Here, my position is that our awareness of at least some Forms—though they may find representation via words or other symbols—cannot constitute representations of what actually is. For example, an awareness of the aesthetic is itself non-representational … and any representation of what is experienced (though it may help to convey the essence of meaning from one person to another) will in no way of itself embody the given experience (if one for whatever reason cannot experience what another experiences as aesthetic, no amount of phenomenal representation will convey the noumenal reality that is experienced by the other). — javra

I think that the route toward understanding this issue is Plato's concept of participation. This is critical to Plato's refutation of Pythagorean Idealism. But when it is not understood, that refutation is not apprehended, and Plato is presented as a Pythagorean Idealist. If you are familiar with The Symposium, which is an early work by Plato, you know that the Idea of Beauty is discussed. It is explained that beautiful things obtain their beauty through partaking in the Idea of Beauty. So when we come to see things as having beauty within them, what is claimed is that what is really the case is that the thing participates in the Idea of Beauty. So it is proposed according to the principles of Pythagorean Idealism, that there is an independently existing Idea of Beauty which the things are participating in. This is a universal Idea, and the particulars participate in the universal. So in this model, the universal is passive (participated in), while the individuals, or particulars, actively participate.

Throughout his early dialogues, this model is presented, and continually attacked from all perspectives, revealing its weaknesses. The existence of the independent universal Idea is very difficult to uphold because it cannot be positioned within the human mind, nor the separate world. To give it objectivity, to make it more than just opinion, requires a separation from any human mind. Furthermore, the passivity of the universal Idea starts to become a real problem. If the objects actively participate in the universal Idea, then there ought to be evidence of this activity. And what is really needed to support the position is an active Idea, which causes the objects to "be", or exist, according to the Idea. So the Pythagorean Idealism begins to look deeply flawed in this respect.

In The Republic, a work from his middle stage, Plato proposes "the good". The good appears to be meant as a principle of actualization, it's what gives Ideas actual existence. Notice that the good illuminates intelligible objects, like the sun illuminates visible objects. As much as some Platonic scholars will represent the good as "the Idea of Good", this is a misrepresentation, because it puts the good back into the classification of a passive, Pythagorean independent Idea, when the whole point is that the good is meant as a principle of actuality which allows us to go beyond the constraints which are imposed by the deficiencies of Pythagorean Idealism. But the existence of the good itself needs to be supported, so Plato must turn to divine Ideas in a divine mind to support this. (The divine mind must be singular mind, to maintain consistency in the divine Ideas, contrary to a plurality of gods). So by the end of The Republic there is a hierarchy of existence described. The craftsperson produces a physical object, a bed. The physical bed is a representation of the craftsperson's idea of bed. From "the good", the craftsperson believes that there is a proper (objective) Idea, of how a bed ought to be. So the craftsperson wants the bed to participate in the Idea of Bed, in the way of Pythagorean Idealism. But this Pythagorean Idea of Bed is only supported by 'the good". The craftsperson must believe that there is a proper, or good, Idea of Bed, and attempt to conform to this. Now the good Idea of Bed must be supported by a divine Idea of Bed, such that the craftsperson person attempts to represent the divine Idea of Bed with the chosen idea of a bed which is supposed to be the good idea of a bed.

bring this perspective up, however, both to offer the possibility that independent Forms need not be theistic in their nature and, for me more importantly, to say that (at least some) independent Forms, as universals, are that which actively in-forms all beings’ identity—thereby making the actuality of the Forms minimally concurrent with the actuality of the beings whose identity is thus brought about via these universal Forms. — javra

I believe that Plato tries to stay away from the necessity of a divine mind to support the independent Ideas. His best defence of Pythagorean Idealism is probably in The Parmenides, but this is where many say that he effectively refutes it. Here he brings in the nature of time, and if you continue with this inquiry you'll find that time is of the utmost importance, due to the passive/active classifications. Socrates compares the existence of the Idea with the existence of the day. We can replace "the day" with "the present", or "the now". No matter how many different places participate, or partake, in "the day", this participation removes nothing from the day. The day, or the present, is actively participated in by all different things, while it maintains its status as passive and unaltered. But in a way completely different from the things which actively participate in it, the day, or the present, is itself active.

I believe that the key to understanding Platonic Idealism, in the sense of the Idealism which was developed by the Neo-Platonists, is to understand the role of time. Plato's Timaeus was pivotal, and it represents a transformation from the universal Ideas of Pythagoreanism, to the particular Forms of Neo-Platonism. What Aristotle describes, is that the important metaphysical question is not why there is something rather than nothing, but why is there what there is rather than something else. Now in the Timaeus Plato posits an independent, and active Form for each individual, particular thing, which determines what that thing will be when it comes into existence. The independent Forms of Neo-Platonism are the forms of particular things.

Here it is important to develop a peculiar notion of time. We look to the past as comprised of that which has actual existence, and we look to the future as comprised of that which has potential existence. So there is a coming into being of actual existence which occurs at the present. This means that all physical existence must come into being at every moment of the present. The Forms determine exactly how every individual physical thing will come into being at every moment, but the Forms are changing, and may be altered by human will. The Forms are on the future side of the present so they cannot be detected by human senses, but they are actual in the sense of being active in determining how the physical world will appear at each moment in this world of change. There is some speculation as to how the Forms interact with each other, and the Neo-Platonist posited an order, a type of procession, which dictates how things appear to us at the present.

Why can it not be logically viable that an eternally present, a priori actuality is coexistent with the temporal potentiality which it as a priori actuality brings forth? — javra

Let's assume for the sake of argument, that this "a priori actuality" which is "eternally present", is the present itself. At the present, there is an activity which I can describe as the future becoming the past. So, we know that there is future time, and past time, and a difference between the two, such that tomorrow becomes yesterday, when Oct. 9 comes to pass, and October 9 is substantially different when it is in the past from when it is in the future. The past is always coming into existence, and this activity is occurring at the present. This, what you call "a priori actuality", the activity which is occurring at the present, is what validates what you call "temporal potentiality". There is no temporal potentiality without this activity occurring, which is the passing of time. We can say, as you suggest, that these are coexistent, they are two sides of the same coin. There is the activity of time passing, and this appears to us as the potentiality of the future.

However, we cannot neglect the fact that this activity of time passing also appears to us as the actuality of the past. So we have the activity of time passing, and this is the other side of the coin, or co-existent with, temporal actuality and temporal potentiality, as a dichotomy. Now, when we look at this side of the coin, the side described as the dichotomy between actuality and potentiality, we see that as time passes, particular actualities are actualized, from a vast realm of numerous potentialities. There is a lacking of necessity with respect to potential, expressed by "possibility", such that there must be a cause of the actualization of the particular possibilities which are actualized. So we have to posit a different type of actuality, one which determines which potentialities will be actualized at each moment as time passes. This actuality must be in some sense prior to the actuality which is time passing, in order to have any power over time passing (on its other side, potentialities being actualized). So this is the actuality which is somehow outside of time, as prior to time passing, and cannot be said to be co-existent with it.

All the same, can you further explain the argument from the principle of plentitude: why it precludes any eternally existent possibility from being a real possibility? This to me is tied into what I express toward the end of this post regarding a global telos. — javra

The principle of plenitude says that if given an infinite amount of time, any possibility will be actualized (a monkey at the typewriter will type Shakespeare for example). Therefore a possibility cannot be eternally existent because that possibility would be actualized, and therefore cease being a possibility, it would be an actuality.

Current logicians will use forms of modal logic to break the categorical division between possible and actual. In this case what is actual is just one of the many possibilities. Some will proceed to argue against the above stated conclusion, to claim that when a possibility is actualized, it still remains in the category of being a possibility. But as you can see, this is to conflate, and create equivocation, between epistemic possibility and ontological possibility.

So you are presuming that motion, change or action needs a cause and can't instead be spontaneous?

I'm instead making the opposite presumption. Fluctuations are the result of a lack of constraint. The problem that existence has is in developing regulating habits.

The initial conditions are an everythingness of spontaneity that is utterly unruly. There is nothing standing in the way of motion, change and action. Then out of that constraints develop. Chaos is transformed into definite actions having definite directions. — apokrisis

To be accurate, in the first quoted sentences “a cause” should be changed to “causation”—thereby including various types as well as allowing for a plurality of instantiations. And then, yes, this is one of my premises.

BTW, doesn't "spontaneous" translate into something like an uncaused event? You could also uphold ex nihilo events but these would need to reify the nothingness into an uncaused given, or so I'll argue. Nevertheless, these are yet notions of causality--for they address causal mechanisms (of origination).

As it happens, I also very much uphold the notion that “[random] fluctuations are the result of a lack of constraints”. Yet this chaos (these random fluctuations) to me is always relative and can never be absolute (absolute chaos to me is logically contradictory); this, then, likewise specifies that the lack of constraints upon the given chaotic system is itself always relative, and can never be an absolute lack of constraint.

As to the issue of causation-devoid motion, change, or action: how would one go about justifying this position? As a reminder, we both agree upon there being multiple, existent forms of causation, and not merely the efficient variety.

Thank you for the feedback on Platonic Forms. I’ve read much of Plato but it’s been some time and, to be honest, my memory of his writings are by now more hazy than not. What you’ve said about Plato and Pythagoras makes sense. And I don’t have anything to debate in regard to the historicity of the concepts.

So we have to posit a different type of actuality, one which determines which potentialities will be actualized at each moment as time passes. This actuality must be in some sense prior to the actuality which is time passing, in order to have any power over time passing (on its other side, potentialities being actualized). So this is the actuality which is somehow outside of time, as prior to time passing, and cannot be said to be co-existent with it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m very much in tune with this. As previously noted, I would append to it the additional factor of this same “actuality which is somehow outside of time” being itself a metaphysical end-state of being. All the same, the relation between actuality and potentiality you’ve described in relation to the present works well with me.

The principle of plenitude says that if given an infinite amount of time, any possibility will be actualized (a monkey at the typewriter will type Shakespeare for example). — Metaphysician Undercover

I should have known. Cheers for the explanations.

“Let part of a surface be painted green while the rest remains white. What is the color of the dividing line; is it green or not? I should say that it is both green and not. ‘ But that violates the principle of contradiction, without which there can be no sense in anything’. Not at all; the principle of contradiction does not apply to possibilities”.

I see a faulty premise here. The faulty premise is in "what is the colour of the dividing line". There is no such dividing line in the original description. There is a green surface, and a white surface side by side. Then the need for a "line" is assumed, but this assumption is unwarranted, there is no need to posit a line here. So the violation of the principle of non-contradiction is derived from this unwarranted assumption, that there is a line between the green and the white.

As I explained, the Aristotelian description is much more logical. Instead of a dividing line, we assume a transition of :"becoming". In the "becoming", the LEM does not apply, because the surface is neither white nor green. This renders the transition area intelligible through such concepts as potential, and matter. In this way, "possibilities" is understood through the concept of "potential", which is understood through the concept of "becoming" which is understood through the concepts of matter, change, and time.

If we claim that there is a dividing line, as per the quoted passage, instead of a transition of becoming, then the existence of this line is unintelligible due to the fact that the non-existent line is described as both green and not green. It is unintelligible because the line is not really there, what is there is a transition between green and white. When it is assumed that there is a line there, then the line must be given attributes, so it is said to be both green and not green.

The faulty representation is due to the positing of something, a line, which is not really there. So the premise, that there is a dividing line there, is a faulty premise, and this premise creates the illusion of Peircean vagueness. That vagueness is created by the false premise of a line. When we remove the line, then there is nothing there except a "becoming". And "becoming" is of a completely different category from being and not-being, so the question of whether the becoming is green or not green is simply not an applicable question. And we are in no way inclined to say that it is both green and not green, which is the Peircean way, which renders the transition unintelligible.

So it is not wrong. But it is a different sense of "potential" - one that is now about crisp possibilities or definite degrees of freedom. — apokrisis

No, it is actually wrong. It is wrong because it is a sense of "potential" which is created by that false premise. That false premise is what renders "potential" as something unintelligible. If we remove that false premise, then we are left with the Aristotelian concept of "potential", which makes "potential" something intelligible under the principles described above.

Their actualisation would be emergent. And spacetime~action, as the most fundamental form of symmetry breaking or dichotomisation, would be itself emergent. Time - conceived of as the necessary medium to effect change - itself emerges to achieve the said change. — apokrisis

But how can you refer to "fluctuations" which are prior to change? Change is emergent, but fluctuations are prior to symmetry breaking. Fluctuations are, by definition, changes.

It's always suspicious how you can provide actual references. — apokrisis

You mean you have suspicions that I might actually be right, because I can actually provide valid, coherent references to back up my claims? You firmly believe that I must be way off base, because my position is so foreign to you. Then I provide actual references to back up my claims, and suddenly you become suspicious. Suspicious that I might actually be right, while you and Peirce are actually wrong about this ontological matter?

So does emergence work from the mental to the mental I wonder. Perhaps you can say how, or why not? Tell me more about the nature of this "mental".

Yet this chaos (these random fluctuations) to me is always relative and can never be absolute (absolute chaos to me is logically contradictory); this, then, likewise specifies that the lack of constraints upon the given chaotic system is itself always relative, and can never be an absolute lack of constraint. — javra

But then what meaning does constraint have except that it is relative to a possible action? So how is the actual possibility of that action not prior to the existence of the constraint?

Unless there is something trying to happen, then it makes no sense to speak of that which is preventing it happen.

So the argument you want to employ is the one that is also going to count against you.

I'd agree that the idea of an uncaused fluctuation is unsatisfactory - a brute micro-fact!

So what comes next to dissolve that? We may still have a problem, but at least we have drilled down further to have an actually deeper level structural issue in our sights.

Getting technical, a fluctuation would seem to have to be understood as both an act of differentiation and an act of integration at the same time. Two ends of the same stick in some subtle way.

So yes, you can still make the usual "no cause/no effect" protest. You can point out my talk of fluctuations looks like talk of brute micro-facts. But my argument also hinges on mutuality or dependent co-arising. The two faces of reality will each be seen to be the cause of its other. And that in turn means that follow their present separation back to their root common origin and a convergence to a limit will result.

There will be some scale where the separate things of action and direction (energy and spacetime) become equivalent and indistinguishable. A blur. A vagueness.

Now you have the constituents of reality explained - if each face of reality is the cause of its other. And you have a common limit defined by the logic of convergence. Cosmic development, when inverted, sees everything causal contract and blur, then vanish at some limit.

There is a green surface, and a white surface side by side. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, that works. :-}

So does the edge of one surface touch the edge of the other at every point? Or are you imagining a faint gap in-between? If touching, then what makes that not continuous. If a gap, let's talk about the colour in-between.

Instead of a dividing line, we assume a transition of :"becoming". In the "becoming", the LEM does not apply, because the surface is neither white nor green. — Metaphysician Undercover

So we now have the third thing of a transition area. And the LEM does not apply as clearly this third thing is a crisply existent generality of it own. So far, pretty Peircean.

But this new transition area that replaces the line now has two boundaries - the one on the green surface area side, and another on the white surface area side. So what colour are they? Or are they further transition areas (and so on, ad infinitum)?

Aren't you really now hoping that the whole boundary question disappears into an amophous blur? The question becomes vague. It becomes impossible to say it is one thing or the other, and so therefore possible to say either could be claimed equally well without fear of contradiction?

Think again about how the laws of thought go, starting from the principle of identity. If the individuated particular is by definition the particular, then it is not not itself, and thus not its "other". The PNC and PEM follow from an axiom that assumes individuation exists.

But that leaves individuation itself unsecured. So when it comes to talk about boundaries or dividing lines, we can't afford to simply attempt to bury the problem out of sight for the moment with talk about further things such as transition zones.

Note that Peirce does follow Aristotle closely on treating the infinite as potentiality. So the number line is considered to have the continuity of a limit. We did discuss this about a year back with a guy who was a decent Peircean scholar. There is also this paper - https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/viewFile/13389/9925 - which relates this back to Peirce and Aristotle's shared conception of time. It might be worth you reading to see the basic degree of overlap.

But then I depart from Peirce at this point in adding in the strong notion of the dichotomy, or symmetry breaking. I employ the convergence to a limit argument to show that the continuity of a limit is a virtual object.

This isn't anti-Peirce, as in his voluminous writings, he touches on the same thing. But it is something I am foregrounding as the critical element. Just as I foreground the hierarchical structure which is also more implicit than explicit in Peircean semiotics.

You mean you have suspicions that I might actually be right, because I can actually provide valid, coherent references to back up my claims? — Metaphysician Undercover

Hah. No. That was just my iPad autocorrecting can't to can.

I'm just complaining how you wave your airy hand at SEP and say look there when I ask for a specific reference. You have always avoided quoting actual sources when citing from authority. So of course I think the reason is that the sources aren't going to be much support to your rather personal interpretations.

But then what meaning does constraint have except that it is relative to a possible action? So how is the actual possibility of that action not prior to the existence of the constraint?

Unless there is something trying to happen, then it makes no sense to speak of that which is preventing it happen. — apokrisis

The possibility of action is the possibility of causal agency. In a culture heavily habituated to notions of causal determinism this is often overlooked, or else looked upon as illusions we live by. This especially holds where we know the physical to be inanimate (devoid of causal agency) and then further uphold the ontology of physicalism (everything is physical and, so, inanimate).

The possibility of causal agency, in turn, cannot be devoid of ready existent teloi which bind, limit, and thus constrain that toward which possible actions can move. So no possibility of action can exist prior to the actuality of teloi which constrain what the causal action moves toward.

The action will always be concurrent with the actuality of teloi, but the teloi will be a priori to the possibility of action.

The action will always be concurrent with the actuality of teloi, but the teloi will be a priori to the possibility of action. — javra

With the proviso of actions out of learned habit.

With the proviso of actions out of learned habit. — Rich

Trying to keep things as simple as possible. With habit, it can well be argued that former consciously willed actions between teloi have become repeated so often that they become automated relative to conscious awareness. Actions from learned habit can then be argued to still be constrained by the a priori existence of teloi. Same stimulus, same choice of which way to go between alternatives, only that now it’s become a learned instinct. Or so I’d maintain.

With habit, it can well be argued that former consciously willed actions between teloi have become repeated so often that they become automated relative to conscious awareness. — javra

Agreed. They are learned and are in memory and will repeat unless overruled.

Your description is a precise description that can be directly observed by any individual who wishes to spend the time observing it. It is life as we experience it.

So we now have the third thing of a transition area. And the LEM does not apply as clearly this third thing is a crisply existent generality of it own. So far, pretty Peircean. — apokrisis

Clearly it's not Peircean, because Peirce proposed a line between the green and white, which is both green and white, violating PNC, while I propose a transition which is neither green nor white. violating LEM. Do you not see the difference? Furthermore, the violation of the LEM, is specific to that particular object, it is not a generality. It is common to particular objects in general, due to the nature of matter, but it is not a property of a generality, it is the property of physical things.

But this new transition area that replaces the line now has two boundaries - the one on the green surface area side, and another on the white surface area side. So what colour are they? Or are they further transition areas (and so on, ad infinitum)? — apokrisis

Again, you are just repeating Peirce's mistake, replacing "line" with "boundary". There is no line here, nor is there a boundary. Why do you feel the need to assume a boundary? There is nothing about the description which implies that there is a boundary here. It is the assumption of a boundary which is the false premise, the mistake which is leading you awry. The fact of the matter is that physical objects overlap each other, the gravity of the sun and moon are here on earth, the air around me enters the pores into my body. There is no boundary between one object and another. The assumption of a boundary is a false representation which is causing you problems, as it did for Peirce.

Aren't you really now hoping that the whole boundary question disappears into an amophous blur? The question becomes vague. It becomes impossible to say it is one thing or the other, and so therefore possible to say either could be claimed equally well without fear of contradiction? — apokrisis

Actually, the boundary question does disappear, when you realize that there really is no boundary there. You are assuming a boundary for no reason, so this is a false assumption. Then this imaginary, and non-existent boundary is assigned the property of where the PNC does not apply. But it's all imaginary, not real at all. There is no boundary.

Think again about how the laws of thought go, starting from the principle of identity. If the individuated particular is by definition the particular, then it is not not itself, and thus not its "other". The PNC and PEM follow from an axiom that assumes individuation exists.

But that leaves individuation itself unsecured. So when it comes to talk about boundaries or dividing lines, we can't afford to simply attempt to bury the problem out of sight for the moment with talk about further things such as transition zones. — apokrisis

Did you read what I said about the law of identity? The Aristotelian formulation of the law of identity is that a thing is identified as itself, the thing is the same as itself. This implies that identity is completely arbitrary. What the thing is, is what the thing is. It need not have any specific form. There is no necessary formula which the thing has to follow, in order that it is itself, it simply is itself, no matter what it is. So individuation is completely arbitrary, there is no rule which says that individuation must follow this or that procedure. And in order that individuation is completely arbitrary, we must dismiss this idea that there are boundaries, because this would mean that individuation must follow these boundaries.

Boundaries are created, artificially, by the human mind, when "what the thing is" is described. This gives us the other formulation of the law of identity, the one employed in formal logic. Here, the thing is identified by "what the thing is", the description. And in order for the logic to work, the thing cannot be other than what the description says. So boundaries are part of the description, they are not part of the thing itself.

But then I depart from Peirce at this point in adding in the strong notion of the dichotomy, or symmetry breaking. I employ the convergence to a limit argument to show that the continuity of a limit is a virtual object. — apokrisis

See, the "limit" is something produced by the human mind. It is conceptual only, and doesn't represent anything real within the physical world. Limits are completely immaterial, and that's why any proposed limit will never actually match what exists in the physical world, because there aren't any limits there. They are made up by the mind, and applied by the mind, in an effort to understand the physical world through containment. But this containment, these constraints which we impose, do not actually constrain the material world. However, it must be constrained in some way. We observe that the physical world is constrained, so we must look for something, other than boundaries, or limits (which are human constructs), which is doing the constraining.

I'm just complaining how you wave your airy hand at SEP and say look there when I ask for a specific reference. You have always avoided quoting actual sources when citing from authority. So of course I think the reason is that the sources aren't going to be much support to your rather personal interpretations. — apokrisis

I gave you the reference, it's right there under "identity". What do you want me to do, read it for you? Furthermore, the other time you asked for reference, I gave you direct quotes from Aristotle. So your claim that I haven't been able to produce references is very bogus. Just because the reference doesn't say what you think it should say doesn't mean that I didn't provide the reference. Now go read SEP under "identity", and tell me that it doesn't explicitly say that that there are two distinct forms of identity.

So does the edge of one surface touch the edge of the other at every point? — apokrisis

"Edge"? Who said anything about an edge? How does this urge to add something to the description, which isn't there, possess you?

I confess I am helpless against this level of rhetorical idiocy. Reason has completely departed the scene.

Reason has completely departed the scene. — apokrisis

I've been telling you this from the very beginning, your position is completely irrational. On your part, reason hasn't yet come on the scene, you just regurgitate nonsense.

“Let part of a surface be painted green while the rest remains white. What is the color of the dividing line; is it green or not? I should say that it is both green and not. ‘ But that violates the principle of contradiction, without which there can be no sense in anything’. Not at all; the principle of contradiction does not apply to possibilities”. — apokrisis

So does the edge of one surface touch the edge of the other at every point? Or are you imagining a faint gap in-between? If touching, then what makes that not continuous. If a gap, let's talk about the colour in-between. — apokrisis

I also did not follow this example. If a part of a surface is painted green, then there is no "dividing line" as such - the division does not constitute in a substantive, in a noun, in an object. The division is therefore not a line.

The division constitutes in a transition from a white line, to a green line and vice-versa. It is a becoming. This is an interruption in the continuity of whiteness (or greenness). In order to perceive the boundary (which again is not a thing, but a process, a transition) one must perceive both the white surface and the green surface juxtaposed. Indeed, it is this perception of a rupture in the continuity that constitutes the perception of the boundary - it is this very act of seeing both as juxtaposed. This rupture in the continuity is not a thing once again, so don't reify it. It's the very process of seeing the one, and then the other.

The edge of the green surface is green, and the edge of the white surface is white. The two edges are touching - it is not spatial separation in-between that makes them discontinuous, but rather the change in color.

The division constitutes in a transition from a white line, to a green line and vice-versa. — Agustino

So does the PNC apply to this "transition"? Can we say whether it is white or green? Do we feel moved to claim it has to be one or other because it can't be both? Or do we want to say the question of which colour it is seems vague?

So does the PNC apply to this "transition"? — apokrisis

Yes.

Can we say whether it is white or green? — apokrisis

Does this have anything to do with the previous question? I certainly hope it doesn't.

Or do we want to say the question of which colour it is seems vague? — apokrisis

No, the question of what colour it is isn't vague, it's incoherent, a pseudo-question. A transition is not in the same category of things as a line or an object. A transition is a process of passing from one thing to another - in this case from a green line to white line (in vision). As such, a process does not have the property of colour the way things (such as the lines) have the property of colour. The transition has no color. There's absolutely nothing vague here.

Your question is much like asking me "can we say running [a process] is white or green? Or do we want to say that the question of which colour it is seems vague?" - The apparent vagueness you detect there is the result of the category error that the question presupposes.

In fact, your whole philosophy is a bunch of category errors stuck one upon each other, precisely because you want to reach the point where mind and matter, time and space, etc. collapse into a unity and become indistinguishable. That means that you are not willing to recognise the categorical difference in kind between these phenomena. Your philosophy implies that envy can be white because there is some limit after which the two become indistinguishable in the supreme vagueness of the apeiron :s

Say what you will, but logically this is the status of your thought. It is built on a foundational incoherence which is bound to propagate throughout - and that is the category error. You refuse to admit that some things are categorically different than others, meaning that they are different in kind, not in degree.

Now this one is more interesting:

Your justification for this beginning point is nothing more than the contradiction, that .99999 repeating is the same as 1

1/9 = 0.1111111111 repeating, agreed?

So if I multiply both sides by 9, I get 9/9 = 0.99999999 correct? So how are the two not equal? I think the idea behind this is rather that decimal notation cannot capture the value of a number to the same precision as fractions can.

If you want to say they are not equal, then what number is there between them? Two numbers that are not equal are after-all separated by another number. The problem of mathematics is that continuity cannot really be broken into discreteness without creating such paradoxes.

You write a vagueness as origin. Would this not be a brute fact? — t0m

I don't understand why the long paragraphs. It's quite simple:

1) First there is the Vagueness (the Dao)

2) Then the Dao/Consciousness (Thermodynamics Imperative) begins to differentiate into a multitude.

It is straight out if the Dao De Jing or Whitehead's God. At least Whitehead was intellectually honest about it while Peirce neatly hides it away as The Vagueness. It is the Dao. There is always a sleight of hand in materialistic descriptions of Genesis.

Is it appealing because the word Thermodynamics is bring used? Well it isn't. The phrase Thermodynamic Imperative is being used to replace God.

The alternative to what you call 'long paragraphs' is dogmatic assertion. I prefer to make a case for my ideas. Whatever Hegel's failings, he was write about the content or the development of the thesis being the thing itself. Philosophy isn't math. In math, the theorem can be used without its proof. In philosophy the "theorem" (thesis) is more or less devoid of content when unaccompanied by its development. Slapping different names on the "absolute" without developing one's vision of it is a rhetorical affair. Feelings dominate in this slapping-names-on. There's nothing wrong with feelings, but for me philosophy is largely the "labor of the concept." Hence their actual development in "long paragraphs" like this one.

So you yourself speak of the origin as vagueness and then mention the thermodynamic imperative as the force behind differentiation? And your primary objection to apo's/Peirce's description of this is the choice of "The Vagueness" instead of "God" for this origin? To me this is just an emotional investment in mere choice of names. Who cares if it's Firstness or God? Such names only have conceptual content in the theory as a whole.

Answer if you dare what God means to you. Do you take the bible as the word of God? Or is your God a "philosopher's" God? Are you a Taoist? A Christian? Do you believe in sin and personal immortality? I'm not saying you are wrong or right to believe in this or that direction. I'm trying to root out your emotional investment in the word "God." Does materialism offend you as a metaphysician? Or does it threaten your belief in the afterlife (if you have one)?

Finally, sure, the thermodynamic imperative is a theology of some kind. I don't think apo would deny that. But for those no longer pious this isn't much of a confession.

I'm trying to root out your emotional investment in the word "God." — t0m

Some have an emotional investment in the word "God" and others have an emotional investment in the word "No God".

A transition is a process of passing from one thing to another - in this case from a green line to white line — Agustino

You are just playing with words. The talk here is of the boundary that marks the position where the transition happens. It's a well traversed debate in the philosophy of maths.

Your philosophy implies that envy can be white because there is some limit after which the two become indistinguishable in the supreme vagueness of the apeiron — Agustino

Sure, the Apeiron would absorb all differences of any category. But the categories that matter at a metaphysical level are all the product of dialectical reasoning. They are dichotomies.

So there is no dialectical connection between white and envy. One might talk about black and white and the spectrum of gray inbetween. One might talk about envy and whatever its polar opposite seems to be, plus the transition then connecting them which is defined in terms of these limits. But that kind of category forming relation is not being claimed of randomly chosen particulars like white and envy. They are not opposites and so neither in any useful sense the same.

Say what you will, but logically this is the status of your thought. — Agustino

I'll just say I thought you were smarter than this. Looks like you can't in fact rise above glibness. At least MU is passionate about ideas. You don't sound like you believe your own argument for a minute.

I prefer to make a case for my ideas. — t0m

A Vagueness Imperative, is not making a case. It is a manufactured phrase designed to replace the word God so as not to upset the sensibilities of "scientific materialists." Pure obfuscation embedded in long paragraphs in the hope that the sleight of hand is not noticed. In short (I do prefer getting to the point), nonsensical babble masquerading as intellectualism.

Answer if you dare what God means to you. — t0m

I have no idea what God means.

However, I do know my Mind and that is the creative force that is shaping and evolving as the universe.

You are just playing with words. The talk here is of the boundary that marks the position where the transition happens. It's a well traversed debate in the philosophy of maths. — apokrisis

There is no boundary as a thing. You've done nothing to show that there is such a boundary.

Sure, the Apeiron would absorb all differences of any category. But the categories that matter at a metaphysical level are all the product of dialectical reasoning. They are dichotomies. — apokrisis

Oh, so how are these different dichotomies related one to another? And why is it that this vagueness apparently contains unrelated dichotomies inside of it?

I'll just say I thought you were smarter than this. Looks like you can't in fact rise above glibness. At least MU is passionate about ideas. You don't sound like you believe your own argument for a minute. — apokrisis

:-} Next time try a different strategy.

There is no boundary as a thing. — Agustino

That's why the PNC fails to apply.

That's why the PNC fails to apply. — apokrisis

No, that doesn't mean PNC fails to apply. It only means that the boundary cannot have the property of color because it is not a thing, and therefore such a property cannot apply to it. But the PNC still applies - the boundary is a boundary and not - not a boundary.

So now you are saying the boundary is both not a thing and also a thing.

Hmm. See what happens when you think you can get away with glib sophistry in place of serious thought. It might pay you to read up on the philosophy of boundaries before you make too much more of a fool of yourself.

So now you are saying the boundary is both not a thing and also a thing. — apokrisis

Where did I say that?