In other words, the very being of this I will be becoming, and the universal form of this being will not be space, but time. Therefore, its continuation in existence will signify for this I: "not to be what it is (as static and given being, as natural being, as 'innate character') and to be (that is, to become) what it is not." Thus, this I will be its own product: it will be (in the future) what it has become by negation (in the present) of what it was (in the past), this negation being accomplished with a view to what it will become. In its very being this I is intentional becoming, deliberate evolution, conscious and voluntary progress; it is the act of transcending the given that is given to it and that it itself is. — Kojeve
For Kojève, the necessity of revolutionary violence follows from the ineffectiveness of persuasive speech. Already in his analysis of Bayle’s Encyclopedia (to which he indirectly refers in this letter to Strauss), Kojève demonstrates that the philosopher cannot overcome the plurality of particular opinions by means of persuasive speech alone – by the speech that pretends to be ‘true’ speech. [17] Indeed, throughout its history philosophy tried to operate by persuasion. It measured its effectiveness by the influence that it exercised on listeners or readers. But there is no evidence that is evident enough to compel readers to abandon their own opinions and begin to accept ‘evident speech’ as ‘true speech’. The hope that motivated philosophy for centuries – the hope to produce such an intense light of evidence that it would be impossible for anybody to reject this evidence, to turn one’s back to this light, to remain unpersuaded – this hope demonstrated itself as futile and ruinous for philosophy. As a result philosophy degenerated into literature; philosophy began to reproduce the plurality of opinions instead of overcoming it.
The end of history is the end of persuasive speech; or, rather, the end of belief in the ability of speech to persuade. But if the philosopher abandons his hope to persuade, would it mean that he would also abandon any hope of influencing the course of the world? Kojève’s answer is: ‘no’....
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If the philosophical project is the search for the common truth that would be able to unite humankind, this search is, indeed, abandoned in our time. Today, everyone insists on his or her own opinion and reacts to any attempt to change this opinion as propaganda, indoctrination and totalitarian oppression. The end of persuasive speech that Kojève diagnosed before World War II is in our time a reality that is obvious to everyone. But that does not mean that the unity of humankind as such became impossible. The principle of the new post-historical, post-philosophical politics is the principle of inclusion. Here Kojève was right. To be truly inclusive the form of the state – and all other state-like institutions – should be empty. That means that the realization of the universal state presupposes the process of the progressive emptying of its form. Here, again, art is a good illustration. A typical global art exhibition of our time is an exhibition that includes all the possible art forms and attitudes, cultural and ethnic identities, sexual orientations, and so on. It has nothing to do with the time of the historical avant-garde as artists tried to define the universal art forms that would correspond to their own time. Today, the form of an art exhibition tends to be an empty form that can contain any artistic method and attitude. Meanwhile, individual artworks are also produced as ‘open’ ones, which means not having any specific message and open to all possible interpretations.
The same can be said about the political activism of our time. As a rule it is directed towards inclusion in the existing system of political representation of the people, who are currently excluded from this system; or towards better and more general access to information; or towards better access to economic opportunities, and so on. Thus, today’s political activists operate de facto in the name of the universal and all-inclusive state that is empty and not based on any commonly shared values or truths. In this respect, they continue the post-historical politics that Kojève started before World War II: the project of opposing the world as it is, not in the name of an Idea, but rather in the name of the state as universal, all-inclusive, empty form, or in the name of Romantic Bureaucracy. Kojève died from a heart attack during a meeting of the European Commission in 1968. It was, of course, a truly Romantic death. Kojève was the Arthur Rimbaud of modern bureaucracy: a philosophical writer who consciously became a martyr of the post-historical bureaucratic order. — Groys
I primarily post this in order to share, but I do think the limits of persuasive speech and anything else in the article would make for a good discussion. — t0m
Returning to the limits of persuasion, I tend to view the plurality of worldviews or philosophies as personal adaptions to specific environments. Philosophies are as unique as snowflakes or fingerprints. In my view, all philosophies are "ultimately" groundless. I mean that unquestioned and perhaps unconscious assumptions lie at their base. This does not mean that I regard them all as equal. — t0m
Just to be clear, what I mean by groundless is not the equal "reasonableness" of beliefs. What I have in mind is that authenticity is a risky venture. Heidegger (who has great moments in my view) talked about the "they" that "one" is for the most part. We all emerge from the "they." What "one" does is, for instance, to reason in a certain way. Or "one" understands and worships God in a certain way. Our initial grounds are inherited from the "they," from our culture. So to emerge as an individual is to be "groundless" with respect to this "they" and this inherited culture. If we aren't groundless in this sense, then we aren't significantly individual. We are just going through the permutations. — t0m
So it takes some grit to stand confidently in the cognitive dissonance of this pluralism. A philosopher does more than that. He projects his own personality as a truth or law. That's fascinating. To be really interesting is to be original, and in this sense philosophers are non-fiction "poets." — t0m
Wherever a man comes, there comes revolution. The old is for slaves.
The imitator dooms himself to hopeless mediocrity. The inventor did it because it was natural to him, and so in him it has a charm. In the imitator something else is natural, and he bereaves himself of his own beauty, to come short of another man's.
Every man is a new method.
There is a time in every man's education when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for better for worse as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but though his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given to him to till.
— Emerson
I have been writing & speaking what were once called novelties, for twenty five or thirty years, & have not now one disciple. Why? Not that what I said was not true; not that it has not found intelligent receivers but because it did not go from any wish in me to bring men to me, but to themselves. I delight in driving them from me. What could I do, if they came to me? — they would interrupt and encumber me. This is my boast that I have no school & no follower. I should account it a measure of the impurity of insight, if it did not create independence.
You must read Plato. But you must hold him at arm's length and say, 'Plato, you have delighted and edified mankind for two thousand years. What have you to say to me?' — Emerson
You must read Plato. But you must hold him at arm's length and say, 'Plato, you have delighted and edified mankind for two thousand years. What have you to say to me?' — Emerson
My problem with Kojeve, much like Hegel, is that they are both largely responsible for the collapse of order in Western civilization and the return of barbarism in one form or another. Both create a politics that authorizes the use of force - makes it legitimate and necessary in the progress of consciousness and self-consciousness. To them, the 20th century with all its wars and violence was absolutely necessary.Kojeve — t0m
For example this. What could be more incriminating? It is clear that they advocate the use of force, so long as force is used for truth - but in that very process, truth becomes untruth. Persuasive speech isn't ineffective due to a fault of its own or due to the times - it's ineffective because people are free - free to disagree.For Kojève, the necessity of revolutionary violence follows from the ineffectiveness of persuasive speech. — Groys
Sure but the underlying point here should be that philosophy cannot be effective. Goodness and Truth cannot be effective except in their very expulsion and victimhood and failure.Indeed, throughout its history philosophy tried to operate by persuasion. It measured its effectiveness by the influence that it exercised on listeners or readers. — Groys
The principle of inclusion fails for the very same reason that desire itself fails. Namely it turns back on itself and ends up being a very restrictive form of totalitarianism. Nothing excludes as much as or as well as inclusion.The principle of the new post-historical, post-philosophical politics is the principle of inclusion. — Groys
The concrete Real (of which we speak) is both the Real revealed by a discourse and Discourse revealing a real. And the Hegelian experience is related neither to the Real nor to Discourse taken separately, but to their indissoluble unity. And since it is itself a revealing Discourse, it is itself an aspect of the concrete Real which it describes. It therefore brings in nothing from outside, and the thought or the discourse which is born from it is not a reflection on the Real: the Real itself is what reflects itself or is reflected in the discourse or as thought. In particular, if the thought and the discourse of the Hegelian Scientist or the Wise Man are dialectical, it is only because they faithfully reflect the “dialectical movement” of the Real of which they are a part and which they experience adequately by giving themselves to it without any preconceived method. — Kojeve
This is a good essay on Hegel (and Kojeve).I share your concerns about that side of Kojeve. — t0m
Well yeah, everyone around here knows I'm not the biggest fan of democracy either :PI don't feel particularly sentimental about the word democracy — t0m
You might like to look into René Girard about that.We might say that civilization the manifestation of this collision in terms of sophistry or rhetoric with a minimum of violence. — t0m
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