Is this like Kant's distinction between the empirical and intelligible self?

In a certain sense yes.

That being said, if the "Platonic" viewpoint eventually floats off into the aether, then the Aristotelian viewpoint seems to eat itself alive, so to speak. This is Kant's whole schtick; how do you derive things from your senses without some means of deriving them given independently? There are answers to this argument, of course, but I'll stop there for now. — Pneumenon

I was responding more to the Humean point raised by Sap. We derive ideas from impressions - where do we learn how to do that? — Pneumenon

How does this relate back to my comment? I didn't say that Hume's theory of perception - more specifically, The Copy Principle - is without shortcomings, but rather that it's more convincing than Plato's theory of Forms. I don't go as far as Hume in all things, and I think that Kant made some very good points in response to him.

In answer to your question, we have an inbuilt capacity which has such a function. But what do you think that this says about Plato's theory of Forms, if anything? Does it in some way that has escaped me imply that there are independent Forms of which objects in the real world are derived? I still think that he basically got it backwards.

I didn't say that Hume's theory of perception - more specifically, The Copy Principle - is without shortcomings, but rather that it's more convincing than Plato's theory of Forms. — Sapientia

What Hume's CP misses is that impressions are always-already structured by the mind, and hence there is no deriving of the idea of the chair by seeing a chair, simply because in order to see a chair, one must already have the idea (that which, in the mind, structures the perception to be a perception of a chair, as opposed to some nonsensical perception of a "blur").

Does it in some way that has escaped me imply that there are independent Forms of which objects in the real world are derived? — Sapientia

If the perception of objects requires the mind to have a structure/faculty which already contains the idea of objects in it a priori, then it follows that the idea is ontologically prior to the object, empirically speaking, for there simply cannot be an object without the idea of it - and so it is not Plato and/or Aristotle that got it backwards ;)

What Hume's CP misses is that impressions are always-already structured by the mind, and hence there is no deriving of the idea of the chair by seeing a chair, simply because in order to see a chair, one must already have the idea (that which, in the mind, structures the perception to be a perception of a chair, as opposed to some nonsensical perception of a "blur"). — Agustino

What you're calling an "idea" isn't an idea in the ordinary or Humean sense. Which raises the question of what you call an actual idea. If you have it both ways, then you'd be equivocating, since you'd be calling some mental function involved in the production of an idea an "idea", in addition to the idea itself. So the idea would be produced by the idea, which is a needlessly muddled way of speaking.

Also, I don't really get what you're going on about. You seem to contradict yourself when you say that impressions are "always-already" structured by the mind, so the idea isn't derived from the perception, and then that we have an ability which structures perceptions to form ideas. How can they be "always-already" structured, yet require structuring? This ability you speak of would be redundant, would it not?

We derive the idea of a gold mountain from the necessary simple impressions, such as that of gold, and these are in turn a result of having had a certain perception (or perceptions); in this case, for example, the perception of a gold coin and that of a mountain. That the mind has such a capacity doesn't mean anything. It doesn't mean that Hume was wrong. He never denied it, as far as I'm aware. I don't really know what you mean by claiming that they're "always-already" structured. Perhaps in some other sense than what Hume was talking about, in which case you might be missing the point.

If the perception of objects requires the mind to have a structure/faculty which already contains the idea of objects in it a priori, then it follows that the idea is ontologically prior to the object, empirically speaking, for there simply cannot be an object without the idea of it - and so it is not Plato and/or Aristotle that got it backwards. ;) — Agustino

The mind doesn't contain the idea of objects in it a priori, nor is that necessary to perceive objects. Although it does have mental faculties which structure perception.

So, Plato got it backwards. Sorry to disappoint. ;)

How does this relate back to my comment? I didn't say that Hume's theory of perception - more specifically, The Copy Principle - is without shortcomings, but rather that it's more convincing than Plato's theory of Forms. I don't go as far as Hume in all things, and I think that Kant made some very good points in response to him.

In answer to your question, we have an inbuilt capacity which has such a function. But what do you think that this says about Plato's theory of Forms, if anything? Does it in some way that has escaped me imply that there are independent Forms of which objects in the real world are derived? I still think that he basically got it backwards. — Sapientia

Well, you'll note that I said I didn't take Plato's metaphysics in its entirety. The OP seemed to be trying to isolate vaguely "Aristotelian" and "Platonic" strains of the thought, rather than arguing between the metaphysical beliefs held by two historical figures.

My point is that, if we have some inborn capacity that allows us to derive ideas from impressions, then we've gotten into inborn capacities, a priori knowledge (at least in terms of "knowing-how"), and so on, which gives "Platonic" thinking a foothold of some sort. I think that the ultra-Humean viewpoint (which Hume himself may not have believed) that we are simply blank sheets of nothing until we have some experiences just doesn't cut it, either logically or empirically. This is the reason for my comments about the Platonic viewpoint "floating off into the aether" and the Aristotelian viewpoint "eating itself alive."

For the record, I was not under the impression that we were engaged in a fully contextualized debate yet - my thinking was that we were still in the "stage setting" phase of the discussion. That's why my comments were vague and somewhat tangential to your own. That being said, if you would like to narrow the scope and start in on the "What does it mean for us to have built-in faculties for shaping perceptions?" question, then I'd be happy to do that.

If you have it both ways, then you'd be equivocating, since you'd be calling some mental function involved in the production of an idea an "idea", in addition to the idea itself. So the idea would be produced by the idea, which is a needlessly muddled way of speaking. — Sapientia

Not at all. Awareness of an idea does not mean production of an idea. An idea can and does exist prior to your awareness of it. The idea of a chair is what makes it possible for you to experience the sight of a chair. But then, contra Hume, the sight of the chair does not PRODUCE the idea - rather the sight of the chair is required for you to come to KNOW that you have such and such an idea. Point is that the idea makes the experience possible, and the experience makes you aware of the existence of the idea. Similarly, light makes sight possible (no light, no sight), but sight makes one aware of the existence of light (no sight does NOT mean no light exists - only that one can't be aware of its existence). So just like light comes prior to sight (as it is its ground of possibility), but is nevertheless necessarily known only through sight, so too the idea comes prior to experience (ontologically), but it is known only through experience.

Also, I don't really get what you're going on about. — Sapientia

Clearly :D

You seem to contradict yourself when you say that impressions are "always-already" structured by the mind, so the idea isn't derived from the perception, and then that we have an ability which structures perceptions to form ideas. — Sapientia

Impressions are structured by the mind through the ideas. We become aware of ideas through perception. Ideas exist prior to perception, even if we may be unaware of their existence - they are what make perception possible in the first place.

How can they be "always-already" structured, yet require structuring? — Sapientia

They are always-already structured because all experience is mediated through the ideas - there can be no experience otherwise.

We derive the idea of a gold mountain from the necessary simple impressions, such as that of gold, and these are in turn a result of having had a certain perception (or perceptions); — Sapientia

You cannot have the impressions without the idea.

The mind doesn't contain the idea of objects in it a priori, nor is that necessary to perceive objects. — Sapientia

Explain. How can I see a chair if my mind does not individuate a smaller set of impressions from the much larger set of impressions currently available - thus making possible the experience of a chair as opposed to the experience of "patches of color"? And how can it individuate it except through the idea?

Impressions are structured by the mind through the ideas. We become aware of ideas through perception. Ideas exist prior to perception, even if we may be unaware of their existence - they are what make perception possible in the first place. — Agustino

More like ideas (meaning) are so regardless of perception (and existing states) and they do not exist. Plato's forms - that which is like existing things but never them- are sort of an allusion to this, only he mistakes them as a foundation for existing things when they are just infinite meanings.

In this respect, you are a Platonist extraordinaire. Your notion that ideas are the foundation of states of existence is basically a carbon copy of Plato's forms. You say there is an meaning, say triangle, from which all existing triangles are derived.

Explain. How can I see a chair if my mind does not individuate a smaller set of impressions from the much larger set of impressions currently available - thus making possible the experience of a chair as opposed to the experience of "patches of color"? And how can it individuate it except through the idea? — Agustino

Because you don't ever individuate in such a manner. When you recognise a chair, your mind has not done individuating form a larger set of impressions. There is only the idea of the chair. You didn't derive anything. You just had the idea of chair. It came entirely from you, in that you existed with the idea of chair.

Something "making it possible" is incoherent. You seeing the chair was merely possible by definition (you might look at a chair and have the idea of chair) and it happened (you had the idea of chair while looking at a chair).

More like ideas (meaning) are so regardless of perception (and existing states) and they do not exist. Plato's forms - that which is like existing things but never them- are sort of an allusion to this, only he mistakes them as a foundation for existing things when they are just infinite meanings. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I am not convinced of the truth of idealism, but Schopenhauer's logic seems quite good. We come to know of the world through perception. Indeed it is through perception that we come to KNOW of the ideas of reality, existence, external world, etc. All our concepts are derived from perception. And so, you cannot speak of something that cannot be percieved even in principle (even cells can be percieved using microscopes! - electrons using beams of photons, etc.) as existing - because to exist is to be percieved. And hence, when you tell me that ideas don't exist - that is nonsense. If ideas don't exist, then nothing does either. So I agree that ideas are as they are regardless of our awareness of them, but I disagree that they do not exist. Plato's forms are in no way like existing things, the same way the idea of a circle, is in no way like a real circle - as Spinoza showed.

Your notion that ideas are the foundation of states of existence is basically a carbon copy of Plato's forms. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Nope, I don't believe this. Ideas are on a different, but ontologically prior level to actual states of existence. And if Idealism is true, then ideas are all that exists. If materialism is true, then ideas form the structure of our minds only, and all our experience is mediated and converted through these structures. The material worlds becomes Kant's noumenon, the one we can never know of. That's why Schopenhauer affirming the possibility of knowledge of the noumenon necessarily implied idealism, which I tend to think is the better explanation, but I may be wrong on this point. I am not at all certain of the truth of idealism.

You say there is an meaning, say triangle, from which all existing triangles are derived. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No I merely say that the existence of actual triangles, perceptible triangles, requires the existence of the imperceptible idea of triangles. Even this is far-fetched. It's much better to say that the existence of spatial objects requires the imperceptible existence of the idea of space.

When you recognise a chair, your mind has not done individuating form a larger set of impressions. — TheWillowOfDarkness

False. To recognize a chair, I need to separate it from the rest of the environment, which is also in my visual field. What performs this separation? Why don't I just see a mess of colors, with no logic behind them?

Something "making it possible" is incoherent. You seeing the chair was merely possible by definition (you might look at a chair and have the idea of chair) and it happened (you had the idea of chair while looking at a chair). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes it is. Certain structures are required for perception to be at all possible, as Kant clearly and irrefutably (by the way) demonstrated. This is one of the things he got right, and I do disagree with Kant on quite a few points. But not this insight.

You are confusing the causality of many of our thoughts with being logically derived. We have many ideas caused by our perceptions. Our body is that that it responds to perceiving something by have ideas about it and sorting out meaning which is committed to memory.

Once we have perceived a blur, we are caused to investigate it further, which causes new ideas to emerge in our head, which then are committed to memory and cause further ideas in the future, and so on and so on...

At no point is the emergence of an idea in your head logically derived. It's always a brute inspiration which has nothing to with saying the idea comes out of some previous idea or state. Indeed, to derive in such a manner is impossible because, prior to having an idea, we know notthing about it. Setting up the deduction is impossible because you aren't aware of the conclusion yet. You can't say that you will now get this new idea of "chair" from looking at a thing in front of you because you don't yet have the idea of chair. In attempting to derive the idea of chair from perception, you make exactly the error you chastised Sapientia for: holding you have the idea before it is actually present in your mind.

This is why you cannot separate the chair from its environment to discover it. To do that, you would have to already have the idea of chair, such that you could distinguish between what was the chair and what was not. You do not have this.

As with any idea, the realisation has to come form you, a brute realisation of a meaning. You have to have a moment where you realise the separation of chair all at once. You can't reason through a deduction to arrive at the difference of chair form everything else. You don't know a chair is "XYZ" such that you can look at the many things in front of you and say: "Well, that has XZY so it must be a chair." Nothing performs a separation. You just appear with the separation.

Yes it is. Certain structures are required for perception to be at all possible, as Kant clearly and irrefutably (by the way) demonstrated. This is one of the things he got right, and I do disagree with Kant on quite a few points. But not this insight. — Agustino

Kant gets this entirely wrong. What he talks about is not possibility. Like many people what he is deeming "possibility" is actually a question of what existing things are required to produce a causal outcome.

We sometimes say, for example, things like: "It's impossible for humans to break diamond by hitting it with their hand." In such cases, we are operating on the idea there is a specific state required to produce a casual outcome. Supposedly, for example, some other from of human existence would be needed for breaking diamond with our hands to be possible. Here we are confusing possibility with actuality.

It's actually always possible, by definition (i.e. an infinite, logically necessary), for humans to break diamond with their hand. All it would take is an existing human who could. The fact no-one we know has so far had the ability doesn't change this. Someone without the ability might wake-up tomorrow with the power to break diamond (viz Hume, Quantum Mechanics). Even those who can't break diamond still might have. They just didn't.

Similarly, particular structures are not required for perception to be possible. Not even our space-time, for it is possible perception might with all sorts of of different things, many of which are not like our space-time at all. Just because our perception and space-time are one way, and are not without it, it doesn't mean that's required for perception to be possible. Those are only needed for the actual states of our perception. It doesn't have any impact on possibility.

What Kant deems "ideas" of space-time are really actual states of our world, the existing objects which interact, which expresses a particular relationship of space and time.

Aristotle has never given me 'the fire.' What I get out of Plato I mostly get from the extent to which he is trying to portray Socrates, who from this imperfect reflection seems like by far the more compelling thinker. To the extent that Plato departs form the 'historical' Socrates, he becomes less interesting.

Overall I would say I hold the Socratic tradition and the 'ethical turn' in the highest regard, and that this is distinct from the not so great directions that Plato and Aristotle took him in. I see the Hellenistic philosophers as the heirs to this more interesting tradition, which is sort of 'ethicist' rather than empiricist or rationalist.

Aristotle has never given me 'the fire.' What I get out of Plato I mostly get from the extent to which he is trying to portray Socrates, who from this imperfect reflection seems like by far the more compelling thinker. To the extent that Plato departs form the 'historical' Socrates, he becomes less interesting.

Overall I would say I hold the Socratic tradition and the 'ethical turn' in the highest regard, and that this is distinct from the not so great directions that Plato and Aristotle took him in. I see the Hellenistic philosophers as the heirs to this more interesting tradition, which is sort of 'ethicist' rather than empiricist or rationalist. — The Great Whatever

I would largely agree to this. Socrates in my opinion is superior, as a human being, compared to Plato and Aristotle.

For me, personally, Aquinas and Leibniz.

Plato was too idealistic, and Aristotle did not do any research in the scientific sense -- he just dreamed everything up in his own head.

Socrates was an extremely bright and highly experienced old man who managed to get into big trouble with the leadership of Athens on freedom of speech issues like creating a Philosophy God and showing how ridiculous Greek Pantheonistic Theology is.

This continued to be a hot button issue for another 725 years until Constantine The Great published his edict of tolerance at Constantinople regarding the toleration of Christianity and all other religions.

That's what got Socrates killed.

The irony however is that the Christian God The Father is a lot like Zeus anyway.

And His Beloved Son Jesus is a lot like Heracles.

And the Holy Spirit is a lot like Hermes.

And Holy Mary Mother Of Christ is a lot like Aphrodite.

And whether or not there is only one God like the Jews and Muslims say, or 3 of them like Early Christianity (pre-Nicene) says, or a whole multitude and families like the Greek Pantheon we cannot and do not know.

So the Greeks weren't that far off as far as true Christianity is concerned.

And Socrates may have gotten himself killed for nothing.

My point is that, if we have some inborn capacity that allows us to derive ideas from impressions, then we've gotten into inborn capacities, a priori knowledge (at least in terms of "knowing-how"), and so on, which gives "Platonic" thinking a foothold of some sort. — Pneumenon

Does it? It makes me think of Kant, but it seems quite far removed from Plato. Also, in what way do you think a priori "know-how" knowledge is involved in what we've discussed? I don't think that you can rightly categorise either the process of perception or the capacity to perceive as knowledge of any sort, let alone a priori "know-how" knowledge, of which I doubt there are any actual examples. That sort of knowledge seems to be exclusively a posteriori.

That being said, if you would like to narrow the scope and start in on the "What does it mean for us to have built-in faculties for shaping perceptions?" question, then I'd be happy to do that. — Pneumenon

We could do, I suppose.