What kind of Buddhism did you study? — MysticMonist

Well, after my initial years of reading spiritual books, Buddhism seemed to have the best overall product. (No kidding!) I was introduced through Alan Watts and D T Suzuki, who were very popular in the 1960's. I got some training in meditation from a kind of new-agey type of awareness-training group, then read about Vipassana meditation. The book that impacted me the most was To Meet the Real Dragon, which is Soto Zen; I got that in the 1980's; Nishijima-roshi only died a few years back. Much later, I formed a kind of informal dharma friendship group through a Buddhist library, we used to meet monthly, then bi-monthly - that went for about 7 or 8 years, although petered out in the end. So I don't have any current association and don't attend any particular place. But I still maintain the daily meditation practise along the lines taught in that book - 'just sitting', zazen. (Although as the Dalai Lama remarks, spiritual practise is like driving a donkey uphill with a stick ;-) )

Now I'm thinking of signing up for the self-paced courses at Nitarthta Institute. Trying to concentrate long enough on one thing to learn it properly instead of constantly grazing on all kinds of things.

Ironically, Socrates' unwillingness to part from (his concept of) rational action is one of the most unreasonable things about him. Who else would willingly die rather than express a little bit of selfish, less-than-perfect rationality? Even Jesus cried out on the cross and begged to be spared in Gethsemane. Socrates is a saint in the church of the rational. Showing total devotion to self-mastery and reason like Paul to God.

No, I think you are reaching here. Platonic irony has to do with Socratic ignorance. Socrates claimed to know one thing, that he does not know and yet in this knowledge he knows more than all his interlocutors. Platonic irony it that of a great man's dissimulation, not as a vice but as a gentile art.

The concept of a will divided against itself was not available in the ancient Hellenic culture. It is only by means of the division of the will, that Paul could explain sin and grace. The Greeks saw reason and desire as competitive forces (the horses), they did not suspect that there could be a faculty of the mind divided against itself...the will as we know it.

The concept of a will divided against itself was not available in the ancient Hellenic culture. — Cavacava

I don't see the basis for the claim that the will is "divided against itself". The will resists activity, and it allows for activity, but this is not a divided will. The same will, which enables you to resist a specific activity because it appears to you as irrational, will allow you to carry out that activity in a different situation, when the activity appears to be rational. This is not a case of a divided will, it is the case of the same person in different circumstances.

When the will appears to be divided it is just a matter of the individual being incapable of adequately assessing the circumstances, one's environment. This is indecisiveness, but indecisiveness is not a defect of the will, it is a deficiency in the mind's capacity to apprehend the situation. The will, by its very nature must be in the middle, between acting and not acting, in order that it can allow for both. But this is not a divided will, the forces which drive the will toward acting, and away from acting, are divided. The will acts to reconcile, unite these divided forces.

I am out and about. Please check out quote from Paul's Romans 7 above.
Later

Yes, I read the quote, that's what got me thinking. I do not think Paul's position is inconsistent with Plato though. St Augustine dealt with this subject to some depth, how we can knowingly do wrong, when Plato insisted that morality is a form of knowing.

The resolution is to recognize that Plato posits a tripartite person. As a medium between mind and body, he posits spirit, or passion. This is evident in The Republic, where he models the state after the human person, and proposes a three part state. rulers guardians, and subjects. This third aspect of the person, spirit (I don't know the Greek word used, but it is translated in different ways), is necessary to explain the interaction between body and mind. A well disposed person has the spirit allied with mind, to exercise control over the body. A not so well-disposed person will allow the spirit to be allied with the body, to overpower the mind. In St. Thomas' work this gets all tied up in the concept of habit.

In any case, the third aspect becomes very important in explaining why we need to know what is right, to do what is right, making knowledge and morality closely tied, yet we can still knowingly do what is wrong. This is because the will itself is essentially free, being tied neither to the mind nor to the body. When Augustine did his work On The Trinity, he modeled the Holy Trinity after the human trinity of memory, intellect and will. Aquinas expanded on this, and demonstrated how, in relative terms (relative to morality), the will must be subservient to, and therefore posterior to the intellect, but in the absolute sense, the will is prior to, and therefore free from, even the intellect.

The resolution is to recognize that Plato posits a tripartite person. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks for this explanation. I just finished book 2 of the Republic so this is a spoiler, haha! I was wondering where Plato was going with the guardian and spirit thing.

So Plotinus says something simmilar. We have our souls that illumine our animal nature and we choose to turn our face towards higher things or baser things. I love how he says it's not the soul's fault if we sinned. She did her job of illumination and it is us who decided to turn away.

So Plotinus says something simmilar. We have our souls that illumine our animal nature and we choose to turn our face towards higher things or baser things. I love how he says it's not the soul's fault if we sinned. She did her job of illumination and it is us who decided to turn away. — MysticMonist

That's the thing with the will. As Augustine argues, the will must be free from the material influences of the physical body in order to follow the immaterial principles of the intellect. However, it is quite clear that this freeness is a double edged sword, because in being free, the will is also free not to follow the intelligible principles.

As Augustine argues, the will must be free from the material influences of the physical body in order to follow the immaterial principles of the intellect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does Augustine address this? I'm only familiar with Luther's Bondage of the Will. I've read The Trinity and The Two Cities but it's been a long time.

Check Augustine's "On Free Choice of the Will". I think it's available online. He is really the first one to actually develop the concept of free will by that name. He's greatly influenced by Neo-Platonism.

the will must be free from the material influences of the physical body in order to follow the immaterial principles of the intellect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Have a listen to this passage (up till about 42:00)

Thanks. I'll look them up.

This third aspect of the person, spirit (I don't know the Greek word used, but it is translated in different ways), is necessary to explain the interaction between body and mind.

Aristotle called it proairesis, the faculty of choice. It is how we deliberate about the means, not the ends. Both means and ends are given, for Plato & Aristotle, freedom of choice is a selection process for them. If our selections are moral then our soul is in tune (Georgias). The parts of the soul are friends, when they work together.

Paul sees men obeying/disobeying laws. The law against coveting, makes coveting a sin, without the law there is no sin. (Romans 7:7,8). The law speaks in imperatives which naturally arises the passions within us. Paul becomes a stranger unto himself (7,15). Such a concept would have been impossible for Plato or Aristotle. For Paul the only way for man to mend this inner wretchedness through grace.

It was the law of voluntary submission to the law that lead to the discovery of the will. "Thou shalt" is not merely the mind speaking to the body as Augustine put it, but rather it is "Thou shalt will" which implies a yes or no answer.

Augustine tells a joke in his Confessions. What was God doing prior to his creation of the world? Answer, making a hell for those who ask such questions. I am not sure about your interpretation of Augustine. I think he followed Paul much more closely, that he felt that man never is at peace with himself without the mercy of God, that the will is always divided against itself until death, but that is well off topic.

the will is always divided against itself until death, but that is well off topic. — Cavacava

This is more what I had assumed Augustine had thought. I was taught theology by Lutherans so they emphasized a continuity of Paul, Augustine and Luther as expressing the same theological orthodoxy. No agenda there, hahah. But that's what I'm very familiar with that the will is not free it is either riden by God or the devil. We are always slaves to someone.
My Buddhist training taught me that to believe we have a completely objective will is absurd. We are conditioned by a vast amount of influences that shape our natures. Spinoza is helpful here too. I defiantly think a lot of choices are an illusion and we are not the free thinkers we imagine ourselves to be. But we do still have a choice and occasionally we will choose to go against the grain. Back to Platonism, I love the Baha'i prayer that says "I turn my face to you, Oh God, illumine it with the light of thy countance and protect it from turning to anyone but thee." We have the ability to turn to God or to the illumination within our rational souls. To let our souls guide us or to turn away and follow our baser passions. I have trouble when I read Plotinus in particular of seeing myself as my soul. I sure don't feel rational and immovable and beyond suffering and all these things. But I do sense there is a personal light beconing me to follow. What's that light, my soul? An emanation? God himself? Who am I that follows? It's a jumble and Plotinus himself talks about philosophy "dividing" parts of a person that are united in their natural state. Maybe it's like a doctor saying here's your arm, your leg, and your brain but where is you? Certainly all of it.

Aristotle called it proairesis, the faculty of choice. It is how we deliberate about the means, not the ends. Both means and ends are given, for Plato & Aristotle, freedom of choice is a selection process for them. If our selections are moral then our soul is in tune (Georgias). The parts of the soul are friends, when they work together. — Cavacava

I don't think it is correct to say that means and ends are given for Plato and Aristotle. This is what enables Socrates to say "I don't know", nothing is given to him. So in his dialectic method, Plato seeks the meaning of terms like "love", "just", "friendship", words which refer to the various virtues. The virtues are themselves ends, but if they were given, Plato wouldn't have to work at determining what the words mean. And as Aristotle aptly describes, the ends are usually desired for the sake of something else, a further end, so they end up being nothing more than means. That's why he seeks the ultimate end, if we keep asking what is it for the sake of, we can't have an infinite regress, so he posits happiness.

Plato has a slightly different outlook, because he comes to the realization that none of these ideas, which are signified by the words, "just", etc., are even intelligible unless they are illuminated by the good. That's what he says in The Republic, that the good illuminates intelligible objects like the sun illuminates visible objects. So instead of the ultimate end, this is for the sake of that which is ultimately for the ultimate good, which Aristotle posits, he posits the good. The good is a more powerful concept than the ultimate end, because it relates directly to intelligible objects (concepts and ideas, rather than to actions. All intelligible objects (ideas and concepts),not just actions, are seen in relation to the good.

For Paul the only way for man to mend this inner wretchedness through grace. — Cavacava

Grace, is that which is given, by God, so you seem to be saying that Paul takes means as needing to be given. But this all depends on how we look at the laws. If laws are given by men, then it is necessary that the human mind works to learn and create laws so they are not really "given". But if laws are given by God, then we must simply take them as they are given to us.

laws are given by men, then it is necessary that the human mind works to learn and create laws so they are not really "given". But if laws are given by God, then we must simply take them as they are given to us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Jewish laws are both! The Pharisees/Priests and now Rabbis create "fences" around the true Law that is given by God. For example the Torah says do not boil a kid in its mothers milk. The Rabbis say no meat and cheese in the same meal or on the same plate. Maybe the real law (intent behind the Torah passage) is to be kind to all beings.

P.S. my inner Jew keeps coming out on these forums. I don't think I can keep pretending to myself that I'm not grounded in the Abrahamic faiths. Shiva is definitely cool but it's not the same as the LORD. Even though philosophically I don't see why there should be a difference. Maybe it's just the way I've experienced God, I've never set foot in a Hindu temple for example.

Perhaps the best way to proceed is by taking each point in turn. First

I don't think it is correct to say that means and ends are given for Plato and Aristotle.

Desire is for something, no? So ends are given.

And means vary, they must be deliberated upon but they are known, and must be subject to a selection process.

Dialects for Plato is in the give and take of the dialogue, this is what dialects entails for Plato. The Socratic ignorance is largely ironic, it is his way of putting himself on the same level as his interlocutor, but it is clear from all the dialogues that he knows more than those he questions.

Agree or disagree?

Desire is for something, no? So ends are given. — Cavacava

Perhaps you are using "given" in a way that I am not familiar with. Desire begins as an indefinite feeling. It is a sort of uneasiness within a person. The feeling must be interpreted then directed towards an object. The object of desire is chosen, not given, and the object of desire is the end.

And means vary, they must be deliberated upon but they are known, and must be subject to a selection process. — Cavacava

You would think that the means must be determined after the end is determined, because how could you ever properly fulfil your desire until after you've determined the object which the desire is for. But there is something very odd which happens with means, and this odd thing is demonstrated by the reality of habituation.

When the means to the end is determined, the activity may be repeated indefinitely in many different situations, bring about the same, or a very similar end. At this point, we do not take the time to determine what is really desired, the real end, we just carry out the operation habitually, assuming that the end is given. In this type of situation, the end is simply determined by the means. So in this situation we can say that the end is given.

This is the issue which Socrates addressed when he went around asking skilled people, do you "know" what you are doing. The crafts people are carrying out a procedure, and the end is "given", meaning that the product which is produced will have a form which is determined by this habitual procedure. But Plato suggests that there is something inherently wrong with this procedure. He says that the people who are using the product ought to have some say in the production of the product, such that the product is tailored to the user's satisfaction.

If we go in this direction, then the end, the finished form of the product, is not actually a "given". The manufacturer has to go to the consumer and ask what is wanted. So there is a distinction here between what is given, and what is asked for. And when you relate this to the grace of God, it is not a given, it is something which must be asked for.

Dialects for Plato is in the give and take of the dialogue, this is what dialects entails for Plato. The Socratic ignorance is largely ironic, it is his way of putting himself on the same level as his interlocutor, but it is clear from all the dialogues that he knows more than those he questions. — Cavacava

Socrates is doing this with all knowledge. He is denying anything as a given, and therefore he has adopted a skeptical position. So for anyone who claims to have knowledge, he ask of them, show me this knowledge which you claim to have. So the perspective is one of determining what is wanted (knowledge in this case), and asking for what is desired, the end, rather than just taking what is given.

Perhaps you are using "given" in a way that I am not familiar with. Desire begins as an indefinite feeling. It is a sort of uneasiness within a person. The feeling must be interpreted then directed towards an object. The object of desire is chosen, not given, and the object of desire is the end.

OK, Plato was not a very psychological philosopher, I am not saying he didn't have his moments but in regards to what is choice worthy or not he was pretty clear. Just look at the subjects of his dialogues, he may not have the answers but he certainly know the topics, the ends are rarely questioned.

You would think that the means must be determined after the end is determined, because how could you ever properly fulfil your desire until after you've determined the object which the desire is for. But there is something very odd which happens with means, and this odd thing is demonstrated by the reality of habituation.

The end is generally the purpose of the dialogue, its topic, such as: can virtue be taught, what is justice, what is piety....and so on and Plato has a general methodology that he uses to approach these topics. The methodology is to question his interlocutors to come up with general ideas that may pertain to the topic and then investigate each idea, see what might be right or wrong with it and go on and on until they can't go any further. It is a selection process.

This is the issue which Socrates addressed when he went around asking skilled people, do you "know" what you are doing. The crafts people are carrying out a procedure, and the end is "given", meaning that the product which is produced will have a form which is determined by this habitual procedure. But Plato suggests that there is something inherently wrong with this procedure. He says that the people who are using the product ought to have some say in the production of the product, such that the product is tailored to the user's satisfaction.

Poppycock, what is that MU, the Marxian interpretation :-x

So the perspective is one of determining what is wanted (knowledge in this case), and asking for what is desired, the end, rather than just taking what is given.

I disagree. The topic is never in question, he may not know exactly what is entailed by the his topic, such as knowledge in his Theaetetus, or Piety in his Euthyphro but there is never a question about the topic itself it is given as the subject of the dialogue.

Just look at the subjects of his dialogues, he may not have the answers but he certainly know the topics, the ends are rarely questioned. — Cavacava

Actually I think the opposite of this is true, the ends are what are questioned by Plato. Pleasure, the different virtues, and virtue itself, are presented as the ends, and the nature of these things is questioned. So he takes words like "pleasure", "courage", "just", "pious", etc., and questions what is meant by these terms, what is referred toby them. So these ends are clearly questioned.

The end is generally the purpose of the dialogue, its topic, such as: can virtue be taught, what is justice, what is piety....and so on and Plato has a general methodology that he uses to approach these topics. The methodology is to question his interlocutors to come up with general ideas that may pertain to the topic and then investigate each idea, see what might be right or wrong with it and go on and on until they can't go any further. It is a selection process. — Cavacava

It is not a selection process. It is a process of understanding. Choice, or selection is withheld, suspended in the manner of a skepticism, such that the subject may be understood before selection is made. Each of Plato's dialogues ends without a clear and conclusive understanding of the subject presented, so no selection is actually possible.

Therefore, unlike your representation, the purpose of the dialogue, is not to produce a choice or selection, it is to further the understanding of the subject. So as much as the arguments of the various interlocutors may be rejected, as inadequate, a definite resolution does not come about, so it is a process of elimination rather than a selection process. A process of elimination is unending until all possible options are exhausted, but that is never the case here, so no selection is actually made.

Poppycock, what is that MU, the Marxian interpretation — Cavacava

Have you not read Plato? Clearly he stated that those using the product ought to have some say in the production of the product. It is produced for their purposes, not for the purpose of the producer. Plato was communist, he proposed communal living, so he lends himself well to a Marxist interpretation.

I disagree. The topic is never in question, he may not know exactly what is entailed by the his topic, such as knowledge in his Theaetetus, or Piety in his Euthyphro but there is never a question about the topic itself it is given as the subject of the dialogue. — Cavacava

The word "knowledge", or "piety", is not what is at question. What is at question is the thing signified by the word. That is why Plato's method is called "dialectics". It is incorrect to say the there is no question as to what the subject is, just because there is no question as to what the word being investigated is. The word is not the subject. The subject is what is referred to by the word, and this is exactly what is at question.

Actually I think the opposite of this is true, the ends are what are questioned by Plato. Pleasure, the different virtues, and virtue itself, are presented as the ends, and the nature of these things is questioned. So he takes words like "pleasure", "courage", "just", "pious", etc., and questions what is meant by these terms, what is referred toby them. So these ends are clearly questioned.

Virtue as an end is not questioned, what virtue consists of is questioned; is pleasure choice-worthy is questioned. Meno asked Socrates 'can virtue be taught' and Socrates says I don't even know what virtue is. The topic is given from the outset and an understanding is sought.

It is not a selection process. It is a process of understanding. Choice, or selection is withheld, suspended in the manner of a skepticism, such that the subject may be understood before selection is made. Each of Plato's dialogues ends without a clear and conclusive understanding of the subject presented, so no selection is actually possible.

Socrates selection process is a process of understanding, it is the basis of the dialectic. He proposes or an interlocutor proposes and idea and in the give and take of their conversation these ideas are thoroughly investigated. Socrates describes himself as a mid-wife who can determine if what they come up with is worth while or not.

my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth.

It is a selection process.

Have you not read Plato? Clearly he stated that those using the product ought to have some say in the production of the product. It is produced for their purposes, not for the purpose of the producer. Plato was communist, he proposed communal living, so he lends himself well to a Marxist interpretation.

Double poppycock. The Republic set up different classes in a Utopian society, Marx was after a classless society, how different can you get? Plato Republic has a complex division of labor, with separates classes, it is ruled by a philosopher king, not by the masses. Marx wanted to abolish the division of labor, abolish the class system, with a state ruled democratically by the masses. Their theories of government are almost completely opposite.

The word "knowledge", or "piety", is not what is at question. What is at question is the thing signified by the word. That is why Plato's method is called "dialectics". It is incorrect to say the there is no question as to what the subject is, just because there is no question as to what the word being investigated is. The word is not the subject. The subject is what is referred to by the word, and this is exactly what is at question.

Yes, it is about what is entailed when one says they have knowledge, or piety or virtue but these topics are known as topics to be investigated and Plato uses his dialectic method to approach these topics. I never said his dialogues are about "words", I said he selects or his interlocutor select a topic to discuss. You can't have a discussion about nothing, unless you take 'nothing' itself as the topic of a discussion.

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