The child abstracts the concept of redness solely by seeing red things. The understanding of language is not necessary for abstracting the concept, but it is to test if the child got the concept or not, simply because us observers need to ask the child questions. If we could pierce into his mind without asking questions, then he would not need to understand the language. The language is necessary only to know the words which point to concepts, not to obtain the concepts themselves.OK, now you add another qualification, the child must be able to understand the language. That just proves my point. Which do you believe, does the child abstract the concept of redness solely by seeing red things, or is the use of language necessary as well? — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you suggesting that universal forms are identical to minds? This seems so absurd to me that I did not find the need to backup that statement. Does this means that if you think of a triangle, then your mind becomes triangle-ness? Anyways, I was not trying to prove that concepts are separate from minds, I was trying to prove that all minds connect to the same concepts; as such the argument is not begging the question.First, you beg the question with your definition of universal form, by saying that they are separate from the minds which they are in. That is what you are trying to prove, that they are separate from the minds. — Metaphysician Undercover
We went over this before but I will demonstrate once again for one concept. My concept of triangle-ness has the essential properties "flat surface" + "three straight sides". Does your concept have the exact same properties? If not, then what are they?Then, you still do not have any premise which allows you to assume that concepts in different peoples' minds have "the exact same properties"? — Metaphysician Undercover
But I thought you agreed that forms were not physical, did you not? If not physical, then they cannot have any physical properties, such as a physical location.I would assume that being in different minds is a case of having different properties. — Metaphysician Undercover
I asked about this "higher plane of being". You've said a lot but nothing that counts as an explanation. What is it? How is it? What is it? Where is it? When is it? — apokrisis
I am familiar with how the argument goes. To succeed, the argument must be consistent with what we observe and what we observe are hylomorphic particulars such as the builder, the blueprint and the building, not immaterial forms or formless material. — Andrew M
This really comes down to Wittgenstein's private language argument. Hylomorphic particulars are public observables. — Andrew M
The child abstracts the concept of redness solely by seeing red things. The understanding of language is not necessary for abstracting the concept, but it is to test if the child got the concept or not, simply because us observers need to ask the child questions. If we could pierce into his mind without asking questions, then he would not need to understand the language. The language is necessary only to know the words which point to concepts, not to obtain the concepts themselves. — Samuel Lacrampe
Are you suggesting that universal forms are identical to minds? — Samuel Lacrampe
We went over this before but I will demonstrate once again for one concept. My concept of triangle-ness has the essential properties "flat surface" + "three straight sides". Does your concept have the exact same properties? If not, then what are they? — Samuel Lacrampe
But I thought you agreed that forms were not physical, did you not? If not physical, then they cannot have any physical properties, such as a physical location. — Samuel Lacrampe
But psychological science gives us good reason to question "primal experience". What is the status of the yellow we see? — apokrisis
We presume introspection is part of primal experience and yet it is a learnt, language-scaffolded, skill - a social framing. — apokrisis
Why groundless? Psychological science shows that we are only thinking about our consciousness in some particular socially constructed fashion. — apokrisis
Sorry, but my concept of triangle is not the same as that — Metaphysician Undercover
Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.
IN the context of a discussion about Platonic philosophy, the 'higher plane of being' is the domain of forms. — Wayfarer
IN the context of a discussion about Platonic philosophy, the 'higher plane of being' is the domain of forms.
— Wayfarer
Hmm. I thought you were referring to a realm of meaning, value, wisdom and consciousness rather than a realm of mathematical abstracta. — apokrisis
But metaphysics and phenomenology are different matters. You want to subsume them to science, and you act as though this stance is itself supported by science; but this is circular reasoning, and you are thus assuming a standpoint that you are called upon to show is free of that very assumption. — Janus
I am talking about reporting how experience seems to us in its 'first person' immediacy, not its objective contents but its subjective quality. I believe this is something we all know; we know what it is, subjectively speaking, to experience ourselves in relation to a world of others, not as some objectivist description about it, but as subjective immediacy. — Janus
Even animals must be thought to emjoy such a subjective quality of life, or experience. — Janus
This shows clearly what I say above; you keep defaulting to thinking I am talking about "thinking about consciousness" in some objective sense; you just cannot seem to get outside your presuppositions in order to understand what I am saying. — Janus
But the entire point is that Plato was concerned with a real basis for value, an objective 'domain of values' — Wayfarer
The animating purpose is the thermodynamic imperative - the general drive to self-organising simplification. — apokrisis
The cosmological argument is consistent with what we observe, as well as consistent with logical principles derived from what we observe. Do you recognize that in every case of a hylomorphic particular, the potential for that particular precedes, in time, the actual existence of that particular? — Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps you might spell out the end-point of the 'thermodynamic imperative' - what it is all heading towards. This, I presume, will be what you see as the 'final cause'. — Wayfarer
The thermodynamic imperative is not pointing towards anything particularly grand. Just a Cosmic heat death. — apokrisis
In Aristotle's scheme, final causes work on various levels - even mundane creatures have a final cause or 'telos'. — Wayfarer
But there's also a sense of an ultimate end, to which all the particular causes are directed. — Wayfarer
But in any case, the salient point is that it is not simply non-existence or nothingness; so I think there's a problem with appropriating the notion of a 'final cause' but then adopting the 'thermodynamic imperative' in place of that. — Wayfarer
So your claim is that the child understands what "red" is without understanding language. Why is that not contradictory to you? — Metaphysician Undercover
Why is it contradictory to you? It would be contradictory to understand the word "red" without the language, but not the concept "redness". Concepts are not made of words; rather, words point to concepts. A blind man may know the language, but cannot grasp the concept of redness if he has never seen a red thing. Therefore language is not the cause of acquiring concepts.Do you really believe that we can have concepts without language? — Metaphysician Undercover
"Flat", "plane"... don't be so picky about the words MU. And yes, you can have three angles too, but these are redundant because a plane with three sides necessarily has three angles. You might as well add that the sum of the angles equates to 180°, but this is once again redundant. To sum up, your concept coincides with mine; thereby demonstrating that subjects acquire identical concepts, which is necessary to have coherent communication.Sorry, but my concept of triangle is not the same as that. Mine is of a plane figure, with three sides and three angles. See how different mine is from yours? Yours is "flat", mine is "plane". Mine has three angles. yours does not. Mine is the concept of a triangle while yours is the concept of triangle-ness. To have "the exact same properties", all properties, even the accidentals, must be the same. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think I agree with you regarding time not being a physical thing, because it is a function of causality, which is not necessarily about physical things. But what about space? Common sense or default position is that space or location is a physical thing. How can you back up your claim that it is not?Space and time, as we understand them, are not physical things. Nor are the relationships between physical things physical things. This is why physicalists produce such a confused form of metaphysics, they take the descriptions which physicists produce, concerning the physical world (descriptions of relationships between objects), and treat these descriptions as if they are actually physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover
You stated the terms 'blueprint' and 'eternal' in the same sentence. — Samuel Lacrampe
This is where you keep getting unstuck. You keep arguing about whether ‘the same’ means ‘the same’, or whether it means something else. Whether your idea, and someone else’s idea, of ‘a triangle’, is the same or different. Whether the difference between two accidental objects (i.e. rocks) is intelligible. You are arguing here that because the way you describe ‘a triangle’ is different to the way another does, that this difference is significant. All I see in all of that is obfuscation. — Wayfarer
I have been reading up on Timeaus again, following your recommendation. The key idea that Timeaus introduces is between ‘that which always is’ and ‘that which becomes’ - being and becoming. The idea is that the Forms are ‘that which always are’, and actual things, particulars or individuals, are in the realm of ‘becoming’. Now at this stage, very little detail of how forms relate to particulars etc is left vague - it wasn’t until much later that the details were really considered. — Wayfarer
have been reading up on Timeaus again, following your recommendation. The key idea that Timeaus introduces is between ‘that which always is’ and ‘that which becomes’ - being and becoming. The idea is that the Forms are ‘that which always are’, and actual things, particulars or individuals, are in the realm of ‘becoming’. Now at this stage, very little detail of how forms relate to particulars etc is left vague - it wasn’t until much later that the details were really considered. — Wayfarer
Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed.
No, I don't. Time is a universal. As such, it is immanent in particulars and not transcendent to them.
So, on a hylomorphic version of the cosmological argument, there can be no universals prior to the existence of the prime hylomorphic substance, including time or potentiality. — Andrew M
Why is it contradictory to you? It would be contradictory to understand the word "red" without the language, but not the concept "redness". Concepts are not made of words; rather, words point to concepts. A blind man may know the language, but cannot grasp the concept of redness if he has never seen a red thing. Therefore language is not the cause of acquiring concepts. — Samuel Lacrampe
"Flat", "plane"... don't be so picky about the words MU. — Samuel Lacrampe
What accidentals can you add to concepts? Remember that concepts are universals. — Samuel Lacrampe
But what about space? Common sense or default position is that space or location is a physical thing. How can you back up your claim that it is not? — Samuel Lacrampe
By allowing that there is a difference which does not make a difference, you permit a tainted sameness into you epistemology. The tainted sameness allows that two distinct things, can be said to be the same, because the difference is not significant. — Metaphysician Undercover
Good question. My guess is that 'intelligible' it is not synonymous to 'observable', but is rather related to having coherent communication. We can observe particular things with all their accidentals, but we cannot intelligibly describe each particular thing without the use of universal forms followed by their accidental properties. In order to have an intelligible conversation with you about a particular rock in my backyard, I would have to describe it literally as "the rock (universal form of rock-ness) in my backyard (its accidental properties)". If I called it "Rock #22" or "Bob", you would not know what I am talking to you about if you have never observed said rock.One question I have about it is - what exactly is meant by the term ‘intelligible object?’ — Wayfarer
Unless you are a dualist, the question seems moot. Only a dualist would classify things as physical/not-physical.
To an anti-realist, information is not physical because NOTHING IS.
To a physicalist, information is physical because EVERYTHING IS.
Is the implication then that we are all actually dualists? Or is something else meant by "physical" in this context? — Lucifer Sam
the beauty of the world is found in the uniqueness of each and every thing, with each and every minute difference. — Metaphysician Undercover
Taking issue with the view expressed in certain Platonic dialogues that universal Forms (such as the Good, the Just, the Triangular and so on) constitute reality, Aristotle regarded an individual as something real in itself. An individual therefore has two kinds of unity: specific and numerical. Specific unity (that is unity of the species to which an individual belongs) is a unity of nature which the individual shares with other individuals. For example, twin daughters are both human females, and share a unity of nature. This specific unity, according to Aristotle, is derived from Form, for it is Form (which makes an individual substance the kind of thing it is. But two individuals (such as the twins) can share exactly the same form, yet not be one in number. What is the principle by which two individuals differ in number alone? This cannot be a common property. As Bonaventure later argued, there is no form of which we cannot imagine a similar one, thus there can be 'identical' twins, triplets, quadruplets and so on. For any such form would then be common to several things, and therefore not an individual at all. What is the criterion for a thing being an individual?
In a passage much-quoted by the medievals, Aristotle attributes the cause of individuation to matter:
The whole thing, such and such a form in this flesh and these bones, is Callias or Socrates; and they are different owing to their matter (for this is different), but the same in species, for the species is indivisible.
By allowing that there is a difference which does not make a difference, you permit a tainted sameness into you epistemology. The tainted sameness allows that two distinct things, can be said to be the same, because the difference is not significant. What follows from this tainted sameness, necessarily, is confusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think I can justify why we should make a distinction between eternal Forms (1) and non-eternal forms (2). — Samuel Lacrampe
My guess is that 'intelligible' it is not synonymous to 'observable', but is rather related to having coherent communication. — Samuel Lacrampe
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