I don't know what the objectivist would say. There doesn't seem to be any sensible answer, which is why moral objectivism doesn't – and can't – work. — Michael

God and one's own nature, and ultimately, sub specie aeternitatis, the two aren't any different.

In what sense is morality obligatory and a command if talk of obligation and commands in this context is a category error? Your position seems to be affirming its own incoherency. — Michael

In a different meaning of obligation and command than was used. My nature, metaphorically, commands me and orients me towards its own fulfilment. But I have the freedom to go against it if I so desire. So in that regard, and in this sense, it commands me, even though, strictly speaking, it is not a person.

Perhaps, but I'm talking about the sort of rules that relate to obligations. — Michael

Okay noted.

No, I'd say that the premise is right, and that your premise that there are obligations sans-rules that is wrong. — Michael

Why?

The claim "one ought not X" has everything to do with obligation. It's the second word. — Michael

No, ought is not obligation.

Moral philosophers might agree that X is contrary to human flourishing but not agree that one ought not X. — Michael

Something is human nature only if it has a certain effect on what you do (dictates/influences what you do), and what you are oriented towards. Thus it is human nature that decides what you ought to do - that's precisely why it is one's NATURE. That murder is contrary to human flourishing means that human nature is not oriented towards murdering, and thus, when we speak of the immorality of murder, we simply mean to point out this fact. Someone who is immoral thus does something that is against their nature, and saying that they ought not to is just an affirmation that they indeed share that human nature.

No, ought is not obligation. — Agustino

Yes it is. That one ought not X is that one is obligated to not X.

And before we go 'round in circles arguing over definitions, I'll simply say that this is the definition of "ought" that I'm using in my argument.

My nature, metaphorically, commands me and orients me towards its own fulfilment.

What does it mean to be metaphorically commanded to behave a certain way? And is that all moral obligation is? Poetry?

Why?

Because that one ought not X just is that X is against some specified set of rules. If it's a legal obligation then it's a set of legal rules. If it's a moral obligation then it's a set of moral rules. Therefore rule-free obligation makes no sense.

And note that I'm talking about actual obligations, not your proposed metaphorical obligations (whatever they're supposed to be).

Yes it is. That one ought not X is that one is obligated to not X.

And before we go 'round in circles arguing over definitions, I'll simply say that this is the definition of "ought" that I'm using in my argument. — Michael

Fine, then your definition of ought simply does not cover all the uses of the word ought in a moral context.

What does it mean to be metaphorically commanded to behave a certain way? And is that all moral obligation is? Poetry? — Michael

To be metaphorically commanded to eat when you are hungry for example, is that command which does not come from a person, but rather from one's own being/nature. Moral obligation is such a command from one's own being/nature. This has nothing to do with poetry :)

And it's metaphorical because one's own nature is not a person with a will who can command one to do something. But nevertheless, the person experiences the demands of his nature as commands.

Because that one ought not X just is that X is against some specified set of rules. — Michael

According to your limited definition yes, I'm just saying that there are other uses of one ought not X in moral discourse.

If it's a legal obligation then it's a set of legal rules. If it's a moral obligation then it's a set of moral rules. Therefore rule-free obligation makes no sense. — Michael

These are just your definitions.

And note that I'm talking about actual obligations, not your proposed metaphorical obligations (whatever they're supposed to be). — Michael

:s

It's possible you ought not to do something, even if there's no rule against it. It's also possible you ought to do something even though there is a rule against it. So your account can't be right. — The Great Whatever

This.

Although I do more or less agree with your conclusion. Morality can be reduced to the subjective and does not transcend it.

I think of morality as a subset of ethics.

I think of all morality and ethics as objective not as subjective.

Protagoras the Sophist believed and taught that all things are subjective even so called "truth". But this would only serve to justify liars.

As Immanuel Kant said, we should not objective-ize anyone. But when your morality and ethics are subjective then you are objective-izing others.

Ergo subjective morality and ethics are inappropriate for a thoughtful philosopher although just fine for a lying Sophist.

Q.E.D.