Information is matter and energy yes? Therefore is physical right?

Each thought is made up of electro-chemicals, and electricity; along with a pattern of nueral pathways. They have short lifespans, I don't see any part of the thought that is not physical.

The same goes for information within computers: across a chalk board, or on a sheet of papper.

Gods, ghosts, and spirits as far as I've seen have anatomical and physical decriptions within the classic religious scriptures. I was always under the assumption that energy, and or plasma, would be the most likely canidate substance for such things, but even if they are made of something yet to be discovered, they would still be physical, is a god even considered meta-physical? How can something exist without being physical, if God exists as a sentient being, then he would have to be physical(wether made of matter, energy, or plasma); otherwise there would only be thoughts of god, writings of god, therories if god, all of which are physical.

Even a thoery may be a physical thing; if you destroy all writings, and physical descriptions of a theory, does that theory still exsist?

If physics includes the study of other dimensions then won't anything discovered within those demensions become part of physics?

Information is matter and energy yes? Therefore is physical right?

The question is whether meaning is material. Its probably not. If it is for you, then I'm not sure how far you're extending the meaning of material to be. If everything is 'material', then your statement ends up being vacuous.

Each though is made up of electro-chemicals, and electricity; along with a pattern of nueral pathways. They have short lifespans, I don't see any part of the thought thats not physical.

That's just begging the question.

How can something exist without being physical, if God exists as a sentient being, then he would have to be physical(wether made of matter, energy, or plasma); otherwise there would only be thoughts of god — XanderTheGrey

He would exist immaterially, or a combination of the two, or hypothetically an infinite set of modes of God.

He would exist immaterially, or a combination of the two, or hypothetically an infinite set of modes of God. — Marty

In an area of infinite space, infinite matter: enery, and time he would have to exist, in infinite forms, but he would be physical. There would be him himself, or "the actual being itself", and then thoughts, concepts, writings, ect. of him, all of which are physical. A "concept" exists across a vast area(the whole world for example) as a combination of writings(ink and papper, or photons through glass diodes[monitors, comp. & TV screens.]), voice & voice recordings(air against vocal cords, electricity against magnets[speakers, subwoofers, amps]), and finally thoughts and memories(electricity and electro chemicals traveling trough neural pathways.) Where is the non-physical god? Recordings, thoughts, memories, writings, and then concepts they collectivley compose; are all physical, because physics is a feild of study that includes time, energy, matter, and space. Anti-matter now as well I suppose.

Energy is physical, yet it is immaterial, immaterial can merely mean something that is not made of matter. Its an old word however; invented before the study of particle and quantum physics, so its specific meaning I think would be: immaterial - "something that cannot be grasped or held in the human hand". Therefore even a molecule may be "immaterial", right along with thoughts, energy, ect. But the non-physical? What is that? Physics includes time, energy, matter, and space.

Look are you gonna answer the question of what the physical/matter is, or are you gonna avoid that question? Because all that seems to be irrelevant until I know what the physical is from you. I didn't ask what physics is.

The non-physical is generally constitutive of things like: intentionality, beliefs, meaning, desires, motivations, concepts, etc. But again, if you're extending the concept of physical to include those - if its all encompassing - then of course everything is going to be physical but that claim begins to get vacuous.

Look are you gonna answer the question of what the physical/matter is, or are you gonna avoid that question? Because all that seems to be irrelevant until I know what the physical is from you. I didn't ask what physics is. — Marty

The non-physical is generally constitutive of things like: intentionality, beliefs, meaning, desires, motivations, concepts, etc. But again, if you're extending the concept of physical to include those - if its all encompassing - then of course everything is going to be physical but that claim begins to get vacuous. — Marty

I was under the impression that "physical" refered to anythng thats studied within the feild physics. But yes, it seems to be all encompassing, but not because I make it that way; and wether or not its vacuous is irrelavent. Intentionality, beliefs, meaning, desire, motivations, concepts, ect., all that is required for these things exsist is physical(matter, energy, time, and space.) How do you see these things? What part of them is not physical? Perhaps they are seen as non-physical because their anatomies are difficult to imagine compared to somthing like the human body, the human body exists in one small area, exsists within one timespan, ect.

Most philosophical discussions go no where, and we end up talking past each other, because the terms we are talking about aren't clearly defined. How is it that we can point to certain influences in our decision-making and sometimes not? — Harry Hindu

"Because our language is old, and therefore subject to inerpritation." I agree with Jacque Fresco that we need to develope a language that is not subject to interpretation. He pointed out that math, and the language of engineers, and chemists, where precursor examples of such a language.

I don't think "physical" or "mental" are helpful terms. They are terms referring to arbitrary boxes we've decided to put things in our categorizing of nature. "Mechanism" can simply refer to causation. We know that our intention/will has a causal influence on other things and itself is influenced by other things. There really doesn't need to make a distinction between "physical" or "mental" here. — Harry Hindu

Thank you very much for refocusing the discussion to the original topic. Thats my dilemma here, we have no control over what we decide; and that seems to make our efforts pointless, untill we relize that its too boring and are pushed to adopt faith in "free will".

How is it irrelevant? Presumably, you place all those things into the category of physical because you understand what the physical is. But now you claim that the physical doesn't mean anything? So in what sense are they similar? Vacuously similar?

Star-formation was required in order for the body to be created. Does that mean the facts of bodies can be determined exclusively by the facts pertaining to stars?

Are you espousing a type of reductionism or eliminativism? The latter is completely incoherent, and the prior is, I think, easily refutable since physical facts largely underdetermine the mental ones.

The point isn't whether or not our decisions are motivated (influenced) by the world, the point is whether our decisions are over-determined by external mechanisms. — Marty

I don't see a difference. If our decisions are influenced by the world, then they would be influenced by external mechanisms, as that is what the world is.

Also, what do you mean by "over-determined"? It seems to me that you are saying that one's freedom of will is arbitrarily determined. Where does one draw the line from being determined to being over-determined?

Historically mechanism has been defined as working with material and efficient causes, and ignoring intentionality (formal-final causes). — Marty

Final causes seem to imply that some cause in the future influences the present. But that makes no sense. We often experience where a purpose we have doesn't come to fruition no matter how much work we put into it. Sometimes we fail in achieving our purposes and goals. Things happen that we don't anticipate that prevent us from accomplishing our goals and purposes. Goals and purposes are simply ideas in the present driving behavior forward in order to bring the goal to fruition. In other words, purpose isn't a final cause. It is just another cause, like every other kind of cause - that precedes an effect.

Thank you very much for refocusing the discussion to the original topic. Thats my dilemma here, we have no control over what we decide; and that seems to make our efforts pointless, untill we relize that its too boring and are pushed to adopt faith in "free will". — XanderTheGrey

I don't see how having no control over what we decide makes our lives pointless. Most people who believe in a god as omnipotent designer, which implies that we don't have control over what we decide as God has already laid our our lives in his predetermined plan, point to their god as giving their life meaning - not making it pointless.

It seems to me to be the opposite of what you are saying - that being able to make decisions without any reason to point to for making that decision, would make our life, or at least the decision being made, pointless. Isn't that what we mean by freedom of will - that we don't have any reasons for making the decision we did? A reasonless decision is what is pointless, not decisions made for a reason.

It would be over-determined if our actions are in some way completely reducible to external mechanisms. However, a mechanical world is completely run on material/efficient causes, while our decisions are done through formal-final causes as well, which of course presuppose normativity. Since mechanical causes aren't normative, but merely blind, then I don't see how they could in principle over-determine the facts of formal-final causes since they cannot fail.

Now, you can deny that our actions are formal-final, but I don't see how that makes sense since our own intentions are known to us prior to making the actions, which then use a type of "pull-causality". Via the intentions we have, our body would efficiently move along with them.

Final causes seem to imply that some cause in the future influences the present. But that makes no sense. We often experience where a purpose we have doesn't come to fruition no matter how much work we put into it. Sometimes we fail in achieving our purposes and goals. Things happen that we don't anticipate that prevent us from accomplishing our goals and purposes. Goals and purposes are simply ideas in the present driving behavior forward in order to bring the goal to fruition. In other words, purpose isn't a final cause. It is just another cause, like every other kind of cause - that precedes an effect

Right, it might be the case our intentions are stopped by external factors, but that's what distinguishes them from mechanical states - that even if they fail, we know that we intended to do otherwise.

It would be over-determined if our actions are in some way completely reducible to external mechanisms. However, a mechanical world is completely run on material/efficient causes, while our decisions are done through formal-final causes as well, which of course presuppose normativity. Since mechanical causes aren't normative, but merely blind, then I don't see how they could in principle over-determine the facts of formal-final causes since they cannot fail.

Now, you can deny that our actions are formal-final, but I don't see how that makes sense since our own intentions are known to us prior to making the actions, which then use a type of "pull-causality". Via the intentions we have, our body would efficiently move along with them. — Marty

My point is that or intentions (it doesn't matter if they are known to us or not) are determined by external factors, as they change as the state-of-affairs around us change, which includes the states of our own bodies like in being hungry, needing to urinate, or simply being bored.

Intentions are predictions of how we want things to be compare to how they currently are, and how things currently are determine the plan we execute in order to bring that prediction to fruition. You can still have same intent in different circumstances, but the circumstances determine the actions you will take to accomplish your goal.

Knowing one's intent is simply being aware of one's state of mind, which is just another thing to be aware of - no different than being aware that you are aware of an apple on the table, and how hungry you are. The things we are aware of, and natural selection's programmed responses to what we are aware of, drive our behavior.

You also have to address how our intentions can have a causal influence on the world and vice versa. To acknowledge that is to acknowledge that there really isn't any distinction to be made about the kind of substance one part of the world is and what kind another is (physical vs. mental or mechanistic vs normative). We would simply be talking about causation and can dispense with terms like, "physical", "mental", "mechanistic" and "normative", as that turns to dualism and makes things more complicated unnecessarily.

Right, it might be the case our intentions are stopped by external factors, but that's what distinguishes them from mechanical states - that even if they fail, we know that we intended to do otherwise. — Marty

How can intentions be stopped by external factors if they are not of the same "material", "substance", or follow the same causal laws?

My point is that or intentions (it doesn't matter if they are known to us or not) are determined by external factors, as they change as the state-of-affairs around us change, which includes the states of our own bodies like in being hungry, needing to urinate, or simply being bored.

Right, because the values that we experience change. In that sense the values motivate us different ways. This has nothing to do with material/efficient conditions, though.

I agree that circumstances change our evaluations of scenarios and our intent. I'm not sure how this means they are over-determined by mechanical/efficient (essential material) causes, though.

You also have to address how our intentions can have a causal influence on the world and vice versa. To acknowledge that is to acknowledge that there really isn't any distinction to be made about the kind of substance one part of the world is and what kind another is (physical vs. mental or mechanistic vs normative). We would simply be talking about causation and can dispense with terms like, "physical", "mental", "mechanistic" and "normative", as that turns to dualism and makes things more complicated unnecessarily.

Well, I'd reject a mechanistic world view. That's what the entire point of the thread is about. And I'm not saying the mental and physical are reducible to each other.

As far as they both partake in being, yes - they are two aspects of the same world. The mental is not however a subset of the physical.

How can intentions be stopped by external factors if they are not of the same "material", "substance", or follow the same causal laws?

External factors - such as the value of a cake, for example - don't have to be attributed to the material. It just serves a motivation (reason) for our actions, and are constitutive of our intentions. I'm just holding an externalist model of intentionality. That is, the content of our intentions is supplied by external motivations.

Right, because the values that we experience change. In that sense the values motivate us different ways. This has nothing to do with material/efficient conditions, though. — Marty

I'd say that values develop out of our goals. It isn't the values that motivate us, it is the intent itself that motivates us and values develop from our intent as any thing is only valuable to achieving some goal. To say that any thing is valuable is to say that it helps us achieve our goal(s).

I agree that circumstances change our evaluations of scenarios and our intent. I'm not sure how this means they are over-determined by mechanical/efficient (essential material) causes, though. — Marty

I don't see how it doesn't. If you agree that it changes our intent, then you seem to be agreeing that it changes the fundamental source of our choices.

Well, I'd reject a mechanistic world view. — Marty

I'm not talking about a mechanistic world view as you understand. I provided a definition of mechanism in my first post in this thread. Here:

Mechanism
- the fundamental processes involved in or responsible for an action, reaction, or other natural phenomenon.

- a natural or established process by which something takes place or is brought about. — Harry Hindu

Notice how the terms, "physical", "material", "mental", "normative", and any other loaded term, are left out, not needed. The general idea is simply one of causation. So to reject a mechanistic world view as I have defined it is to reject causation in general. To say that some state-of-affairs is responsible for another state-of-affairs is to say that it was caused by the latter state-of-affairs.

As far as they both partake in being, yes - they are two aspects of the same world. The mental is not however a subset of the physical. — Marty

I'd say that they are two different kinds of processes. Process seems to be the fundamental aspect of reality.

External factors - such as the value of a cake, for example - don't have to be attributed to the material. — Marty

I don't see how the value of a cake can be external. The cake is external. It's value changes as our intent changes. The cake is less valuable when you are full and more valuable when you are hungry. Values reside internally and are intimately tied to our intent, or current goal.

It just serves a motivation (reason) for our actions, and are constitutive of our intentions. I'm just holding an externalist model of intentionality. — Marty

The cake doesn't serve as a motivation. It is our hunger that is the motivation. When hungry, any food, not just a cake, can be valuable.

That is, the content of our intentions is supplied by external motivations. — Marty

I don't know what this means. If the content of our intentions (meaning the form our intentions take) are supplied by external (motivations?) processes, then that is saying that external things determine our intent. I don't see how you can then say that there isn't any over-determination. I don't know what you mean by external motivations. Motivations aren't external, unless you are saying that the universe, reality, nature, etc. itself has motivation. If that is the case, then you are merely proposing intelligent design. Motivation is intent, and intent only resides as part mental processes. To say that motivation is external can only mean that you are referring to other minds. Their motivations are external to yours which is what accounts for conflicts between us as different minds can have different motivations, and other people's motivations can influence our own.

Again, you have to account for how an internal motivation gets out, or external, and then back in, or internal to some other mind in order to say that another mind influenced another mind. How does your intent get out of your mind, onto this screen in the form of letters and sentences, and then into my mind to say that it is responsible for the kind of reply I give?

It seems that to even use "external" and "internal" when talking about our minds and the world, is to fall into that false dichotomy of dualism. There is no external or internal when it comes to talking about how our mind influences the world and how the world influences our mind. It really is no different than talking about how any individual thing influences it's environment and how the environment influences it.

I'd say that values develop out of our goals. It isn't the values that motivate us, it is the intent itself that motivates us and values develop from our intent as any thing is only valuable to achieving some goal. To say that any thing is valuable is to say that it helps us achieve our goal(s).

But then what is the intention? It seems to be generated by reasons. These reasons are supplied by external content.

I don't see how it doesn't. If you agree that it changes our intent, then you seem to be agreeing that it changes the fundamental source of our choices.

To be clear though: There is no 'intent' that's subjectively locked away in our minds, that then "changes" by external conditions. Rather, it's constitutive of external content. But when I said that it's not "over-determined" by mechanical/efficient causes, I mean that the relationship we have with values doesn't seem to make use of these causes. I can have external stimuli like a wave push my body, but I still intend to push through them for-the-sake-of, say, a competition because I value winning a competition.

Notice how the terms, "physical", "material", "mental", "normative", and any other loaded term, are left out, not needed. The general idea is simply one of causation. So to reject a mechanistic world view as I have defined it is to reject causation in general. To say that some state-of-affairs is responsible for another state-of-affairs is to say that it was caused by the latter state-of-affairs.

The question is: What type of cause is it? I don't see a need to be reductionistic w.r.t causes.

As for these causes "not being needed", I'd just say look at the definitions I'm using. If they are not in conflict with your definitions of mechanism, then we're just using a different scheme. There's no right or wrong there. It's just how we setup our philosophy.

I don't see how the value of a cake can be external. The cake is external. It's value changes as our intent changes. The cake is less valuable when you are full and more valuable when you are hungry. Values reside internally and are intimately tied to our intent, or current goal.

Perhaps you lack creativity? Surely the desirability of a cake cannot be something projected on it via introspection; rather the cake is meaningful already, has content to it that attracts me, makes sense of the cake, etc. If we took a Humean view, and the desirability is merely projected, then I think this makes agency problematic.

And of course the value of a cake changes.

The cake doesn't serve as a motivation. It is our hunger that is the motivation. When hungry, any food, not just a cake, can be valuable.

I don't see why this matters. Yeah, hunger is a casual disposition. It'll serve as a motivation to eat. But hunger alone wont get me to eat a cake. I need reasons to eat a cake, and the reasons are supplied by external content. Certain values. Like the desirability of the cake.

But then what is the intention? It seems to be generated by reasons. These reasons are supplied by external content. — Marty

Intentions, goals and reasons are all the same thing. Intentions/Goals/Reasons can be "internal" in that they are predictions and predictions only exist internally. Why is Marty walking down the street? He is intending to get home by 5pm. You arriving at home isn't external, as you could be hit by a bus and killed. It is internal and the cause of your walking.

To be clear though: There is no 'intent' that's subjectively locked away in our minds, that then "changes" by external conditions. Rather, it's constitutive of external content. But when I said that it's not "over-determined" by mechanical/efficient causes, I mean that the relationship we have with values doesn't seem to make use of these causes. I can have external stimuli like a wave push my body, but I still intend to push through them for-the-sake-of, say, a competition because I value winning a competition. — Marty

I don't see how you could choose to push through a wave that isn't pushing you back. If you aren't on the beach in the water with waves pushing you, how could you choose to push through waves? External conditions DO factor in to any kind of decision you make and determine the kinds of choices that pop into your head. If you see your child drowning, there won't be a choice to go buy some ice cream that pops into your head, unless something is just wrong with your mental processes. The choices that will probably come to mind are to jump in and save the child, scream for help, or throw them a life raft. Those choices will be narrowed down as you think about how well you can swim and if there are any life rafts around. Time is also a factor in our decision making. Take to much time in making your decision and your child drowns and the decision is taken out of your hands.

Your explanation seems to be no different than describing two forces, that are the result of separate causes, opposing each other.

The question is: What type of cause is it? I don't see a need to be reductionistic w.r.t causes. — Marty

I don't see why you'd need to know what kind of cause it is when all causes can lead to effects in other areas. If some physical cause can lead to an effect in the mental and vice versa, then why is it useful to separate these things into different substances?

As for these causes "not being needed", I'd just say look at the definitions I'm using. If they are not in conflict with your definitions of mechanism, then we're just using a different scheme. There's no right or wrong there. It's just how we setup our philosophy. — Marty

I didn't say these causes weren't needed. I said the terms weren't needed. Please read more carefully.

Perhaps you lack creativity? Surely the desirability of a cake cannot be something projected on it via introspection; rather the cake is meaningful already, has content to it that attracts me, makes sense of the cake, etc. If we took a Humean view, and the desirability is merely projected, then I think this makes agency problematic. — Marty

Well the cake does have meaning already as it was made by someone else. So in that sense the meaning of the cake is external, because the baker of the cake's meaning and intent in making the cake is external to your mind, if that is what you mean. To say that some thing has meaning independent of human minds is to say that there is intelligent design in nature, or that God's mind gives it meaning. Are you going religious on me?

I don't see why this matters. Yeah, hunger is a casual disposition. It'll serve as a motivation to eat. But hunger alone wont get me to eat a cake. I need reasons to eat a cake, and the reasons are supplied by external content. Certain values. Like the desirability of the cake. — Marty

Reasons that only exist in your head. You can say that the cake is desirable. But then what happens when someone comes along and says that the cake is undesirable? How can you then say that the desirability resides externally? It seems to me that the only good explanation is to say the desirability and undesirability reside in minds, not apart from them.

So meaning and value is imposed on the world? Sounds Humean. :-|

Look, my view is inspired by McDowell's sensibility theory. In order to get at what we mean by 'subjective', 'real', 'objective', it'll be best if we define these with some clarity, as to get to the notion that by 'objective' we do not mean completely mind-independent, but nor do we mean free-standing values that arise completely within the subject. They are real insofar as they are externally provide content to the subject. They are mind-dependent as far as they can only be real to subjects witnessing them, but nonetheless, they are real.

It seems like mere scientism to presuppose that the only qualities that can exist are ones that're material things (and suggest only primary qualities are real - you'll have to provide proof). It also seems to advocate that the only things that are real are things that exist mind-independently, but this seems misguided. Minds themselves are real, and don't of course exist mind-independently. Certain beliefs about the world are true, and their form (or idea) is manifest of the world itself. So I'm not sure what the problem is other than you haven't read metaphysics that are sympathetic to alternative views than materialism.

If this isn't something you "get", and you just want to reduce everything down to material properties then you'll run into other problems, I believe. Particularly the issue of agency, meaning, truth - all of which seem immaterial. If you reject them, you'll ulimately run into a reductio ad absurdism. Since in order to believe in materialism, you'll need meaning and truth... I don't mind a form of naturalized Platonism to solve this issue.

I think responding to all your problems won't do much good. Your foundations are unsympathetic to types of philosophy that espouse anything other than the world is a dead object without purpose and meaning.

So meaning and value is imposed on the world? Sounds Humean. :-|

Look, my view is inspired by McDowell's sensibility theory. — Marty

No. It's Harry Hinduan.

I don't really get this response. Are you disagreeing with the way that I have defined "values" and "meaning"?

It seems that you are committing a genetic fallacy by associating my statements with someone else, who you seem to have a negative view of, and who I've never read much about or know much about. My views are my own and I don't read much of other philosophers views, as that would just be more of an influence on my own. I could respond to you post, "Sounds McDowellean :-|", and where would we be in our discussion then?

What is ironic is that these "Pro-Subjective Philosophers" are the ones spouting off quotes of other philosophers. The people on these forums who try to make this clear distinction between the objective and the subjective, where there is none, are the same ones spouting off the quotes of other philosophers, as if they are trying to limit their subjectivity and be more objective in their philosophical view, while at the same time spouting off statements about how things really are, and how reality really is.

In order to get at what we mean by 'subjective', 'real', 'objective', it'll be best if we define these with some clarity, as to get to the notion that by 'objective' we do not mean completely mind-independent, but nor do we mean free-standing values that arise completely within the subject. They are real insofar as they are externally provide content to the subject. They are mind-dependent as far as they can only be real to subjects witnessing them, but nonetheless, they are real. — Marty

See what I mean? I don't really get what you're saying here or what it has to do with answering a simple question,

I don't see why you'd need to know what kind of cause it is when all causes can lead to effects in other areas. If some physical cause can lead to an effect in the mental and vice versa, then why is it useful to separate these things into different substances? — Harry Hindu

It seems like mere scientism to presuppose that the only qualities that can exist are ones that're material things (and suggest only primary qualities are real - you'll have to provide proof). It also seems to advocate that the only things that are real are things that exist mind-independently, but this seems misguided. Minds themselves are real, and don't of course exist mind-independently. Certain beliefs about the world are true, and their form (or idea) is manifest of the world itself. So I'm not sure what the problem is other than you haven't read metaphysics that are sympathetic to alternative views than materialism.

If this isn't something you "get", and you just want to reduce everything down to material properties then you'll run into other problems, I believe. Particularly the issue of agency, meaning, truth - all of which seem immaterial. If you reject them, you'll ulimately run into a reductio ad absurdism. Since in order to believe in materialism, you'll need meaning and truth... I don't mind a form of naturalized Platonism to solve this issue.

I think responding to all your problems won't do much good. Your foundations are unsympathetic to types of philosophy that espouse anything other than the world is a dead object without purpose and meaning. — Marty

What the hell, dude? Are you even reading anything I have said? I consider wasting my time an insult, and offensive. For the umpteenth time, I'm not arguing for "materialism". I've been questioning the very use of the word! - along with "mental", "subjective", "external" vs. "internal", etc.!

I'm not the one making a distinction between the "material" and "mental", or the "external" and the "internal". You are, and you are trying to place me on the opposite side of the fence of you and then bash "my" views by the way of the Straw Man. All along I have been asking a simple question, and asking to you try to avoid using those terms that I have tried to avoid, as they seem be the cause of the very problem itself. Is that beyond your understanding?