Can you take another pass at this? I don't disagree with anything here but I'm not sure what the connection is ... — Srap Tasmaner

As I said, I'm getting lost, but one of the major points seems to be the difference between quantitative and qualitative data. Well - the data from the iridium layer is definitely not quantitative. I guess it's not really qualitative either. It's observational, descriptive. Also fascinating and illuminating. It's a type of science that is completely different from chemistry and physics. There are different criteria for valid data and different standards for truth. I think about the difference between the detection of gravitational waves and the Higgs Boson and the classification of organisms that started with Linnaeus' system, travelled on through Darwin's identification of a mechanism, on through Mendel and genetics, and now on to plotting the genomes of organisms.

I don't think the physics model of science works can be applied to some very important and interesting aspects of the world.

I think I'm getting it.

If it looked like someone was saying the data have to be quantitative or you're not doing science, no, nobody was saying that, I think. Analyzing your data (of whatever kind) quantitatively is almost preposterously helpful, but maybe also not an absolute requirement. (For instance, in your cool example about iridium, measuring and quantifying the natural incidence of iridium, and comparing it to the observed incidence in the magic layer, is crucial.)

Don't get hung up on what is "qualitative" and what is "quantitative" too much, it is really only important to make such distinctions when you are doing statistical modeling or something similar. People just grasp on to the word quantitative because they think it makes them sound scientific or more official, but they all too often make the mistake of assuming it means numbers are in in the area.

If you can't separate them out, just talk about things plainly like you normally would, you may not realize it but you were already taught the difference just by learning how to talk and do basic math. You know what time is and you know what colors are, you don't need extra labels just to talk about those things.

If you can't separate them out, just talk about things plainly like you normally would, — Jeremiah

I thought that was what I did in my asteroid discussion.

If it looked like someone was saying the data have to be quantitative or you're not doing science, no, nobody was saying that, — Srap Tasmaner

Well, going back to the OP and carrying forward, I do think some people were saying that.

Analyzing your data (of whatever kind) quantitatively is almost preposterously helpful, but maybe also not an absolute requirement. (For instance, in your cool example about iridium, measuring and quantifying the natural incidence of iridium, and comparing it to the observed incidence in the magic layer, is crucial.) — Srap Tasmaner

Of course there were quantitative measurements - concentrations of iridium, depths below the ground surface, the locations of borings, but those were completely subservient to the brute fact of observation - digging a hole and looking for the telltale signs of the layer associated with the impact.

Here's another one. I saw this on 60 Minutes - a news show in the US that I have been watching since 1968. They interviewed psychologists who were studying moral development in young children. Then they showed video of 3 to 4 month old babies interacting with their mothers, the scientists, and stuffed animals. They showed the babies one of the animals and let them hold it. Then they acted out scenes between that animal and others. In some cases, the other animals behaved aggressively toward the first one. In those cases, when they handed the babies the other animals, they wouldn't hold them. When the other animal had played with the first animal, the babies would hold it. Three month old babies have an understanding at some level of human agency and right and wrong. That was one of the most fascinating things I have ever seen and it changed the way I feel about human nature forever. @rickyk95 - tell me psychology isn't a real science. Tell me something more important than that.

I do think some people were saying that. — T Clark

If so, I ignored it. ;-)

Rationality is insufficient, though. Pure mathematics attempts to be 'as rational as possible', but maths is not a science, per se. You can create a perfectly rational argument for something which there is no prospect of falsifying through evidence or observation. So 'tangibility' or 'testability' is an essential ingredient - the proposition has to concern something for which particular kinds of evidence applies, otherwise it ain't scientific. — Wayfarer

Nevertheless, "being as rational as possible" is a fundamental property of being "scientific", (though not a blueprint)and a good definition if the word is to have most power for good. In this manner, it is perfectly possible to take a scientific approach tojust about anything a very wide range of analysis; lab coats and test tubes are not essential. Stuff about observation and experiment, prediction, being systematic are merely instructions on how to be rational in certain applicable situations.

You can create a perfectly rational argument for something which there is no prospect of falsifying through evidence or observation. — Wayfarer

Only if "rationality" is not subject to Occam's Razor, I suggest.

Occam's Razor itself is a reasoned suggested approach which is not based on direct hypothesis testing; instead it is nothing but a guideline or a rule of thumb.

To be honest, I think some here have a misconception of science. Not everything is wired down to the quantitative or empirical, some of it is arbitrary and most of it is simply our best guess. Also I would like to point out that the term "rational" is not empirically falsifiable, nor is it quantifiable.

"What is rationalism" is a very interesting question. I think it could be said of "rationalism", that it requires for its application, a goal and the use of reason to attempt to reach that goal. Where the goal is stated only in subjective (as in non-objective, non-numeric) terms, then rationalism can itself only use "subjective reasoning" (if such a thing is possible...).

Also, the use of intuition might well be deemed to be "reason-enableed", or even just "reasonable" I think, and therefore rational.

Only if "rationality" is not subject to Occam's Razor, I suggest. — Jake Tarragon

No that's got nothing to do with it. A rational argument is simply one where the conclusion follows from the premises. It may or may not concern a subject which is amenable to scientific analysis.

The root of 'rationality' is 'ratio', which 'proportion' or 'measurement'. Science needs to make predictions which can be tested against evidence and observations. Those predictions comprise theories and hypotheses, which generally have to be able to be measured against some outcome or observation. That is what you mean by 'rationality', I think. However, it's important to understand that a great many important scientific discoveries have been stumbled on by accident or by serendipity, or as a consequence of looking for something else altogether. Sometimes a scientist will start out with some hypothesis in mind, only to find that she has to jettison it as a consequence of the experiment which was designed to confirm it. That's all part of scientific method - it includes rationality, but many other things besides.

Three month old babies have an understanding at some level of human agency and right and wrong. That was one of the most fascinating things I have ever seen and it changed the way I feel about human nature forever. rickyk95 - tell me psychology isn't a real science. Tell me something more important than that. — T Clark

In the social sciences, psychology and medicine, in particular, that the replication crisis has reared its ugly head. The upshot of that often is that, try the same experiment elsewhere, and you'll get contrary results. This is particularly so with psychological and social sciences.

In the social sciences, psychology and medicine, in particular, that the replication crisis has reared its ugly head. The upshot of that often is that, try the same experiment elsewhere, and you'll get contrary results. This is particularly so with psychological and social sciences. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure how that relates to the particular example I was giving? Are you expressing skepticism? I haven't read the related articles, so I can't comment.

I'm not at all disagreeing with the import of the experiment - that babies have some kind of grasp of right and wrong - they are, after all, human babies. This is more about the argument that psychology, sociology and the like are 'soft sciences', and that they don't really exhibit the same rigour, or rigidity, as the hard sciences, such as physics and chemistry. The replication crisis is about the discovery that in such cases (and I don't know anything about this particular case, I mean cases of this kind), the experiment can be run again but a different or null result attained.

That just means the soft sciences are harder.

I'm not at all disagreeing with the import of the experiment - that babies have some kind of grasp of right and wrong - they are, after all, human babies. This is more about the argument that psychology, sociology and the like are 'soft sciences', and that they don't really exhibit the same rigour, or rigidity, as the hard sciences, such as physics and chemistry. The replication crisis is about the discovery that in such cases (and I don't know anything about this particular case, I mean cases of this kind), the experiment can be run again but a different or null result attained. — Wayfarer

I've been making the point about observational science. The study I was describing is more like natural history - Jane Goodall with the chimps, Sigourney Weaver with the gorillas, even Charles Darwin with the finches and pigeons. Describing behavior, not theorizing. Sure, theorizing will come later and there's plenty of room for bad observations and unsupportable theories.

That's all part of scientific method - it includes rationality, but many other things besides. — Wayfarer

That's why Popper is so great. He includes the "irrational"/creative source of hypotheses. Science is a criterion for these hypotheses than can comfortably ignore their source. It doesn't matter if we get a great scientific hypothesis from a random-symbol generator. Its greatness will be established by its survival of various attempts to falsify it.

Agree. Another great book I read decades ago, was Arthur Koestler's The Sleepwalkers.

It traces the history of Western cosmology from ancient Mesopotamia to Isaac Newton. He suggests that discoveries in science arise through a process akin to sleepwalking. Not that they arise by chance, but rather that scientists are neither fully aware of what guides their research, nor are they fully aware of the implications of what they discover.

A central theme of the book is the changing relationship between faith and reason. Koestler explores how these seemingly contradictory threads existed harmoniously in many of the greatest intellectuals of the West. He illustrates that while the two are estranged today, in the past the most ground-breaking thinkers were often very spiritual.

Another recurrent theme of this book is the breaking of paradigms in order to create new ones. People – scientists included – hold on to cherished old beliefs with such love and attachment that they refuse to see the wrong in their ideas and the truth in the ideas that are to replace them.

As (I think) Planck commented, scientific progress is made 'one funeral at a time'.

People – scientists included – hold on to cherished old beliefs with such love and attachment that they refuse to see the wrong in their ideas and the truth in the ideas that are to replace them. — W's quote

I think this is very true. Such ideas are the cultural or spiritual "bodies" of individuals. We have to face the "death" of these crystallizations of ourselves in order to remain open to the new. Or rather that's what openness is. A "being-toward-death" is a "being-towards-birth." A total identification with any particular idea is a death-like hardening or freezing of this process. We get tired of death-birth and try to lock down the process in terms of a final/ultimate vision. It's easy to forgive/understand individual thinkers for this. It's not easy to stay strong in the face of aging or stay humble in the face of success.

(Y)

rickyk95 — rickyk95

If the science gods convene tomorrow and then emerge from a room and say in front of a waiting press corps, "Beginning now, psychology is officially a hard science. In addition, quantum physics is no longer considered science. After careful consideration we have concluded that quantum physics is closer to philosophy", does it change anything intellectually?

It might rearrange things politically, economically and socially. It might change who gets the most funding, the most prestige, the most fame, etc. But does it in any way change what we know and our ability to acquire knowledge and understand the world?

What difference does it make if something is or is not considered to be science?

I am no fan of psychology and have openly mocked it for being too subjective but to say it is not a science is just ignorance. Science is something we work towards, an approach, an aim, and they at least are moving in that direction.

I wonder how many people here would consider statistics a science.

I wonder how many people here would consider statistics a science. — Jeremiah

I don't think of any branch of mathematics as a science. Do you think I should?

There is no doubt in my mind that statistics is a science and if you studied it more I have little doubt you would disagree.

There is no doubt in my mind that statistics is a science and if you studied it more I have little doubt you would disagree. — Jeremiah

Are all branches of math sciences, or only statistics? Although it certainly seems different in detail than other branches, it seems pretty much the same in kind. Feels pretty mathy to me.

I consider mathematics a science, but statistics comes with some extra baggage the other big two don't. When you study statistics you have to study a series of classes that are more focused on the conceptual rather than mathematics; this is in addition to all the math you have to learn. It is the scientific method as told by statisticians.

It falls under the umbrella of what is know as a data science. Statistics aims at proper scientific methods for the collection and analysis of data. This analysis can be on observational data or data collected from an experiment. It uses hypothesis testing and modeling to help researchers reach a conclusion.

It falls under the umbrella of what is know as a data science. Statistics aims at proper scientific methods for the collect and analysis of data. This analysis can be on observational data or data collected from an experiment. It uses hypothesis testing and modeling to help researchers reach a conclusion. — Jeremiah

Not sure I buy that, but my familiarity with statistics is not enough to make a case. Maybe fdrake will poke his nose in and provoke a better conversation than I can provide.

I have never met anyone on the statistician's journey to disagree with the idea it is a science.

But I understand your reservation. On my first day in intro to statistics the instructor called it a science and I challenged him to prove it, so right there in class we looked up the common definition of science and talked about it. That class was mostly math, but as you push on it is clear that you are learning how to apply the scientific method on empirical data using statistical methods.