Wakefulness is nothing other than a dreamlike state constrained by external sensory inputs... the brain sustains the same core state of consciousness during REM sleep and wakefulness, but the sensory and motor systems we use to perceive and act can’t affect this consciousness in regular ways when we’re REM-sleep dreaming. Consciousness itself doesn’t arise from sensory inputs; it’s generated within the brain by an ongoing dialogue between the cortex and the thalamus. — StreetlightX

This part is particularly intriguing. I can just hear some philosophers gnashing their teeth over this. Would love to see Dennett's reaction to it.

Intuition and concepts … constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. Thoughts without [intensional] content (Inhalt) are empty (leer), intuitions without concepts are blind (blind). It is, therefore, just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible—that is, to add an object to them in intuition—as to make our intuitions understandable—that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers, or capacities, cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only from their unification can cognition arise. (A50–51/B74–76)

Kant's Togetherness Principle

This applies to judgments, Kant agrees that we sense without concepts but that it is only through concepts that judgments can be made.

Wittgenstein also discusses the duck-rabbit as two different points of view or aspects Duckrabbit in his Philosophical Investigations II.

So yes you run into something but it is not yet a tree.

That would seem to largely support indirect realism, even if you're not interested in framing it that way. It also seems to support the Cyrenaic view of perception, which was that it was the result of bodily movements, with the addition of external inputs. — Marchesk

It only supports 'indirect realism' if the very distinction between direct and indirect realism makes sense. But of course, the point is that it doesn't. We see (to speak in the overused modality of sight) exactly what appears, insofar as appearance just is the result of a perceptual process. It could not even in principle be otherwise: there is nothing to 'compare' it to, there is no appearence-that-is-not-an-appearance, no perception which is not a result of a perceptual process.

As Michael points out, the external inputs can be totally unlike what consciousness presents us. — Marchesk

It's not clear that this is a sensical statement either.

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This part is particularly intriguing. I can just hear some philosophers gnashing their teeth over this. Would love to see Dennett's reaction to it. — Marchesk

Anything that makes a Dennett gnash teeth - hopefully to grind them down to the point of silence - is fine by me!

What it means is that there is a circular object that gives rise to the experience of seeing a circular shape, and that's why two people can have similar experiences. Also that's why there are two people. — Marchesk

I disagree. The universe isn't a mechanism. Its particulars, or facts if you will, are not produced according to some set of rules. Rather, the universe is a mass of particulars that are related to each other in a specific way. Mechanisms are created by humans for the purpose of prediction. That's all they are. If we knew everything about the world, you can be sure, our knowledge wouldn't have the form of a theory, but that of a mass of particulars. Theories exist only because we are ignorant.

It's not clear that this is a sensical statement either. — StreetlightX

How is it not? What are the external inputs? What are their properties? Do any of those properties show up in our experiences?

It only supports 'indirect realism' if the very distinction between direct and indirect realism makes sense. But of course, the point is that it doesn't. — StreetlightX

I don't see how it doesn't. You've basically quoted evidence that our perception is internally generated from a combination of external inputs, and ongoing processing in the brain (conversation between cortex and thalamus).

How is it not? What are the external inputs? What are their properties? Do any of those properties show up in our experiences? — Marchesk

What would it mean for something to be 'unlike' what it appears? Would it appear differently? But appearance is just a function of a perceptual process, and to speak of an appearence-which-is-not-an-appearence simply makes no sense. A different kind of perceptual system might perceive things that we don't (the eyes of an insect, say), but - to put it tautologically - there is no point of view which is not a point of view.

You've basically quoted evidence that our perception is internally generated from a combination of external inputs, and ongoing processing in the brain (conversation between cortex and thalamus). — Marchesk

Sure, but what would it otherwise be? What sense can be made of saying that perception is not as such? What you call 'anti-realism' only makes sense when countervailed by 'realism', but what you call 'realism' can be given no sensical content as far as I can see, which makes 'anti-realism' itself a position which states nothing, that marks a difference which makes no difference.

What would it mean for something to be 'unlike' what it appears? — StreetlightX

What I was saying is that the properties of the experience (e.g. colour and taste) are not properties of the external stimulus (e.g. the apple).

As a rough example, coffee has properties that the water and the coffee beans don't have when separated.

What you call 'anti-realism' only makes sense when countervailed by 'realism', but what you call 'realism' can be given no sensical content as far as I can see, which makes 'anti-realism' itself a position which states nothing, that marks a difference which makes no difference. — StreetlightX

Considering my coffee example, where our bodies are the water, the external stimulus is the coffee beans, and our experience is the interaction between them (i.e. the coffee), the realist argues that the object of perception (and the thing we talk about) is the coffee beans, whereas the anti-realist argues that the object of perception (and the thing we talk about) is the coffee.

It only supports 'indirect realism' if the very distinction between direct and indirect realism makes sense. But of course, the point is that it doesn't. We see (to speak in the overused modality of sight) exactly what appears, insofar as appearance just is the result of a perceptual process. It could not even in principle be otherwise: there is nothing to 'compare' it to, there is no appearence-that-is-not-an-appearance, no perception which is not a result of a perceptual process. — StreetlightX

I think the issue between direct and indirect realism is best understood by looking to the epistemological problem that gave rise to the competing theories. Do our experiences provide us with information about what the world is like when we're not looking? If the properties of the experience are products of the experience (i.e. the interaction between our bodies and some external stimulus) then they don't.

Sure, but what would it otherwise be? — StreetlightX

The external object or environment itself. Direct realism is a sophisticated form of naive realism. Things are as they appear, under normal conditions where the perceiver is functioning properly.

What you call 'anti-realism' only makes sense when countervailed by 'realism', but what you call 'realism' can be given no sensical content as far as I can see, which makes 'anti-realism' itself a position which states nothing, that marks a difference which makes no difference. — StreetlightX

Collapsing the distinction between realism and anti-realism is a form of anti-realism. And you can do that, but what about those "external inputs"? Are they just appearances too?

What about the entire physiological account of perception? Is that an appearance? Is there any reason to suppose anything else exists other than my own appearances? You're providing a sophisticated form of solipsism.

What would it mean for something to be 'unlike' what it appears? Would it appear differently? — StreetlightX

Yeah, the bent stick in water appears straight outside of water. The solid table is mostly empty space on the microphysical level. The earth rotates around the sun, despite appearances. There are massive galaxies of billions of stars, despite it looking like there are only a few thousand points of light in the night sky. Most the EM spectrum is invisible to us. There is a giant list of appearance/reality distinctions.

whereas the anti-realist argues that the object of perception (and the thing we talk about) is the coffee. — Michael

But that anti-realist can't answer the question of why there is coffee, while the realist can appeal to chemistry. For the anti-realist, coffee is brute, and chemistry is a just-so story. Something that makes sense of appearances.

But that anti-realist can't answer the question of why there is coffee, while the realist can appeal to chemistry. For the anti-realist, coffee is brute, and chemistry is a just-so story. Something that makes sense of appearances. — Marchesk

You mean an anti-realist can't be a scientific realist and instead has to be an instrumentalist? Perhaps. But so what? Are you suggesting that anti-realism is wrong because it doesn't allow for realism?

But so what? Are you suggesting that anti-realism is wrong because it doesn't allow for realism? — Michael

I'm suggesting anti-realism is wrong because it can't explain why anything happens. The instrumentalist explanations are just-so stories. We don't know why appearances have the structure they do. We invent atoms and electromagnetism to make sense of it all. Evolution didn't happen, it's just a story we tell ourselves about our origins, because we replaced the religious account.

Landru was real good at this game.

I'm suggesting anti-realism is wrong because it can't explain why anything happens. — Marchesk

That doesn't follow.

We invent atoms and electromagnetism to make sense of it all. — Marchesk

I think one can be a realist about the fundamentals (e.g quantum mechanics and the Standard Model) but an anti-realist about macroscopic objects. Allows one to avoid reductionism.

Yeah, it does follow.

Evolution is a fictional account of species because it didn't happen on an anti-realist reading, anymore than God created all the animal kinds in six days. It's just more palatable to modern empiricism.

I think one can be a realist about the fundamentals (e.g quantum mechanics and the Standard Model) but an anti-realist about macroscopic objects. Allows one to avoid reductionism. — Michael

One can. Wouldn't that be mereological nihilism? And does biology still fit in there somehow?

Evolution is a fictional account of species because it didn't happen — Marchesk

That's the wrong way to look at it. It's like saying that "playing chess" is a fictional account of the deterministic movements of a computer. It's better to say that "playing chess" is an abstract way of describing the very real mechanical behaviour of the hard drive and the screen. And evolution is an abstract way of describing the very real interaction of fundamental wave-particles (or just "noumena" if you don't even want to be a realist about the Standard Model).

And evolution is an abstract way of describing the very real interaction of fundamental wave-particles. — Michael

If one is realist about wave-particles, but not biological structures, sure.

If one is realist about wave-particles, but not life forms, sure. — Marchesk

I think you missed my edit: "or just 'noumena' if you don't even want to be a realist about the Standard Model".

Incidentally, is there a Godwin's equivalent law for metaphysical discussion and QM?

Do our experiences provide us with information about what the world is like when we're not looking? — Michael

But looking provides us with information about how a thing looks to that which looks at it. If this has a ring of tautology to it, it should. But the creation of a false problem happens when you try and step outside this tautology to ask: but what would it look like to something which doesn't look at it? But of course the question is nonsense. But - and this is why this problem is so prevalent - the nonsensical nature of the question is covered over and 'hidden' by the illegitimate semantic slide by how a thing looks like and how a thing 'is' ('what the world 'is' like'). But the question of appearance belongs in the domain of appearance. A thing looks like how it looks like to you. A legitimate question might be: but why does it look this way and not another way? But not: what does it look like when there is no looking involved?

If you don't keep absolutely clear the distinction between a thing's appearance and what it 'is' (the 'apperential' properties of a thing being a subset of the many properties a thing might have), and if you speak about them as though they belonged in the same category, you're going to ask pseudo-questions.

I think you missed my edit: "or just 'noumena' if you don't even want to be a realist about the Standard Model". — Michael

Yeah, if you want to go full Kant. Streetlight's post would also be Kantian. The external inputs could be the noumena.

It's just that when you arrive at noumena as your reality, why even bother being realist? What makes that more likely than the alternatives? What makes a Kantian so sure there has to be something responsible for experience?

But not: what does it look like when there is no looking involved? — StreetlightX

But doesn't science do exactly that by extracting the properties which aren't creature dependant to arrive at an abstract picture? Nagel's view from nowhere. That's the point of objectivity. To get around our idiosyncratic human experiences.

It's just that when you arrive at noumena as your reality, why even bother being realist? What makes that more likely than the alternatives? What makes a Kantian so sure there has to be something responsible for experience? — Marchesk

Presumably the same thing that makes a direct realist so sure that there has to be something responsible for the experience (so sure that the things we see continue to exist even when not seen).

Presumably the same thing that makes a direct realist so sure that there has to be something responsible for the experience (so sure that the things we see continue to exist even when not seen). — Michael

That the alternative is an absurd, gappy and brute account of individual experiences, or solipsism?

Or appeals to God and universal consciousness.

But doesn't science do exactly that by extracting the properties which aren't creature dependant to arrive at an abstract picture? Nagel's view from nowhere. That's the point of objectivity. — Marchesk

And if I were to grant that this is what science does, what would this have to do with perception? If 'science says': here are some properties of the thing which is not 'creature dependent', then by definition it clearly isn't talking about anything to do with perception, with how a thing appears to a 'creature'.

then by definition it clearly isn't' talking about anything to do with perception. — StreetlightX

If it has nothing to do with perception, how would we know about it? On an empirical account of knowledge, there must be something perceptible which leads us to inferring the non-perceptible properties of things.

Make up your mind: does science 'extract properties which aren't creature dependant' or is science 'creature dependent'. You can't have you cake and eat it. Note that I don't at all agree with your understanding of science, but that's not relevant.

But looking provides us with information about how a thing looks to that which looks at it. If this has a ring of tautology to it, it should. But the creation of a false problem happens when you try and step outside this tautology to ask: but what would it look like to something which doesn't look at it? But of course the question is nonsense. But - and this is why this problem is so prevalent - the nonsensical nature of the question is covered over and 'hidden' by the illegitimate semantic slide by how a thing looks like and how a thing 'is' ('what the world 'is' like'). But the question of appearance belongs in the domain of appearance. A thing looks like how it looks like to you. A legitimate question might be: but why does it look this way and not another way? But not: what does it look like when there is no looking involved? — StreetlightX

And I think this is exactly the issue behind the argument between the direct and indirect realist. The direct realist (or at least the naive realist) does say that things have a look even when not being looked at, and that in the case of a veridical perception it looks to us as it "objectively" looks (which I agree is nonsense). Whereas the indirect realist says that a thing's appearance is only representative of its objective properties (so, for example, a red appearance is representative of a surface that reflects light at a wavelength of ~625–740nm).

Whereas the indirect realist says that a thing's appearance is only representative of its objective properties — Michael

But what is the status of this 'only'? Only, as opposed to what, exactly? A thing's appearance is not... nonsense?