I agree that with no container, there is no information. But as I have previously stated, it does not follow that the container is an essential property of information, as it could simply be the cause to its existence. Or to use Aristotle's language, the container could be the efficient cause of information, not necessarily its formal cause. And I claim the efficient cause is the correct one, because I can acquire the same information from different containers which have no properties in common. E.g. obtaining info from a purely visual media like a book, or purely audio media like an audiobook.This is the point which I objected to in this thread. It is physically impossible to strip away the container from the information package, because then the information would be lost. Without the container, there is no information. So the container, which makes the existence of information possible is just as essential as the contents. There is no contents without a container. Therefore it must be accepted that the container is part of the information package. — Metaphysician Undercover
I have an interesting book by Thomas McEvilly, The Shape of Ancient Thought, which is a cross-cultural comparison between ancient Inndian and Greek philosophy. In the introduction, he says that a professor of his once noted that ‘everyone is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian’. — Wayfarer
I would prefer 'instantiated' to 'grounded'. It's more that particulars are 'grounded in form' rather than vice versa. According to A's 'hylomorphic dualism', particulars are always composed of matter (hyle) and form (morphe) - and the form is what is grasped by the intellect, both the intellect (nous) and form (morphe) being immaterial. — Wayfarer
I would say that is the aspect of Aristotelianism which was rejected by the advent of nominalism and then empiricism, as forms and formal causes. — Wayfarer
Hylomorphism doesn't imply dualism. — Andrew M
whatever is received is in the recipient according to the mode of being that the recipient possesses. If, then, the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner. This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.
Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.
Sure do. What does the active intellect do, that the passive intellect can't? — Wayfarer
Nominalism: the doctrine that universals or general ideas are mere names without any corresponding reality. — Wayfarer
If you have a better explanation, I'm here to be persuaded, but it doesn't seem like you have a better explanation. You're only "argument" is "That's neo-darwinism and I don't like that." - as if labeling some explanation as "neo-darwinian" and that you don't like it, automatically disqualifies it.thanks to the way we are "designed". — Harry Hindu
According to neo-darwinian materialism - which is why I mentioned Coyne. — Wayfarer
The theory that I'm working on is that the rational mind - the mind that recognises meaning and can therefore translate and transform ideas between media and languages - corresponds with the 'immaterial intellect' above. — Wayfarer
Just as the meaning of a text can be distinguished from the manner of its representation, so too the intellect which understands meaning can be distinguished from the sensory apparatus. — Wayfarer
What does the active intellect do, that the passive intellect can't?
— Wayfarer
If I remember correctly the Aristotelian distinction between passive intellect and active (agent) intellect, is not much more than a mention of the need to assume both, to maintain consistency with hylomorphism, matter being passive, form being active. The soul is an immaterial form, while the powers of the soul, the different capacities including the intellect, are potentials, and therefore associated with the material existence of the living body. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think that he proposed that each individual has both passive and agent intellect. — Metaphysician Undercover
to make me nominalist you would have to argue that an agreement between human beings is not something real. — Metaphysician Undercover
You're only "argument" is "That's neo-darwinism and I don't like that." - as if labeling some explanation as "neo-darwinian" and that you don't like it, automatically disqualifies it. — Harry Hindu
because this is really a discussion about semiosis, the definition of "representation" should conform to its usage in semiotics, to wit: a representation is a socially-conditioned concept, category, or mental model. — Galuchat
...materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets to take account of himself... Everything objective, extended, active, and hence everything material, is regarded by materialism as so solid a basis for its explanations that a reduction to this can leave nothing to be desired. But all this is something that is given only very indirectly and conditionally, and is therefore only relatively present, for it has passed through the machinery and fabrication of the brain, and hence has entered the forms of time, space, and causality, by virtue of which it is first of all presented as extended in space and operating in time. — Schopenhauer
what does semiosis say about physicalism and idealism? — Galuchat
A sign is an object which corresponds to a representation. — Galuchat
The same message, transmitted in different codes (physical information), through different physical channels or mediums, conveys the same representations/meanings (semantic information) to a recipient (a psychophysical organism) who has knowledge of the codes used and their corresponding representations. — Galuchat
So on Aristotle’s account, although the soul is not a material object, it is not separable from the body. — Wayfarer
. It is the shape that is getting passed along as a particular way to constrain some set of material freedoms, some heap of fleshy metabolism. — apokrisis
you want information to be a substance - a semantic content — apokrisis
Instead, states of interpretance are the third thing - the actually substantial thing - which emerges when formal constraints and material freedoms come together in an act of interpretance, or a sign relation. — apokrisis
My view also - the active intellect is what perceives the forms or ideas - it is 'intellect' proper. The passive intellect receives sensations. That is what that passage I quoted says. — Wayfarer
It's real, but only as a matter of convention. — Wayfarer
The important point about the OP, is articulating an idea of what is real but not material - a genuine metaphysic which grounds meaning in reality, not in social convention or language. — Wayfarer
I claim the efficient cause is the correct one, because I can acquire the same information from different containers which have no properties in common. E.g. obtaining info from a purely visual media like a book, or purely audio media like an audiobook. — Samuel Lacrampe
I think that 'soul' might be productively interpreted as a metaphorical expression for the subjective unity of consciousness; it is the principle by which the being hangs together, physiologically, psychologically, and even spiritually (which is also very close to Aristotle's meaning). But when you ask, 'what is this principle' or 'where is this principle', then that is a reification. But it's also not simply non-existent. This is the point that I think perplexes everyone in this conversation - as soon as you name it, you reify it, and then ask 'can it exist'? But that's a reification and therefore a category error. — Wayfarer
There are only two broad types of phenomena which I think embody 'interpretance', namely, organisms, and minds. — Wayfarer
Furthermore, we can prove that a container is not essential to information because we can imagine information being acquired directly through telepathy. The fact that we can imagine a thing proves that it is logically possible. And if logically possible, then a container is not an essential property of information. — Samuel Lacrampe
But is inorganic matter on a continuum with life and mind? Or is there a discontinuity there? — Wayfarer
The forms are what are not sensible i.e. they’re ‘intelligible’. Hyle - matter - morphe - form = hylomorphic. Trying to keep it simple here. The Thomistic arguments on the nature of the soul are close to those about how many angels could fit on a pin. — Wayfarer
It seemed to me that you were taking the position of nominalism, perhaps without knowing you were doing that. Note that is not a personal criticism but I think in the context it is worth bringing that out. — Wayfarer
I'm not assuming anything when I ask the question, "What form does our linguistic abilities take prior to learning a language?".Not, it's not that. Nowadays, most people simply assume that evolutionary biology explains everything about humans, so to question that then leads to a whole series of other arguments. So if you assume the neo-darwinian view (which I think you do), responding to that is a completely different question to the questions in this thread. — Wayfarer
However humans have linguistic and rational abilities that animals don’t - they’re born with that, as per Chomsky’s ‘universal grammar’. — Wayfarer
I gave those answers early in the thread. It boils down to a difference that makes a difference. — apokrisis
I agree that with no container, there is no information. But as I have previously stated, it does not follow that the container is an essential property of information, as it could simply be the cause to its existence. — Samuel Lacrampe
And I claim the efficient cause is the correct one, because I can acquire the same information from different containers which have no properties in common. E.g. obtaining info from a purely visual media like a book, or purely audio media like an audiobook. — Samuel Lacrampe
Furthermore, we can prove that a container is not essential to information because we can imagine information being acquired directly through telepathy. The fact that we can imagine a thing proves that it is logically possible. And if logically possible, then a container is not an essential property of information. — Samuel Lacrampe
I think that if you push this analysis further, you'll see that you are not actually acquiring the same information in those two cases. — Akanthinos
A more causally-explicit way of saying this would be that a sign has the function of constraining an interpretation.
So the actual physics of a sign falls away - even though a sign, as some kind of mark, is always also physical.
The causally important things going on are that signs are intended to have meanings. A purpose must exist. And signs then have an effect in terms of constraining or limiting some form of freedom or uncertainty. — apokrisis
So what gets transmitted through a variety of transmissions is not the actual information, like some precious substance or cargo. It is the constraints that would limit another mind's state of interpretance. It is the container rather than the contents that get delivered. — apokrisis
But constraints are also transmissible - due to semiotics. — apokrisis
In other words, information is a lack of uniformity per Donald MacCrimmon MacKay and Gregory Bateson. — Galuchat
Is information physical (meaningless), semantic (meaningful), or both (independently or simultaneously)? — Galuchat
All constraints on interpretation occur within the mind of the interpreter and this can be expressed as habit, or lack of habit. — Metaphysician Undercover
How could they be, if the being has to interpret the sign to determine the constraints required for interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover
The realist position, as I said, takes social conventions for granted, so the analysis which it provides does not go deep enough to understand "the good". — Metaphysician Undercover
To say, "They are born with that." seem to imply that our linguistic abilities only take shape once we are born. Doesn't that assume neo-darwinism? What is it about being born - about moving from inside the womb to outside of it that gives us our linguistic abilities? — Harry Hindu
That was Shannon’s big step, where he connected to concepts of entropy or fluctuation. — apokrisis
The symmetries that account for the fundamental forms of reality - the symmetries of spacetime and particle physics - are the part of existence that feel hard, definite, crystalline. They have the force of mathematical necessity. — apokrisis
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