Exhibit A would be that philosophy is entirely founded on dialectical reasoning. — apokrisis
To claim that would be to deny that non-social animals don't have raw feelings. — Janus
If even raw feelings are socially constructed then they are not raw feelings; there would be no raw feelings. Then how much more so would the notion of raw feelings or anything else be socially constructed; which would mean all of our idea and theories are nothing more than arbitrary social constructs. — Janus
Animals would just be aware "directly" of the world. — apokrisis
So we are imagining ourselves being inside their heads and watching a parade of raw feelings playing out. — apokrisis
They would also be directly aware of their bodies; and that is precisely what I mean by "raw feeling". — Janus
That basic feeling of ourselves, that really cannot be put into words adequately is the primal basis upon which everything else is constructed. — Janus
Those are simplified labels for lived feeling, and lived feeling is never observed as a third person phenomenon, it is felt by the person 'having' the feeling. — Janus
Nothing prevents us from realizing , discussing and theorizing about our inability to discuss and theorize about some kinds of experience — Janus
There are intents whether we are conscious of them or not. — Magnus Anderson
Self isn't a single thing. It is many things. — Magnus Anderson
Go ahead and believe that all intent is conscious if you want to. I think you are wrong if you believe that, but it's no skin off my nose. It's not important enough to me to waste time trying to convince you of something which is
so obvious, and yet for whatever reasons you don't want to believe. — Janus
Well, for starters we need to realize that the very notion of 'self-deception' is self-contradictory. It doesn't really make any sense when placed under careful scrutiny. I mean think about it differently for a minute. What sense does it make to say that we deliberately set out in order to trick ourselves into believing something that we don't?
— creativesoul
I haven't said we do it deliberately. — Janus
Then we don't do it at all. That's the point being made here.
— creativesoul
Most of what we do is not deliberate; following your argument that we therefore do not actually do it, we actually do very little at all. :-} — Janus
It should also be noted that it's a sign of absolute philosophical failure when discussion about perception glibly slides into discussion about 'experience' or knowledge more generally, without any attention paid to the specificity of perception. Or for that matter when people speak of sensation and perception as though they were the same thing. These last few pages in this thread have been one long litany of failire in that regard. — StreetlightX
So, one knows that what they say about themselves isn't true, as they're saying it but they say it anyway — creativesoul
I quite agree. I only would add that many philosophical problems come from failing to recognise when we have slipped from discussing ineffability to discussing the ineffable.
Edit: Such as when people claim that we cannot talk about trees, but only about about private experiences-of-trees... — Banno
So you mean that "raw feeling" is about the division that gets made in terms of self vs world? It is the primal distinction between self and other? — apokrisis
Of course it is possible to deceive others or oneself without consciously intending to.
Braggarts who. probably out of a sense of insecurity, bullshit about what they have done and even come to believe their own bullshit are a good example. — Janus
So, one knows that what they say about themselves isn't true, as they're saying it but they say it anyway as a means to make themselves look a certain way to another that they're actually not. This telling of falsehood about oneself happens repeatedly enough and over a sufficient enough time period that the speaker forgets that the falsehood isn't true and begins to actually believe it? — creativesoul
If they thought about it at the time; if not then they tell a lie without being conscious of doing so. Quite common I would say. — Janus
As to tree-talk, I think it's right to say that people talk about trees, not about "tree-experiences". ON the other hand people can only speak with knowledge about trees, insofar as they have experience of them, and can only speak of what emerges from that experience, and not about 'what a tree is' absent any human experience or perception of it. About the 'what the tree is beyond human experience' people may conjecture, and it is an open question as to whether such conjecture is empty, but in any case it cannot be knowledge. — Janus
...when we allude poetically to the ineffable, or to God, or the Eternal, we are not speaking about the ineffable, God or the Eternal, but about our own sense and understanding of ineffability, godliness or eternality. So, that's a very useful distinction to make. — Janus
...if you have never observed this kind of unconscious deceit in yourself or others then your experience of people is simply different to mine and nothing I can say will make any diiference to what you believe. — Janus
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