Plato's Georgias... by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole life will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I provided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict myself.
We are social creatures only negatively. Human's by nature are desirous, greedy, needful, spiteful, weak creatures. We are social creatures because we have no other choice but to negate our natural inclinations, to alienate our self from our nature. — Cavacava
Reason is a tool, it is neither good nor bad. Our passions: love, hate, jealousy, kindness ...these are good or bad.
By what standard are you determining human nature?
Man is not by nature social, i.e. Nature dissociates men. This however means that nature compels man to to make himself social; only because nature compels man avoid death, as the greatest evil can man compel himself to become and to be a citizen. The end is not something toward which man is by nature inclined but something toward which he is by nature compelled; more precisely, the end does not beckon man but it must be invented by man so that he can escape his natural misery, Nature supplies with an end only negatively: because the state of nature is intolerable.
Humans are both, reasonable and sensitive creatures. The Rousseau quote implied otherwise, as if we could not be both.
By gratuitous assertion?
What is the criterion which when met, counts as being by nature?
How is that not natural?
The distinction has to do with nature's forcing us to be social, in spite of our natural instinct to act as we see fit. It is a defensive maneuver that sets man against nature, this maneuver enables man to attempt to conquer nature to make life livable. — Cavacava
Being social then, according to this, is not acting as we see fit...
Doesn't make sense.
Seems to me that being interdependent social creatures predates codes of conduct, rights, and notions of self... — creativesoul
How? — Cavacava
When we limit what counts as a moral claim to only utterances of ought, we continue to work from an archaic impoverished notion of what counts as a moral claim.
In order for a moral agreement/system to actually exist between two or more parties, they must necessarily share some beliefs about what constitutes harm and happiness. Where conflict might arise that can infringe or damage our mutually shared values/beliefs, it becomes rational and appealing for us to come to an agreement in order to protect those values.
Can you give an example of a moral agreement that is not based on some shared value?
How about honor killing, or suicide bombing..I guess divine command theory in general? — Cavacava
I think we all make moral claims to objective rightness, which must be judged on the basis of rational arguments based on our convictions and beliefs regardless of normative contexts. — Cavacava
Arguments to support our beliefs, feelings, and convictions can be measured against one another and judged based on their soundness and validity. Defective judgements do exist.
I don't support a naturalistic, causal explanation of this process.
It's really important to pull this one out in the open and yank down it's trousers. — VagabondSpectre
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