My first suggestion is that you offer a brief summary that doesn't require that I read your actual dissertation. You'll get far more feedback that way.

I could give it a go. I was worried it would lead to a lot of feedback that was already covered in the body of the thesis. But sure, here goes nothing:

Freedom consequentialism is a consequentialist theory based on the idea that what is of value is the protection of a particular, limited kind of freedom: that of persons over that which already belongs to them; their mind, their body and their property. In the first chapter posted, I begin with the starting assumption that if moral realism is correct, that an objective, universal morality exists, then there is a way in which persons ought to be or act. I make the case for this being a more fundamental starting assumption than those made by other normative theories such as utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics and that their starting assumptions presuppose mine. Then I argue that based on this assumption, our best candidate for moral value is the ability of persons to make their own choices, which I call freedom. Then I make the case for being an act consequentialist rather than a kind of virtue theorist or a deontologist of some kind.
In the second chapter I discuss what kinds of freedom matter and use a triadic relationship chart to clarify what I mean by freedom. Then I discuss how freedoms over different things can be weighed against one another.

On page 2 you say you are not assuming that "morality" exists. Can "morality" (a codified system) exist without producing what is good? Maybe Adolf Hitler behaved properly within his 'system of morality' even though he did a long string of very bad things. Does a difference between "morality" and being moral (doing what is good) need to be clarified?

Later you say that it makes sense to assume that we have free will, whether we do or not. I totally agree that it makes sense to suppose that we have free will. Such a statement will fly here just fine. Will it fly with your PhD advisor and committee?

It seems to me that one of the limitations on the freedom of a mind to think and direct actions, is that "the mind" may not be entirely in charge. You can't choose to like or not like blueberry pie, or feel a longing to eat some. You can choose to either eat it or not. As Sigmund Freud put it, "We are not masters of our own houses." We are not in control of our mental resources in their entirety. One may believe that it is right to avoid saying unkind things to other people. Yet, one finds that one has blurted out some unkind thing without wishing to, without intending to, and without any prior thought.

People commit far worse acts than the sarcastic putdown that someone may or may not have deserved. They might find that themselves in the act of using physical force to hurt some one--again without wishing to, without intending to, and without any prior thought. (So and so just turned around abruptly and slugged him in the face.) Are people like this insane, lacking in the capacity to control their behavior, unfree, etc.? Almost certainly not. Their subconscious urges or suppressed feelings of anger, resentment, jealousy, etc. just suddenly got the better of them--before they could block it.

Freud thought (and there is evidence that he was right) that people sometimes behave irrationally, badly, despite themselves. This isn't an argument for not punishing bad behavior. If you shoot your PhD advisor, you'll likely go to prison, even if you didn't wish or plan to shoot her seconds before you felt the uncontrollable urge to silence her endless nit-picking criticisms, pulled out your legally concealed and carried gun, and shot her in the head.

I bring it up because you are assuming that people actually are free. How free? 100%? 98%? 88%? 75%? 50%? 5%? How unfree can they be and still count as free? On the other hand, accountants don't suddenly defraud a bank on the basis of unconscious urges. Proper fraud takes time and planning. Will is very much involved. Saints don't impulsively do good. They have to work at it. Free will is behind their behavior.

So, getting late, time to go to bed. I'll look at this again later.

Bitter Crank: First let me say thank you for reading my work and providing your thoughts. The issue about freedom over one's own mind is something I would like to discuss in my thesis objections chapter. Would you mind if I referenced you as someone who had brought up this objection? If you wouldn't mind, please message me your name so I can reference you properly as I fear calling my detractors bitter cranks won't go over well in my thesis :).

That said, let me try to deal with these issues in order.

First, I think I have made it reasonably clear that I am talking about morality in an objective, universal sense, and not just referring to a system of cultural norms. So it isn't really an issue that Hitler thought he was acting rightly, because he wasn't.

Second, it seems to go over okay so far, but if I only said things my supervisors agreed with, I wouldn't be much of a philosopher.

As for the main issue here, I am not convinced that when someone blurts something unkind and uncharacteristic out unthinkingly, that they are in any sense not acting freely. I am inclined to agree that we do not choose to like or dislike things (though it seems we can choose to attempt to cultivate a like or dislike in ourselves which may or may not be successful), but I think we are free to choose our actions. When we say "felt the uncontrollable urge to punch someone in the face", I would say we are being poetic, rather than precisely describing what is happening in our minds. Firstly, we are still the ones acting, there is no one and nothing else making the choice but us. Secondly, I would say that we can choose how to act in these situations and when we choose to act in a way which is wrong, we are morally culpable for them. The fact that you are very angry doesn't make you hit someone, you still choose to, although the choice may be made quickly and influenced by the person's emotional state. To put it another way, a person does not need to be good at controlling their temper in order to be free.

But, supposing that people exist for whom turning around and slugging someone in the face really isn't a choice, but is rather an automatic action, like a reflex. I would suggest we might want to hold them at least partially morally responsible for this conduct after they know that they have this kind of reflex, if they do not take reasonable steps to avoid situations where they might violently assault another person without intending to. Much in the same way as we might want to hold Cyclops responsible for destroying a building because his glasses got knocked slightly, because he went out with two cannons attached to his face and only a pair of sunnies preventing them from going off... or some other example that doesn't involve one of the X-Men.

As for how free a person needs to be, I would say that the question is ill-formed. A being either has free will, or they don't. That is, they either have the ability to make choices that are not wholly determined by preceding or external factors, or they don't. If we had several more reflexes, we wouldn't be "less free", though there may be fewer things over which we have freedom. If we imagine an alien that has a mass of tentacles that all act independently of its intentions, to ward of predators, absorb nutrients, etc, and could only control its head, then it could still have just as much free will as any other person. So I would say that having free will or not is a dichotomy and not a sliding scale.

How quaint that today people are interested in the "new" instead of the "true" in philosophy... :(

moral realism is correct, that an objective, universal morality exists, then there is a way in which persons ought to be or act. — Dan

The dichotomy objective/subjective doesn't truly hold water. Everything is subjective, even objectivity itself, because the meaning of objective is formed and known only via subjectivity. Hence that which we call objective, is really just a special type of subjectivity which is shared in by others. This is a very very important distinction. It means that for example, no one can be called objectively happy if a series of criteria is met but they do not feel happy. It also means that someone can't be called happy if they merely feel happy but do not meet the "objective" conditions of happiness.

Then I argue that based on this assumption, our best candidate for moral value is the ability of persons to make their own choices, which I call freedom. — Dan

Right. So a woman who makes her own choice to be a luxury escort is according to you acting morally? Or is this kind of question simply not a moral one in your vision?

I am interested in the true philosophy, but everyone thinks the philosophical theories they believe in are true, that's why they believe in them. Claiming to have a true moral theory (though I think it is) wouldn't be any kind of claim at all.

As for objectivity. I think you're just wrong. To go back to basics, when we go through the reasoning of Descartes to find that we most definitely do exist, this is objectively true. It is an odd kind of objective truth in that only you can know, but it is objectively true none the less. It isn't merely a matter of opinion. I agree that happiness could be subjective, but that doesn't mean everything is. 2 + 2 = 4 is, if true (and I'm pretty confidant that it is), objectively true. It isn't a matter of opinion or intra-subjective agreement, it's true because of that those concepts mean. You could say that it is subjective in the sense that we might understand the term "2" to refer to something else, but that is rather missing the point. It isn't that those words have an objective meaning, it is that concept they are presently describing is objectively the case.


I would say that it is completely morally permissible to be a luxury escort, or a poorly paid escort for that matter. I would say so long as they are not hurting anyone else (which in this context can be understood as violating anyone else's freedom), then people can pretty much do what they want. Although I will add the caveat that people can have obligations to do good rather than just refrain from evil, but there is nothing about being a luxury escort that would prevent this person from living up to those obligations.

I am interested in the true philosophy, but everyone thinks the philosophical theories they believe in are true, that's why they believe in them. Claiming to have a true moral theory (though I think it is) wouldn't be any kind of claim at all. — Dan

And claiming to have a "new" theory is just uninteresting. Newness has no value in philosophy - it's truth that is of value.

As for objectivity. I think you're just wrong. To go back to basics, when we go through the reasoning of Descartes to find that we most definitely do exist, this is objectively true. — Dan

You ignore the process of coming to know what you call objective. You are not born knowing what objective refers to - you are not born with knowledge of such a concept. The real question is how is it possible at all to acquire the concept of objective, when all that you have to start with is your subjectivity - your impressions - with Kant, you never have access to the noumenon as such, or with Schopenhauer, you only have access to it THROUGH your subjectivity? Descartes' cogito is a purely subjective truth - no one but you can be aware of your existence with certainty in Descartes' thought experiment. It becomes an objective truth because of the impossibility of its denial - its necessary truth. Likewise, you are not born knowing that in Euclidean space in a right triangle a^2+b^2 = c^2; you come to know that this is objective, with absolute certainty. How is it possible to attain certainty when all that you have is your subjectivity? When you will answer that question, you will realise that objectivity is a form of subjectivity.

2 + 2 = 4 is, if true (and I'm pretty confidant that it is), objectively true — Dan

Not IF true; there is no if. It is true. The only interesting question is the Kantian one - how is it possible to know that it is true, if all you have is your subjectivity? What is it that guarantees its truth?

You could say that it is subjective in the sense that we might understand the term "2" to refer to something else, but that is rather missing the point. It isn't that those words have an objective meaning, it is that concept they are presently describing is objectively the case. — Dan

This is kindergarten arguments, sophistry.

I would say that it is completely morally permissible to be a luxury escort, or a poorly paid escort for that matter. I would say so long as they are not hurting anyone else (which in this context can be understood as violating anyone else's freedom), then people can pretty much do what they want. — Dan

Exactly - so you fall in the same trap as the moderns do, and believe that so long no one else's freedom is violated, everything is morally permissible. That is absolute nonsense, and it is a betrayal of the way morality has been understood for most of history. Gluttony is immoral, even though it impinges on no one else's freedom directly. Why? Because it harms the perpetuator first and foremost. Self-harm, just like other-harm is immoral. Freedom - in the sense you understand it - doing whatever you want - is not a value, it's not even a virtue. That is why you fail to realise that someone who objectifies their person, and sells their body in exchange for money is doing a harm to themselves first and foremost - its losing their human dignity. Now how do we identify what harm is? How did you come to know that violating someone's freedom is a harm? We identify harm by inquiring into the nature of people, and seeing what frustrates this nature. That's why ultimately it will collapse into a virtue ethics - a striving towards the fulfilment of one's nature, with harm being identified as what is contrary to that nature.

The thing about objective reality is that it exists with or without us. Even with no one around to perceive it, the world just keeps on existing. The fact we don't have direct access to objective truth doesn't mean it doesn't exist, or that objectivity is subjective, though it might mean that we are doomed to never be totally sure of anything about reality... except the cogito. But not having direct access to a thing and being forced to view it through an imperfect lens is not the same as it not being objective. The objective exists, the issue is in getting at it.

I am not falling into a trap. I just disagree with you. I will quite happily fly in the face of the way morality has been understood throughout most of history, as I think it has been understood very poorly. I am inclined to agree that the best way of identifying how to be moral starts with inquiring into the nature of people, if by people you mean persons, but that nature is the ability to understand and make choices. That is what makes one a person. So I would say no, self-harm is not immoral as every person owns themself to do with what they will

Even with no one around to perceive it, the world just keeps on existing. — Dan

It does not make sense to say something exists without even the possibility of it being perceived. What sense would it have for me to say aliens exist, and then add that whatsoever you do, however your technology improves, etc. you can never perceive them. In what sense then do they exist? Something exists only if it can, in principle, be perceived. The concept of objective world, the concept of existence, all those concepts which you use in saying "the world keeps on existing" are born out of your subjectivity; out of your subjectivity you encounter the impressions which lead you to know these concepts. So your objectivity is either a form of subjectivity, or it is NOTHING - at least nothing that can be positively known.

Please note I am not saying objectivity doesn't exist. But just that subjectivity can be much more powerful than you allow it to be.

So I would say no, self-harm is not immoral as every person owns themself to do with what they will — Dan

According to you it follows that if you own yourself you have a moral right to do whatsoever you want with yourself. I disagree, and you have not yet proven a necessary link between the two statements. In fact, quite the contrary - if that which you do harms or frustrates your nature, then your actions are immoral in-so-far as your actions harm you. What you really mean to say is that if you own yourself you CAN do whatsoever you want with you. But from this factual statement it does not follow that you OUGHT to do whatsoever you want. You are confusing facts with morality.

but that nature is the ability to understand and make choices. — Dan

It's much more than just this.

Is it typical to have part of a thesis written in your second year?

Are you sure you aren't considering human nature, rather than the nature of personhood?

No, the fact that we cannot directly perceive something does not mean it does not make sense to say that it exists. When we discuss whether we should believe our perceptions of the external world resemble the actual outside world even though we only have direct experience of the veil of perception, this is a sensible discussion.

Further, the cogito is not subjective truth. It is an objective truth, albeit one discovered through personal experience. When we work out that we exist, this is not true relative to us or true from only our perspective. It is true definitely and objectively, although no one else can know it.

I am not claiming a necessary link. I am saying that the freedom over persons to make their own choices seems the best candidate for moral value we have.

I would not say that if you own yourself you CAN do whatever you want. For example it might be the case you are bound and gagged and locked in a small room. Then you cannot exercise your freedom, though you still own yourself. I would say that you are morally permitted to harm yourself.

Also I should make it clear that I am not defending the freedom to do anything you want. I am defending the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. To put it another way, the freedom over those things that already belong to the person: their mind, body and property.

Are you sure you aren't considering human nature, rather than the nature of personhood? — Dan

I am considering human nature, personhood is just part of human nature.

No, the fact that we cannot directly perceive something does not mean it does not make sense to say that it exists. — Dan

Red herring and strawmanning. I never said we have to directly perceive it to say it exists.

When we discuss whether we should believe our perceptions of the external world resemble the actual outside world even though we only have direct experience of the veil of perception, this is a sensible discussion. — Dan

Okay, so based on what information do we discuss this, if all that we have access to are our perceptions? Where does our concept of external world come from? From our perceptions no? So if it comes from perceptions, how can this concept be used to reach beyond the perceptions themselves?

Further, the cogito is not subjective truth. — Dan

You're equivocating on subjective truth and not adopting the same understanding of it as I put forward.

It is an objective truth, albeit one discovered through personal experience. — Dan

Again what do you mean by objective? Do you mean that it is true independent of what we think of it? I agree. But still, we access this objective truth through our own experience, and hence, it is first and foremost, before it is objective, subjective. You fail to realise what subjective means. It doesn't mean it's up to whatever you think. It means it's up to whatever you percieve, and since you can't percieve any different in this case, it is objective.

I am not claiming a necessary link. I am saying that the freedom over persons to make their own choices seems the best candidate for moral value we have. — Dan

This is unjustified. Freedom is just one of the many human potentialities. Why should it have priority?

I would not say that if you own yourself you CAN do whatever you want. For example it might be the case you are bound and gagged and locked in a small room. Then you cannot exercise your freedom, though you still own yourself. I would say that you are morally permitted to harm yourself. — Dan

Okay you're not disagreeing with me there. It still does not follow that you OUGHT to do whatever you want, and you haven't proven that you OUGHT to do whatever you want.

It is not only humans that are morally relevant. Any kind of person, be they human or not, surely matters just as much. It is not our humanity that makes us matter, it is our personhood.

What do you mean "reach beyond"? If you mean find out if our perceptions are actually reliable and actually represent the external world, then they can't. We are doomed to forever experience only our perceptions, and never the reality beyond them. But whether such a reality exists and, if so, what that world is like is a matter of objective fact. The answer to those questions are true regardless of whether people can ever know them. I suppose what I am getting at here is that there is a difference between something objectively existing and/or being true, and whether we can know it to be true and, further, whether we can know it to be true in a way you would consider "objective". Or, to put it another way, there is a difference between epistemology and ontology.

I do not fail to realize what subjective means but, using your definition, I do not remotely except that what we perceive dictates what is true. There may be things that we, or someone, cannot perceive in any way but the way we, or they, do, but that may not be objectively true.

It should have priority because if morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, then it must be able to apply to all potential persons, not just humans. And I suspect these other human potentialities (assuming you mean any of the things virtue ethicists generally care about) you are talking about are not necessarily shared by other possible persons.

I would not say you "ought to do whatever you want". I would say you ought to be free to make your own choices. If a person decides to do something they don't particularly want to do, there is nothing wrong with that. The wrong comes in the violation of their ability to make and understand choices. As for how I establish this is the case, it goes back to freedom (by which I mean the ability to make and understand one's choices) being the best candidate for moral value. Which goes back to my assumption that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act.

It is not only humans that are morally relevant. Any kind of person, be they human or not, surely matters just as much. It is not our humanity that makes us matter, it is our personhood. — Dan

What's the use of this abstraction? Even a non-human rational animal of the same kind humans are would be characterised by much more than their freedom. Perhaps I phrased my sentence in a limited way (non-human person does not make sense to me though - we don't know of aliens, etc), I should have said every rational animal.

What do you mean "reach beyond"? If you mean find out if our perceptions are actually reliable and actually represent the external world, then they can't. — Dan

Where do you get this idea of there being an external world from?

We are doomed to forever experience only our perceptions, and never the reality beyond them. — Dan

Indeed. So how can we speak of an external world? Through what do we gain access to this external world? How do we even form the idea?

I suppose what I am getting at here is that there is a difference between something objectively existing and/or being true, and whether we can know it to be true and, further, whether we can know it to be true in a way you would consider "objective". — Dan

No the difference collapses on itself. If I tell you there is a certain ghost in your house, but regardless of what you do, or what happens, you can never experience it or percieve anything from it in anyway, in what sense does the ghost exist? Sure, according to you, it objectively exists, even though it's impossible to ever percieve it. But that makes no sense, because existence is one, and thus existence is inter-related qua existence. Substance dualism does NOT make sense, as Spinoza for example proved. And for this reason nothing can exist detached from everything else - in a way that something else that exists cannot interact with it in anyway.

It should have priority because if morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, then it must be able to apply to all potential persons, not just humans. And I suspect these other human potentialities (assuming you mean any of the things virtue ethicists generally care about) you are talking about are not necessarily shared by other possible persons. — Dan

Yes, they will necessarily be. For example, the desire for expanding agency, growth and survival will necessarily be shared by other possible persons.

I would say you ought to be free to make your own choices. — Dan

That is on one level because freedom itself is a value. On another level, there is a right and wrong choice regardless of the actual choice that I make, if you believe in objective morality as you claim you do (and I believe in objective morality as well, btw).

The wrong comes in the violation of their ability to make and understand choices — Dan

Yes this is a wrong. But one among many wrongs, certainly not the central or most important one. To illustrate. I may decide to be a hooker, and if someone stops me from acting on my decision by force they will do a wrong. I grant you that. But I also insist that if I do decide to be a hooker, I will commit a wrong, and I will use my freedom in a way that degrades my dignity and potential.

As for how I establish this is the case, it goes back to freedom (by which I mean the ability to make and understand one's choices) being the best candidate for moral value. — Dan

It's one moral value, I grant you that. How do you establish it's the only one?

Which goes back to my assumption that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act. — Dan

If this is your assumption then you are contradicting yourself. The way persons ought to be or act is different than the way they do (or choose) to act - hence it's different than mere freedom. Your proposed morality is just terribly incomplete, otherwise there is nothing wrong with it.

If this is your assumption then you are contradicting yourself. The way persons ought to be or act is different than the way they do (or choose) to act - hence it's different than mere freedom. Your proposed morality is just terribly incomplete, otherwise there is nothing wrong with it. — Agustino

I am not sure what you mean by this. I completely agree that the way persons ought to act is different from the way they do act. However, one can only be morally obliged to act in some way if that person can actually act in that way (ought implies can) so it seems to follow that whatever is of moral value must be shared by all possible persons.

I don't remotely agree in the case of the ghost. It may well be the case that the ghost exists. It doesn't make sense for me to believe in it, but that doesn't affect whether it exists or not. As for how we form the idea of the external world, that is either a very hard question or a very silly one. I am going to assume you mean this in the difficult way, in which case I think my answer is probably "I don't know, but I certainly do have an idea of an external world" it seems completely coherent to talk about an external world, even if we have no direct access to it.

If non-human person makes no sense to you then we are likely talking past one another. When I say that morality is the way persons ought to be or act, I mean all persons, not just ones we know about. If this is the case, then either their are lots of different moral values or what is of moral value is something shared by all possible free, rational agents. We can imagine all sorts of aliens that don't share out desires to, for example, grow, or expand their agency or even survive (though that one looks like it might require a bit more mental gymnastics) so these cannot be shared by all possible free, rational agents. So yes, I really am talking about all possible persons, including any imaginable alien.

However, one can only be morally obliged to act in some way if that person can actually act in that way (ought implies can) so it seems to follow that whatever is of moral value must be shared by all possible persons. — Dan

It is of moral value for me to take care of my physical health because I can do it. Someone bed-ridden who can't do anything about it - for them it's still a moral value, just that they can't strive to fulfil it in anyway. There is no question of obligation though. Just the way someone ought to strive to act in. If their striving potential constitutes a mathematical zero, then that's everything they can do about it. So no ought does not imply can in the sense you have put it.

I don't remotely agree in the case of the ghost. It may well be the case that the ghost exists. — Dan

Notice that I didn't say that you just haven't percieved the ghost. I said IN PRINCIPLE you could never percieve it, no matter what happened. This is alike you and the ghost being two different substances, which can never interact with each other, even in principle. This is incoherent.

As for how we form the idea of the external world, that is either a very hard question or a very silly one. I am going to assume you mean this in the difficult way, in which case I think my answer is probably "I don't know, but I certainly do have an idea of an external world" it seems completely coherent to talk about an external world, even if we have no direct access to it. — Dan

Exactly, you don't know, but without knowing the genealogy of the concept, how can you go about using it without falling into error? If I know what I have abstracted from in order to form the concept, then I also know how to use the abstraction - what it means.

We can imagine all sorts of aliens that don't share out desires to, for example, grow, or expand their agency or even survive (though that one looks like it might require a bit more mental gymnastics) so these cannot be shared by all possible free, rational agents. — Dan

No we cannot imagine that. Not in any sense of the word imagine - to picture clearly and distinctly in an image what it would be like. Why not? Because no living beings can exist which don't strive for expanding agency and survival - no such beings are possible in a world like ours (because of a few things, amongst which the inevitability of the process of evolution is one). We can imagine it the same way we imagine a square circle - just in words.

So yes, I really am talking about all possible persons, including any imaginable alien. — Dan

I don't mind. Even if you're talking of all possible persons, my points still hold, because all possible persons share in those desires I mentioned. It's simply part of what it means to be a person in this world.

I understood what you meant in the case of the ghost. Even if the ghost cannot be perceived in principle, it may still exist. This is not incoherent.

I would say that saying someone is obligated to do something and saying they ought to (if we are using "ought" in an objective, universal way, rather than an "if, then" way) amount to saying the same thing.

I absolutely can imagine aliens of that sort. They are not like square circles at all. Evolution certainly occurs, but it is not the only possible way persons could come about. They could be artificially constructed persons, or persons which are the result of a bizarre accident of physics bringing particles together to cohere into an entire person. It seems totally conceivable that one of these convoluted examples could bring about a person without a survival instinct, even if they are only a short-lived person. I can coherently conceive of such a thing. If you find that you cannot imagine such entities, I would suggest that you may not be trying very hard.

How about it, Dan? Get your degree? :smile:

How about it, Dan? Get your degree? — jgill

If he did, he's probably not slumming it in these parts anymore.

|>ouglas