The Conflict Between Science and Philosophy With Regards to Time

Agustino

Quite a few philosophers have seen Time as being intimately related with Being in some ways. I'm thinking principally Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Bergson. Their intuition seems to be that time represents some kind of "last frontier" for thought.

There is a profound difference between the phenomenological conception of time (or temporality) adopted by the philosophers and the 'materialist' conception of time adopted by scientists. These two different starting points seem to lead to incommensurable conclusions.

In science, one typically thinks of time as a measurable quantity. In other words, time is merely the comparison of the rate of change of one phenomenon (which is taken to be a standard of measurement, we'll call this a clock) and any other phenomenon. For example, very basically, the sun is taken as a clock, and we measure the time it takes to complete - say - a festival, by counting the number of times the sun rises until the festival is complete. Let's say it's 5 days.

An essential feature of the clock (whether it is the sun moving, an atomic clock, or a light clock) is that it requires something - a phenomenon - that is taken as a reference point. Namely, one day corresponds to one appearance and disappearance of the sun, and it does so all the time. If it doesn't, then time cannot be measured anymore.

This means that physical time is always relative, and in a certain sense immanent. We measure physical time by effectively comparing the rate of change of one phenomenon that we take as stable and unchanging (and that we call a clock) with any other phenomenon that is obviously less stable than the former. Under this worldview, time is nothing more than a comparison between the rate of change of one stable phenomenon with the rate of change of other phenomena.

Theoretical problems can be brought against this scientific conception of time. Namely, what happens if everything, as it were, speeds up in equal proportions, including the phenomenon that we take to be the stable unit of time? It would seem that if that is the case, then scientific time cannot tell us. For our festival that we took 5 days to complete, will still take 5 days now, only that the former 5 days aren't the same as the latter. Clearly, physical time will never be able to capture this occurrence. But is this phenomenon a chimera of our imaginations?

How does philosophy derive this phenomenon of experienced temporality? It is by looking at our experience of the flow of time. And we clearly do have some sense of time, and we imagine that if everything were to speed up at twice the speed things run at now, we would realize it, we would experience this change, even though we cannot measure it with clocks.

However, if everything were to so speed up, our brain processes, our perceptions, and everything about us would speed up as well. Would this not effectively result in us having our perception of time altered as well? Meaning we would effectively NOT perceive that anything has changed? A materialist would probably answer yes, rendering the conception of the philosopher moot.

In effect, the philosopher thinks of time as transcendent. Time is something above and beyond this world, something objective, by means of which events in this world can be measured. Unless one believes in God - an unchanging standard that can sustain such a time - this doesn't make much sense.

The 'materialist' view of time does render out of time an entirely relative phenomenon. There exists no absolute time, time itself is immanent within the world. I am reminded of 180 Proof asking rhetorically "what is north of the North Pole?" when asked "what happened before time began during the Big Bang?".

What about the philosophical idea that time is heterogeneous? This idea seems to suggest that time does not always flow the same way. It seems to agree with the 'materialist' view that time is not absolute but rather relative but places the relativity of time within conscious experience rather than within what we call the objective world. Now time becomes relative to the experience of consciousness - sometimes time flows fast, and sometimes slow, which science cannot capture since everything at once flows either faster or slower. I suppose the philosopher takes this as proof that the thought experiment we went through before does indicate that time changes in the physical world - namely things suddenly speed up or slow down proportionately such that objectively we do not notice this on our clocks. We only notice it in our direct experience of time.

This obviously bifurcates now and it depends on what your ontology is. If matter is in some sense "basic" in your ontology, then you'll probably lean with the materialist. If consciousness is properly basic, you'll probably lean with the philosophers.

How can such questions be adjudicated? Or is it impossible to decide between them in any way that is conclusive and not a matter of faith? Which is 'real' time? The interesting thing is that both sides take the other side's refutation as proof of their own position.

Rich

In effect, the philosopher thinks of time as transcendent. Time is something above and beyond this world, something objective, by means of which events in this world can be measured — Agustino

Duration (real time) from a Bergsonion perspective, would be actual evolution as experienced. It is not transcendental, but rather the actual. It is continuous (indivisible) and heterogeneous (feels as though it is moving faster or slower).

Duration in the manner that we experience it, is quite different from what scientists call time. Time, for science, is a method for judging simultaneity of events based upon some standardized rhythm of a chosen standard. While time appears in relativity, it appears in two different forms. Special Relativity contains the standard time that we know of in school, and is used to explain why two observers may disagree on the simultaneity of two events as they experience it. Beyond this Relatively time is given some ontological significance which begins to produce paradoxes which are always red flags, especially since Special Relatively can only be applied to a non-accelerating environment, e.g. one that is not within a gravitational field. Time in General Relativity is defined differently than in Special Relativity because the measurement problems are different.

The differences between the two can be seen as a function of what is one trying to inquire into. It one is inquiring into the nature of life, then understanding philosophical time is crucial, including the time we experience when we are asleep or unconscious. If one is attempting to transpose one set of scientific observations taken in one frame of reference into another frame of reference, then the Lorenz transformations are used.

The error would be to elevate any version of time as it appears in scientific equations, including Relativity, to a ontological level. They are simply measurements. They do not grasp the full meaning or experience of life. To substitute equations for life just leads to mass confusion which generally reveals itself as paradoxes.

javra

[Just saw Rich’s post; the one I’ve written is in the same overall vein … still, different enough to make me think it’s still worth posting.]

In effect, the philosopher thinks of time as transcendent. — Agustino

Contingent on interpretations of “transcendent”, I can envision alternatives to this: e.g., that of time being a metaphysical corollary of freewill-endowed awareness in the plural, of multiple first-person points of view that will things … and here, too, time can well be hypothesized to be relative, i.e., not absolute, and immanent.

For instance, akin to all the BIV, etc., mindsets of abstract hypotheticals, hypothesize two freewill-endowed first-person points-of-view that are incorporeal and dwell within incorporeal realms. That they in any way interact entails that there will be, at minimum, an incorporeal body of information common to both; this, in itself, speaks more to non-physical space, or distance, between the two as gaged between a) what is private to both and b) what is common to both. Again, grant that both hold some causal sway over this common non-physical space of information (which, if one would like to be more abstract, can be fully non-phenomenal … this in as much as an intention is of itself non-phenomenal: has no taste, smell, sound, visual appearance, or tactile feel, etc., though one could phenomenally re-present it at will). When one causes this common space to change, it will causally influence the awareness of the other, and vice versa. There is then a cause-and-consequence to all willed actions on the part of either; furthermore, the cause (the willing of the activity) will always be before the resulting consequence. Hence, there will always here be a before-and-after relative not to phenomena but to one’s willed action as awareness. And, so, the ontic reality of this before and after will be, in this scenario, relative to the two points of awareness, as well as dependent on their so being.

OK, a simpleton attempt at providing an example of how the philosopher’s time can be relative and not absolute, also metaphysically entailed while not being transcendent. The intended point to this hypothetical primarily being that, metaphysically, were there to be a plurality of freewill-endowed first-person points of view as a foundation to all that otherwise stands, there will then, I now think via logical entailment, then also be present some form of time.

True, within the offered hypothetical, there would be no way of measuring “how much time” had passed (kind of like when one is in an extremely good state of mind in interacting with another). To slightly paraphrase what you’ve mentioned, the repetition of the same identity common to all would be required for time to become measurable (including from such a metaphysical interpretation as that previously mentioned): that the sun goes up and down in the same way over and over again allows for quantification of how many days have gone by. This in turn, requires a physical space –a common space between all first-person points of view – that remains relatively stable in its constituency. Even in an imaginary digital clock that never cycles there would yet be repetition of “the same identity” in abstract form: 1a, 2 (1a + 1b), 3 (1a + 1b +1c), etc.

But yes, there is also the notion of absolute time among philosophers. Nevertheless, (as with Rich) I don’t believe that the immanence of time is strictly limited to the materialist’s notions of time.

Agustino

Duration (real time) from a Bergsonion perspective, would be actual evolution as experienced. It is not transcendental, but rather the actual. I'm v would be continuous (indivisible) and heterogeneous (feels as though it is moving faster or slower). — Rich

Yes, that's why in my second repetition I said:

What about the philosophical idea that time is heterogeneous? This idea seems to suggest that time does not always flow the same way. It seems to agree with the 'materialist' view that time is not absolute but rather relative but places the relativity of time within conscious experience rather than within what we call the objective world. — Agustino

The prior conception you quoted wasn't of the Bergsonian notion. This one is, and since time is relative to our conscious experience it can't be transcendent to it. Hence why I said "agree with the 'materialist'"

Time, for science, is a method for judging simultaneity of events based upon some standardized rhythm of a chosen standard. — Rich

That's a one-sided view. It's also a method for judging how fast an event happens compared to a fixed standard.

Special Relativity contains the standard time that we know of in school, and is used to explain why two observers may c disagree on the simultaneity of two events as they experience it. Beyond this Relatively time is given some ontological significance which begins to produce paradoxes which are always red flags, especially since Special Relatively can only be applied to a non-accelerating environment, e.g. one that is not within a gravitational field. Time in General Relativity is defined differently than in Discussing Relativity because the measurement problems are different. — Rich

I don't buy this.

It one is inquiring into the nature of life, then understanding philosophical time is crucial, including the time we experience when we are asleep or unconscious. — Rich

Why? And how come you say we "experience" time while asleep or unconscious? I don't experience anything while asleep or unconscious.

They do not grasp the full meaning or experience. To substitute equations for life just leads to mass confusion which generally reveals itself as paradoxes. — Rich

You have yet to show this.

Rich

That's a one-sided view. It's also a method for judging how fast an event happens compared to a fixed standard. — Agustino

This would be another way of saying the same thing. There is a standard which is used for measuring simultaneity with some event (with the standard) and then there is another event being used to measure simultaneity. The two events can then be judged against each other.

Crucial to understand is that measuring simultaneity had nothing to do with time as we actually experience it in life. Duration is life and evolves whether or not there are clocks.

Rich

Stephen Robbins has the most comprehensive discussion on the subject, but it is taxing on one's duration. He has numerous YouTube videos and a comprehensive paper on his and Bergson's criticism of Relativity time in his site at:

http://www.stephenerobbins.com "Special Relativity and Perception: The Singular Time of Psychology and Physics"

It begins:

"Physicists mislead us when they say there is no simultaneity. When the camera pans to the heroine tied to the rails and then to the hero rushing to the rescue on his horse – these events are simultaneous."

To begin to fully penetrate the nature of time, one must begin by setting aside clocks and observe duration by closing ones eyes. That is philosophical time unfolding.

Agustino

This would be another way of saying the same thing. There is a standard which is used for measuring simultaneity with some event (with the standard) and then there is another event being used to measure simultaneity. The two events can then be judged against each other. — Rich

No it's not. Simultaneity is ultimately a fake concept because physical time itself is relative. Simultaneous in one reference frame isn't simultaneous in another. The very concept of simultaneity presupposes some objective time, some transcendent time, that can encompass both events and say that the clock striked 12 at the same time the spaceship passed by us. But if time is immanent, then simultaneity is relative.

Stephen Robbins — Rich

Who is he and what are his credentials? By the looks of his website he is a retired amateur with a hobby interest in Bergson.

Rich

↪Agustino

Never mind. Our discussion is over. Thank you.

Jake Tarragon

Bergson. Bergson. All I hear is Bergson.

andrewk

Science doesn't think of time as being anything. Science doesn't do ontology. All science does with time is develop equations that use time to help us predict or explain phenomena.

The question 'what is time' is purely one for philosophy. There is no conflict.

The standard response to that is 'what about Bergson vs Einstein?'. To which the response is that they were both philosophers, arguing AS philosophers. That Einstein was also a scientist no doubt informed his philosophical views. But they were still philosophical views, not scientific ones. Einstein was not arguing as a scientist.

_db

The 'materialist' view of time does render out of time an entirely relative phenomenon. There exists no absolute time, time itself is immanent within the world. I am reminded of 180 Proof asking rhetorically "what is north of the North Pole?" when asked "what happened before time began during the Big Bang?". — Agustino

This is one of the questions I have regarding cosmological arguments. In what sense are we to understand God "causing" the universe (and time) to exist, if there was no time before hand? Our concept of causality seems to me to be intrinsically tied to time. Things change because of certain causes, and this takes time to happen. So if time did not exist "before" (what does that even mean, though, "before time" - was there a time before time?), in what sense is God "causing" the world to exist?

Metaphysician Undercover

↪Agustino

I think your op misses the most important aspect of time. Time exists as the separation, or division, between past and future. The difference which exists between past and future is likely the most important aspect of our living experience.

So you say that we experience a "flow" of time, but this might not really be correct. We experience a separation between past and future, and there is something about this separation which is always changing, the anticipated future comes to pass, so there is always becoming a new past. This we assume as the flow of time. But there is also something about the separation between past and future which seems to always stay the same, and this is what allows us to measure time.

Rich

The difference which exists between past and future is likely the most important aspect of our living experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

Time as we experience only exists as an experience of the past moving into the present, continuously. No one experiences the future. What we do experience is some action that we imagine as a possible future. Possibilities, however are not future time. Imagined possibilities are not duration.

TimeLine

An essential feature of the clock (whether it is the sun moving, an atomic clock, or a light clock) is that it requires something - a phenomenon - that is taken as a reference point. Namely, one day corresponds to one appearance and disappearance of the sun, and it does so all the time. If it doesn't, then time cannot be measured anymore.

This means that physical time is always relative, and in a certain sense immanent. — Agustino

... to the observer. I assume that this phenomenon is actually a space-time interval that is calculated between two endpoints, and being so time becomes more of a dimension of sorts that explains this position. It is not time but distance that is the problem here, as time converts these coordinates into distances. Proper time measures this distance so to speak between two events as though a clock had passed through it and enables a causal connection. Coordinates are essentially used as labels in science that help us identify spatial events and time actually holds no real significance in the physical sense; take time dilation, for instance.

Theoretical problems can be brought against this scientific conception of time. Namely, what happens if everything, as it were, speeds up in equal proportions, including the phenomenon that we take to be the stable unit of time? It would seem that if that is the case, then scientific time cannot tell us. For our festival that we took 5 days to complete, will still take 5 days now, only that the former 5 days aren't the same as the latter. Clearly, physical time will never be able to capture this occurrence. But is this phenomenon a chimera of our imaginations? — Agustino

The propagation of information cannot move faster than the speed of light and it is why we have the theory of special relativity.

Time as we experience only exists as an experience of the past moving into the present, continuously. No one experiences the future. What we do experience is some action that we imagine as a possible future. Possibilities, however are not future time. Imagined possibilities are not duration. — Rich

No one experiences the present. It is only future and past.

Metaphysician Undercover

Time as we experience only exists as an experience of the past moving into the present, continuously. — Rich

Yes I agree, strictly speaking, with a proper definition of "experience", our experience is only of the past. However, as living beings we also anticipate the future, and this is just as much a part of being alive as our experience of the past is. So there is a part of being alive which transcends experience, and this is our anticipation of the future.

Maintaining this strict definition of "experience", it would not be correct to say that we experience time, or the passing of time. All we have experienced is a changing past, and this is why the empirical notion of "time" is restricted to an abstraction from change.

The point I am trying to make though, is that in the more primordial sense, time appears to us as this separation between things experienced and things anticipated. So if the empirical sciences utilize a definition of time, which is restricted to an abstraction from our experience of things past, then this definition is completely missing half of how time appears to us.

noAxioms

A materialist would probably answer yes, rendering the conception of the philosopher moot.

In effect, the philosopher thinks of time as transcendent. — Agustino

Have not read all the replies, but the language in the OP is summarized by that snippet. One is a materialist or a philosopher. It seems that materialism is not presented as a philosophical stance.

Mr Bee

↪andrewk

Agreed. One deals with physics, while the other deals with metaphysics. The scientific models by themselves don't necessitate any particular worldview; that would require an additional argument.

Agustino

This is one of the questions I have regarding cosmological arguments. In what sense are we to understand God "causing" the universe (and time) to exist, if there was no time before hand? — darthbarracuda

Obviously, the time in question would not be the time physics and the materialist deal with. Before the creation of the Universe there was no time for the physicist/materialist because there were no phenomena that could be used to measure time. Acts of creation are not acts in time. They are events. But events are not necessarily linked by any flow of time in particular. Think of it as the still frames in a movie. Each frame is an event as it were. Time is only that which links them, we could imagine the same frames changing faster or slower. So having events is not sufficient to have a notion of a moving time.

Our concept of causality seems to me to be intrinsically tied to time. Things change because of certain causes, and this takes time to happen. — darthbarracuda

Yes, and our notion of causality, as we scientifically understand it, is also immanent and with reference to the world. No world, no causality as understood by science.

So if time did not exist "before" (what does that even mean, though, "before time" - was there a time before time?), in what sense is God "causing" the world to exist? — darthbarracuda

First, the Prime Mover argument isn't even that. The Prime Mover argument is that every second God is causing the Universe to exist.

Agustino

Now those few people here complaining about Special Relativity, you should watch this (and after drop the tin foil hats):

Special Relativity is a very simple theory, the only additional assumption compared to classical mechanics is that light travels at a fixed speed everywhere. Nobody with a good understanding of physics can disagree with special relativity.

Agustino

I think your op misses the most important aspect of time. Time exists as the separation, or division, between past and future. The difference which exists between past and future is likely the most important aspect of our living experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

The notion of past and future are tied to memory though. We know about the past, and by extension the future because we have memory. Without memory, there would be no notion of past and future, just the present.

We experience a separation between past and future, and there is something about this separation which is always changing, the anticipated future comes to pass, so there is always becoming a new past. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think we experience such a separation, as much as we construct it.

But there is also something about the separation between past and future which seems to always stay the same, and this is what allows us to measure time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Meaning? What is this that stays the same?

Agustino

Proper time measures this distance so to speak between two events as though a clock had passed through it and enables a causal connection. Coordinates are essentially used as labels in science that help us identify spatial events and time actually holds no real significance in the physical sense; take time dilation, for instance. — TimeLine

I don't follow you here. What do you mean time holds no real significance? And what does this have to do with time dilation?

The propagation of information cannot move faster than the speed of light and it is why we have the theory of special relativity. — TimeLine

Hmm yeah, agreed.

No one experiences the present. It is only future and past. — TimeLine

:-O That's not at all obvious. I would say we only experience the present directly, and the future/past indirectly via our faculty of memory.

Rich

It is only future and past. — TimeLine

As I said, we experience the past moving into the present. Anyone experiencing the future is referred to b as a fortune teller.

Rich

we also anticipate the future, — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we imagine possible actions, but this is done in memory, not in the future.[

quote="Metaphysician Undercover;108464"]All we have experienced is a changing past[/quote]

Yes, this is real time (duration) as it is experienced. From this we create the concept of simultaneity for which we need clocks. We experience duration (real time) whether or not we have a question about simultaneity.

The point I am trying to make though, is that in the more primordial sense, time appears to us as this separation between things experienced and things anticipated. — Metaphysician Undercover

If one wishes to observe real time passing, one should meditate focusing on the breath. This is the most fundamental form of duration. From this, one can experience the flow if life. It is quiet and continuous as sweet feel ourselves flowing into the present.

Metaphysician Undercover

Special Relativity is a very simple theory, the only additional assumption compared to classical mechanics is that light travels at a fixed speed everywhere. Nobody with a good understanding of physics can disagree with special relativity. — Agustino

Why do you say that no one with a good understanding of physics can disagree with special relativity? According to what you've said here, all one has to disagree with to disagree with SR, is the assumption that light travels at the same speed everywhere. Unless the speed of light has been measured in every possible type of circumstance, then there really is no reason to believe in SR. We can easily fail in our inductive generalizations when we conclude that X is the case in all types of situations, without testing X in all different types of situations.

The notion of past and future are tied to memory though. We know about the past, and by extension the future because we have memory. Without memory, there would be no notion of past and future, just the present. — Agustino

Without memory there would be no conscious mind, and it is the conscious mind which anticipates the future, but this does not mean that we know about the future by means of our memory. That would be the fallacy of association. If all creature which anticipate the future also have memories of the past, we cannot conclude that they anticipate the future by means of their memories of the past. So you haven't really provided an argument for your claim that we know about the future through our memory.

That sounds rather nonsensical to me, as memory and anticipation are distinct. Here's a test. Try sitting or standing, and concentrating very rigorously on some past memories. Something could come out of the blue and whack you on the head because you have neglected that faculty which anticipates the future. If you are really good at focusing your attention on past memories, you will find that while you are doing this, you are really not able to do anything else. So anticipating the future, which enables you to do things, and remembering the past are distinct faculties, and this is evident from the fact that if we are overly attentive of one, we do so at the expense of neglecting the other.

I don't think we experience such a separation, as much as we construct it. — Agustino

Again, this is a rather meaningless statement. It may be argued that everything we experience is constructed. Then the questions would be "constructed by what?", and "out of what?". I don't think that you mean by "we construct it", that the difference between future and past is totally imaginary, so what do you mean?

Meaning? What is this that stays the same? — Agustino

The division between future and past stays the same. Have you not found, that throughout your life, the division between future and past has always been right there with you, and has always remained the same, as the division between future and past? Despite the fact that things have changed, the division between future and past, itself, has not changed

Yes, we imagine possible actions, but this is done in memory, not in the future.[ — Rich

No, the imagination is not the memory. And as much as our anticipation of the future is not "in the future", this does not mean it is in the past. Likewise, our memories are of the past, they are not in the past.

Rich

↪Metaphysician Undercover

No, the imagination is not the memory. And as much as our anticipation of the future is not "in the future", this does not mean it is in the past. Likewise, our memories are of the past, they are not in the past — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not know of how to conceive of a possible future without it being in memory. I'm trying it right now. It is in memory. And it changes as possibilities change. However, there is a creative force that is creating these images in memory from memory. What we feel as the present is continuously moving into the past. I do not know if any way to speak of memory except as the past, but we can inconveniently drop all part, present, future terminology and just speak of memory pressing on into unfolding duration. This would be representative of the experience of duration.

Rich

Nobody with a good understanding of physics can disagree with special relativity. — Agustino

The problem is that SR is only applicable to inertial frames which doesn't exist (except as an approximation), so SR had no relevance to any discussion about light or scientific time (my distinction,). Only GR is relevant. Under GR, scientific time becomes relative.

Metaphysician Undercover

I do not know of how to conceive of a possible future without it being in memory. — Rich

I am not talking about conceiving of a possible future, I am talking about anticipation. We anticipate the actual future, not possibilities. Possibilities are created by knowing that the anticipated future is lacking in necessity. Every day I anticipate all sorts of new situations which I will be in, before I am in them. Clearly, since they are new situations, I am not remembering them.

Rich

I am not talking about conceiving of a possible future, I am talking about anticipation. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is fine. I understand the feeling of anticipation that one may have of a possible future. And I also understand the colloquial use of the term future to which I have no objection. However, when discussing time (duration) as we experience it, I believe what we are experiencing is a possibility that we create in memory as opposed to an experienced future. I believe this is an important concept to apprehend when discussing the nature of time, especially when contrasting it with some block view of time.

Metaphysician Undercover

However, when discussing time (duration) as we experience it, I believe what we are experiencing is a possibility that we create in memory as opposed to an experienced future. — Rich

I agree that duration is a construct of memory, it is an empirical concept, but the point of my first post was that this is not the way that time appears to us in the most primordial sense. In the primordial sense time appears to us as a past and a future, the two being fundamentally different. It is when we assign order to what has occurred, that we conceive of duration. But duration is not time itself, because time goes to that deeper level.

Rich

In the primordial sense time appears to us as a past and a future, the two being fundamentally different — Metaphysician Undercover

We all experience life, and I'm all about describing experience as precisely as we can by direct observation.

I can say on my behalf, that the duration that I experience is all in my memory. This is my experienced time.

With this said, if you experience time differently, then I cannot deny your experience. It is yours and you are the only one that can directly observe it. But, as a point of reference, there was a whole movement of modernist authors who attempted to describe their feeling of duration (Proust, Woolfe, etc.) and their works can stand as evidence of how others perceived their existence through duration. It's interesting to compare notes.

Metaphysician Undercover

We all experience life, and I'm all about describing experience as precisely as we can by direct observation.

I can say on my behalf, that the duration that I experience is all in my memory. This is my experienced time. — Rich

I agree with this, assuming that we maintain a strict meaning of "experience", as I described earlier. But this allows that we have many feelings which are not experiences. This would be for example, intentions, we have them but we do not experience them. Anticipations fall into this category, we have anticipations but we do not experience the things which are anticipated. We experience what really happens to us relative to the anticipation, and this might be somewhat different from what was anticipated.

With this said, if you experience time differently, then I cannot deny your experience. — Rich

So I would not say that time falls into the category of things which are experienced. Do you recognize that concepts are not experienced? They are understood, not experienced. So duration is a concept, it is not experienced. Experience is always of the particular, while the concept is general. So for example, we do not experience the colour red, this is a concept, we understand it. But we do experience particular instances of seeing the colour red. Likewise, we do not experience duration, we understand it, but we do experience particular instances of duration. So if I referred you to a particular instance of duration, "the time when X was occurring", you would probably describe your experience of that instance of duration as X occurring.

The Conflict Between Science and Philosophy With Regards to Time

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