The paradox in a nutshell: We must always have a good reason for anything but there's no good reason to be good. — TheMadFool

How about this: we feel that it is good to be able to give reasons. We 'unreasonably' like reasons. We have an image of virtue that compels us, and this image is of a human that is reasonable. [On second thought, I think it's less explicit than that. From childhood we are taught to give an account of ourself. This just becomes more theoretical-metaphysical perhaps as we try to give persuasive accounts in terms of abstract authorities (?)]

A different approach: do we seek for reasons to eat food when we are hungry? Or only justifications when others don't want us to eat the food? Do we need a reason to look at a picture of someone we find attractive? Or just an excuse if this looking is challenged by others or the conflict of this looking with another desire (to transcend lust, not be shallow, etc.) Isn't desire primary? The 'good' is perhaps a name for the object of a certain kind of desire, for what we desire to see in ourselves and others.

I think there’s a problem with your depiction of reason which is this. By “reason” you are implicitly referring to, or thinking of, scientific justification. That is not at all an unreasonable or obviously mistaken thing to do, but a mistake nonetheless. When you say ‘reason’, I think you mean ‘empirical reason’.

Consider The Apology. Socrates goes to his death, untroubled. And why? Because he himself is certain that he has lived in such a way as to not have to fear death. That is the exercise of reason, in the context. And yet who today would regard this as ‘reasonable’.

But since then Hume, of course, enunciated the ‘is/ought’ problem, which is what, I think, you’re referring to here:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.

So here, when Hume says that moral principles are ‘not perceived by reason’, then he’s saying something very close to your OP. But it does, I think, depend on a very narrowly-conceived notion of what constitutes ‘reason’.

Like our principles of morality, we learn what rational thinking is through reward and punishment.

Therefore doesn't the justification of all applications of reason, even purely mathematical reason such as 2+2=4 and scientific reason such as E=MC^2, boil down to ought-justifications of the type "I ought to lock the backdoor when leaving the house"?

In other words, isn't the confusion of the paradox a result of overlooking the normative basis that is ultimately needed to justify the use of *any* law or rule - even those laws which are supposedly purely empirical or of pure reason?

We 'unreasonably' like reasons. — t0m

I don't think we like reason without cause. Reason is key to survival and look at all the scientific truths we've discovered using rationality.

Isn't desire primary? — t0m

Desire was primary. Philosophy, in a way, is the application of reason to find truths; truths that are to be used to guide our desires.

My question, specifically, is the unreasonable association of morality and reason. To me the expression ''good reason'' is proof of the morality-reason connection. Yet, when we apply rationality to morality all we get is confusion.

What's the problem here? Could it be that morality is irrational? Goodness is associated with foolishness e.g. a young person is described as naive or innocent (unaware of the Big Bad World).

Could it be that rationality isn't good? It takes cunning and a sharp mind to concoct devious plans. We need to be aware of strengths and weaknesses of people, manipulate them, escape detection, etc. In short it takes more brain power to be evil.

So here, when Hume says that moral principles are ‘not perceived by reason’, then he’s saying something very close to your OP. But it does, I think, depend on a very narrowly-conceived notion of what constitutes ‘reason’. — Wayfarer

That means morality is irrational. Is this an absolute truth or just situation-dependent? I mean, are we blind to moral truths or is morality, itself, just an illusion? I pray it's the former.

Like our principles of morality, we learn what rational thinking is through reward and punishment. — sime

A fine point. But the normative nature of reason is quite different from that of morality. We ought to be logical because being so reveals truths that are necessary for our survival. However, logic, as yet, hasn't revealed any reason why we ought to be good.

That means morality is irrational. Is this an absolute truth or just situation-dependent? I mean, are we blind to moral truths or is morality, itself, just an illusion? I pray it's the former. — TheMadFool

It's not 'morality' that's irrational, but the modern conception of what constitutes 'reason'.

Like our principles of morality, we learn what rational thinking is through reward and punishment.
— sime

A fine point. — TheMadFool

That's not 'a fine point', it is behaviourism.

Reason is key to survival and look at all the scientific truths we've discovered using rationality. — TheMadFool

But why do we like to survive? And justifying our liking reason in terms of the truths it brings us only further makes my point, as I see it. We like reason because it gives us truth. Why do we like truths? They help us survive comfortably. They satisfy curiosity. They can even function as a substitute for God. We can put ourselves in touch with something beyond our pettiness. The truth is cold and pure. It is unchanging like the stars. But the stars do change, so the 'metaphysical' truth (if we can get it) is even more 'godlike' than the stars, even more 'outside of time.'

My question, specifically, is the unreasonable association of morality and reason. To me the expression ''good reason'' is proof of the morality-reason connection. Yet, when we apply rationality to morality all we get is confusion.

What's the problem here? Could it be that morality is irrational? Goodness is associated with foolishness e.g. a young person is described as naive or innocent (unaware of the Big Bad World). — TheMadFool

To me this confusion is best explained by considering all the unconsidered baggage that we are bringing to the question. If we assume without questioning it that virtue should be 'metaphysically ground' and that 'rationality is X' then we will indeed experience dissonance.

In some sense, I think morality is 'irrational,' in that it is prior to (as the foundation of) what we mean by 'rational.' If we assume that some kind of cold, ideal logic is authorative (good), then the invisibility of 'good' to this cold, ideal logic looks like a problem, like a collision of goods. If we think of langauge use as inherently social, however, we can see that truth-finding is value-laden and just as well described in terms of consensus building. We cope with both physical and social reality using language. If we impose unrealistic distinctions (a radical gap between metaphysics and morality), then strange problems appear. I'm suggesting we look into these distinctions. In short, we experience it as 'good' to be rational in a way that is largely invisible to a narrowly conceived version of rationality.

I don’t think that’s the issue. Look again at @sime’s comment: reward and punishment. But that governs the behaviour of the slime mound - or indeed, anything else that lives. It’s only rational humans who can weigh up alternative possibilities, imagine different outcomes, and act accordingly, which is why ‘reason’, in the sense being discussed here, is meaningful.

That, again, is why the concept of a ‘final cause’ is important - it provides a reason for the existence of something. It is precisely the absence of that which is why evolutionary theory is a totally meaningless existential philosophy. And why? Because evolution doesn’t exist for any reason. Creatures exist in order to survive - but they only survive in order to exist. ‘Why’, doesn’t come into it. Note this exchange between a bishop and Dawkins, in a TV debate about evolution and religion:

GEORGE PELL: Well, what is the reason that science gives why we're here? Science tells us how things happen, science tells us nothing about why there was the Big Bang. Why there is a transition from inanimate matter to living matter. Science is silent on we could solve most of the questions in science and it would leave all the problems of life almost completely untouched. Why be good?

RICHARD DAWKINS: ‘Why be good’ is a separate question, which I also came to. Why we exist, you're playing with the word “why” there. Science is working on the problem of the antecedent factors that lead to our existence. Now, “why” in any further sense than that, why in the sense of purpose is, in my opinion, not a meaningful question.

There is the cause of the OP’s question in a nutshell; there is no reason for life, or anything else, to actually exist. It just happens to exist, as a consequence of...well, nothing really. This is from someone who purportedly ‘praises reason’.

It's not 'morality' that's irrational, but the modern conception of what constitutes 'reason — Wayfarer

I'd be grateful to know how our ''modern conception'' of reason is defective.

That's not 'a fine point', it is behaviourism. — Wayfarer

But there is an ought to logic, presuming of course that the aim/desire is to survive. However, as Hume said, there's no rational ought to morality, at least not in a an airtight, foolproof sense.

Perhaps my question assumes some form of objective morality - a necessity, I think(?), for rationality to produce results.

Yet, looking at the trends of moral history it does seem that we're ALL approaching some form of, to say the least, consensus on moral issues. For instance, pedophilia, slavery, murder, rape, to name a few, are now universally immoral. Does this count as evidence that morality is objective?

Like our principles of morality, we learn what rational thinking is through reward and punishment.
— sime

A fine point. But the normative nature of reason is quite different from that of morality. We ought to be logical because being so reveals truths that are necessary for our survival. However, logic, as yet, hasn't revealed any reason why we ought to be good. — TheMadFool

I mean it deeper than that. Even what we call 'pure logic' and its mechanical application is a matter of us following normative principles that are not represented in the rules of the logic itself. We draw attention to the normative essence of logic when we teach logic to somebody by practically demonstrating how they *ought* to apply a formula.

Logic doesn't merely involve oughts, it is only oughts.

Recall that no matter what linguistic instruction we give somebody in our explanation of a rule and its application, they might always apply the rule "wrongly" in a way we never intended. Rules by themselves cannot justify how one interprets other rules. We ultimately ground our intended interpretation of rules in behavioural habits established through rewards and punishments.


The equations of physics say nothing to the scientist about the world independently of how he ought to apply them. And he does his best to avoid miscalculation on *pain* of failure. But the miscalculation isn't distinct and separable from the pain of failure - there aren't "two' separate things - rather the definition of miscalculation involves pain of failure.

Now why should it be assumed that reason involves different criteria of normativity to morality?

Why should logic and logical thinking be considered to be a distinct type of behaviour to morality and moral thinking?

However, as Hume said, there's no rational ought to morality, at least not in a an airtight, foolproof sense. — TheMadFool

You just answered the question you asked above that quote. And Hume is one of the main perpetrators in the story that needs to be told. But to explain that, requires an excursion into the subject of intellectual history.

Actually - on second thoughts, I can’t possibly cover it in a forum post. I can only make a few suggestions. The notion of ‘reason’ that you’re infected with working under, is not ‘reason’ in the sense that would have been understood by Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle. Your understanding of ‘reason’ is instrumental or scientific reason, which only recognises what Aristotle would have called ‘efficient and material causes’. Within that limited domain, there is indeed no such thing as ‘reason’ in an ethical sense, beyond a prohibition on the obvious evils of ‘pedophilia, slavery, murder, rape, to name a few’. That is just so as to maintain a veneer of civility (although as is clear from the Daily News, even this is crumbling). But the overwhelming consensus of the ‘modern scientific worldview’ is that life is an ultimately fortuitous occurrence which exists for no reason other than to survive. Which you assume as the only rationale in your response to me.

Now why should it be assumed that reason involves different criteria of normativity to morality? — sime

To me, reason is a tool and morality is the material we use reason on. Isn't that the working analogy for philosophy?

If I understand you correctly, your view is somewhat similar to my OP - that reason is good. This is what I'm questioning here.

(Y)

So, what kind of reason will be productive in the moral domain? As you said, and I agree, scientific reason fails miserably. One thing that I have to say though is that science isn't all that useless in morality. No truth stands in isolation and the world, to me, is a complex pattern of truths.

To me, reason is a tool and morality is the material we use reason on. Isn't that the working analogy for philosophy?

If I understand you correctly, your view is somewhat similar to my OP - that reason is good. This is what I'm questioning here. — TheMadFool

Yes, i think it is a deeply flawed analogy, for we don't possess a single form of reasoning but have evolved many different games of reasoning-behaviour that constitute a family of coping strategies for surviving in different sets of circumstances.

Using reason to solve a problem is equivalent to comparing actions taken in similar situations of adversity and to estimate their utility in a new situation. And our logical acts of comparison, deduction and prediction are not themselves unique forms of behaviour, and they possess no justification beyond the utility of their behavioural consequences.

Yes, i think it is a deeply flawed analogy, for we don't possess a single form of reasoning but have evolved many different games of reasoning-behaviour that constitute a family of coping strategies for surviving in different sets of circumstances. — sime

That's really interesting. @Wayfarer and you seem to be saying something similar. Wayfarer, if I understood him, thinks scientific reasoning (I assume he means the notion of life being nothing more than chance) is faulty. You seem to be saying classical logic is inadequate for the examination of morality.

Well, to both of you: What kind of reasoning will yield better results?

Actually I disagree with Sime’s analysis, as it’s based only on evolutionary biology. For a very concise account of what I see as the problem, please have a read of Anything But Human, Richard Polt, which lays it out.

I have no beef with entomology or evolution, but I refuse to admit that they teach me much about ethics. Consider the fact that human action ranges to the extremes. People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts. Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense. — Richard Polt

We must always have a good reason for anything but there's no good reason to be good.

Reason provides guidance. It enables us to sort things out, but I don't think reason is good or bad, moral or immoral. It is the way of thinking that can be valid, sound, or mistaken. We have to desire something in order to employ reason, to obtain what we desire. How we fulfill our desires as well as what we desire can be good, bad or indifferent. I think we all have a conscience, a way to judge our own actions and accept responsibility for them.

Consider The Apology. Socrates goes to his death, untroubled. And why? Because he himself is certain that he has lived in such a way as to not have to fear death

Nietzsche points out in 340 of his Gay Science, there are some questions as to whether or not Socrates died untroubled, given his last words. Similarly, Christ asks "My God, My God, Why Have You Forsaken Me?' when he faced death.

Bottomline, there's a struggle between altruism and selfishness. Both have evolved in us. Perhaps there's no contradiction in it. Both altruism and selfishness, opposites as they are, are advantageous to survival. The former benefits the group and the latter benefits the individual. It depends on which car you want to ride in.

Anyway...back to the point.

I don't think science is completely useless in the study of morality. In a very basic sense, morality begins within the family and science has shown that all life is a really BIG family.

Reason provides guidance. It enables us to sort things out, but I don't think reason is good or bad, moral or immoral. It is the way of thinking that can be valid, sound, or mistaken. We have to desire something in order to employ reason, to obtain what we desire. How we fulfill our desires as well as what we desire can be good, bad or indifferent. I think we all have a conscience, a way to judge our own actions and accept responsibility for them. — Cavacava

You're right. Reason per se has no moral color. It's simply a tool, a good(;) ) one at that. I think as @Wayfarer said, the ''good'' in ''good reason'' doesn't mean the moral good and even if it does it probably doesn't match the meaning of ''good'' I have in mind.

Of course the question on why reason is a failure in morality still remains.

advantageous to survival.... — TheMadFool

This leads me to believe you haven’t understood what I’ve been saying.

The strange part is that applying rationality to moral theory hasn't led to anything substantive. — TheMadFool

Are you sure?

I mean, even prior to any educated judgement about adaptive advantages concerning evolution, I've rarely found that it made much sense to be mean, cruel or simply uncaring. There's usually a simple obvious advantage to doing good, which is that people will tend to notice that you are a person who does mostly good.

This leads me to believe you haven’t understood what I’ve been saying. — Wayfarer

I don't mean to say that such a view is right. I'm just trying to fit morality with science - may be it didn't work.

Why is morality so difficult? I mean our moral compass, in general, has religious sources and religion is notoriously ''unreasonable''. What is the problem with morality or is it reason (logic as opposed to a specific variety like scientific reasoning)? Perhaps morality isn't objective, lacking incontrovertible truths, and so reason fails to navigate the shifting landscape. Or may be it's a work in progress - we remain confused[/i], unsure of a story's message until the end.

Are you sure?

I mean, even prior to any educated judgement about adaptive advantages concerning evolution, I've rarely found that it made much sense to be mean, cruel or simply uncaring. There's usually a simple obvious advantage to doing good, which is that people will tend to notice that you are a person who does mostly good. — Akanthinos

It may be that reason isn't at fault. For one, it's yielded many useful results in other fields - maths, science, etc. The problem, it seems, is with finding our initial premises - the foundations for any theory, morality included.

On another view, it appears that we may require a different thinking tool to handle morality. Perhaps we need to rethink our strategy. I don't know.

Why is morality so difficult? I mean our moral compass, in general, has religious sources and religion is notoriously ''unreasonable'' — TheMadFool

But that is a tendentious argument. There is always an aspect of a religious philosophy that is beyond empirical evidence but ‘transcendent’ is not the same as ‘unreasonable’. It might be that it surpasses reason rather than denying it.

Now, I do agree that sometimes religion is simply irrational; I would put young-earth creationism in that category. There are many religious ideas and beliefs that might be irrational, or sub-rational. But the philosophy of Aquinas, for example, is scrupulously rationalistic; every proposition starts with a number of reasoned objections.

The problem with science in this context is not that it’s faulty or incorrect, but that moral reasons require consideration of values, and science is principally concerned with quantification. Science can build powerful technology, but the question of which technology to build, and why it should be built, is not a scientific question, but a political and ethical question. But in the absence of a shared domain of values, such that the Christian ethos used to provide, then society is inclined to look to science as a source of truth or reason, in respect of ethical issues; or alternatively to declare that ‘science has proven’ that there is no objective basis for morality.

There is always an aspect of a religious philosophy that is beyond empirical evidence but ‘transcendent’ is not the same as ‘unreasonable’. It might be that it surpasses reason rather than denying it. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is a good point. Reason may be a poor tool to examine the ''transcendent'', as you put it. Somewhere inside me I think that there are aspects of our world that reason can't reveal (may be it's just because of circumstances, I don't know). What bugs me is the notion of the ''transcendent'', no matter how deeply we sense it, is, by definition, beyond our grasp. It's very attractive in a world which, from all angles, seems meaningless. Yet, there's a real danger in missing the truth ''under our noses'' if we entertain beliefs in the transcendent. I mean is it wise to give up the fish on our line for a bigger fish that may be simply your imagination?

But in the absence of a shared domain of values, such that the Christian ethos used to provide, then society is inclined to look to science as a source of truth or reason, in respect of ethical issues; or alternatively to declare that ‘science has proven’ that there is no objective basis for morality. — Wayfarer

I don't think science is that harmful to morality. As I said, it has united, so to speak, the human family and it seems the family is only going to get bigger. Don't you think this is good for morality?

is it wise to give up the fish on our line for a bigger fish that may be simply your imagination? — TheMadFool

That’s where faith plays a role. And no, ‘faith’ is not ‘clinging to a belief in propositions for which there is no evidence’, as a Dawkins would describe it. It exists within a context of a community of practice and a domain of discourse, which provides some anchors for it. It isn’t simply faith in anything, or wishful thinking.

And if you read what I said, I didn’t imply anywhere that science is harmful for morality. You can be a good person and a good scientist, but being a good person doesn’t necessarily rely on science.

That’s where faith plays a role. And no, ‘faith’ is not ‘clinging to a belief in propositions for which there is no evidence’, as a Dawkins would describe it. It exists within a context of a community of practice and a domain of discourse, which provides some anchors for it. It isn’t simply faith in anything, or wishful thinking. — Wayfarer

What a nice thing to say. I was of the opinion that faith is a bad thing, rationally speaking. I think it does have a place in our belief systems to say nothing of the fact that reason itself must begin somewhere.

And if you read what I said, I didn’t imply anywhere that science is harmful for morality. You can be a good person and a good scientist, but being a good person doesn’t necessarily rely on science. — Wayfarer

Sorry for misreading your thoughts but I'm under the impression that you think science doesn't mingle well with moral philosophy. Sorry.

hey no apologies needed. It’s an interesting conversation.

(Y)

Why is morality so difficult? — TheMadFool

Perhaps because the way it has been talked about is based upon misunderstanding what it is?

Perhaps because the way it has been talked about is based upon misunderstanding what it is? — creativesoul

I don't know. Moral theories, at least the ones I'm familiar with, all seem to have one interesting objective - to frame a set of rules that are universal (for all situations and all times). This is the aim of all moral theories and as natural as this is it is also the most problematic.

I don't know. Moral theories, at least the ones I'm familiar with, all seem to have one interesting objective - to frame a set of rules that are universal (for all situations and all times). This is the aim of all moral theories and as natural as this is it is also the most problematic. — TheMadFool

It's the rules part that is problematic. Morality is much better understood as a human condition.

That which is good is good in and of itself. There is no reason for being good. There is no reason for being human either, or being a tree.