An interesting account of compassion?

jancanc

The German philosopher Schopenhauer says that when we experience compassion we participate in another's suffering, desiring their well being. Yet at some points he suggests that we experience another's suffering in another's body (not through our imagination); he states, we feel the suffering “in his person, not in ours” (In seiner Person, nicht in unserer).
Yet, at the same time, the compassionate person is aware that the other is the sufferer, not himself and he is also aware that the pain is the sufferers’ pain, not his: “we feel his pain as his, and do not imagine that it is ours” . The compassionate person “shares the suffering in him (the sufferer), in spite of the fact that his skin does not enclose [his] nerves” (BM, §18, p. 166; Schopenhauer’s emphasis).

Now I understand that Schop believes that compassion signifies the will qua thing-itself. The unity that exists beyond the empirical world. We have compassion for another because we are ultimately of the same essence. However, I don't think he really means that in compassion we actually feel another's suffering inside another persons body. Seems there is some grammatical confusion or something? I think he is also referencing Plato's notion of participation here...participation in a transcendent source.
Any comments on this interesting conception of compassion most welcome!

Thorongil

However, I don't think he really means that in compassion we actually feel another's suffering inside another persons body. — jancanc

We might distinguish between two types of harm that I think he proposes. One is physical or bodily harm and the other is metaphysical harm. The former is a manifestation of the latter, and metaphysical harm refers to the will being forcibly denied. I may not be able to feel the same bodily harm that the other person is experiencing, but I can experience the same metaphysical harm they are experiencing, and this on account of the fact that his will and mine are at bottom one and the same will. In being compassionate, I understand that the will being frustrated in this particular individual in the will being frustrated in toto.

jancanc

Thanks,
In your answer, I am assuming "harm" is a synonym for "suffering".
Physical suffering and metaphysical suffering.

So essentially you are saying that, in compassion, I don't feel your physical suffering, yet I do feel your metaphysical suffering?

The will is one identical will or essence, yet this is not to say that all human beings are metaphysically identical. we all manifest one identical essence. It's a fine distinction.

jancanc

The compassionate person “shares the suffering in him (the sufferer), in spite of the fact that his skin does not enclose [his] nerves”

Technically, I think what he means is we "share the suffering of the one identical will even though we are empirically distinct". That doesn't me I feel another's suffering 100% as they do (as their suffering).... but the will explains why my i feel any suffering at all at the sight of your suffering, and perhaps also explains why my suffering is similar to yours.... I think that's what he means.

Thorongil

In your answer, I am assuming "harm" is a synonym for "suffering".
Physical suffering and metaphysical suffering. — jancanc

Not quite. I used the word "harm" to describe something being done to the will, not the state the will is in. Suffering follows harm.

So essentially you are saying that, in compassion, I don't feel your physical suffering, yet I do feel your metaphysical suffering? — jancanc

Yes.

The will is one identical will or essence, yet this is not to say that all human beings are metaphysically identical. — jancanc

Actually, I think it is to say this. Human beings are phenomenally distinct but metaphysically identical.

Technically, I think what he means is we "share the suffering of the one identical will even though we are empirically distinct". That doesn't me I feel another's suffering 100% as they do (as their suffering).... but the will explains why my i feel any suffering at all at the sight of your suffering, and perhaps also explains why my suffering is similar to yours.... I think that's what he means. — jancanc

Yes, I agree.

jancanc

Not quite. I used the word "harm" to describe something being done to the will, not the state the will is in. Suffering follows harm. — Thorongil

I see what you mean, like infringing on another's will, as such.

T Clark

Yet, at the same time, the compassionate person is aware that the other is the sufferer, not himself and he is also aware that the pain is the sufferers’ pain, not his: “we feel his pain as his, and do not imagine that it is ours” . The compassionate person “shares the suffering in him (the sufferer), in spite of the fact that his skin does not enclose [his] nerves” — jancanc

Thinking about my personal experience of compassion, there is an emotional distance there. It's not the same as pity or simple sympathy. That distance allows us to stand back and see and understand what is happening. It allows us to figure out the best thing to do next because we are not distracted by our personal emotional reaction.

Frank Barroso

That distance allows us to stand back and see and understand what is happening. — T Clark

I don't think you could have compassion without first having some understanding of the harm or situation that the person is in. By having a clear understanding of peoples situations you might view them as small or manageable, because to you they are, but solely this, isn't compassion. The key is the emotion behind the sympathy or the drive behind why we should feel compassionate towards someone or something. And, I think that drive comes about also through an objective understanding that compassion is the best action to take even if it isn't the easiest.

However, I don't think he really means that in compassion we actually feel another's suffering inside another persons body. Seems there is some grammatical confusion or something? I think he is also referencing Plato's notion of participation here...participation in a transcendent source. — jancanc

I concede that we cant feel pain in their body. I'm a science man myself. But, if you think of ideals and call suffering one. When you encounter another's suffering, you would recognize the ideal, then the subtle ways this suffering is specific to this person, and feel that suffering of that specific kind, surely your body creates the sensation, but you didn't create that initial one of a kind formula of suffering.

“in his person, — jancanc

We could not feel the pain without first becoming him, one could say.

jancanc

I concede that we cant feel pain in their body. I'm a science man myself. But, if you think of ideals and call suffering one. When you encounter another's suffering, you would recognize the ideal, then the subtle ways this suffering is specific to this person, and feel that suffering of that specific kind, surely your body creates the sensation, but you didn't create that initial one of a kind formula of suffering.

These points are interesting, can you expand? I think you i interpret him to mean that by feeling another pain in another body....we experience a pain that originates in the other?

“in his person, — jancanc

We could not feel the pain without first becoming him, one could say. — Frank Barroso

you mean he is speaking metaphorically here?

sime

We have compassion for another because we are ultimately of the same essence. However, I don't think he really means that in compassion we actually feel another's suffering inside another persons body — jancanc

Yes in a sense and No in a sense.

This type of mind-body-problem is caused by the surface grammar of our language suggesting to us the idea of there being an 'owner' of first-person experience.

This is caused by the fact that as children we learned sensation words in inter-subjective contexts in which our carers point to the behaviour of themselves and to other people while saying a pain word, and then they repeat exactly the same word to ourselves when we behave similarly. From this process we arrive at the idea of a literal first-person who isn't merely equivalent to experience itself, but is rather a distinct yet hidden entity who 'owns' their experience.

One way to interrogate this idea is to replace the word "pain" with two separate words. For example, call pain "i-pain" if it is pain which I experience and call it "b-pain" when I am referring to somebody else's pain behaviour.

Your question is then translated into questions concerning the relationship of how these two words fit-together, such as whether learning the meaning of 'i-pain' is dependent on learning the meaning of 'b-pain'

A question probably best left as a forum exercise :)

An interesting account of compassion?

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