I stated that without the concept or idea of what a tree is, there is/may be no tree. — Cavacava
Okay, but then what happens when you decide to run through the unconceptualized blob of green & brown? — Marchesk
. As I see it, only philosophers ever bother with the issue in the first place. — t0m
But they're not. One is talking about a simulation running inside your head by which you're indirectly aware of an external world.
The other is talking about there being no simulation, just direct access to the external world. — Marchesk
So what does it mean for sense-data/qualia to provide "direct" (or for that matter "indirect") access to the tree? — Michael
but beyond that, what's the difference between saying that the experience is direct or "just" a simulation? — Michael
Direct realists deny that there are sense-data. — Marchesk
The difference is what we're directly aware of when having a perception. — Marchesk
And what are dreams/hallucinations if not the occurrence of sense-data? — Michael
So are you saying that the image of a tree is the tree, or that there's no such thing as the image of a tree? — Michael
Repeating the claim "awareness is direct" doesn't explain what it means for awareness to be direct. — Michael
As long as 'perception' continues to be spoken about as a 'mental', imagistic phenomenon - and not the bodily/physinomic, interactive, environmental, affective, anticipatory, and memory-laden process that it is - this thread will continue to be mired in aporia - as it currently is. — StreetlightX
You perceive a mind-independent object, not a mental image, sound, etc. — Marchesk
No, image of the tree is seeing the tree.
Remember the infamous dress? Everybody was seeing the same picture, but some saw it to be black and blue and some saw it to be white and gold. So despite the fact that there was a shared object of perception, the image differed. — Michael
I'm not sure how putting it in those terms dissolves the philosophical issue of what a perceived tree is, or the skeptical concern that we can't know. — Marchesk
I'm asking for the distinction between perceiving a mind-independent object and perceiving a mental image. I don't get it. — Michael
but then the former wants to say that the perception is of the external stimulation and the latter wants to say that the perception is of the experience. Except for the wording, I don't understand the difference. — Michael
It dissolves it because it puts to ground the untenable, philosophically atrophied distinction between the 'mental' and the 'thing itself'; the very question posed by the OP is an error. The challenge is not to answer it but to reformulate its terms entirely. — StreetlightX
But if the direct realist is right, then what we see is what we get, — Marchesk
When you dream, hallucinate, visualize or remember a tree, it's only available to you. When you perceive a tree, other people can also perceive it. Realists say this is so because the tree is mind-independent. — Marchesk
Each one of us has his own experiences. When we say that we both perceive something (i.e. that the sky is blue) what we mean is that we have similar experiences. Nothing else. — Magnus Anderson
When we say that we both perceive something (i.e. that the sky is blue) what we mean is that we have similar experiences. Nothing else. — Magnus Anderson
The fourth point is where I think direct realism fails. The properties of the experience (colour, smell, taste, texture, shape) are properties of the experience and not properties of the external-world stimulus. The properties of the external-world stimulus are causally covariant with the properties of the experience, but they are not the same. For example, a sweet taste is causally covariant with the apple's chemical structure, but isn't a property of the apple, and a red colour is causally covariant with the apple's surface (and/or the reflected light), but isn't a property of the apple's surface (and/or the reflected light). — Michael
But are there some properties that we do directly perceive, such as shape? — Marchesk
A visual circle is just an experiential effect of the right kind of external stimulation, just as a tactile circle is just an experiential effect of the right kind of external stimulation. I think it very wrong to think that things look (or feel) like something even when not being seen (or felt). — Michael
The set (or more accurately, category) always refers to some range of experience. There is thus no dichotomy between experience and reality that is separate from our experience. — Magnus Anderson
What we mean is that we have similar color experiences when looking at the same sky. — Marchesk
I understand, but I don't see how it accomplishes that, since we do have sensory experiences which are not externally generated. — Marchesk
When two men look at a wheel and agree that its shape is circular what that means is that their "shape" experience is similar. — Magnus Anderson
But objects do have shapes, and those shapes are important to how the objects interact with the world. When we see a circle, we see that shape because the light bounces off it that way. When we feel the shape, we can tell that it's rounded, and if a blind person walked around a shape, they would know they went in a circle. — Marchesk
Science claims otherwise. There is big universe that exists beyond and before, and after us. But our everyday experiences tell us the same thing. The big oak tree has 120 rings. It was alive before I was born, etc. — Marchesk
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