What if I dream of something that doesn't exist in the waking world, like me having a child?

Or is such a thing impossible? How so? — Michael

I’m not exactly sure what his point might be but it may have something to do with the fact that we can’t imagine or dream of things that are beyond our experience. Our experiences of the physical world provide the basic contents or building blocks of our minds, without which there could be no minds.

You can dream of having a child because you possess the basic conceptual elements to form that dream, or simulate it in imagination. It would not be possible for you to dream of or imagine things that consist of conceptual elements that are beyond your knowledge or experience.

This limit in imagination indicates the mutually dependent nature of mind/matter, I believe.

There is no meaning without something external to thought. So, if consciousness consists of thought, then there is no consciousness without something external to it.

One finger cannot point at itself...

Spatiotemporal distinction requires a plurality.

If this were the case, then calling it a mind would be incoherent. If there is no reality outside a "mind", then the "mind" would essentially become reality. We use different terms to refer to minds, and reality. To switch the meaning of the two is ridiculous and unnecessary. One simply needs to follow the implications of what they are saying. If "mind" is the only thing to exist, then the "mind" is simply reality and there is no such thing as "mind". — Harry Hindu

There is no meaning without something external to thought/belief. So, if consciousness consists in/of thought/belief, then there is no consciousness without something external to it.

One finger cannot point at itself...

Spatiotemporal distinction requires a plurality. — creativesoul

I'll address both of these together. Basically you're argument is that since we refer to reality and mind as two separate things, then it doesn't follow that they could be one thing, as if the words point to two different objects. Thus, since object X is separate from object Y, then my argument is incoherent or possibly inconsistent. This, to me is just a misunderstanding of how language is used. Use is key (Wittgensteinian use) here. It's true that sometimes words do refer to objects, but words don't exclusively point to objects. There are two many uses of the words mind and reality to give them such precise definitions. If you define these words as you have done, of course you're conclusion is going to be, " If 'mind' is the only thing to exist, then the 'mind' is simply reality and there is no such thing as 'mind'." It's like (Wittgensteinian e.g.) defining all games as board games, and thus someone who calls "playing catch" a game is incorrect because it doesn't fit the definition, or their definition.

This, it seems to me is a perfect example of how many of us create problems that don't exist. Part of the problem here is with the word reality, it's just to vague a term to try to fit it into some precise definition, that is, as something definitely separate from the mind. And since reality is objective, then it has to be separate from the mind. You're definition is keeping you locked into a particular view, as if the word has some definite sense (word = object).

I think both of you have fallen prey to this problem.

Nah Sam...

I understand Witt's point about "game", and grant it. Moreover, I understand how conceptual frameworks limit and/or delimit what can be sensibly said according to them. I'm also a fan of the Speech Act theorists. There's more to it than comparing senses of a term...

My point was on the level of existential contingency. All meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become signified/symbolized, and an agent to draw the correlations/associations between them.

Well, then you need to demonstrate that. I don't see how your argument works here.

Do you have an example/candidate of meaning that does not require and/or consist in/of what I just wrote?

My point was on the level of existential contingency. All meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become signified/symbolized, and an agent to draw the correlations/associations between them. — creativesoul

This is my point, this idea, that all meaning requires something to be signified is just incorrect. Some things fall into this category but not all things. The term reality is just such an example, so is the word game. By signs I take it you mean the sounds we make when talking, or the marks we make when writing, and the symbol is that which correlates with the sign. But many words have no symbol, other than how we use them in different contexts. For example, what is the symbol that correlates to the sign reality. There are just rules of use (or grammatical rules) determined by different language-games. Language is simply a form of human behavior, thus, what we do with words, and how we use them in practical situations is what's important more often than not. There is no symbol that correlates with the word five. Wittgenstein points this out in his example "buying five red apples," and what's important here is the use of the word five. Thus the idea that there is something that exists, an ontology associated with the word is wrong-headed. Now you know this, so maybe I'm misinterpreting what you mean by sign and symbol.

You also said, "All meaning requires...and agent to draw the correlations/associations between them," but again this is something Wittgenstein would have said in his early philosophy (Tractatus), but it's not something that he would have said in his later philosophy (PI). You seem to be saying what many have believed throughout history, that the meaning of a word is associated with some thing, or some object out there in reality.

I'll address both of these together. Basically you're argument is that since we refer to reality and mind as two separate things, then it doesn't follow that they could be one thing, as if the words point to two different objects. Thus, since object X is separate from object Y, then my argument is incoherent or possibly inconsistent. This, to me is just a misunderstanding of how language is used. Use is key (Wittgensteinian use) here. It's true that sometimes words do refer to objects, but words don't exclusively point to objects. There are two many uses of the words mind and reality to give them such precise definitions. If you define these words as you have done, of course you're conclusion is going to be, " If 'mind' is the only thing to exist, then the 'mind' is simply reality and there is no such thing as 'mind'." It's like (Wittgensteinian e.g.) defining all games as board games, and thus someone who calls "playing catch" a game is incorrect because it doesn't fit the definition, or their definition.

This, it seems to me is a perfect example of how many of us create problems that don't exist. Part of the problem here is with the word reality, it's just to vague a term to try to fit it into some precise definition, that is, as something definitely separate from the mind. And since reality is objective, then it has to be separate from the mind. You're definition is keeping you locked into a particular view, as if the word has some definite sense (word = object).

I think both of you have fallen prey to this problem. — Sam26

Meaning is not use, and I have made that argument over and over again on these forums.

The thing is that there is a consensus on the use of the terms, "mind" and "reality". Look them up in the dictionary and you will see that they are mutually exclusive. Sure you can use any word you want to refer to whatever you want, but if you expect me to understand you, then you'd need to use the words how I understand them, not how you understand them.

Not only that, but saying that reality is actually a mind, just obliterates the definition of mind, and makes it the definition of reality. So to say that there still is a mind, is to confuse to the two. I don't see how a mind can exist all by itself and then you'd an all new explanation for the relationship between the contents of the "mind" reality, which includes the will and attention.

I'm sorry but you're way off on this. Read some Wittgenstein.

You also said, "All meaning requires...and agent to draw the correlations/associations between them," but again this is something Wittgenstein would have said in his early philosophy (Tractatus), but it's not something that he would have said in his later philosophy (PI). You seem to be saying what many have believed throughout history, that the meaning of a word is associated with some thing, or some object out there in reality. — Sam26

While i'm not myself within this camp of opinion, there are many self-proclaimed Wittgensteinians who interpret Witty's supposed "private language argument" as a 'transcendental argument' for the existence of the external world that attempts to turn the language of idealism against itself. And this interpretation sounds along the lines of what I understand creative soul to be saying.

Recall Wittgenstein's comparison of the meaning of a word with something you walk up to.

Aren't such examples of "meaning as use" the essence of transcendental arguments for realism?

If the nouns of one's language are spoken in order to convey information, either to oneself when one talks to oneself in introspection, or to other people when one speaks to others, then the nouns of one's language must be referring to something outside of one's immediate experience when one speaks - for otherwise one is merely re-signalling one's immediate experience in a private language that is defined purely in terms of his immediate experience - a pointless task surely?

Ergo, to be motivated to say a noun with the objective of discussing the existence of a fact is part of what it means to assert that something exists externally to one's immediate experience. Hence, the realist hopes, scepticism of the external world in the sense of doubting that nothing lies outside of one's immediate experience, is meaningless and nonsensical. For to doubt the external world is to already objectify it.

The reason I don't fall for this argument and doubt that Wittgenstein would have supported it, is because I understand Wittgenstein to be a verificationist in spirit who sought to treat illnesses of the mind as opposed to legitimising pseudo-philosophical problems.

For it is nonsensical for a verificationist, who rejects both the meaning of non-empirical premises and the meaning of non-empirical arguments based on pure reason, to speak of non-empirical truths that cannot eventually be grounded in first-person experience, since all so-called 'truth's must be verifiable either a priori in the imagination or a posteriori in the sense of walking up to and confirming something. The above transcendental argument I presented above isn't an empirical argument based on philosophers actual use of language, and neither is the absolute notion of an external world empirically meaningful.

Perhaps we could say, transcendental arguments are potentially useful therapies for treating anxieties over idealism, while skeptical arguments against realism are potentially useful therapies for treating nihilistic despair over realism.

But since the arguments used in both philosophical therapies not empirically verifiable arguments, they purely consist in propaganda with an intended remedial effect.

There is a lot of philosophy written in the name of Wittgenstein that's not really representative of his thoughts on language. I've done a lot of study over the years on Wittgenstein and most of it is done using primary sources. Much of what some philosophers believe about Wittgenstein is based on what others have interpreted, some of it's good, some not. I have a good grasp of his philosophy, but I'm sure that my own interpretations have fallen short too. To neglect his philosophy, or to sell it short, is akin to neglecting Einstein if you're a physicist. He was probably one of the greatest philosophers in the past two to three hundred years. Moreover, to not understand what he said about meaning as use, and to think that a dictionary is something other than a guide, is doing a disservice to oneself and to those who read the posts. I'm mainly referring to what Harry posted above. It's fine to disagree with Wittgenstein, but to misunderstand this very important point is to remain in confusion as far as I'm concerned. I disagree with some of Wittgenstein's metaphysics, and also what he said about ethics, but not with the core of what he wrote in the PI. On Certainty is another important work that has important implications for what it means to have knowledge.

I posted hundreds of pages of Wittgenstein in another philosophy forum, and started to post it here, but most of the philosophers in here have already read most of my posts, so it didn't get much attention. It's mostly an exegesis of Wittgenstein.

This is my point, this idea, that all meaning requires something to be signified is just incorrect. Some things fall into this category but not all things. The term reality is just such an example, so is the word game. — Sam26

I think you're misunderstanding me Sam.

The terms "reality" and "game" have meaning by virtue of how they've been used to talk about, refer to, symbolize, and/or signify all sorts of different things. The fact that there is nothing that all games have in common aside from the fact that we call them "games", doesn't bear upon the fact that the term "game" is meaningful in all of the ways that it is solely by virtue of our using it to signify and/or symbolize something other than the term itself.

By signs I take it you mean the sounds we make when talking, or the marks we make when writing, and the symbol is that which correlates with the sign. But many words have no symbol, other than how we use them in different contexts. For example, what is the symbol that correlates to the sign reality. — Sam26

I should clarify here as well. The term "reality" would be a symbol or sign. The definition would be the signified/symbolized, and the use of the term would show it's meaning by virtue of showing what's being signified/symbolized(what's being talked about).

There are just rules of use (or grammatical rules) determined by different language-games. Language is simply a form of human behavior, thus, what we do with words, and how we use them in practical situations is what's important more often than not. There is no symbol that correlates with the word five. Wittgenstein points this out in his example "buying five red apples," and what's important here is the use of the word five. Thus the idea that there is something that exists, an ontology associated with the word is wrong-headed. Now you know this, so maybe I'm misinterpreting what you mean by sign and symbol. — Sam26

The word "five" is a symbol. It symbolizes a specific quantity, as does the number. Numbers are names of quantities. The word "red" is also a symbol. It symbolizes a specific color.

The point I take Witt to be making is not that words do not symbolize/signify, but rather that not all words do in the same way. We can glean understanding regarding the roles that things other than nouns have in our language by virtue of looking at how we use language for things other than denoting.

You also said, "All meaning requires...and agent to draw the correlations/associations between them," but again this is something Wittgenstein would have said in his early philosophy (Tractatus), but it's not something that he would have said in his later philosophy (PI). You seem to be saying what many have believed throughout history, that the meaning of a word is associated with some thing, or some object out there in reality. — Sam26

That would be a more narrow reading than intended, although given the history surrounding the notion of meaning, and the inherent philosophical baggage of almost any key term, it's not at all surprising nor unexpected.

I would only clarify here by virtue of noting that that which becomes symbolized can range from an object such as a tree to an emotional state of mind such as the happiness of a newlywed couple after hearing the pastor's pronouncement, and any and all combinations thereof.

In the Tractatus what Wittgenstein means by sign are 'perceptible sounds or inscriptions,' and symbols, are signs that have been projected onto the world or reality. And propositions have a sign, because of their projective relation to the world, and a sense because it is associated with a situation. Moreover, a name is a sign that has been associated with an object. Of course Wittgenstein is using name and object as the smallest parts of propositions and facts respectively.

Symbols are signs that have a projection in the world, so, since I'm writing about Wittgenstein, I'm using these terms in the Wittgensteinian sense.

In Wittgenstein's later philosophy he continues to talk about signs, and what gives signs meaning, but what gives signs their life is not some thing associated with them, as he thought in the Tractatus, but their use.

You seem to be confusing signs and symbols, and in places are referring to symbols as signs. Thus the term tree is a sign, and the symbol is the tree. The sign points to the symbol (the thing) associated with the sign. When we type or write, we type or write the sign. Propositions are also signs that have a sense, and in the Tractatus, that sense is associated with some thing, but in the PI, it's use that gives the proposition its sense.

So when referring to reality, there is no thing to associate with the sign, the key is how we use the term in a variety of ways. Some philosophers want to give the word a definite sense, that is, a precise definition, however, that doesn't exist. There are just a multiplicity of uses that have a sense in a particular context.

And to get back to my point with Sime, definitions are just guides, they don't give us, nor could they cover all possible uses, there are just too many possible uses. This can be seen in trying to use dictionary definitions to cover each and every possible use of the term game. The term reality is just like the term game, probably more so.

I'm using the terms differently and rightly so Sam. I reject logical atomism.

On my view, symbols symbolize, and signs signify. Symbolic meaning arises from the former and significant meaning arises from the latter. Modern convention has it that all theories of meaning are based upon one, the other, or both.

They both require an agent to draw correlations between that which becomes sign/symbol and that which becomes significant/symbolized.

Or, to translate that into the scheme you're implementing...

Meaning requires an agent to draw correlations between that which becomes sign and that which becomes symbol.

Do you have an example/candidate of meaning that does not require and/or consist in/of what I just wrote? — creativesoul

Is @Sapientia messing around with people’s quotes again? :)

The later Wittgenstein is not a logical atomist. I'll stick with his later philosophy when it comes to language, because, I believe, it clarifies linguistic problems, such as the ones we're talking about.

Sam, I honestly do not find that later Witt is incompatible with my position.

But your replies don't to seem to fit with my understanding of the later W., and much of the reading I've done on W. Who are you reading? I haven't seen anyone describe sign and symbol the way you do. Maybe you can refer me to someone.

I think our conversation would be more helped by virtue of my pointing out that nothing I've said negates and/or refutes Witt's insight into looking at how we use language as a means for understanding different ways that we attribute meaning.

The difference between the use of "sign" and "symbol" have no bearing that I can see. They are tangential and seem irrelevant. Although, it very well may be problematic at the level of discourse that begins discussing the content of thought/belief. I mean, he does hold to the historical conventional notion of proposition, and propositions are not equivalent to thought/belief.

To directly answer your question...

As far as Witt's stuff goes, I've read the Tractatus, On Certainty, PI, The studies for PI(blue and brown books), KT Fann's Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, Remarks on Colour, Culture and Value, and a couple of other compilations... I still have hard copies of them all, if you wonder which versions...

HarperPerennial, UC Press Berkeley,University of Chicago

I was just wondering because we're pretty far apart on some of this stuff, so I thought you may have been reading something other than what I was reading. I too have read most of those books, although I haven't read completely through Remarks on Color, and very little on Culture and Value. Two really good books that I recently read are Ludwig Wittgenstein by Monk, and Wittgenstein, by Schroeder. KT Fann's book is really good if you want to get a good overview. I spent a lot of time reading and re-reading On Certainty, I find it fascinating.

Lately though I've been caught up in the arguments about consciousness.

On Certainty shows the trouble Witt had with explaining the relationship(s) between certainty and knowledge. I think that that may be a result of treating belief as equivalent to propositions. The fascinating part of it, to me at least, surrounds the remarkable insight that paying careful attention to what counts as 'doubt' can render, particularly with regard to his quest to set out a foundational basis, what he called "hinge propositions"; the bedrock as it were.

Like I said, we're far apart, even your ideas of what Wittgenstein is saying in On Certainty.

I still suspect that we're not as far apart as you may think. I'll take the time to set out the ways in which my position is compatible with Witt's notion of meaning as use sometime in the next few days. I'll use PI...

That's not an argument against anything I said. I can just say that you're way off on this because you read Wittgenstein. Meaning is not the use of words.

Meaning is not the use of words. — Harry Hindu

Witt doesn't say that. No one that I know of holds to that simplistic notion at face value.

Using words does both shows and attributes meaning.

Witt from the Investigations...

When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.

Witt also from the Investigations(referencing Tractatus)...

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself."

The point I take Witt to be making is not that words do not symbolize/signify, but rather that not all words do in the same way. We can glean understanding regarding the roles that things other than nouns have in our language by virtue of looking at how we use language for things other than denoting. — creativesoul

I think our conversation would be more helped by virtue of my pointing out that nothing I've said negates and/or refutes Witt's insight into looking at how we use language as a means for understanding different ways that we attribute meaning. — creativesoul

Witt doesn't say that. No one that I know of holds to that simplistic notion at face value.

Using words does both shows and attributes meaning. — creativesoul

It's not the use of words that is meaning, as the same string of words can mean different things. Meaning is tied to the cause of the words being spoken or written, which would be the intent of the speaker or writer.

"When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires." — creativesoul

This was Wittgenstein quoting Augustine.

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.

And this is him describing Augustine's view.

He then spends a lot of time showing the problem with this view.