Yeah prob. But you can only exaggerate if there's something to exaggerate. Otherwise it's fabrication, not exaggeration.I think the similarity is exaggerated
I think you're getting lost through fidelity to your theory. People play basketball together. They all see a hoop. They all see a basketball. Do you sincerely doubt this? (And please please please that these hoops and basketballs could be unsubstantial projections is implicit here) — csalisbury
Yeah, maybe they don't. (Hopefully there's no reporter with a shit assignment who asks each one to describe what the basketball game was like afterward. The variances would be wild. Or I guess you could do that thing of maybe what I see as orange, you see as purple. Maybe what I experience as playing basketball, you experience as masturbating in the desert while v scary ghosts try to stop you bc unejaculated semen powers their memory-wars...But we both describe those different experiences using words like 'hoop' and 'basketball') I'm going to ask you point blank: Those childhood memories of playing basketball - Do you think the other players saw a hoop, saw a basketball? Or was it just you? Can you please honestly answer this question?Let's bracket the question for a moment and ask a more basic one. Instead of 'do they,' ask 'would they need to?' If not, then of course the fact that they play isn't necessarily evidence that they do.
Definitely not. And?Now ask, do symbiotic creatures need to see 'the same things' to interact, or even depend on each other to live?
Definitely not. And? — csalisbury
I'm going to ask you point blank: Those childhood memories of playing basketball - Do you think the other players saw a hoop, saw a basketball? Or was it just you? — csalisbury
I'm going to ask you again, point blank, do you think the other players saw hoops and basketballs? If you don't want to answer that, that's fine. But if you're not willing to share your actual beliefs, I don't think I can honestly engage you in this conversation.How could I know? And what does it matter?
I'm going to ask you again, point blank, do you think the other players saw hoops and basketballs? If you don't want to answer that, that's fine. But if you're not willing to share your actual beliefs, I don't think I can honestly engage you in this conversation. — csalisbury
But what do you believe?I don't know. There's no point in denying it under any pubic circumstances, but I don't see how I could have any idea.
That people can describe, in literature or reporting, similar experiences seems to me a good indicator we share similar experiences. — csalisbury
But what do you think, in your heart of hearts. When you were playing basketball with the other ppl, did they see a hoop, a basketball. What do you believe? — csalisbury
Philosophy, in the socratic tradition, requires shared experience which renders possible the discussion and critique of various particular beliefs. You can't have a socratic dialogue if you don't have multiple people who understand the same language. There's no 'Republic' if Socrates and whats-is-name don't have that mutual understanding of being-wealthy which sparks the whole thing. — csalisbury
Well. I can argue I'm the only conscious being in the world and there's no such thing as inter-affectivity and coercion and the blind fountain or any of that. How can you argue against that? — csalisbury
I wanted to know how it's possible for a basketball game to take place, where different players see the same ball, the same hoop. You have a hard time saying whether you believe different players see balls and hoops. You believe people sometimes play basketball with one another but you can't quite go the whole hog of thinking they all experience hoops and basketballs.I don't think you can argue it. You can say it, which is not arguing it.
If you wanted to talk to someone about coercion and inter-affectivity they could, at any time, simply deny the existence of others. — csalisbury
Love-proxies for the infant and basketball-robots - there doesn't have to be anyone but you tgw. — csalisbury
Sure there's your pathe blob over which you have little control. And there's no one else with pathe blobs.I don't think this option is open, because the position being outlined here isn't compatible with solipsism. Solipsism is a transcendental position, which is against the spirit of the sort of 'outside' and blindness I'm talking about. This is something that it shares with realism, as many authors note. Ignorance, even systematic ignorance, is not the same as denial.....But there does [have to be others], because as I said, I'm utterly dependent on what's beyond my control.
Work me through " I think other people see basketballs and hoops when I play basketball with them" -> "I want people to be reducible to me." — csalisbury
TGW has a model or metaphor of which I understand as something like a churning stew of passions that are only painstakingly, and largely unsconsciously, molded into the 'world' phenomenologists speak of. The 'world' (think also of Schop's world-as-idea subjected to the PSR) is nothing but molded passions - the word TGW uses is "pathe" - and as such has no reality of its own. Its kind of an iceberg-tip that many people forget relies on an iceberg base. — csalisbury
He's gestured toward an explanation in that we gain a modicum of mastery over our pathe by instrumentally externalizing them. He's also gestured toward an emotional/traumatic explanation of externalization as a way of evading our inner turmoil. But these are just gestures and, though I have a lot of sympathy for these ways of looking at things, I don't think such broad indications constitute adequate explanations.I sort of had trouble understanding his explanation of how an illusion of world-as-idea does not need to be explained
I admire Schop's lucidity, elegance & eloquence but I personally get more from Kant+Schelling, where, crudely, the former is world-as-idea and the latter is world-as-will. I like Hegel a lot too, but he takes a lot of effort, and I've barely scratched the surface. My approach stems experientially from my current participation in transference-based therapy, where transference is purposefully triggered in the purpose of dismantling it in order to create a shared space) — csalisbury
Therefore, destined originally to serve the will for the achievement of its aims, knowledge [what I've called consciousness] remains almost throughout entirely subordinate to its service; this is the case with all animals and almost all men. — Schopenhauer
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