced that you have shown or solved anything.

And my point is that it doesn't matter. Sure, a simulation of Paris is not the same as Paris. That is why it's called a simulation. But that doesn't affect the fact that we do not know if the Paris we know is one or the other. Apart from that, I don't see your point. — Alec

It apparently does matter if you give meaning to the distinction between the Paris we know being real or a simulation. If a thing cannot be a simulation (only be simulated), then the Paris we know is not one. It only then doesn't matter since there is no distinction between the two cases because there are not two cases.

Evidence of this lack of distinction is that it is impossible to do a "I'm in a simulation" test armed with only subjective knowledge, no matter how inaccurate the simulation.

Note I did give a distinction there. Given non-subjective knowledge, there is a distinction since there is suddenly existence of information from outside the universe. It isn't really a simulation then anymore, but just a sub-process within a larger universe. So for instance, if God created this universe and communicates in any way (imparts state inconsistent with the physics), then the universe is not really a universe, but just a sub-process/object (not a simulation), part of a larger universe containing the full explanation of all empirical data including the said communication.

And again, I must stress that you move away from talk about the self. The simulation argument deals more with the world we are in rather than ourselves and I feel like ignoring that would lead to more confusion than not.

No self needed here. Paris has a library with books describing different physics than the physics of the Paris being inaccurately simulated. That's inconsistent. Such inconsistencies are detectable.

It indeed cannot be exact, and yes, it works fine that way. I suppose our universe could be simulated down to the quantum level, but not on any simulating equipment that I can envision. It seems unnecessary unless there is a quantum amplifier (like the one that kills Schrodinger's cat) that needs to be simulated. Biology seems not to have them, nor does electronics for the most part. History cannot be reproduced, but a functional world of sorts can be simulated. It would work. A transistor for instance has very simulatable macroscopic behavior, and I've actually worked with transistor simulations which are cheaper to test than real chips. But transistors rely on quantum effects to function. They wouldn't work without that. Doesn't matter: The simulation does not simulate at the quantum level. It simply simulates it as a macroscopic switch with this and that delay, threshold, and EM noise. The neuro-chemical nature of brain cells seem to have similar macroscopic function. The simulation need not be more detailed than that.
— noAxioms

Didn't know you were implying quantum phenomena here by the use of "macroscopic".

Never said that. I said macroscopic rules will usually do unless the simulation needs a quantum amplifier, which cannot be simulated properly with a macroscopic simulation.

I must first start off by saying that my knowledge of physics is only basic (some Pop Sci. Books and a rough knowledge of the history), but I do not see how quantum phenomena cannot in principle be simulated.

It can be, but not with simulator running macroscopic rules, and not even in principle if predictable results are expected, since quantum events are not predicable.

Indeed, aren't some physicists already simulating quantum phenomenon in their research?
I can imagine it is impractical sure but not impossible.

Sure they do, but those simulations do not predict unpredictable events like when the atom will decay. The simulations necessarily have randomness built into them, something not particularly needed at the macroscopic level.

In addition, we should not imagine that the world running a simulation of our physics needs to run on the same rules. That was the point of what I said earlier. The ancestor world can run on an entirely different set of laws, one that makes the simulation of the quantum more practically feasible.

That's right, but it wouldn't be an ancestor simulation then, but merely a dumbed down fictional virtual reality.

However, the simulation would still run on the same fundamental principles of computation that we have for our own computers.

No, that cannot be. The nature of our universe is not one that can be accurately simulated on the principles on which our computers operate. I cannot even figure out how to express the position and state of the most trivial particle given unlimited computing resources. An accurate simulation of us would require something fundamentally different I would think.

And that is the key point in all this. In order to demonstrate that something cannot in principle be simulated, it must not be able to run on a computer. Computers, as far as I can tell, are digital, they run on binary, they use an algorithm and are finite.

OK, so we can simulate Paris, at least on a macroscopic level. Anything that can be put in a box. Hard to put Paris in a box since it has continuous interaction with its neighbors, but perhaps the whole Earth with pared down simulation of celestial activity which is pretty easy to predict most times.
A simpler case is a locked room. The whole simulation can be confined to that. I assert that barring information inconsistent with the simulation, it is impossible for the simulated thing to distinguish reality from the simulation. If it were possible, it would be a simulation of a different reality, and thus the distinction would be in error.

You mentioned infinity, which is something that our ideal computer cannot simulate,due to its limitations.

Hence the need for a box. The box confines some of the infinities.

Other examples of phenomena which cannot be simulated are continuity and true randomness.

That is an interesting point. Does randomness need to be true? I think so, since if it was not true randomness, it would be predictable, and that conflicts with QM. It would not be a simulation of our reality. If it is a macroscopic simulation, I don't think randomness is needed at all, true or otherwise.

There are computers with true randomness. It just requires a small randomness device, and they probably fit on a chip. Not so hard.

I've seen 3-body simulations that had poor continuity implementation. The objects seemed to always gain energy. So point taken again.

Unless the intelligent race is somehow able to tap into the infinity and create the ultimate computer, then we can safely assume that their simulations are limited (thus excluding the infinitely small and the infinitely big). And the same goes for true randomness, as computers are necessarily deterministic.

That the running-on-the-same-rules point. Said super-race might have physics that effortlessly let them do infinities in their computations, but again, they would not be running an ancestor simulation by simulating us here.

However, the problem with these possibilities, when I was thinking about them, was that it was impossible for us to know whether or not they were true. Unless we are able to go to the ends of the universe, then we cannot determine if there really is an end to space or not.

Not too hard to know that. People didn't know where the Earth ended either, nobody having visited the edge. Then they found out it had a geometery with no edge and the problem went away. The geometry of the universe has no edge, and no center (not in space at least). There is no vantage from which there are stars only on one side and not the other.

A computer-simulation can't create a world. Infinitely-many possibility-worlds are already "there", as possibility-worlds, complex systems of inter-referring inevitable if-then facts. Each one existent and real only in its own local inter-referring context, and quite independent of eachother, or anything objective or global.

A computer-simulation can't "create" what's already there.

The only thing that a computer-simulation could create would be a demonstration, a portrayal, of something that already is. ...for the benefit of the simulation's viewing-audience.

Are we and our world being simulated? If it's possible to simulate a universe with a computer-program, and if there'd be any conceivable reason for doing so, then in the infinity of possibility-worlds, no doubt someone is simulating our universe with a computer-simulation. But that didn't create our world. ...merely duplicated, portrayed it.

You simulation program can amount to a duplication of our possibility-world, but some transistor-switchings in a computer has no effect on anything.

Michael Ossipoff