When we say that a phenomenon is "mental" what we mean is that it belongs to the category that we represent with the word "mind". Thus, if you want to determine whether any given phenomenon is mental or not, you have to know the rules of the category "mind". What does the word "mind" mean? In other words, what phenomena does it include and what phenomena does it exclude? That is the relevant question. Unfortunately, it is not an easy one.

Simply seeing a tree with your own eyes is not enough for the tree to be considered non-mental. What if you're inside some sort of virtual reality, for example? You need context.

To refer back to an example I've given before, a painting of a tree isn't a painting of paint, but it is just paint – paint which 'represents' a tree.

So perhaps the experience of a tree isn't an experience of sense-data, but it is just sense-data – sense-data which 'represents' a tree.

There's a distinction between the intentionality and the composition of perception (or a painting).

Simply seeing a tree with your own eyes is not enough for the tree to be considered non-mental. What if you're inside some sort of virtual reality, for example? You need context. — Magnus Anderson

We're in our world, regardless of what the actual metaphysics are. Does the act of perceiving a tree make us aware of the same sort of thing as it would while dreaming, hallucinating, visualizing?

But is the tree mental when we actually perceive one (see, smell, touch, hear it fall in the woods, etc)? — Marchesk

When you perceive this actual tree, is it’s greenness also actual? Or mental? Or what?

When you perceive this actual tree, is it’s greenness also actual? Or mental? Or what? — apokrisis

I side with mental on color, but not shape.

Sorry to sound like a broken record, but I've yet to see anything that suggests there is any difference between 'being conscious of a mental tree' and 'being conscious of a tree itself', beyond the differences in the strings of letters that make up the two phrases.

How can perception be divided so that colour is your perception of a mental image and shape is your direct perception of the actuality?

I agree that this is an attractive position to take, But it is fundamentally inconsistent. How do you square it?

ut I've yet to see anything that suggests there is any difference between 'being conscious of a mental tree' and 'being conscious of a tree itself', beyond the differences in the strings of letters that make up the two phrases. — andrewk

So you see no difference in meaning between dreaming of a tree, remembering a tree, visualizing a tree, hallucinating a tree, and perceiving a tree?

How do you square it? — apokrisis

Pun intended?

I agree that this is an attractive position to take, But it is fundamentally inconsistent. — apokrisis

The reason is because color is likely creature dependent, while shape is not. Shape is objective, and doesn't depend on the kind of eyes we have.

But you're wondering how perception can involve awareness of both mental and non-mental properties of an object. That is a good question.

Does the act of perceiving a tree make us aware of the same sort of thing as it would while dreaming, hallucinating, visualizing? — Marchesk

If I understand you correctly, what you're asking is this: does the act of seeing a tree with your own eyes give you the same kind of experience that the act of, say, visualizing a tree does?

If that's what you're asking, the answer is no. There's a clear difference between the two kinds of experience. Visualization lacks the richness that seeing with your own eyes has.

But suppose that this weren't the case. Suppose that they were equally rich. Suppose that visualizing a tree was just as clear as seeing it with your own eyes. Would that make visualization non-mental? Of course not. This is because whether something is mental or not depends on context. You need to look at how your experience relates to what was in the past. It is this relation, which is never complete, because past is not finite, that determines to what degree what you're looking at is either mental or non-mental.

So is perception of a tree... phenomenological given and therefore we play a passive role or is the tree a representation which we actively construct, and are responsible for?

So is perception of a tree... phenomenological given and therefore we play a passive role or is the tree a representation which we actively construct, and are responsible for? — Cavacava

I don't have much control over seeing a tree. Maybe some drugs and meditative exercises would help me see it in some other manner?

I would say perception is given.

But you're wondering how perception can involve awareness of both mental and non-mental properties of an object. That is a good question. — Marchesk

Hah. OK. We agree on that. :)

This is because whether something is mental or not depends on context. — Magnus Anderson

The worry is that if see a mental image while perceiving a tree, then how do we know there is a tree at all? It could be just like a dream tree. That naturally lends itself to skepticism, where the context is undermined by holding all of perception in doubt.

The worry is that if see a mental image while perceiving a tree, then how do we know there is a tree at all? It could be just like a dream tree. That naturally lends itself to skepticism, where the context is undermined by holding all of perception in doubt. — Marchesk

The purpose of reasoning is to make guesses regarding something that is unknown (i.e. something that hasn't been experienced or at the very least memorized.) Thus, the fruits of reasoning are necessarily fallible.

If you push one eyeball are you conscious of two trees or two mental trees?

I can guess. One is the real tree, the other it’s double image.

So consciousness perceives a tree in a certain way, 'it's a green tree' which corresponds to its concept of a tree in itself, and which allows for the possibility of error. What we perceive is tainted by our concepts, we may not be even able to be aware of an object unless it is among our concepts.

There is a claim, "it's something", and then the classification "its a green tree". The claim is sensuously given, the statement is a mental construction, without which there is no awareness of a tree.

One is the real tree, the other it’s double image — apokrisis

Why is it one has phenomenological privilege over the other? After holding the eye in place, if you then close the other eye then the image of the manipulated eye becomes dominant.

But you're wondering how perception can involve awareness of both mental and non-mental properties of an object. That is a good question. — Marchesk

If you are saying that you have an awareness of a mental property as opposed to a non-mental (physical?) property, then you are saying that you have an awareness of two different things, as trees don't have mental properties, only physical ones. Minds have mental properties. So, when looking at a tree, are you aware of the tree or your mental representation of it. And if you say that you are aware of your mental representation of it, then by calling it a representation you are implying that you are aware of something else, which would be the tree as well. If not, then it wouldn't be a representation.

It's like asking, "Are you aware of the word, or what the word refers to?" They are both separate things that are linked together by representation. Because it is a representation, you could say that by being aware of one as a representation, then you are aware of what it represents.

There is a claim, "it's something", and then the classification "its a green tree". The claim is sensuously given, the statement is a mental construction, without which there is no awareness of a tree. — Cavacava

Words are just other sounds and visuals. How is it that words aren't just something that we then classify as words? Are we not aware of words until we engage in categorizing them?

It seems that there is an awareness of some thing and how that thing interacts with other things that exists prior to categorizing in such a way as to communicate some thing and how it interacts with other things.

The Man With No Words didn't seem to have a problem in being aware of the things around him as he was able to survive, dress and feed himself without knowing a language.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Man_Without_Words

He didn't need words to make distinctions between what to eat and what not to eat, or what to wear and what not to wear. He simply made observations and organized his observations into a consistent world-view - all without classifying his observations with words.

I find it amazing how the extremes of the human condition throws wrenches into many philosophical playbooks. The only reason why we don't try to find more of these kinds of cases, or reproduce them in order to study them, is because of something called "ethics". I wonder how it became unethical to NOT teach someone a language, but I guess that's another topic for another thread.

and organized his observations into a consistent world-view - all without classifying his observations with words

His "consistent world-view" are the concepts he works with, how he classifies his experience and makes reality coherent regardless of whether this is in words or not.

What we perceive is tainted by our concepts, we may not be even able to be aware of an object unless it is among our concepts. — Cavacava

My point was that he could make distinctions between objects without language. You seem to imply that The Man With No Words wouldn't be aware of anything, but he obviously was. He was obviously aware of food as something to eat, not to wear, without language. Was he just manipulating concepts in his mind, or was he really getting at the differences that exist in reality - outside his mind? Is it food that he was eating, or just a concept?

One must also be aware of something in order to make it a concept, or by being aware of something is the same as forming a concept. Are we aware of concepts? Do we need to make concepts more conceptual in order to be aware of them?

I stated that without the concept or idea of what a tree is, there is/may be no tree. What is observed has to fit into person's conceptual structure in order for us to recognize it, in order for reality to be coherent. What we are sensuously aware of is always classified by us in some manner. This all happens in less than 500 milliseconds.

Have you ever tried to figure out what something is in the dark.

I agree that there is such a thing as an instantenous classification of sensory information the mechanism of which we are largely unconscious (e.g. facial recognition) but I am inclined to disagree that classification precedes sensory information. My position is that sensory information comes first and classification comes second. However, the switch between the two can occur so fast that it becomes difficult to differentiate between the two.

Yes, I agree that sensory perception precedes classification, but I think "instantaneous classification" is due to its habitual re occurrence. I think that we become aware of something, and then classify it into our conceptual structure....such as a face.

If what we sensuously perceive does not fit into our concepts, we ignore it because there is no place for it in our imagination.

When a dog pisses on a tree, does it behold, and piss on, a mental construct?

I would say "no." I would say the dog is simply a creature that's a part of the world, doing what such creatures do while living in the word. There is no mind separate from the dog or world separate from the dog, or world separate from the mind of the dog. There are, instead, other things and creatures also parts of the world, with which the dog interacts.

Why should we be different from the dog in this respect?

I stated that without the concept or idea of what a tree is, there is/may be no tree. What is observed has to fit into person's conceptual structure in order for us to recognize it, in order for reality to be coherent. What we are sensuously aware of is always classified by us in some manner. This all happens in less than 500 milliseconds.

Have you ever tried to figure out what something is in the dark. — Cavacava

I still don't get what you're talking about. Are you saying that without the concept of what a tree is in here, there is no tree out there? Is it our minds that make construct our perception of reality, or our minds a reflection of reality, or maybe a bit of both? What is it that governs how we make concepts? How is it that so many different human beings, not to mention other animals, react the same way to the same thing (when in water, we either swim or drown, and animals do the same thing)?

Have you considered that a dog's "conceptual" system may be geared towards scent. I note that they tend to sniff and sniff around until they find just the right spot and I have read that wolves and other animals urinate to establish their territory.

Do they systematize their experiences differently than us?

So you see no difference in meaning between dreaming of a tree, remembering a tree, visualizing a tree, hallucinating a tree, and perceiving a tree? — Marchesk

Studies indicate that all these instances are mental simulations that actually use the same neural pathways. The difference is that ‘imagined’ simulations are somehow suppressed in a way that the consciousness mind recognizes as imagined, or rather it is obvious due to the lack of fidelity.