***** doesn't re-present the number five. The number five is present (immanent) in *****. It doesn't matter if you don't know that it is there or don't know how to count. It also wouldn't matter if there were no sentient beings in existence. The number five is there as a consequence of the asterixes being there. — Andrew M
I only have to find that my states of belief are reliable in minimising the surprises I encounter in the world. — apokrisis
Very well then, thank you for your comments. — Wayfarer
***** doesn't re-present the number five. The number five is present (immanent) in *****. It doesn't matter if you don't know that it is there or don't know how to count. It also wouldn't matter if there were no sentient beings in existence. The number five is there as a consequence of the asterixes being there. — Andrew M
it's not that redness is separable from red things, not physically, but we can separate it from red things in our minds. — Srap Tasmaner
The very word "separating" starts to look wrong, so we might say "distinguishing" instead. We merely distinguish the property from the objects that possess it. And what is distinguishing? — Srap Tasmaner
In relation to sameness being a property of temporal continuity: A guy builds a toy ship made up of legos. His wife gets upset at his wasting of time with the toy ship and smashes the ship to bits. Many years later he builds himself the same ship out of the same lego pieces. It will be deemed the same ship by its builder despite there having been no temporal continuity between instantiation A and instantiation B. Therefore, temporal continuity is not necessary in order for sameness to hold presence. — javra
In relation to meaning being identical to phenomenal information: There’s a phenomenal object A and a phenomenal object B. Object A is the same relative to itself. So is object B. The relation of sameness remains unaltered in relation to objects A and B, this despite both objects holding different phenomenal properties of information. Hence, the relation of sameness—in this case, as a cognitive abstraction that one can hold awareness of—is not itself identical to any particular phenomenal information that may be discerned as being the same relative to itself. — javra
You seem to be missing the point. The redness which you are seeing, when you see a red thing, is in your mind, the image is in your mind. So it is not the case that you are distinguishing the property from the object, but you are separating the property from the object. The redness of the object is in the image, within your mind, while the object remains out there, being sensed. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, I told you where I disagree, and it would be helpful to me if you told me where you disagree. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think doing math is dealing with relationships between symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover
This sounds reasonable, but isn't the surest way to minimize surprise to reduce the information content of your beliefs? — Srap Tasmaner
So the argument is that we attempt to predict our future sensory inputs to minimise our need to actually process anything. And then what we fail to predict is where we retrospectively have to put the further attentional effort in. — apokrisis
Any chance there is some relation between the object out there and the image of the object in my mind? — Srap Tasmaner
All I can say is that there are some disagreements that are unproductive to debate, and I judged this to be one of them: — Wayfarer
I suppose one bit of evidence I could produce in support of my contention that it's the relationship of ideas, rather than symbols, would be the fact that mathematics and science has constantly had to develop new symbols to express concepts and ideas, for which the symbol didn't yet exist.
Were what you say to be true, this could never have happened. — Wayfarer
The people who are developing new symbols for new ideas are producing hypotheses and speculations, these I believe fall out of the realm of logical proceedings. — Metaphysician Undercover
I have no time for endless obfuscations. — Wayfarer
Perhaps you should consider, that when we are talking about things like symbols, meaning, and information, the physical/non-physical division is not applicable. And the attempt to apply it, is itself an obfuscation. — Metaphysician Undercover
you refuse to respect the fact that the mind thinks using symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover
Concepts are not made of physical things, because every physical thing is a particular (at least in their x, y, z, t properties), where as concepts are generals. Therefore meaningful info is, at least in part, non-physical. — Samuel Lacrampe
The question I posed was, if the physical representation changes, and the information does not, then how can the information be said to be physical? — Wayfarer
My initial argument, which as far as I am concerned hasn't been rebutted, was simply this: an item of information can be encoded in a variety of different media, and/or a variety of different languages, whilst remaining unchanged. — Wayfarer
I am late in this discussion so I apologize if this was already addressed, but why do you say we interpret these differently? It seems to me that they all point to the same concept.The claim that "the same" information is carried by different media is a false premise. The fact that we interpret 5 in a different way from V, and in a different way from ***** is evidence of this. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are these answers not all true? If they are, then this also answers your objection on what basis could we claim that the media is different: — Samuel Lacrampe
Different media may point to the same concept. — Samuel Lacrampe
I agree that each thing (a) to (d) do not have all the same properties, because they all look physically different, but they still all have the same property of pointing to the concept of "five-ness". This should clarify why only V is the correct answer to the question "what is the Roman numeral for five?", while all of them are correct answers to the question "What results from 2+3?".So it is quite clear that each of these answers does not carry the same information, despite the fact that they might all be the correct answer to some specific questions. — Metaphysician Undercover
I will indeed use a principle of identity: If things have the exact same properties, then they are one and the same thing; and if not, then not. Two sticks may look identical, but are not one and the same because they have different x, y, z properties. What about the concept of 'triangle'? To me, its essential properties are 'surface' + 'three straight sides'; nothing else. What about for you? If your concept has the exact same essential properties as my concept, then they are one and the same.By what principle of identity do you claim that these are the same concept? — Metaphysician Undercover
My initial argument, which as far as I am concerned hasn't been rebutted, was simply this: an item of information can be encoded in a variety of different media, and/or a variety of different languages, whilst remaining unchanged. The question I posed was, if the physical representation changes, and the information does not, then how can the information be said to be physical? — Wayfarer
The question I posed was, if the physical representation changes, and the information does not, then how can the information be said to be physical? — Wayfarer
If the mental representation changes, and the information does not, then how can the information be said to be mental? — Srap Tasmaner
I soundly refuted that argument, perhaps you weren't paying attention. — Metaphysician Undercover
in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.
….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too.
Does an abstraction (such as information) depend on the existence of concrete particulars?
Aristotle would say "Yes", Plato would say "No". — Andrew M
So semantics evolves from the first hardware syntactical beginnings. — apokrisis
The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the universe has to teach it. In Induction it simply surrenders itself to the force of facts. But it finds . . . that this is not enough. It is driven in desperation to call upon its inward sympathy with nature, its instinct for aid, just as we find Galileo at the dawn of modern science making his appeal to il lume naturale. . . . The value of Facts to it, lies only in this, that they belong to Nature; and nature is something great, and beautiful, and sacred, and eternal, and real,— the object of its worship and its aspiration.
The soul’s deeper parts can only be reached through its surface. In this way the eternal forms, that mathematics and philosophy and the other sciences make us acquainted with will by slow percolation gradually reach the very core of one’s being, and will come to influence our lives; and this they will do, not because they involve truths of merely vital importance, but because they [are] ideal and eternal verities.
Now I know you might object on the basis of it being 'Platonia'. — Wayfarer
I don't think it's so clear-cut. Let me ask you this - would the 'law of the excluded middle' be the case, even in the absence of anyone capable of grasping it?
I would think the answer is 'yes'. — Wayfarer
I am still in the process of studying Aristotle's hylomorphic dualism, which is his major difference with Plato, but I *think* the difference between the two lies in sense in which number (etc) can be said to exist in the absence of any observer. — Wayfarer
A horse or a man is good enough as an example of an entropy-accelerating agent. — apokrisis
It is also an abstraction that depends on the existence of concrete particulars.
Do you agree? — Andrew M
The question I keep asking is, how can you preserve the functionality of formal and final causes and top-down causation, if there is no 'top'? Or, in other words, if the final end is mere non-existence? — Wayfarer
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