Yes, it's difficult to talk about NOTHING. Being, by definition, nonexistence, it lacks properties we're familiar with and, so, is beyond our grasp.

We may, however, approach it negatively, in fact it's defined negatively - as what it isn't. The only property NOTHING has is zero, a quantiative property. — TheMadFool

As a number concept, the quantitative concept of zero entails a unit-concept. We need to specify the unit, an answer to the question "Zero what?" Moreover, one might argue that what makes a negative existential claim (There is no x such that PHI(x)) a concept of zero-units is its place in a number system; and that the concept of nonexistence is thus more primitive than the concept of zero.

To say there are no marbles in an urn is not to say there's nothing in the urn.

To sat that Pegasus doesn't exist is not to say that nothing exists.

The abstract concept of zero and the abstract concept of nonexistence are distinct from each other as well as from the yet more abstract concept of Nothing.

Judgments that there are zero marbles in this urn involve conceptual relation among the concept "marble", the concept "this urn", and the world in which it's said there are no marbles in this urn.

Judgments that Pegasus doesn't exist involve conceptual relation between the concept "Pegasus" and the world in which it's said there's no such thing as Pegasus.

Two interesting facts about nothing. First is, decimal math couldn't have got off the ground without the concept of zero - and this breakthrough was held back for centuries, in the West, because 'nothing' was a kind of verboten concept, associated with the Devil. It was Buddhist mathematicians who formalised the recognition of zero, because Buddhist philosophy had no such compunction, immersed as it was in the concept of 'emptiness' or 'Śūnyatā'.

Second interesting fact: the symbol for zero, 0, came from the hole in the middle seat of a dhow (small sailing vessel).

Numbers themselves are not properties — Herg

Really? What then of the distinction quality vs quantity?

Also...

Quantity is a property that can exist as amultitude or magnitude. Quantities can be compared in terms of "more", "less", or "equal", or by assigning a numerical value in terms of a unit of measurement. — Wikipedia

Another thing is science is in the business of quantifying everything. I reckon it's to do with achieving objectivity and also the assumption that mathematics is the underlying principle of the universe.

So, a quality, unequivocally a property, can be quantified. For instance, red is a certain wavelength of light. I think quantity is a property.

Martin Heidegger's argument in Being and Time. I would kindly suggest that your ontology needs to be either displaced or supplemented. — bloodninja

NOTHING is, by definition, neither physical nor mental. Where, exactly, do you have a problem with that?

The abstract concept of zero and the abstract concept of nonexistence are distinct from each other as well as from the yet more abstract concept of Nothing. — Cabbage Farmer

If you have the time, can you unpack the above quote for me? How is zero different from nonexistence from NOTHING?

To me, NOTHING is nonexistence and zero is a property of NOTHING.



Thanks for the post. I learned something.

Is Sunyata = NOTHING?

Here you seem to be making an implicitly metaphysical claim that the physical stuff the hammer is made out of is actually real, and therefore, because it’s actually real, the dog can actually play with it. — bloodninja

The fact that dogs can play with hammers does not imply that they are real. Dogs can play with hammers in cartoons, and no-one would think that dogs and hammers in cartoons are real. I will, however, concede that in using the term ‘object’ without making it clear that I mean ‘physical object’, since ‘object’ is frequently understood in philosophy to imply independent existence I may have seemed to be making a claim for reality of the hammer. This was not my intention.

Please note that, for the dog, the hammer is neither ontologically ready-to-hand equipment nor an ontologically present-at-hand object. I think it’s safe to say that dogs aren’t ontological, and for that reason the dog has no understanding of the being of the hammer as either a hammer or an object. For the dog it is a curious play-thing. Therefore that the dog can play with the hammer does not prove that the hammer is also an object. Ontologically speaking, the dog is just irrelevant. — bloodninja

You begin here by saying that the dog has no ontological view of the hammer (which I will agree to), but then you allow that to the dog the hammer is a play-thing. Obviously you do not mean to imply that the dog THINKS of the hammer as a play-thing – it just plays with it – but even so, your position is untenable, because if the dog is able to play with the hammer but does not view the hammer AS anything, this can only be by virtue of the hammer possessing some properties that are not conferred on the hammer by its being viewed AS something, but are actually intrinsic to the hammer. These are the hammer’s physical properties – its length, breadth, mass, shape, molecular constitution, and so on. These intrinsic physical properties constitute the hammer as a physical object.

The hammer driving in the nail in wood in order to..., the door knob you don't notice but that you nevertheless turn to open the door in order to enter the room in order to..., the keyboard beneath your fingers that you type on in order to express the meaning of the sentence in order to..., the sidewalk at your feet while rushing to the train in order to not be late to work... have in the first instance the intelligibility of readiness-to-hand, there is no awareness of anything like an object. — bloodninja

Untrue. I can pick up a hammer, knowing it to be a hammer, and also being aware AT EXACTLY THE SAME TIME of its size and shape and appearance, which are its properties as a physical object.

Moreover, properties do not belong to the ready-to-hand. Properties only belong to present-at-hand ontology. — bloodninja

Everything that exists necessarily has properties, irrespective of whether it features in anyone’s ontology or not. Are you seriously going to claim that the hammer does not have such properties as length, breadth and mass?

It may be, of course, that you think hammers do not really exist, in which case your position is idealist. Are you in fact an idealist?

Numbers themselves are not properties
— Herg

Really? What then of the distinction quality vs quantity? — TheMadFool

Number is not the same as quantity. The number 3 is not the same as 3 OF something.

For instance, red is a certain wavelength of light. — TheMadFool

No it isn’t. Red is a colour. There is a wavelength of light that, when viewed by humans with normal vision, causes them to see the colour red, but that is not the same as red being that wavelength.

What would you do if, you would know nothing, like that so called Socrates did? Would you use your shield of omnipatience in defence of the weak or not?
Should I Ask you, how did Socrates corrupted the youth? -Or not, because you dont' know?
Perhaps these things are irrelevant, hm what do you think?

Is Sunyata = NOTHING? — TheMadFool

It's a notoriously difficult concept to define, but the short answer is that Śūnyatā is not simply nothing, but the insubstantial nature of the objects of perception. Buddhist philosophy says that people invest objects with significance that they don't actually have, due to desire and delusion, but if they see things properly, then they realise that such objects have no intrinsic value. That's one interpretation, although there are others.

However, the point in the context of this thread, is that Buddhist (and Indian) mathematicians didn't have the hang-ups about the concept of zero that were apparently held by rationalist Western mathematicians.

Check out this title - Zero: The Biography of a Dangerous Idea https://www.amazon.com/dp/0140296476/ref=cm_sw_r_cp_tai_JSf0zbKPJCTP7

His "corrupting of the youth" was actually demonstrated in at least one case. He told a blacksmith's (I believe it was) son that he was doing the same work as slaves, and was better than that. The guy then became dissatisfied with his work with is father, as one would, but couldn't figure out what else to do, and took to drinking, and self-destructed basically.

Hegel actually argues that the Athenians demonstrated every single accusations they waged against him.

Number is not the same as quantity. — Herg

What's the difference?

Perhaps these things are irrelevant, hm what do you think? — Vajk

Socrates? What does he have to do with nothing? I know that he's famous for the words ''I know that I know nothing.'' However, this statement can be better expressed as ''I know that what I know isn't perfect, in the sense that it's free of inconsistencies''.

It's a notoriously difficult concept to define, — Wayfarer

I understand. Thanks.

However, the point in the context of this thread, is that Buddhist (and Indian) mathematicians didn't have the hang-ups about the concept of zero that were apparently held by rationalist Western mathematicians. — Wayfarer

I guess the Devil wasn't associated with NOTHING in these culture.

U know that, huh?
"You know nothing John Snow"

U know that, huh?
"You know nothing John Snow — Vajk

I don't see the relevance of this to my OP.

Do you know anything about NOTHING? If you do, please share. Thanks.

If that so, then again, I have nothing to say to you.

It seems you're not making much effort to come to terms with my position, only to disagree with it. I'm not saying that the hammer lacks any physical properties, only that the being, or the hammer-ness of the hammer, is not its physical properties. Moreover, its being is not some mysterious property added onto it extrinsically. The being of the hammer, as ready to hand equipment, is always already determined by the referential whole (the world). I can give you more examples if you like? The key point, however, is that this kind of being is not a property, as hard as that might be to understand.

Could Nothing be the very reason for everything?

Could Nothing be the very reason for everything? — Vajk

What do you mean?

Could Nothing be the Primal Cause in a well Sophisticated world?
I guess it depend, which world we talking about, so lets push it a bit, to the "world of Ideas".

It seems you're not making much effort to come to terms with my position, only to disagree with it. — bloodninja

You mean I am disagreeing for the sake of it? That's pretty insulting, and not true. I disagree with you because I think you are wrong.

I'm not saying that the hammer lacks any physical properties, only that the being, or the hammer-ness of the hammer, is not its physical properties. — bloodninja

The being of the hammer and its hammerness are not the same thing. Its being is as a physical object. Its hammerness, by contrast, consists in its being thought of and used by us as a hammer.

Moreover, its being is not some mysterious property added onto it extrinsically. — bloodninja

I haven't said that it is. Its being, which is physical, is not added to it, it is intrinsic. It's its being a hammer that is added to it (by us) and which is extrinsic.

The being of the hammer, as ready to hand equipment, is always already determined by the referential whole (the world). — bloodninja

You have it backwards. The being of the hammer is as a physical object, not as equipment.

The key point, however, is that this kind of being is not a property, as hard as that might be to understand. — bloodninja

Being a hammer is a property. As I have said, it is an extrinsic property. The hammer's being a hammer is not the same as its mere being. Its mere being is the same as its existence, and there is no agreement among philosophers as to whether existence is a property.

To summarise my position:
1. The being of the hammer, its existence, is as a physical object. It has physical properties which are intrinsic to it.
2. The hammerness of the hammer, its being a hammer as opposed to its merely being, is an extrinsic property which is added to the hammer by us.

Could Nothing be the Primal Cause in a well Sophisticated world? — Vajk

Well, NOTHING forms the backdrop to everything. A physical object occupies the space that was NOTHING. An idea forms to occupy what was once a void/NOTHING. Tabula rasa?

So, the real question is, which idea did not ended with nothing?

To summarise my position:
1. The being of the hammer, its existence, is as a physical object. It has physical properties which are intrinsic to it.
2. The hammerness of the hammer, its being a hammer as opposed to its merely being, is an extrinsic property which is added to the hammer by us. — Herg

Maybe we should agree to disagree. To modify your quote above, I would summarize my position as:

1. The being of the object-Thing as an occurrent physical object, has physical properties.
2. The being of the hammer, as ready-to-hand equipment, is of a different ontological mode than (1).

For your interest, below I have copied and pasted a very small excerpt of Heidegger's description of the phenomenology of equipment in section 15 of Being and Time.

"Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to...' A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability."

"In the 'in-order-to' as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of something to something... Equipment-in accordance with its equipmentality-always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered."

"Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer, for example) ; but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer's character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable. In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the "in-order-to" which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time ; the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is-as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific 'manipulability' of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests itself in its own right—we call "readiness-to-hand". Only because equipment has this 'Being-in-itself' and does not merely occur, is it manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal. No matter how sharply we just look at the 'outward appearance' of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot discover anything ready-to-hand. If we look at Things just 'theoretically', we can get along without understanding readiness-to-hand. But when we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character. Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is circumspection."

"....The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work-that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered."

If you have the time, can you unpack the above quote for me? How is zero different from nonexistence from NOTHING?

To me, NOTHING is nonexistence and zero is a property of NOTHING. — TheMadFool

What does it mean to say "NOTHING is nonexistence"? Do you mean that "Pegasus does not exist" and "Pegasus is NOTHING" are essentially the same claim?

What would it mean for NOTHING to have properties? At first glance it makes more sense to say NOTHING is a property some things have -- more specifically, a property that some predicates, like "being Pegasus", have. For no thing is Pegasus.

Strictly speaking, I'm not sure what a "property" is supposed to be. I have a rough idea what it means to say something like "Hardness is a property of this lump of quartz", or "This quartz has the property of hardness", but I'm not sure whether such expressions mean anything different than "This quartz is hard". We count ourselves entitled to apply the predicate "hard" to this quartz, because it appears to satisfy our standards for applying the term. We have a concept of "being hard" that is informed by encounters with various things said to be hard or not-hard.... What is the special role of the concept of "property" in such accounts? I'm not sure it does any useful work that we can't allocate to terms like "predicate" and "concept" on the one hand, and to terms like "feature" or "characteristic" on the other. Meanwhile, it seems there's a great deal of confusion among philosophers about the use of the term "property".

What do you mean when you say, "zero is a property of NOTHING"? One interpretation that comes to mind: NOTHING is a concept, and there are no things that exist that are NOTHING, in other words, there are no objects that satisfy the predicate "x is NOTHING". Accordingly, no NOTHINGs exist, and the number of NOTHINGs in the universe is zero. Same as the number of Pegasuses.

Alternatively, we might say zero and NOTHING are closely related properties of some predicates or concepts, namely, those without objects.

I'll take a whack at that little bundle you asked me to unpack:

The abstract concept of zero and the abstract concept of nonexistence are distinct from each other as well as from the yet more abstract concept of Nothing. — Cabbage Farmer

So far as I can see, the main difference between zero and nonexistence is that zero is a number concept with a role in a system of number concepts, whereas the concepts of existence and nonexistence are distinct from, and I suppose logically prior to, any concept of number.

I take it that claims involving terms "existence" and "nonexistence" here are just claims to the effect that "There is some x such that PHI(x)", "There is no x such that PHI(x)", and the like. Claims that there are "zero" of something have basically the same logical form as "There is no x such that PHI(x), except that they're linked to a system of number-concepts and numerical relations.

By contrast, the concept of "Nothing" seems a sort of confused conceptual abstraction -- the idea that there is some thing that exists, the nature of which is to be no thing and to be nonexistent... or I don't know what.

I said it's "yet more abstract" than the concepts of zero and nonexistence, because it seems to involve a sort of generalization of the logic of such negative concepts, or even a reification of some such generalization.

I call concepts of number and existence, and perhaps a fortiori the concepts of zero and nonexistence, "abstract" because it seems to me that, although we use such concepts to make objective claims about the world, there are no "things" in the world called "numbers", and there is no "thing" in the world called "existence" -- except insofar as our concepts and their relations may be counted among the "things in the world".

I'm inclined to lump numerical, causal, modal, and existential judgments together in this respect.

What does it mean to say "NOTHING is nonexistence"? Do you mean that "Pegasus does not exist" and "Pegasus is NOTHING" are essentially the same claim? — Cabbage Farmer

I was clear (at least I tried to be) that a thought, one of which is a pegasus, is not nonexistence. A pegasus is an idea and exists in the mental world. It may have no physical correlate but a pegasus exists in the mind. So, no, I don't think a pegasus is NOTHING.

NOTHING is a concept — Cabbage Farmer

NOTHING is not a concept. I believe we can have concepts OF things but the concept is not equivalent to the thing we have a concept of. This part is still unclear to me but my reasoning is that NOTHING, being defined as nonexistence, can't be a concept because concepts exist in the mental world. So, I think we have a concept OF NOTHING and this concept is something similar to a road sign pointing to NOTHING without itself being that which it points to.

So far as I can see, the main difference between zero and nonexistence is that zero is a number concept with a role in a system of number concepts, whereas the concepts of existence and nonexistence are distinct from, and I suppose logically prior to, any concept of number. — Cabbage Farmer

Zero is, to me, the quantity of NOTHING. If you have 2 dogs and I buy them both you're left with NOTHING, or in other words, zero dogs. Nobody will question my math. However, I do agree that NOTHING is prior to zero.

I was clear (at least I tried to be) that a thought, one of which is a pegasus, is not nonexistence. A pegasus is an idea and exists in the mental world. It may have no physical correlate but a pegasus exists in the mind. So, no, I don't think a pegasus is NOTHING. — TheMadFool

What is a "mental world"? How many mental worlds are there? What does it mean to say an idea or concept or fictional object "exists in the mental world"?

I agree that an actual thought, idea, concept, or fictional object is not a nonexistent entity, regardless of whether it has a "physical correlate" in the sense indicated. I agree that we have concepts or ideas of Pegasus, we have thoughts and tell stories about one or more fictional objects called Pegasus.

NOTHING is not a concept. I believe we can have concepts OF things but the concept is not equivalent to the thing we have a concept of. This part is still unclear to me but my reasoning is that NOTHING, being defined as nonexistence, can't be a concept because concepts exist in the mental world. So, I think we have a concept OF NOTHING and this concept is something similar to a road sign pointing to NOTHING without itself being that which it points to. — TheMadFool

I agree that, at least typically, a concept is not identical to the thing it is a concept of.

If nonexistence and NOTHING are not conceptual, then I'm not sure what we're talking about here.
It's beginning to sound as though you're saying that NOTHING, aka nonexistence, is a thing that exists, that is not merely conceptual, and that does not exist merely in the mental world. Is that the ballpark?

Zero is, to me, the quantity of NOTHING. If you have 2 dogs and I buy them both you're left with NOTHING, or in other words, zero dogs. Nobody will question my math. However, I do agree that NOTHING is prior to zero. — TheMadFool

But I'm not left with NOTHING when you take away my dogs. I'm left with plenty, but no dogs. Likewise, when you take my dogs, I'm not left with ZERO, but with zero dogs. Similarly, I don't "have TWO", but I have two hands and two feet.

I do indeed object to your use of mathematics -- not the abstract calculation, but the neglect of units.

Zero is the number of dogs I'm left with when you take them all away. Zero is the number of lots of things, just like any number is the number of lots of things. In each case, the number is a function of a concept, like "Dogs of the Cabbage Farmer at time t", and with respect to number we may call this concept a unit.

Are there different Nothings? Different ways in which Nothing is understood? Perhaps there is a primordial Nothing on the one hand and a not so primordial Nothing on the other? Perhaps Zero is one of these "not so primordial Nothings"?

Not Unlike 'Zero' the word 'Nothing' is the word we use to quantify an absence i.e. "they said nothing" - 'Nothing' quantifys the absence of speech.

Used without context 'Nothing' is an oxymoron.

Even as a theory 'Nothing' or 'Non-existence', If one could possibly explain what it is, then in explination it would exist and that would be a contradiction.

What is a "mental world"? — Cabbage Farmer

The world of thoughts, distinct from the physical world we touch, see, hear and feel. Pegasus exists in the mind, the mental world; it is a mental object/thing, isn't it?

It's beginning to sound as though you're saying that NOTHING, aka nonexistence, is a thing that exists, that is not merely conceptual, and that does not exist merely in the mental world. Is that the ballpark? — Cabbage Farmer

I'm saying exactly the opposite. NOTHING can't be physical or mental. Anything that exists in these two worlds have properties e.g. a banana is yellow and a pegasus has wings. But, NOTHING, being nonexistence, has no properties.

but the neglect of units — Cabbage Farmer

We can work with numbers without units. Pure arithmetic: 2 - 2 = 0. Ask yourself ''how many things there are in NOTHING?'' The answer is ''zero''.

Are there different Nothings? — bloodninja

I'm talking about a specific NOTHING - nonexistence, not anything. Perhaps yhis is what you mean by ''primordial nothing''.

There couldn't have been nothing, because there inevitably are abstract objects, including abstract facts.

Someone could say that there are only abstract facts if there's someone to know them. Sure, and that experience and experiencer are part of any hypothetical system of abstract facts.

That's one reason why I suggest that experience is primary. It would seem meaningless to speak of a world, hypothetical or otherwise, without an experiencer of it.

I wouldn't call those hypothetical abstract systems "nothing", if they're all that metaphysically is.

Michael Ossipoff

Well, NOTHING forms the backdrop to everything. A physical object occupies the space that was NOTHING. An idea forms to occupy what was once a void/NOTHING. Tabula rasa? — TheMadFool

Abstract objects were always there, and didn't at some time appear to occupy what was once nothing.

An inter-referring systems of abstract facts doesn't need a backdrop, or a medium in which to be, or some sort of global or objective reality.

No one ever experiences "nothing", so the experience-primary point of view doesn't support the notion of it.

Michael Ossipoff

‘‘There is nothing in this world more dangerous than a humiliated man.‘‘
Kai

from American Horror Story S07 ep 1