But physicalists, like yourself, seem to have a deep fear of God, and will posit any of a vast number of irrational principles in order to avoid what is logically necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this case, the vast Infinite along with Thermodynamic Purpose and Cosmic Goals have been called upon as the new God. It's a reengineering of the oldest mythology. Somehow, someway, intent and purpose had to be introduced into any Genesis story.

Here is an interesting essay written by an astrophysicist who directly addresses the issues at hand:

http://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2017/03/26/521478684/mind-matter-and-materialism

"The trouble comes when materialists claim the reduction of consciousness to matter is "what science says." Nobody needs me to point out that the relationship between mind and matter (i.e. mind and brain) remains a cutting edge and contentious topic in philosophy and science. That means you can't just state that mind is purely a biological phenomena as if it were a scientific fact. In fact, that statement is a really a metaphysical stance. It's an assumption. It's the beginning of the argument, not the end."

"So, in the end, it's all about being upfront about our metaphysical biases and their limits. As philosopher Roberto Unger and physicist Lee Smolin put it, our job in thinking about the world is to "distinguish what science has actually found out about the world from the metaphysical commitments for which the findings of science are often mistaken."

Metaphysical commitments are fine. We all have them. But when it comes to quantum physics and what it tell us about matter and materialism, we must work hard to distinguish what's solid ground and what is swamp."

It's fine to say "I don't have the foggiest idea", but that is not what is happening here. What is being suggested is that out of nothingness matter magically sprung (the Big Bang), and out of matter Mind magically sprung. That is not vagueness. That is a a pretty definite mythology born out of a specific goal to obliterate the notion of Mind. — Rich

That's not my interpretation of the current consensus, a consensus which (to my mind) states that the big bang is the point where the known laws of physics break down and things become "unknowable". Similarly the "something from nothing" has also been described as the vacuum of space not being as empty as previously thought. It's not as if all scientists are fundamental reductionists or something.

Personally, I find it likely that mind does indeed emerge out of matter, even though science cannot explain fully how life springs from inanimate matter I don't feel the need to invoke some sort of elan vital to make it happen, I don't see why there needs to be an equivalent of such a force when it concerns minds.

feel the need to invoke some sort of elan vital to make it happen — Gooseone

No, but you do need to invoke some faith that "mind just happened", because that is all there is. Faith comes in many forms and when it is part of one's belief system, it simply has to be acknowledged.

Those who place mind (or Elan vital) as primary, do not need to invoke such faith, because mind was always there and still is here exactly as we experience it.

No, but you do need to invoke some faith that "mind just happened", because that is all there is. — Rich

That doesn't follow, I said I find it likely that mind emerges out of matter. The faith I have is the progress which will be made in understanding the subject better in the future. Saying "mind just happened" is a caricature of the complexity which lies beneath what is already known about human cognition.

Also, placing mind as primary is a form of faith in my book, not something with which you can claim you are not invoking some form of faith.

No, but you do need to invoke some faith that "mind just happened", — Rich

So a foetus develops, the child is born. We kind of know that another mind just happened due to the growth of a nervous system, don't we? Or do you have evidence to the contrary.

We kind of know that another mind just happened due to the growth of a nervous system, don't we — apokrisis

Is this the new story that the mind pops out of the nervous system? It keeps changing. I thought it was the child of Cosmic Goals and Thermodynamic Purpose, couple with an Infinite Possibilities.

I love stories as much as the next person, but even the Greeks kept their mythology pretty much straight.

I said I find it likely that mind emerges out of matter. — Gooseone

This is specifically your faith. One can equally say, I find it likely that God created the universe. There is no difference other than the belief of one is different than the belief of the other. Problems only arise when materialists claim that science is on their side. That science says we are just chemicals. Using science as a shield for a faith.

So you are saying the nervous system is not the cause? On what grounds?

Oh that's right. All reality is a mind field projected hologram.

Listen, it's your story. You just don't seem to know how to keep it straight. Don't look for me for help.

Keeping a straight face is the problem here, Rich.

Just give a straight answer. Is the new born mind (a) the result of the development of another infant nervous system or (b) a projected mental quantum hologram just like Bergson-Bohm said?

You've told us your story, remember. Have you suddenly lost faith in it after all? That's good to know.

My view of life is that it is exactly as sit appears. The reason I can be so matter of fact is that I am not part of huge chemical/machinery industrial complex that requires everything to be chemicals. I don't make a living evangelizing stories. In other words I am not laden with biases.

So was it a or b? Why are you suddenly silent here?

The mind, creative intelligence, is it. Peirce was correct except for that bit about tychism. Mind evolves and as it evolves it creates things from what it learns. It even, out of sheer boredom, creates stories that it magically popped out of chemicals. Well not entirely out of boredom, it figured out it can make lots of money from such a story.

I can agree with that but the issue here is the knowing. People adhered to the law of gravity by sticking to the ground before we started to share theories of gravity or even gave it a name, I see no issue to call such a previous state unintelligible / vague, I don't take that as a hard limit on what we can know metaphysically in the future. Inclinations, making efforts, for all I know they could also be something we will have a very different understanding of in the future, just like we did in the past. — Gooseone

I can't understand your principles. You seem to be saying that when people can't understand something, then it is correct for them to say that this thing is unintelligible. Would a child in grade school, who can't understand algebra be correct to say that algebra is unintelligible? Would someone in high school be correct to say that university level physics is unintelligible. I would think that "unintelligible" refers to something which is impossible to understand, for any intellect

Do you not see that there is a difference between something which appears to be unintelligible because you do not have the capacity to understand it, and something which is unintelligible because it is impossible for any intellect to understand it? If you accept that there is such a difference, then consider the problem which arises when something appears to be unintelligible. How are you going to determine whether the thing in question just appears to be unintelligible because you do not have the capacity to understand it, or whether it is impossible for any intellect to understand? Suppose you ask others, and no one seems to have the capacity to understand it. Does this justify the claim that it is impossible for any intellect to understand it? I don't think so, and that's why it's always wrong to designate something which you do not have the capacity to understand, as unintelligible.

I was under the impression that the context in which Apo used the term "unintelligible" had more to do with how things would be if brains weren't perceiving stuff. (As opposed to those who feel there is something 'higher', like knowing without a knower, awareness being really 'REALLY' special, etc.)

Not to get into the: "If a tree falls into the forest....bla bla", but for now I find the whole concept of intelligibility a human thing. Things might exist and the way this stuff behaves might very well be intelligible but if there isn't anything resembling human cognition perceiving it I can just as well call it unintelligible.

You say it yourself, you need a capacity to understand for things to become intelligible, it's my opinion we need something resembling human cognition to do so and I feel 'that' is something very physical.

I was under the impression that the context in which Apo used the term "unintelligible" had more to do with how things would be if brains weren't perceiving stuff. (As opposed to those who feel there is something 'higher', like knowing without a knower, awareness being really 'REALLY' special, etc.) — Gooseone

Apokrisis posits an apeiron, which is inherently unintelligible, as the beginning from which substantial existence emerges. The apeiron is an infinite potential, a vast vagueness. Vague is described as a situation where the law of non-contradiction does not apply. So it is implied that this apeiron is something which is impossible for a brain, or any form of intellect to understand, because it defies the basic principles of logic which are used in understanding. Therefore it is inherently unintelligible, impossible to understand, whether or not a brain is attempting to understand it. That is the principle which I object to.

Not to get into the: "If a tree falls into the forest....bla bla", but for now I find the whole concept of intelligibility a human thing. Things might exist and the way this stuff behaves might very well be intelligible but if there isn't anything resembling human cognition perceiving it I can just as well call it unintelligible. — Gooseone

I don't see how you can make that statement. "Intelligible", and "unintelligible", refer to whether or not a thing may be understood by an intellect. Suppose there are four chairs at a table. This situation is intelligible (possible to be understood) whether or not there is a human being there, actually perceiving it. Do you recognize the difference between being actually understood, and having the possibility of being understood? You seem to think that if something is not actually understood, then you are justified in calling it unintelligible. But the "ible" suffix implies having the possibility of being understood, so just because something is not actually understood, this does not justify calling it unintelligible, it is simply unknown.

You say it yourself, you need a capacity to understand for things to become intelligible, it's my opinion we need something resembling human cognition to do so and I feel 'that' is something very physical. — Gooseone

I agree, that if there was no capacity to understand, no mind anywhere in the universe, we couldn't call anything "intelligible". But to call something "intelligible" requires a mind itself, and it is clearly not the case that there is no mind anywhere in the universe. So that primary prerequisite. that there be a mind for something to intelligible, is already fulfilled, necessarily, by the present conditions of existing minds. Now, what is at issue is what type of things do we label as intelligible or unintelligible. The fact that I can't understand something, or even that no living human being can understand this thing, doesn't warrant it being entitled unintelligible. In the future, someone might figure it out.

Suppose something is described in contradictory terms. Do you agree that this description is unintelligible, because it is contradictory? But just because the description of the thing is unintelligible, this does not necessitate the conclusion that the thing itself, which is described, is unintelligible. The person making the description may be mistaken. My argument is that it is unphilosophical, and wrong, to assume that anything itself is actually unintelligible. When something appears to be unintelligible (requiring a contradictory description or something like that), this is really due to a deficiency of the intellect which is trying to understand it.

Knowing something to be unintelligible still counts as knowledge. It's the unknown unknowns you gotta loook out for. ;)

No, as I explained already, knowing something to be unintelligible is contradictory. If you know the thing, clearly it's not unintelligible. You can partially know a thing, and think that it's unintelligible, but this just means that you must make a better effort to understand it. It does not mean that you know it to be unintelligible.

I don't think you've really thought through what it means for the PNC to fail to apply. Vagueness is defined by it not being actually divided by a contradiction. It is the intelligible which is the crisply divided.

Again, though I am not of the opinion that "reality" depends on a human observer to exist, for all practical purposes, if something cannot be known it is not dissimilar to it not existing.

Would a child in grade school, who can't understand algebra be correct to say that algebra is unintelligible? Would someone in high school be correct to say that university level physics is unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

For the child in grade school algebra would indeed be unintelligible, this points to the narrow framework we have to make sense of things. It's evident in a human life (you don't remember how you understood things when you were very young, you only know you were asleep when you wake up or when you remember a dream and you don't know what it's like to be dead). As a society we have become able to vastly improve our understanding of a lot of things but I feel it's still a narrow framework, maybe you could think of ancient cultures using myths to explain things which we can now understand as natural principles. The changing of the seasons might be such an example and things like gravity might have been an unknown unknown for a large part of human history because nobody was able to even conceptualize it could be other then self evident we tend to stick to the ground.

This narrow framework we are operating in in this thread seems to be the one of the known unknowns where Apo points to the lower end where we can fathom things becoming unintelligible (we do not assign agency to ants yet when we look at the behaviour of an ant colony it can appear to behave intelligently, still we don't assume ants are intelligent) and others point to the higher end where we can fathom more things becoming intelligible (assigning anthropomorphic qualities to the universe, believing in god, having faith in human progress, etc).

When we're talking about, say, physics, we(!) are able to determine various causes for what we see and I do not find it inappropriate to state that some things "just happen" (with the caveat that you're looking at something in a specific framework, still, no need to explain the universe to bake an apply pie). The limit to our knowledge when it concerns the mechanistic / deterministic framework of viewing universe lies in the resolution with which we're able / unable to view things (both in size, time and even place it seems). When we're looking at life, causes become hidden from plain sight in a novel way, though I am able to fathom we might become able to look (back?) at our current situation and describe it in a physical / mechanistic / deterministic framework, it's just as much off the mark to claim we are sure of that at this point as it is to claim we need an equivalent to an elan vital or god to ever make sense of things.

Being able to fathom everything being intelligible to an intellect does not mean it will be so per se. As Apo mentions, you seem to exclude the possibility for unknown unknowns which are, at this moment, unintelligible. And, if you are excluding the possibility for unintelligibility and claim that everything can, in principle, be intelligible, do you then also believe we have the potential to become god-like?

Also there is, for example, Rich, who seems to take issue with Apo trying to lay out a framework of understanding our current situation because it's not to be interpreted fully mechanistically / deterministically and does not provide a succinct final cause nor disproves the existence of a higher power. I guess you could accuse Apo of being a fundamental / reductionistic "emergentist" yet I don't see an issue with taking some consistent constraints (causes?) and using them to see what we can make sense of.

I don't think you've really thought through what it means for the PNC to fail to apply. Vagueness is defined by it not being actually divided by a contradiction. It is the intelligible which is the crisply divided. — apokrisis

When the PNC does not apply, it is and it is not. This means contradiction is united within the same object. To say "not being actually divided by a contradiction" is slight of hand, because what is really said is that contradiction is allowed to be united in the same object. So the object may be described in contradictory terms.

For the child in grade school algebra would indeed be unintelligible, this points to the narrow framework we have to make sense of things. — Gooseone

All you are saying here, is that in relation to the child's intellect, algebra is unintelligible. So you are judging the object, algebra, by relating it to a child's intellect, and coming to the conclusion that the object is unintelligible. You have proposed a system of relativity, and have chosen the child's intellect, as an arbitrary frame of reference, and concluded that within this frame of reference the object is unintelligible. Therefore your use of "unintelligible" is completely subjective, arbitrary. and totally meaningless without a qualifier which designates relative to what.

This narrow framework we are operating in in this thread seems to be the one of the known unknowns where Apo points to the lower end where we can fathom things becoming unintelligible (we do not assign agency to ants yet when we look at the behaviour of an ant colony it can appear to behave intelligently, still we don't assume ants are intelligent) and others point to the higher end where we can fathom more things becoming intelligible (assigning anthropomorphic qualities to the universe, believing in god, having faith in human progress, etc). — Gooseone

It's one thing to say that from within my framework of understanding, it appears like the universe emerged from an unintelligible apeiron. But it is a completely different thing to state this, as apokrisis does, in a way which implies that it is a scientifically proven fact. The latter shows absolutely no respect for the fact that this is only how the object appears from one particular framework, and other frameworks will perceive the object in a completely different way. To base your application of the word "unintelligible" on a framework of relativity, which reduces intelligibility to something completely arbitrary and subjective, and then turn around and insist my framework is the correct one, is completely hypocritical if not actually contradictory.

When we're talking about, say, physics, we(!) are able to determine various causes for what we see and I do not find it inappropriate to state that some things "just happen" (with the caveat that you're looking at something in a specific framework, still, no need to explain the universe to bake an apply pie). — Gooseone

I can't say that I have ever heard a physicist talk in this way, to say things "just happen". A physicist will claim to know why it happens this way, or to not know why it happens this way. When they say that they do not know why it happens this way, what is emphasized is that they do not know. They do not imply that they know that it just happens. Much of high energy physics today is concerned with statistical probabilities. The physicists acknowledge that they do not know why things must be understood in terms of probabilities, but the fact that statistical analysis is applicable, and is being applied, indicates that they do not believe that things just happen.

Being able to fathom everything being intelligible to an intellect does not mean it will be so per se. As Apo mentions, you seem to exclude the possibility for unknown unknowns which are, at this moment, unintelligible. And, if you are excluding the possibility for unintelligibility and claim that everything can, in principle, be intelligible, do you then also believe we have the potential to become god-like? — Gooseone

To speak of unknowns, is completely different than speaking of things unintelligible. "Known" and "unknown" refer to an actual condition in relation to intellect. "Intelligible" and "unintelligible" imply potentiality in relation to intellect. For the reasons I described, it is irrational to assume that something is unintelligible. You have made it rational in a qualified sense with your system of relativity, described above. Things may be deemed as "unintelligible" in relation to particular intellectual frameworks. My argument is that these intellectual frameworks, are therefore deficient. My system allows that if there is something "god-like", then for that god-like being, all is intelligible. Why would you think that it allows that human beings could become god-like?

When the PNC does not apply, it is and it is not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or rather, metaphysically as a state, it is neither one thing nor the other.

Where you just went wrong is to talk about vagueness or Apeiron as an object. An object of course is defined as an already crisply entified thing, although it may have vague properties.

I wondered if the potentiality for humans to become god-like was something which would follow from your philosophy, it was an actual question, not an assumption ;).

For the rest, I don't see much difference between knowing / the unknown and intelligible vs unintelligible, to me they both fundamentally require a perceiving entity (which I can not absolutely rule out). I could try and differentiate between them by saying something about what might constitute an adaptive response (talking biology here) and how intelligibility might depend on communicating with other minds but I find the differences between the terms quite transient.

Also I have not read this thread as thoroughly as might have been proper so I have not seen Apo claim an Apeiron as a fundamental and absolute scientific truth. Again to me it appeared as if some of his observations were declared null and void / strawmanned because he did not provide a succinct final cause ...or something like that.

Also I have not read this thread as thoroughly as might have been proper so I have not seen Apo claim an Apeiron as a fundamental and absolute scientific truth. — Gooseone

Yep. The argument is one of metaphysical logic. And then I also show how science supports it.

But note also that "intelligible" has a technical meaning in this discussion. It is about metaphysics. And it means the Cosmos is rationally structured, therefore capable of being understood in those terms.

The unintelligible then means a "state" where that structure is lacking.

Or rather, metaphysically as a state, it is neither one thing nor the other. — apokrisis

Actually, this is a situation where the principle of excluded middle does not apply. You should learn to differentiate between these two. PNC states that contradiction is not allowed, PEM states that "neither one nor the other" is not allowed. With respect to ontological principles, there is a substantial difference between these two.

I wondered if the potentiality for humans to become god-like was something which would follow from your philosophy, it was an actual question, not an assumption ;). — Gooseone

I would say, that this is not possible, because God is understood as being immaterial and human beings necessarily have a material body. If you read some Christian theological principles, like those explained by Aquinas, you'll see that it is claimed that the major constraints on the human intellect are due to the fact that the human intellect is united with, and dependent on, the material body. God, being a separate Form, meaning a form which is independent from material existence, is intelligible to the highest degree because intellection is an abstraction, or separation of the form from the material object. But to the human intellect God may appear to be unintelligible, due to this deficiency of the human intellect.

For the rest, I don't see much difference between knowing / the unknown and intelligible vs unintelligible... — Gooseone

Do you not recognize the difference between actual and potential here? Known and unknown refer to what is actually apprehended by an intellect. Intelligible and unintelligible refer to what is potentially apprehended by an intellect.

Actually, this is a situation where the principle of excluded middle does not apply. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It is generality to which the LEM fails to apply. The PNC fails to apply to vagueness.

You should learn to differentiate between these two. — Metaphysician Undercover

You need to brush up on your definitions of generality and vagueness by the looks of it.

Intelligible and unintelligible refer to what is potentially apprehended by an intellect. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is about ontology, not epistemology. The claim is about reality itself having rational structure. Though that in turn would be why we can understand reality in rational terms.

No. It is generality to which the LEM fails to apply. The PNC fails to apply to vagueness. — apokrisis

I'm not talking about generality or vagueness, I'm talking about the LEM and the PNC. If the LEM fails to apply then this is a situation where contradictory terms can be used in description. If vagueness is when the LEM fails to apply, then vagueness is when contradictory terms can be used in description.

If there is a situation where neither one nor the other, of contradictory terms may be used, then this is a situation where LEM fails to apply. If generality is where LEM fails to apply, then generality is where neither one nor the other of contradictory terms apply.

This is about ontology, not epistemology. The claim is about reality itself having rational structure. Though that in turn would be why we can understand reality in rational terms. — apokrisis

If there is an aspect of reality to which the PNC does not apply, what you call vagueness, then this aspect of reality would be unintelligible because it allows for contradiction. My argument is that to posit the reality of this vagueness, as an ontological principle, is an irrational act, because it is impossible to determine whether the appearance of vagueness is due to reality not having a rational structure, or to a deficient epistemology. However, if assuming the reality of vagueness requires that we forfeit the PNC to allow for this assumption, then clearly this is a deficient epistemology, because the PNC is fundamental to any epistemology. Therefore we ought to conclude that the appearance of vagueness is necessarily due to a deficient epistemology. To say that vagueness is real is to say that the PNC does not apply, and to say that the PNC does not apply is to have deficient epistemology. So to posit vagueness as an ontological principle (assume the real existence of that which the LEM fails to apply) is irrational.

I'm not talking about generality or vagueness, I'm talking about the LEM and the PNC. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can see why you only want to talk about the particular and not the vague or the general. I'll just remind you that I am talking about a triadic holistic metaphysics - such as Aristotelean hylomorphism - and opposing that to your reductionist metaphysics.

If there is an aspect of reality to which the PNC does not apply, what you call vagueness, then this aspect of reality would be unintelligible because it allows for contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't allow for it. It swallows it up. It absorbs it. It removes the very fact of there being a difference that makes a difference - a fact of the matter, an individuation of either kind.

However, if assuming the reality of vagueness requires that we forfeit the PNC to allow for this assumption, then clearly this is a deficient epistemology, because the PNC is fundamental to any epistemology. — Metaphysician Undercover

It makes the PNC an emergent feature of reality. It explains the PNC itself.

I can see why you only want to talk about the particular and not the vague or the general. I'll just remind you that I am talking about a triadic holistic metaphysics - such as Aristotelean hylomorphism - and opposing that to your reductionist metaphysics. — apokrisis

Sorry, but you're wrong here on two counts. First, Aristotle's metaphysics is nowhere near like yours. He denied the reality of the apeiron, and as I explained to you already, provided decisive refutation of this principle. It's in his Metaphysics Bk. 9. Also, as an epistemological principle he insisted that the LNC not be violated.

Second, I do not have a reductionist metaphysics, I have a dualism. I will discuss both the particular and the general, as distinct ontological categories. What you call vagueness appears to be a mixing up of these two categories, category mistake. Since it is a human an error, it is epistemic in nature. You take something which is of the category of the general, potential, and assign to it particular existence, the apeiron. This category mistake, the failure to properly distinguish between the general and the particular initializes your assumption that vagueness is a real ontological category. If you correctly apprehended the nature of potential, as general, you would not be able to assign to it particular existence, as an individual thing, the apeiron, and there would be no basis for your claim of ontic vagueness.

It doesn't allow for it. It swallows it up. It absorbs it. It removes the very fact of there being a difference that makes a difference - a fact of the matter, an individuation of either kind. — apokrisis

Exactly, you lose that difference to category error, and the result is your assumption that vagueness is ontologically real. Therefore the difference actually does make a difference, because denying that it makes a difference allows vagueness as an ontological principle, to emerge.

It makes the PNC an emergent feature of reality. It explains the PNC itself. — apokrisis

Tell me how the claim that there is situations in which the PNC does not apply, "explains" the PNC. It looks to me more like this renders the PNC as a useless, meaningless statement. Or is that what you mean by "explains the PNC", that the PNC is a useless statement?