He said that one could distinguish between two colors but not know that one was red. I still don't know what that means. He's saying I can know that I have two distinct colors, but I don't know that one is different than the other. Had he said one could distinguish between two colors and not know that one was "red," then I'd understand it to mean the person just didn't know how to correlate his sensation to language.

You changed the example to be that I could know that two people were standing side by side but not know they were husband and wife. Obviously I can know some things about an object but not others. I could know that my computer has a USB port but not a CD drive. I could also know that two objects are husband and wife but not know they were people. I could also know they were husband and wife and not know they were standing side by side. I could also see something and not know that there were two of them. My question still being why are there some things I can know without language (like that there are two people standing there), but there are others that require language (like they're husband and wife).

Would you be conformable with saying that this synthetic (bottom-up obtained) and analytic (in cog.sci . terms: top-down attained, i.e. (genotypically) predetermined toward learned) conflux of meaning can be inherited in all things that can perceive?

For my part, I’m accustomed to using other terms to express such behavioral inheritance of meaning. But I’m curious to know how one would address this same form of inheritance of meaning(s) in lesser animals via formal epistemological philosophy—this such as via the synthetic / analytic distinction. — javra

I'm told monkeys are born with a fear of heights and snakes, and I can say that my sheepdog has a herding instinct that I certainly never taught him. This goes along with your goose example.

My use of the synthetic/analytic language comes from my recent re-reading of Quine, who argued the non-existence of the distinction. It dawned on me that there is a distinction between observing the world and performing logic on the world, but the two are always intertwined. I cannot just look at an object without imposing my sense of reason on it. That's what knowledge is. I think animals do that as well, and I don't think it's really significant whether the reasoning ability has developed over time and was learned or whether it comes hard wired. In either event we see the world and we impose the reasoning of our mind onto it, and sometimes that includes using language and sometimes it doesn't.

You changed the example to be that I could know that two people were standing side by side but not know they were husband and wife — Hanover

It was hardly much of a change. My first example was "I can distinguish one person from another but not know that one of them was your wife".

He said that one could distinguish between two colors but not know that one was red. I still don't know what that means.

I can distinguish between two different animals but not know that one of them is an elephant shrew. I can distinguish between two different foodstuff but not know that one of them is a dragon fruit.

Haven't you ever been shown something but not know what it is?

Seems pretty straightforward to me.

the Himba fail to see the full array of colors you do is because they live in a color deficient environment, and since they can't see those colors, they never created words for them. — Hanover

They had no use for that distinction, so they never learned it.

Perhaps you could distinguish red from other colours before you learned the word. More likely you learned the word and the colour at the same time as you were encouraged to pick up the red block.

So sometimes language precedes knowledge, sometimes not. — Hanover

Is that just "knowing that..." against "knowing how..."? If so, my point is that this does not go far enough. "Knowing that..." is a form of "knowing how..."; knowing that the cup is red is just knowing how to distinguish that cup from other cups. Knowing that something is the case is just knowing how to use words correctly.

Yes: once an incommensurable dichotomy is introduced, it cannot be removed.

It dawned on me that there is a distinction between observing the world and performing logic on the world, but the two are always intertwined. I cannot just look at an object without imposing my sense of reason on it. That's what knowledge is. — Hanover

To push the limits a bit, the thought occurred to me that to perceive requires this analytic side (here assumed by me genotypically inherited): either that perceived is innately judged to be a thing, aka entity—e.g. wall, food, predator—or, conversely an activity, aka process—e.g., the wall’s activity is that of inflexibility to one’s being/actions, the prey’s activity is that or running away relative to one’s being/actions, the predator’s activity is in part that of seeking out one’s being/actions. Something along these lines. Taking this perspective would potentially result in the conclusion that to perceive is to analytically judge, at minimum, what is entity and what is processes (i.e., behaviors, activities) of becoming.

Or course, far more complex and stimuli-specific genotypically inherited analytic-judgments can be offered. And, the more adaptively intelligent the lifeform the more of its behaviors will be gained by synthetic means, i.e. by learning (e.g., requiring parenting in due measure) … but these synthetic means too will require some basic analytic (top-down) judgments as to categories of what is perceived. Again, such as what is thing and what is activity.

So, in pushing the limits, thing is, one can readily argue that amoeba engage in such analytic discriminations between walls, foods, and predators as things—as well as between the respective activities of each. Curt evidence for this is that they would perish if they didn't so discriminate. Amoeba have also be experimentally shown to learn *, so, to some extent, they use their inheritable top-down judgments to made bottom-up judgments, the latter being not specific to the species but to individual selves.

Then, back to more philosophical issues, how should we denote such genetically-inherited analytic-judgments of an ameba in terms of (primitive) forms of knowledge? This since there is a behavioral gradation—of both complexity and abstraction—in these analytic judgments from at least ameba all the way to humans.

It’s certainly not JTB, nor knowledge by acquaintance … and terming it tacit knowledge, though I think it proper, doesn’t address what is denoted by us through the term “knowledge”.

I’m thinking of this as a different route to get to the root of what we intend to signify by knowledge—from which, then, can be interpreted to emerge all the more specialized forms of knowledge we humans are familiar with, including that of JTB and of acquaintance. (Currently don’t want to myself start a new thread on this topic, saying this in case this post is too far off topic.)

* as a quickly found on line reference, the first two sentences from an abstract to an article found at: http://diventra.physics.ucsd.edu/Learning.pdf [overall article is about mathematical modeling of simple intelligent behavior]

Recently, behavioural intelligence of the plasmodia of the true slime mold has been demonstrated1. It was shown that a large amoeba-like cell Physarum polycephalum subject to a pattern of periodic environmental changes learns and changes its behaviour in anticipation of the next stimulus to come.

Perhaps you could distinguish red from other colours before you learned the word. More likely you learned the word and the colour at the same time as you were encouraged to pick up the red block. — Banno

And how important is this empirical point to your general language theory? If I could know red prior to language, does your whole philosophy unravel? I'm just asking because you seem to hinge a tremendous amount on some sociological language learning theory studies that are ambiguous at best. My cat Gumbo greets Ginger, her lifelong dog friend, but hisses at Fred Barkowitz, the new puppy invading her home. How is it that Gumbo can distinguish Ginger from Fred without language but Hanover the toddler couldn't even tell red from the midnight sky?

Is that just "knowing that..." against "knowing how..."? If so, my point is that this does not go far enough. "Knowing that..." is a form of "knowing how..."; knowing that the cup is red is just knowing how to distinguish that cup from other cups. Knowing that something is the case is just knowing how to use words correctly. — Banno

I did already take your position as you have clarified here, which is that you're not just claiming that I might know how to fix broken pipe without language, but that I can't even tell a pipe from a wrench without language.

Someone withou language might be able to fix a pipe. ex hypothesi they know how to use a wrench to do so. Would you say they know what a wrench is?

Would you say they know what a wrench is? — Banno

Is there a difference between these two questions:

• Do you know what this is?
• Do you know what this is called?

(The latter refers to some language, not necessarily the language in which the question is asked, but maybe specifying it matters more than I think.)

Surely. Don't you?

If these experiences do reflect a metaphysical reality, as I believe they do, then it seems that consciousness itself doesn't reside in the body at all, but resides and is dependent upon a separate energy source. — Sam26

What might "a metaphysical reality" be? And "a separate energy source"? :o
(I'm guessing you're using the terminology differently from what I'm used to.)


(Y)

But why address this as “extra-stuff”. It is no more extra than is the mind-stuff causally tied into the brain-stuff. Question then is, can the normal stuff of mind yet be when separated from the normal stuff of body to which it is normally causally tied into. — javra

The extra stuff isn't quite the same as mind, as best I can tell. I tend to use mind as an umbrella-term, covering the likes of experiences, qualia, thinking, ideation, love/feelings, headaches, self-awareness, consciousness, all that.

Suppose you’ve gotten yourself a headache. No aspirin at hand. Instead you go scan yourself, fMRI or whatever the latest may be, doesn’t really matter. You now have two different angles, the experience of the ache, and a visual overview of your gray matter (need not be visual alone). If only the angles differ, in an ontological sense, then what makes them different? Understanding the scan, in this context, would converge on understanding the headache; a straight identity is not readily available, or deducible. The headache itself is part of your self-experience, or, put simpler, just part of yourself — bound by (ontological) self-identity, regardless of any scans or whatever else. Others cannot have your headaches (identity), but others can check out the scans (non-identity). Hopefully the scan will not reveal a tumor or the likes, which would otherwise explain the headache.

The sensation of the headache is mind stuff (and phenomenological, part of you); the scan is not mind (more empirical if you will, not part of you). Does that differentiation work? If yes, then what of that extra stuff?

The extra stuff isn't quite the same as mind, as best I can tell. I tend to use mind as an umbrella-term, covering the likes of experiences, qualia, thinking, love/feelings, headaches, self-awareness, consciousness, all that. [...] Does that differentiation work? If yes, then what of that extra stuff? — jorndoe

We here agree on what mind consists of (leaving behind possible metaphysical appraisals and expressions of the physical, e.g. Pierce’s notion of effete mind).

To my best current understandings there are two means of appraising the issue of life after death: 1) via reincarnations of self-identity and 2) via causal models that specify something along the lines of “while mind, and the self-identity that goes along with it, will always be causally tied into brain within the realms of this physical world, it can subsist to varying extents without being tied into brain within realms that are not of this physical world”.

My favorite is scenario (1). I cannot metaphysically disprove scenario (2). Furthermore, among others, there is an additional metaphysical possibility of both scenarios (1) and (2) co-occurring: e.g. via analogy, like possible dream states between awakened states, so too could there be the possibility of (something like) Elysian Fields or realms of Tortures in-between reincarnations of self-identity within the physical world (e.g., Tibetan Buddhists will often go this route as regards the afterlife).

So the extra-stuff would not be the same as mind if mind is interpreted to always and in all ways be tied into the functioning of the brain—or, else, to in no way be. This, though, is a catch-22 dilemma of physicalism as regards this issue. When addressing mind as first person experience of self-identity and all that it requires, there is no extra stuff involved … neither in scenario (1) nor in scenario (2).

Going back to your diagram, mind can itself be interpreted as a body of information that holds some degree of stability over time, only that this body of information is incorporeal—this holds true even when mind is causally entwined with brain within the physical realm we coexist in. One can interpret the spiritualists’ notion of a subtle body as being nothing more than this: the body of information which is mind, including the self-identity of the conscious agency that is tied into, and emerges from, this body of mind (again, mind as you’ve specified it in the given quote above).

Explaining the “hows” of life after death via scenario (1) is relatively easy when compared to scenario (2). This is in part due to scenario (2) requiring causal mechanisms at play within realms of non-physical reality. Think of string-theory’s multiple parallel dimensions as a rough analogy; only that, here, these other realms are not explainable via the physical, as is string-theory’s.

While I wouldn’t mind further delving into this topic—it’s an interesting topic to me as well—I again am not one to have all the answers. I’ll likely rely more on logical possibilities given a non-physicalist metaphysics. And, to reemphasize, I myself don’t sponsor a Cartesian dualism of mind and body as two basic substances.

Indeed; that is the point at issue.

Are you so sure? The wrench is also drop forged, purchased at Bunnings, and slightly bent.

Further, I don't think my first criticism of the op has been addressed:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/107699

The supposed incommensurability of our mental lives is wrong-headed.

Was that "yes", "no", or "not sure"?

(The latter refers to some language, not necessarily the language in which the question is asked, but maybe specifying it matters more than I think.) — Srap Tasmaner

When you learned what a wrench is, was there more involved than learning the link between a name and a thing? Were you shown how t use it? I'm guessing yes. I think there is more to learning what a wrench is than just learning to use it to tighten a pipe(?).

If someone only knew how to use a wrench to tighten pipes, do we say they know what a wrench is? Or is their knowledge incomplete?

Check out https://www.google.com.au/search?q=wrench&client=safari&rls=en&dcr=0&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj0hrnSsd3WAhXMf7wKHX7FA8QQ_AUICigB&biw=1366&bih=684

What do these have in common?

I am not getting your point.

Suppose I was an accomplished mechanic who spoke only German. An English speaker could say truly both that I know how to use a wrench and that I don't know what a wrench is. The latter's just ambiguous. Just explaining the ambiguity is a pain in the ass:

• He knows what a wrench is; he just doesn't know what it's called in English. (Huh?)

• There is a type of thing, call it X; we call X's "wrenches"; he knows what X's are, but not that we call them "wrenches".

I just can't figure out if your position trades on this ambiguity or makes a point about it or what?!

I am not getting your point. — Srap Tasmaner

My point?

@Hanover seems to think that an ape that uses a wrench to fix a leaking pipe knows what a wrench is.

I'm just urging caution.

In the real world they are called "spanners", saving "wrench" for adjustable spanners. Google tells me that in German they are called "Schlüssel". The ape could not follow this conversation. Nor might it recognise a tap spanner or a ring spanner or a podger or hex key as a variation on the theme.

Caution's nice.

Some of your points look to me like they could be, well, if not "settled" then at least addressed by research. An ape that learned to use a particular individual tool for a particular type of job might substitute a similar tool, might recognize when only one of two similar tools will work for a given problem, might, might, might, or might not. There's a threshold beyond which I'll be fine saying he knows everything I do about wrenches except how to talk about them. I don't know what that threshold is exactly, and I might need to see research even to figure that out.

Indeed; but it needs to be good research. The Himba experiment needs bettering.

SO for my money this is not a garden path worth our time; leave it to the anthropologists. Philosophically speaking, the response to dualism given here abouts looks like a denial of dualism - "oh, we didn't mean that mind and body are really incommensurate..."

But that's a denial of dualism.

Hanover seems to think that an ape that uses a wrench to fix a leaking pipe knows what a wrench is. — Banno

You seem to think that you know what a wrench is. An ape knows it knocks bananas out of trees. You know it tightens the nut on your drawer handle. A mechanic knows how it replaces an alternator. Perhaps an engineer knows something about the wrench I know nothing about. Either we say that unless you know everything about wrenches then you now nothing about wrenches, or we say if you know something about wrenches, then you know, in part, what wrenches are.

Do you know more about wrenches than an ape? Sure. Is part of your superior knowledge the result of the knowledge expanding power of language? Of course. Does this mean that knowledge of the wrench is dependent on language? Of course not.

It's all a matter of degree.

Either we say that unless you know everything about wrenches then you now nothing about wrenches, or we say if you know something about wrenches, then you know, in part, what wrenches are. — Hanover

One might look at it that way, but it strikes me as dubious.

But I think it more interesting to look at it in terms of showing and saying. Show that one can use a spanner and an adjustable wrench and a pipe wrench does not tell us how each of these is related in such a way that the one word can be applied to all. That requires language.

Suppose our ape cannot use the sentence "This is a wrench, and so it this". Then there is a sense in which the ape does not know what a wrench is.

That's not a difference in degree, but in kind.

Does this mean that knowledge of the wrench is dependent on language? — Hanover

Does a wrench ever come to exist in a fashion that isn't dependent on a linguistic culture? The argument has to work both ways here.

You are treating the wrench as an example of a material object. They are just things to be found in the world. Even if communities of plumbers never existed, a chimp might stumble on to one growing on the wrench tree, the one right next to the banana tree, or some such.

So the knowledge which manifests "real wrenches" is a product of linguistic habit. It is a social constraint that is imposed on material reality. There is a particular job to be done. And look! (melt...twist...hammer...shape.) Here is the right kind of tool to do it.

Hence the reality of the "wrench" is conceptual as much as it is material. Words do more than merely signify - point or refer. They are causal.

Clearly chimps are also conceptual creatures. They can fashion sticks in the right shape to fish termites out of a mound. The trick can be based from old to young by a natural inclination to watch and imitate. So chimps also can "know" - form concepts with consequences.

Conception is not dependent on language. But it is crucial to allow for the fact that humans fill their worlds with linguistically-dependent objects. And these - because they depend on (semiotically) higher order concepts - are always being rolled out in arguments to prove points about "theories of truth" which they can't in fact prove.

Once a wrench becomes a brute fact of the world, a mere material state of affairs, then we are into unvarnished realism and all the usual confusion that entails.

The mind becomes cut away from the existence of the object in question. And the resulting naive realism in fact turns into the very dualism it was pretending to leave behind.

Show that one can use a spanner and an adjustable wrench and a pipe wrench does not tell us how each of these is related in such a way that the one word can be applied to all. That requires language. — Banno

You're just making up distinctions. An ape gets hungry and seeks food. It has a concept of food without a word for food and understands a similarity between bananas and berries in that both satisfy hunger. In fact, to understand that one banana is similar to another banana is to understand a relation between two distinct objects. The ape gets sick from eating a mushroom, so he eats no more mushrooms. Such requires appreciating mushroomness, the abstract notion of mushrooms, yet all without language.

It has a concept of food without a word for food — Hanover

That's simply reifying ape behaviour into a concept.

What is a concept of food, apart from the consumption habits of the ape?

Why not instead say that possession of a concept is always evidenced by behaviour, which in the case of some primates includes the sounds and marks they make?

Then what is it that is possessed, apart from certain behaviours?

What sort of thing is a concept, apart from what shows in behaviour?

What sort of thing is a concept, apart from what shows in behaviour? — Banno

A way of classifying 'things' (broadly), I suppose.

There's some really abstract classifying it's pretty hard to imagine doing without language, but doesn't it also seem that language presupposes some ability to classify things, rather than engendering it?

One interesting inflection point between some animals and others might be their capacity to remember. Maybe one has to decide "food/not food", for instance, each time it encounters something, even if it's the same individual something over and over, while another might remember having already decided what to do when encountering that thing, or even another thing a lot like it.

Of course nowadays it is simply assumed by most folks that mind is an attribute or quality of body, rather than vice versa, but in my view that is very much a cultural construct. My Indian Studies lecturer used to point out that Westerners say of someone who died, that he 'gave up the ghost' whereas Indians tend to say he 'gave up the body'. — Wayfarer

This is very interesting. In my experience we often tend to assume in the intellectual landscape that Westerners are the Cartesians, and Indians (Buddhists, Hindus, etc.) are the monists who espouse unity of body-mind. That's why in Chan Buddhism there is the namarupa - mind-body. Is this understanding a Westernized version of Asian culture you would say?

Westerners say "gave up the ghost" because we understand the soul to be the form of the body, meaning its animating principle. So the person (who is a substance formed of the unity of body and mind, form and matter) gave up the ghost - the form and animating principle of the body. Hence why the body is now dead.