'There is, however, an unconditioned, an unmade, an unfabricated. Were there no unconditioned, unmade, unfabricated, there would be no escape from the made, the conditioned, the fabricated' — Wayfarer
You’re saying that purely for sake of argument. If you were employed to do the job in the thought-experiment, you wouldn't have any latitude. — Wayfarer
The information is either conveyed, or it's not. — Wayfarer
I haven't denied that the modes of our experience are culturally mediated, but there must be raw experience that underlies that. You can experience that yourself if you just gaze out your window without thinking about anything. — Janus
It has an experiential dimension which I think is largely forgotten and is certainly hardly taught any more.
- Wayfarer
Also you referred to "objective idealism" which is not Plato (which is rather a form of Conceptual Realism) but predominately Hegel, and following him, Peirce. — Janus
Otherwise it remains empty conjecture; "they are real", "no they're not", "yes they are", and so on ad nauseum. — Janus
And the question is why would one even want to escape from it? — apokrisis
I don't even know what some of the languages you used were. How could those different lines possibly have the same meaning to me? — Metaphysician Undercover
When you say "the same meaning" you mean "same" in the sense of "similar" — Metaphysician Undercover
If it were the case that either the information is conveyed or it is not, then there would be no such thing as ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is the whole point of this thread. The meaning can be represented by entirely different symbols, languages, media types and so on - so 'the meaning' is separable from the representation. It doesn't matter that you can't read French, German, Latin, or morse code, the meaning is the same for those who are can. Not 'similar'- the same. — Wayfarer
There is no room for ambiguity in the example given. Of course there can be ambiguity in other matters. But when it comes to conveying technical information, such as specifications, directions, instructions, and so on, then the meaning has to be conveyed exactly. I know this from practical experience, as I'm a technical writer by profession. — Wayfarer
I do indeed regard Plato as an objective idealist, in that he believed the Forms or Ideas were real, i.e. they were not simply the creations of individual minds or social conventions. — Wayfarer
Conversely if Plato says that ideas are objects, that would seem to be a completely different notion. — Janus
Hegel and Peirce both rejected the idea of anything transcenden — Janus
. Actually if you read Hegel’s philosophy of religion, he develops a very detailed argument of the sense in which God is transcendent. Peirce likewise was not an atheist, although the spiritual side of Peirce is not mentioned much by his scientific affeciandos. — Wayfarer
Peirce likewise was not an atheist, although the spiritual side of Peirce is not mentioned much by his scientific affeciandos. — Wayfarer
All of which is beside the point, but if we can go for 48 pages with you not getting the point, then I will leave it at that. — Wayfarer
There's an article by Robert M. Wallace, Hegel's God, although some of it is pretty murky, in my opinion. — Wayfarer
Are you saying then that the word "red" caused the existence of the redness in things, instead of the opposite way around? Following the same train of thought, there was no badness in things until we used the word "bad", and no wetness until we used the word 'wet'; and so to generalize, our words create reality, as opposed to reality causing us to create words to refer to it. Am I correct on your position?What you claim here is false. Without the word "red" there is nothing that "red" refers to. That's the point. You are claiming that thing which "red" refers to would exist without the word red. But without the word "red" there would be nothing which "red" refers to, because there would be no such thing as "red". So this nothing cannot be an existent thing. To get to the point of asserting that there is something which "red" refers to, it is necessary that there is the word "red". — Metaphysician Undercover
According to the dictionary here, a "plane" is defined as "a flat surface". By law of maths, if x = y, then x and y are the same thing; and so if "plane" = "flat surface", then "plane" and "flat surface" are the same thing.No, I am saying "plane", and you are saying "flat". By what principle of identity do you conclude that two very distinct words are "the same thing". And since it is very clear that these two distinct words are not the same thing, then it is also very clear that we are not saying the same thing when we say these distinctly different words. — Metaphysician Undercover
Does it follow that we cannot test if two things are the exact same if those things don't have accidentals, such as is the case for universal forms, which yourself claimed to exist? How can you speak coherently about universal forms if the first law of logic does not apply to them?This is how we distinguish between when we are referring to two distinct things which are similar to each other, and when we are referring to the exact same thing, by taking account of the accidentals. So it is by analyzing the accidentals that we determine whether we are talking about two distinct, but similar things, or that we are talking about one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Interesting. Could you explain the differences between "the intellect perceives the Form" and "the mind derives the concept"? I would have imagined that the intellect is part of the mind, and that the concept is the concept of the form. Maybe it is that the intellect is active in abstracting the form, where as the mind is passive and merely stores it (now called concept once in the mind)?I think, in Aquinas' terminology, the senses perceive the shape, the intellect perceives the Form, and the mind derives the concept. So concepts are internal to minds, but the Forms are not. — Wayfarer
Are you saying then that the word "red" caused the existence of the redness in things, instead of the opposite way around? — Samuel Lacrampe
Following the same train of thought, there was no badness in things until we used the word "bad", and no wetness until we used the word 'wet'; and so to generalize, our words create reality, as opposed to reality causing us to create words to refer to it. Am I correct on your position? — Samuel Lacrampe
According to the dictionary here, a "plane" is defined as "a flat surface". By law of maths, if x = y, then x and y are the same thing; and so if "plane" = "flat surface", then "plane" and "flat surface" are the same thing. — Samuel Lacrampe
Does it follow that we cannot test if two things are the exact same if those things don't have accidentals, such as is the case for universal forms, which yourself claimed to exist? How can you speak coherently about universal forms if the first law of logic does not apply to them? — Samuel Lacrampe
Here is a better way: We test if two things are the exact same by comparing all of their properties, regardless if those properties are essential or accidental, and checking if they are similar or different. As such, the law of identity is applicable to all, even to universal things. — Samuel Lacrampe
But these accidental differences are still there, and this disallows us, according to the law of identity, from saying that it is the same concept in your mind, as in my mind — Metaphysician Undercover
Apokrisis, following Peirce argues that there is vagueness, and violation of the law of non-contradiction which is an inherent aspect of all universals, it is essential to universals. — Metaphysician Undercover
Most of what you've argued in this thread is that the law of identity means that the meaning of 'the same' is not actually 'the same'; or that A doesn't really equal A, because A for you means something different than A for me. — Wayfarer
If a difference doesn't make a difference, is it really a difference? — apokrisis
The Laws of Thought are framed for dealing with actual differences - differences that make a difference in relation to some generality. So particulars exist in that they contradict some generality. They only partake in that generality in a specific way. — apokrisis
If "A" means something different to you, from what it means to me, then on what basis do you claim that there is a thing which is "what A means"? — Metaphysician Undercover
. Could you explain the differences between "the intellect perceives the Form" and "the mind derives the concept"? — Samuel Lacrampe
(According to Aquinas0 Intellectual knowledge is formed by a conjunction of the passive senses and the active intellect. It is impossible for the intellect to understand anything without the mind forming phantasms, that is, mental images.
The intellect understands by abstracting from phantasms and thereby attains some knowledge of immaterial things. Our knowledge of things, though, is not the same as knowledge of our phantasms, for, if the two types of knowledge were the same, then the taste of honey, for example, could be either sweet or bitter, depending on the state of the perceiver. Rather, the phantasms are the means by which we come to understand things. Knowledge of individuals is prior to knowledge of universals.
The intellect is incapable of directly knowing individual things because it perceives them by means of phantasms. On the other hand, the intellect does perceive universals directly by means of abstraction. The intellect is potentially capable of understanding the concept of infinity insofar as it can form the idea of infinite succession, but it is actually incapable of comprehending infinity. Contingent things are known through sense experience and indirectly by the intellect, but necessary principles governing those contingent things are known only by the intellect.
I would have imagined that the intellect is part of the mind, and that the concept is the concept of the form. — Samuel Lacrampe
There is no such thing as a difference which doesn't make a difference. That is contradiction. If it has been identified as a difference, then by that very fact, it has made a difference. That's the point of my argument. To say that there is a difference which does not make a difference is pure sophistry, it's self-deception if you believe that. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you and I both follow this recipe, we will both make banana bread. In other words, the recipe results in - it 'means' - banana bread. Not regular bread, not muffins - but banana bread. — Wayfarer
The principle of indifference is a fundamental constraint on actuality in that view. It explains why we get the “weird” statistics of quantum entangled states and the quantum indistinguishability of particles among other things. — apokrisis
I don't see why temporal and spatial properties would be relational though. Relational to what? — Samuel Lacrampe
I also don't agree with the negative property concept. Instead of saying "an object has the property of non-x", it seems more correct to say "an object does not have the property x". — Samuel Lacrampe
I think understanding happens in a time, but not in a space. Here is why: Consider time t1 before I understand an info, and time t2 after I understand it. If we could go back to t1 (somehow), then I would not understand the info. But I understand the info at places p1 and p2, provided it is at time t2. In other words, the existence of understanding seems to be a function of time but not of place. — Samuel Lacrampe
What I make, I will call "banana bread", and what you make, you will call "banana bread". But what I make, and what you make are not both the same thing, they are similar. — Metaphysician Undercover
I reckon that seals it for once and for all. Wasn't even that difficult. — Wayfarer
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